

CENSUS OF INDIA, 1911

VOLUME IV

BALUCHISTAN

Part I—REPORT

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CENSUS OF INDIA, 1911

VOLUME IV

BALUCHISTAN

Part I—REPORT

Part II—TABLES

BY

DENYS BRAY, I.C.S.



CALCUTTA
SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA
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PART I.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION—§§1—20	1—7
CHAPTER I	
POPULATION—§§21—59	9—32
CHAPTER II	
VARIATION—§§60—67	33—40
CHAPTER III	
MIGRATION—§§68—84	41—54
CHAPTER IV	
RELIGION—§§85—125	55—72
CHAPTER V	
AGE—§§126—136	73—80
CHAPTER VI	
SEX—§§137—164	81—98
CHAPTER VII	
MARRIAGE—§§165—196	99—118
CHAPTER VIII	
EDUCATION—§§197—208	119—126
CHAPTER IX	
LANGUAGE—§§209—242	127—146
CHAPTER X	
INFIRMITIES—§§243—248	147—152
CHAPTER XI	
CASTE, TRIBE AND RACE—§§249—313	153—187
CHAPTER XII	
OCCUPATION—§§314—326	189—200
INDEX	
	1

MAPS.

Race	Frontispiece
Administrative Divisions	17
Density	24
Language	129

SUBSIDIARY TABLES


	Page
1. Distribution of the Population Classified by Density	29
2. Racial distribution in the Regular and Tribal Areas	30
3. Urban and Rural Distribution	31
4. House-population among the Indigenous Population	32
5. Variation in Relation to Density	39
6. Racial Variation	39
7. Racial Variation by Districts and States	40
8. Fecundity of Marriage	40
9. Nomadism among Selected Tribes	51—52
10. Brāhmins Censused in Sind	53
11. Loss and Gain between Baluchistan and India by Birthplace	51
12. Distribution of the Population by Religion	72
13. Variation in Christianity	72
14. Puberal Distribution by Race	79
15. Puberal Distribution by Locality	80
16. Sex Variation by Locality	97
17. Sex Variation by Race	98
18. Sex Variation by Nomadism	98
19. Civil Condition among the Indigenous Population	118
20. Civil Condition among Brāhmins Censused in Sind	118
21. Literacy among Muslims by Locality	125
22. Literacy among Indigenous Muslims by Race	126
23. Four Chief Languages among Indigenous Muslims	143
24. Languages among Indigenous Muslims	144
25. Indigenous Muslims by Languages	145
26. Abandonment of the Racial Language by Indigenous Muslims	146
27. Incidence of Infirmities	151
28. Incidence of Infirmities among Females	152
29. Occupational Variation, 1901-11	193
30. Occupational Distribution per 1 000 Actual Workers among Selected Tribes	199
31. Agricultural Implements, Live-stock, etc.	200

NOTE.

This Report is unfortunately belated owing to the necessity of making special type for the transliteration of several vernacular words

BALUCHISTAN BRITISH RACIAL DISTRIBUTION

(N.B.—The racial boundaries are very approximate only.)



INTRODUCTION

1 So ends another census of Balūchistān—nominally the third in the series, yet the first to come home to every family in the length and breadth of the country. Not that Balūchistān is even now qualified to take its place among the ordered ranks of censused provinces of India. The latest joined recruit in the Indian Empire, it still has the awkward squad almost entirely to itself. A synchronous census, a census conducted on the precise lines of the standard schedule of India—these are still impracticable outside the few alien settlements dotted up and down the country. And the reasons lie on the surface. With but a dozen British officers and a proportionately small number of native officials to rule over this huge and mountainous area, a synchronous census is clearly a physical impossibility. Yet only half the difficulties have been stated. People the mountains with frontier tribesmen cleaving to the turbulent traditions of their forefathers, still broken in but imperfectly to the mysterious ways of British rule, suspicious of every symptom of innovation and reform, jealous to the verge of fanaticism of any enquiries touching their womenfolk—and an attempt to foist upon them in these early days of our administration a census framed on the searchingly inquisitive lines of the Indian schedule would not merely be foredoomed to failure, it would be a political blunder.

A regular
synchronous census
impracticable

2 And so, at first sight, we seem to have made little advance in our general methods of enumeration since the first census of 1891. Of that census there is, unfortunately, enough, little to tell, for the very simple reason that nothing was left on written record except the bare facts that the operations extended over 20,568 square miles and that 171,752 souls were enumerated, with a few meagre details regarding the composition of the area and the distribution of the population. How the census was taken, has to be pieced together with the help of living memory from a few contemporary references in official documents. It appears that Quetta itself and three other garrison towns, together with the line of railway, were subjected to a synchronous but sketchy census, while the indigenous tribesmen were numbered on rough-and-ready methods. But the operations, such as they were—even in the Quetta Cantonment males and females were not distinguished—were confined to a very small part of the province. The Kalāt and Las Bēla states were left discreetly alone, and a census of Balūchistan which ignores the existence of the Brāhūi country is obviously shorn of most of its interest.

The census of 1891.

3 The records of the second census of the country, on the other hand, are complete. The scheme of operations was somewhat complicated: civil headquarters, garrison towns and railway limits were censused by regular methods, the tribesmen in the districts were enumerated non-synchronously on a simple family schedule, the population of the native states was estimated still more roughly on a tribal basis. The operations covered an area of 82,950 square miles, and yielded a population of 810,746 souls all told. 51,688 square miles were left absolutely untouched. The results were admittedly rough: the estimated population, more especially in Jhalawān, was generally felt to be pitched too high, even in the district areas none but the barest details were recorded, and of the entries contained in the standard schedule those regarding age, marriage, subsidiary occupation, means of subsistence of dependants, birthplace, language, literacy, knowledge of English, and infirmities, were omitted altogether. But the census was a notable achievement for all that, and not the least notable feature of it was Mr Hughes Buller's masterly report. Without the pioneer work done at the last census, the advance made at the census now concluded would have been impossible. And if I am able to go beyond Mr Hughes Buller's conclusions, this is only because, standing on his shoulders, I am able to take a wider view of what before his time was in many ways an unknown land.

The census of 1901.

4 As before, the census of municipalities, cantonments, railway limits and other settlements of aliens was taken on the census night (the night of the 10th March 1911) on the standard schedule. Nothing in this enumeration—and

The census of 1911.

the same remark applies to the subsequent slip-work and tabulation of results as a whole—calls for comment. The operations were conducted on conventional lines, and have none of that imposing dignity of numbers which invests similar operations in other provinces.

5 But the enumeration of the indigenous population proceeded non-synchronously on lines peculiar to itself. In the districts it was done by the village accountants, assisted here and there by the village schoolmaster or a levy clerk. Their work, which kept most of them busy for about three months, was scrutinised periodically by the district officials, who were however too heavily burdened with their ordinary duties to have much time to spare. Elsewhere, unfortunately there was little or no staff available for the enumeration, and we had to engage special men to undertake it. The first essential we asked for in the enumerators was a knowledge of the tribesmen whom they were to enumerate—we found to our cost that this was too often coupled with a knowledge of very little else. But though the enumerators in the native states were poor stuff to begin with, they steadily improved as the operations developed, thanks to careful and patient training. That their eventual output of work was surprisingly good, was due in no small measure to the effective check of the state officials and the representatives supplied, but not paid, by the tribal chiefs, who responded admirably to the moral pressure brought to bear on them.

6. But if it was essential to humour the tribesmen by placing their enumeration in the hands of old acquaintances, it was at least as essential to enumerate them on a schedule that contained nothing to wound their very vulnerable susceptibilities. The crux of the problem lay of course in the enumeration of the women. While any question regarding their womenfolk is resented by the tribesmen, questions trespassing on the marriage state are resented in the extreme. All idea of adopting the apparently inoffensive division of the sex into married, unmarried or widowed had necessarily to be abandoned. But so closely is the question of age interwoven with the delicate question of civil condition, that the recording of the one is as impossible as the recording of the other and the most that could be done was to divide the womenfolk into those over and those under the age of puberty. And as it was palpably out of the question to enumerate the female portion of the population by individuals, it was felt advisable to give up an attempt at an individual census altogether and to enumerate the whole tribal population on a household basis instead. The requisite schedule was not easy to devise. The original draft, modelled in the light of personal experience of Baluchistan on the schedule used at the last census in the Mar and Bugti country was recast not once but several times in the course of discussion with the chiefs and tribesmen assembled at Sibi in the early spring of 1910 for the great half yearly session of the Shikhi Jirga. In the end a schedule was evolved for the whole country which managed to pass muster before such very different and exacting critics as His Highness the Khan of Kalat, the Jām of Las Bela, the chiefs and the tribesmen on the one hand, and on the other the district officers, the Local Government and the Census Commissioner. Its final form was this—

Serial No.	Name of household	Name of head or joint	SEX.		RELIGION.	EDUCATION.	LANGUAGE.	MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD						Remarks.
			Male.	Female.				FAMILIES		SERVED DOMESTANTS.				
								Adults.	Infants.	Adults.	Infants.	Adults.	Infants.	
			Adults.	Infants.		Adults.	Infants.	Adults.	Infants.	Adults.	Infants.	Adults.	Infants.	

The difficulty in some conditions.

7 Tribal life in Baluchistan lends itself admirably to a census on these lines. The conditions are primitive and patriarchal. The unit of society is not the individual but the joint family. In a typical household father mother sons and daughters live under the same roof and work together for the support of the whole family. One and all follow the lead of the head of the household. His religion is their religion his tribe is their tribe. For even though a man marry a woman of another sect or alien race, she leaves her old faith and tribe behind her when she enters his household. Even as regards occupation

there is little scope for individualism. One of the sons perhaps is employed in the levies, but his earnings go into the common pot, indeed the billet he has secured is regarded as a billet secured for the family as a whole, to be passed on to another member of the family as convenience may suggest. In short, once we know the particulars regarding the head of a family, we can make a shrewd guess at the corresponding particulars for the various members of his whole household.

8 In spite, therefore, of the absence of a column in the tribal schedule corresponding to the column headed 'means of subsistence of dependants on actual workers' in the standard schedule, there was little difficulty in collating the required information when the stage for tabulation was reached. Nor was any column provided for the recording of birthplace. Curious though it may seem, questions on this score are apt to be suspect in a land where tribal responsibility is a tangled yarn of birth in the tribe and residence in the tribe, and tribal responsibility is law even as it was, several Kākar families staying within Lūnī limits beat back to their own country as soon as the census was a-foot, for fear that the records might condemn them to a life sentence of double tribal responsibility, first in their own Kākar tribe and again among the Lūnī. But it was not the possibility of arousing unrest that suggested the omission. In Balūchistān statistics of birthplace have too little value to be worth the trouble of grappling with the obvious difficulty of differentiating between the various members of a household. As a test of migration, for instance, they are as unnecessary as they are uncertain: aliens can be sifted from tribesmen without extraneous assistance, the two constituents of the population live to all intents and purposes in separate communities, and even where they mingle, there is scant danger of confusion between them. But the birthplace of all obvious aliens and also of Hindus and others who, as far as race went, might or might not be natives of Balūchistān was duly recorded, to enable us to trace the main streams of immigration to their sources. As for education, so little headway has it made among the tribesmen that it seemed safer to ascertain particulars of literacy and knowledge of English village by village. Had the household been taken as the unit, there would have been a lively danger that the enumerators, finding the columns blank for household after household, might leave them blank as a matter of course throughout. Statistics of infirmities were collected in the same manner.

Record of other particulars.

9 Thus the whole range of enquiries which make up the standard Indian schedule was covered in one way or another by the tribal census with two and only two real omissions. But both, though inevitable, are important enough. Statistics regarding civil condition there are none to offer, and the deficiency must be made good, as best it may, from the fairly wide general knowledge we have of the subject of marriage among the tribesmen. And bereft of the flood of light cast on the whole array of statistics in other provinces by the highly complicated—though confessedly not entirely accurate—statistics regarding age, we have to grope our way through our tables with the help of the dim and fitful glimmer that comes from a mere division of the population into minors and adults.

No statistics of civil condition or age

10 But while the Balūchistān schedule fell short to this extent of the standard schedule used elsewhere in India, in other respects it went beyond it. Most important of all was the provision made for an elaborate classification of the races into tribes, clans, sections and subsections. Though these details do not figure largely either in the following report or the Imperial tables, they are of much administrative value and ethnological interest, and will be fully analysed in a separate volume hereafter to be published under the authority of the Local Government. Our schedule again provided for statistics not only of religion but also of sect, chiefly with a view to discovering how far the curious Zikrī sect had been making headway. Of greater interest is the classification of the tribesmen according to the nature of their dwellings into nomad, semi-nomad and settled, a subject which will be treated at length in the third chapter. And finally by recording any second language spoken freely by all members of a household over and above the language ordinarily regarded as their mother-tongue, we have endeavoured to portray a remarkable feature of Balūchistān, and have collected statistics of no small linguistic interest.

Certain additional statistics

Remarkably little
double-counting.

11 So much for the tribal schedule let me now turn to the tribal census itself. The most obvious drawback to any non-synchronous census lies in the danger of double-counting to which it is exposed. From this danger we heaved with far greater success than the nomadic habits of so many of the tribesmen allowed us to count on. The various precautions that were taken it would be tedious to detail. Nor is it necessary the conditions as a whole were after all very largely in our favour. Though the tribal census was anything but synchronous in the technical sense of the word, it was in so far synchronous that it was begun, conducted, and wound up more or less simultaneously in nearly all parts of the country. Better still, it was found possible so to arrange our programme that most of the enumeration fell within the summer the one season of the year when the shifting elements of the population are comparatively settled. By taking the family and not the individual as the census unit, the risk of double-counting was largely discounted. The enumerators moreover set out on their work equipped with an intimate local knowledge, which enabled them both to detect omissions not only of families but of individuals, and also to exclude from the count casual visitors to the locality whose proper place of enumeration was with their family elsewhere. The unavoidably large extent of an enumerator's beat in the native states, though in some ways unfortunate, was obviously in itself a very valuable safeguard against double-counting. And when the schedules eventually reached the central office, the small number of the people enumerated (or rather the much smaller number of the families to which they belonged) coupled with the minute tribal details accompanying the name of the head of each family rendered it possible to subject the results to a very real scrutiny. It may safely be said that there was little, if any double-counting within the tribal census itself. A certain amount of double-counting of individuals, first under the tribal census and later under the regular census, was doubtless inevitable. But such cases were certainly not numerous. Individual tribesmen do not overlap into the regular areas except incidentally as sepoy or police and the like. And by excluding from the tribal census any members of a household who were expected to be resident in regular areas on the census night, and by clearing those areas as far as possible on that night of all tribesmen not ordinarily resident in them, we were able to reduce double-counting to a negligible quantity. In a word, I do not consider that this source of error has had an appreciably disturbing influence on the census.

Double-counting
owing to migration
from the provinces.

12. One potential form of double-counting lay unfortunately beyond our control. While we were at pains to exclude from the tribal census individual tribesmen who had left their homes for trade or in search of work down country and were not expected back from their travels within the year we were obviously unable to make similar allowances in the case of whole families of Jhalawan Brāhūis who might or might not have made their way back from their winter quarters in Sind by the time of the Indian census. There is unhappily no very certain means of dividing up the total returns of Brāhūis actually enumerated in Sind into those who were mere birds of passage already included in the tribal census of Balūchistān, and those who have taken up a more or less permanent abode in Sind and were consequently left out of account in our census. The number of the latter is known to be considerable. A large proportion of them are settlers who were fortunate enough to secure land in the canal colonies some fifteen or twenty years back in those strange days when the value of canal lands was still unrealised and enterprising colonists were scarce. Of late years they have been reinforced by hundreds of their kith and kin, attracted by the demand for labour to the prosperous plains of Sind which offered them a pleasant refuge both from the long drought in their own hills and from the payment of tribal dues to their chiefs. But when all allowance is made for those who have thrown in their lot with Sind, it is reasonably certain that several migratory Brāhūis were counted in Sind who had already been included in the tribal census of Balūchistān. Not that their numbers are so great as might have been expected for the rains in the Brāhūi country were timely and fairly abundant, and many families were already on their homeward tramp by the time of the Indian census. Indeed had the date of the census been fixed a bare month later the plains would have been wellnigh cleared of the last of them. Whatever may be the number covered by the double-counting of these amphibians of the hills of Balūchistān and the plains of Sind, it

does not of course affect the accuracy of the census of either province. Duplication only occurs when the returns of both flow together into the census of India, engulfed in whose mighty totals it is too insignificant to raise even a ripple of disturbance.

13 But if we succeeded, within the limits of our own province at any rate, in avoiding the great pitfall of double-counting that besets a non-synchronous census, we could hardly hope for the same measure of success in escaping the danger of omissions with which every census, even a thorough-going synchronous census, has necessarily to contend. To any one who has travelled amid the jumble of mountains that darken the map of Balūchistān, or along the bare wastes that leave so much of it blank, and has seen the seemingly inaccessible crannies, the seemingly waterless desolations in which the nomad finds a resting-place on his wanderings, the impossibility of avoiding omissions can come as no surprise. To all who have taken an active part in the census the surprise has been that the omissions were so few. In organising the scheme of operations I resigned myself to a low standard of accuracy as inevitable. I was oppressed by the obvious difficulty of rounding up within the census the backward and largely nomadic peoples scattered so sparsely over the vast area covered by this rugged frontier province. But as soon as I was able to watch the organisation in progress, I found my gloomy anticipations falsified all along the line. The standard of efficiency with which we wound up was very different from the standard with which we set out, the organisation was in fact a great deal more effective than its author dared to hope for. The enlistment of the interest of the tribal chiefs in the census, the modification of the standard schedule in deference to tribal susceptibilities, the entrusting of the actual enumeration to men who knew the tribesmen, their manners and their country—herein lay the main secrets of our success. In the regular districts, where the existence of a trained revenue staff was more or less a guarantee of efficient enumeration, few omissions were anticipated, and still fewer appear to have occurred. And if conclusions derived from a careful personal check up and down the country and from repeated general enquiries can be trusted, the percentage of omissions was hardly higher throughout the native states and tribal tracts, which are only indirectly under our administration. In all probability it reached its highest in Jhalawān and more especially in the Mēngal country, where political trouble called for a military demonstration as recently as 1908 and has not wholly subsided.

14 But though we must plead guilty to sins of omission, it is obviously impossible to make amends by nice calculations of the actual percentage of loss. I believe it to have been remarkably small. So much is certain. The census has been a very real enumeration of the population, unvitiated by estimates or guess-work. It has suffered inevitably from the inherent defects of a non-synchronous census. But a non-synchronous census has, after all, compensating advantages of its own, not the least of which is the greater time that can be devoted to the actual enumeration, to the accurate ascertaining and recording of the requisite particulars, and to the local checking of the results. That the census has been far more trustworthy than any synchronous census of Balūchistān on the standard Indian schedule could possibly have been—even if political, to say nothing of financial, considerations had permitted the flooding of the country with the gigantic swarm of enumerators required to undertake it—of this I have no doubt whatever.

15 To our frontier tribesmen everything connected with the census pointed to war and the preparation for war. So far from this having any disturbing influence, it found a sympathetic echo in their warlike hearts, and left them with the comfortable feeling of having discovered what the extraordinary trouble was about. All our pretty parables of the good farmer who takes stock of his farm or the careful housewife who counts her chickens before and after they are hatched, they brushed aside as child's talk. War they understood, and war or the preparation for war was of course the object of the census, the one thing they were unable to square with this rooted idea was the fantastic counting of the womenfolk. Now it so happened that the opportunity of the census was taken to collect certain additional information for administrative purposes, and our enquiries embraced the numbers of their donkeys and camels.

and plough oxen, water mills and hand mills and musical instruments, harmless unnecessary information, designed to cover up the real object of our inquisition—a rough idea of the arms in the possession of our various tribes. But trust a tribesman to see through so thin a disguise. Even as the tribes were being numbered to gauge the supply of men-at-arms, so the camels and the oxen and the asses were being numbered for future service as transport. The mills were to grind corn for the combatants. And the whole force was to march forth to battle to the stirring strains of the sackbut, the psaltery and all kinds of music.

Other gossip.

16 Sometimes, however their thoughts took a more peaceful turn. Though nothing could shake the general conviction that the primary object of enumerating the blind, the deaf, the leper and the insane, was to weed wasters from the fighting strength of the tribe. It was gravely argued by some that the benign government was contemplating a form of Old Age Pension for these unfortunates in honour of the King Emperor's accession. The tribesmen were at first exercised by the encyclopaedic nature of our enquiries. But they soon fell into the spirit of the thing. "I should like you to put down my poor old sheep dog," said one waggish Pathan. "It's a great pity quoth a hoary-headed Brāhmin lady that you're leaving out our cooking-pots, you would otherwise have numbered everything there is to number among us." The fisherfolk of Sonmānī went one further and gravely presented me at the close of the check of their village with a list based on their catches for the season in which not only the numbers but the names of the fishy tribes on the Bēla coast were faithfully recorded. In another village we were asked if we would mind waiting a few days, as several of the womenfolk were hourly expected to add to the census. Over the counting of the women many heads were wagged. Some folks thought that government's sole object was to give its servants something to do but they had to admit that there was probably something behind it after all when some wiseacre pointed out that the graves were being left uncounted. In the wilds of Makrān it was whispered that one woman in every forty was to be shipped to England, and sent to the marriage-market, or else to the shambles for the production of *sowmya* that precious juice which exudes from dead bodies and is a panacea for all ills. Happily the sinister rumour died down almost as soon as it was born. But I must not forget the most laughable idea of all. In the course of some ethnological research I had asked one of my staff to make some discreet enquiries regarding female circumcision as it exists among certain of our races. As good luck would have it, he soon fell in with a garrulous Makrani midwife who regaled him with several bits of first-hand gossip. By the next day she must have got to know that he was connected with the census, for she came bustling up with eyes starting out of her head, and dropping her voice to a hoarse whisper exclaimed, "There now! And I never guessed why you're counting the women, dullard that I was! And it's as plain as a pikestaff that government is going to circumcise the lot of us!" The old lady must have been sadly disappointed to find that the expected boom in her trade never came off at all.

Frontier incidents.

17 The good humour with which the tribesmen entered into the census was not the least pleasing feature in our work. There were a few little rifts in the general harmony it is true but these one learns to expect on the frontier. For months it looked as if Khārān would have to be left out altogether for the chief had declined roundly to have anything to do with government in any shape or form and adopted an attitude so obstructive as to fire his uncle with the fatuous idea that we would look on unmoved while he put an end to him and usurped the chieftainship. From this fool's dream he was rudely awakened by the appearance of troops on the scene, which speedily paved the way for the peaceful census of Khārān at the eleventh hour. One of the enumerators in the Shīrānī country was kidnapped and left to kick his heels for a few days on the other side of the border. The enumerator in the heart of the Mēngal country was beaten and his precious schedules were torn to shreds and thrown to the winds. But none of these incidents were consciously directed against the census they were merely the effervescence of that spirit of independence which frontier tribesmen still think it necessary to display from time to time. Nor do they darken the general impression of goodwill and

kindly welcome on the part of chiefs and tribesmen alike, with which my two assistants and I came back from our tours

18 And our touring took one or other of us into wellnigh every part of the country. For success clearly hung on the amount of personal inspection we could devote to the operations. It may help to conjure up something of the physical conditions of the country if I give a few bare facts about our tours. Apart from journeys by rail and by sea, we covered in all 6,011 miles by road between the three of us. By road? It was often a sorry apology for a camel-track. But to myself crude figures convey little—a pathetic confession, I suppose, for a census officer to make—and I have amused myself by calculating that one would have to tramp three times from John o'Groats to Land's End and back and once again to Land's End, to top the mileage of our wanderings. As for the enumerators, they must have put a girdle round about the earth among the lot of them. Heavy touring involved.

19 Here then is one very obvious reason for the unavoidably high cost of the operations, for it goes without saying that one cannot travel in the wilds of the frontier without tents or escorts. The costliness of the Balūchistān census was so very different from the admirable economy with which a census is conducted elsewhere in India, that I am tempted to hide the figures (from all but the unnaturally curious) in the obscurity of a subsidiary table. But the bare details must out. In confessing to a cost of Rs 57-1-10 or Rs 110-7-6—there are two complicated systems of accounts to choose from—for every thousand souls we enumerated, I can probably claim the melancholy distinction of having conducted the most expensive enumeration in India during the present operations. But I cannot accept this conventional measurement of the cost in terms of numbers as in any way appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of Balūchistān. On the contrary, it would not be difficult to make out a case to prove that the very smallness of our scattered population tends unavoidably to heighten the cost of a census, and that an increase in the population would tend to cut the expenses down. To any one who knows the country or takes the trouble to turn to it on the map, a much more appropriate method of reckoning the cost of the census is to look not to the numbers enumerated but to the area over which they are scattered. Judged in this light 0-5-8 (or if the other account system is preferred, 0-10-11) for every square mile is no inglorious record. I doubt whether any other province, however much more favourable its general conditions, could hope to enter the lists against it. Cost of the operations.

20 But it would be churlish to turn from this unconventional census to the unconventional report without a word of thanks to those who enabled me to carry out the one and to write the other. In this one feature of the census I have suffered from the embarrassment of numbers. Indeed the people I had to count were so few and my fellow-workers so many, that I find it a little hard to realise that any of the work fell to me at all. In the assistants who were given me at various stages I was fortunate indeed. During the greater part of the active operations I had at my back the ripe experience and sound judgment of R B Dīwān Jamiat Rāi, C I E, and even when he was recalled to other duties, he continued to give me his invaluable help at every turn. In K S Mirzā Shēr Muhammad I had an ideal assistant to undertake the first real census of the Brāhūi country—a Brāhūi himself, he knows it from corner to corner, and a good deal of his knowledge of his race is reflected in these pages. Upon the shoulders of M Gul Muhammad fell the burden of the tabulation of the statistics, and the zest he put into it enabled me to turn from this dreary drudgery to more enlivening parts of the census. How much work my head clerk, L Chōrth Rām, has saved me, he alone knows. And as I pen the last words of this report, I become conscious of the debt I owe to Colonel Archer not only for the many suggestions he has made from the fulness of his knowledge of Balūchistān but also for the stimulating interest he has throughout taken in the operations, and to Mr William Archer for laboriously reading the proofs from cover to cover. But I suppose the people to whom I owe most are the tribesmen themselves, and the chiefs above all. It was thanks very largely to their great if somewhat amused kindness that, with the help of my staff, I was able not only to count heads but to get some sort of peep at the thoughts inside them. And thus what would otherwise have been arid labour proved a pleasant and very interesting duty. Acknowledgments.

CHAPTER I

POPULATION

Statistical data

Subject	TABLE		
	Imperial	Provincial	Subsidiary
Area, houses and population	I	I	I
Density			IV
House population		I, II	
Political Agencys and <i>tribes</i>	VIII		II
Place	III		III
Towns and villages			

Descriptive and Historical

21 Balūchistān—it would be pedantry, I suppose, to insist on Balūchistān **Geographical**—is the extreme north-west buttress of the Indian Empire. Its 131,638 square miles sprawl out into an irregularly shaped block of country, generally described in defiance of all geometrical definitions as oblong. It is bounded on the south by the Arabian Sea, with a small inlet of Muscat territory round Gwādar, on the east it is bounded by Sind, the Panjab and the North-West Frontier Province; on the north by independent territory and Afghānistān, on the west by Persia. At the tip of the horn that juts out on the north-west stands Koh-i-Malik Sial, an otherwise unenviable desolation which enjoys the double distinction of being the most westerly point of all India and the meeting-place of three great countries, Afghānistān, Persia, and the Indian Empire. Not without justice does Balūchistān claim high rank among the frontier provinces of India. For 520 miles it marches with Persia, for 723 miles with Afghānistān, for 38 miles with independent territory. There are 471 miles of coast-line along the Arabian Sea, the precise length of the considerable Muscat frontier is a matter in hot dispute.

22 It is a land of contradictions and contrasts. From a bird's eye view **Descriptive**, the general impression would probably be a chaotic jumble of mud-coloured mountains, for all the world like a bewildered herd of titanic camels. Yet it contains many a rich valley and upland plateau, and at least one broad plain as flat and low-lying as any in India. For a brief and fitful season its rivers are rushing torrents, for the greater part of the year there is hardly a trickle in their giant beds. On the maps there are three large lakes of limpid blue—very different from the gloomy swamps of reality. But the maps are crammed full of unconscious nony, and if you come to the country after poring over these elaborate patchworks of well-defined rivers, refreshing oases of green, and named localities innumerable, small wonder if you condemn it on sight as a land of rivers without water, of forests without trees, of villages without inhabitants. The whole outlook seems bleak and bare. Yet you have only to scratch the soil and add a little water, and you can grow what you please. But often enough nature is so perverse that where

there is land there is no water and where there is water there is no land. Probably no province in India can show so vast a range of climate. The winter cold of the uplands baffles description. Even in Quetta (and Quetta, high lying though it is, is surrounded by mountains five thousand feet higher) it is bitter enough. It is a mildish winter when eggs are not frozen solid a few years back coveys of chikor were driven into the heart of the market-place benumbed and starving. Yet the readings of the thermometer give but a poor idea of the rigours of the winter as everybody knows to his cost who has faced the happily infrequent blast of iciness that is driven over the snow-capped Khwāja Amrān. As for the mid-summer heat of the Kachhi plain, I can only fall back on the hackneyed local proverb of the superfluity of Hell to depict that burning fiery furnace. The sun beats fiercely even above the passes. I have met tribesmen loud in their praises of the telegraph service along the Nushki trade-route; it was not the speedy despatch of messages that appealed to them—that they have found at times an unmitigated nuisance. It was the grateful shade shed by the telegraph poles all along the road. On first acquaintance a newcomer is tempted to sum up Balūchistān as a vast country mostly barren unconsciously echoing the unflattering verdict passed on Makrān more than a thousand years ago by the Arab traveller and historian Al Istakhrī. Yet among those who have sojourned long enough in Balūchistān for their first impressions to fade away there are few who have not fallen under the mysterious spell cast by this wild country and its wild inhabitants.

Population.

23. The contrast between Balūchistān's imposing area and its modest population is almost grotesque. A scanty rain fall and lack of perennial water are enough in themselves to make a sparse population a foregone conclusion. Yet the extraordinary sparseness of the population will probably come as a surprise to most people who have any conception of the vastness of the country. 834,703 souls, all told, were actually enumerated during the census. True, if we are seeking to gauge the normal strength of Balūchistān, we should in fairness add somewhat to this humble total. For the country largely inhabited as it is by nomadic peoples, is extravagantly affected by the nature of the seasons: given a good season it will attract thousands from across its borders given a bad season, it will send them back, with many thousands of its own besides. Now when the census was being taken, conditions were more or less normal in the Pathan part of the country but in Chāgnī and Makrān and still more markedly in Jhalawān, conditions were not a little unfavourable. Yet, when all allowances have been made, it probably takes a pretty good season to raise the numbers above a million. Let me try to bring the contrast between area and population into bolder relief. Balūchistān contributes $\frac{1}{4}$ th to the area of the Indian Empire, yet it has contributed little more than a paltry $\frac{1}{4}$ th to the teeming millions enumerated at the current census. Though there is not much to choose between Balūchistān and the Panjāb in the matter of area, the Panjāb lost considerably more people from plague alone in the last four years than can be found to-day in the whole of Balūchistān. Or put it another way. So vast is Balūchistān that if the British Isles, Channel Islands and all, were lifted up and dumped down on it, there would still be room for over thirteen thousand square miles of surrounding sea. So insignificant is its population, that it falls far short of the births in the British Isles in a single year.

Waterpots and
Caravans.

24. It may be that the population was much greater in the dark backward of time. This at any rate is the thought that forces itself upon most people who have seen the extensive *gab-rbands* studded up and down the country to the west, especially in parts that now are all but desert. Most of these dams of the fire-worshippers were palpably designed to hold up mountain torrents for agricultural purposes. A few seem to be remains of terraced fields. Here and there they look more like watering-places for men or beasts. But be they what they may it is clear that they were the handiwork of a race of thrifty husbandmen, people very different from our devil-me-care tribesmen of to-day. Whether Balūchistān under present conditions could support a much larger population than it actually does, is open to question. Geologists indulge in

gloomy prophecies of its gradual desiccation and ultimate depopulation. But large schemes for damming up its mighty floods are now being evolved, and should they come into being, the census reports of the future may have a very different tale to tell. Yet though scientific irrigation on a large scale might easily spell a tremendous increase in population, one need not necessarily be a pessimist to have an uneasy feeling that without wise guidance it might also spell a deterioration in the breed. It is not merely that material prosperity has an awkward habit of bringing compensating disadvantages in its train. In Balūchistān, society rests on an ancient tribal system, which, admirably suited though it is under existing primitive conditions to people and country alike, is peculiarly sensitive to changes of all kinds, and sensitive above all to any change in the communal or quasi-communal tenures of land on which it is partially grounded. It is a sturdy breed of up-standing men that Balūchistān has produced under the tribal system. And an increase in mere numbers would be poor consolation, if an improvement in environment brought with it not simply a break-down of the tribal system, but a deterioration in the breed, such as sets in with pathetic rapidity among Brāhūis who settle down in the enervating prosperity of Sind.

25 Though the term 'tribal system' is constantly on our lips, it is curiously difficult to define. The truth is that the tribal system is not one and immutable throughout the country. It is to be found in all stages of evolution—from infancy to maturity, from maturity to senile decay. And different races and even different tribes within the same race have evolved characteristic varieties of it, suited to their peculiar needs. But however numerous the varieties, there are certain broad features of similarity running through them all. If I were asked to describe rather than to define the typical tribal system, I should be inclined to say that it is the negation of individualism, individualism is certainly its most insidious enemy. Ask a wayfarer in Balūchistān who he is, and he will simply reply that he is a Brāhūi or whatever his particular race may be. Press him further, and he will say he is a Bangulzai, then, if that does not satisfy you, he will add that he is a Badūzai, and clinch matters by saying that he is a Tēngizai. Further cross-examination may perhaps elicit the more intimate detail that he is an Āghālizai. The information is now complete: he is a member of the Āghālizai group of the Tēngizai section of the Badūzai clan of the Bangulzai tribe of Brāhūi. A glimpse of tribal society peeps out from these answers, I think. Society under the tribal system is no random collection of individuals: it is a living organic whole, made up of organisms within organisms. And the most rudimentary organism of all is the family. Nowadays a typical tribal family consists of the father and his unmarried sons, from a purely formal point of view the wives and the daughters are rather part of the family's wealth, than actual members of it. In olden days the family probably included the eldest living male and all his descendants, and the smallness of the modern family is perhaps a symptom that the system is beginning to decay from within. Now in the family the most obvious bond is the common blood that runs through all its members. But common blood is not sufficient in itself, for a division of the family property results at once in the fissure of the family into several smaller organisms of the same kind. Common blood, common property, common weal and woe, these are the bonds that bind the family together. And the same bonds operate with varying force all up the line, till the tribe itself is reached. True, the bond of common blood in the tribe is often enough imaginary or fictitious, it is none the less real for all that. Even the bond of common property still holds good in some form or other, though it may be somewhat hidden out of sight if tribal tenure of land has passed into severalty. The bond of common weal and woe now looms largest, simply because it is the most material and practical bond of the three, and forms the basis of that communal or tribal responsibility which is the immediate connecting-link between the tribal system and our administration. Corresponding to the patriarch at the head of every well-ordered tribal family, there are leaders at the head of the groups and sections and clans of every well-ordered tribe, all taking their proper place in the tribal hierarchy, with the tribal chief at the pinnacle of them all. And just as strangers may be found as guests within the family circle, alien groups may be found sheltering within the tribe, but whereas the tribe is constantly absorbing such *hamsāya*, 'sharers of the same shade' as they

are called, into the tribal organism there is no customary method of adopting strangers—other than females on marriage—into the family. And finally just as there are dependants attached to the family yet not members of the family so in the tribe, yet not of the tribe, there are alien elements—Sayyid, Hindu, Lōri and the rest—all more or less parasitic, who serve the spiritual and temporal needs of the tribesmen. The family is in fact the tribe in germ.

Recent View.

20. When we mount from the tribes to the larger whole to which these belong in fact or theory we find that the bonds that bind race together are fragile indeed. Common blood now runs in a very thin trickle little though we know of the ancestry of any of our three principal races, Brāhūi Baluch or Pathān, we know that they are of a very mongrel composition. The bond of common land has worn down to a mere matter of hazy territorial boundaries. As for the bond of common weal and woe, it all but snapped on the arrival of British rule and the removal of necessity for union against a common foe. But racial bonds are present none the less, and the most potent of all is the inheritance of a common *riāz* or body of customary law which remains in principle pretty much the same throughout the race, though the evolution of details may have been very diverse among the many tribes. So much for the present state of affairs. But time was when national if not ethnical unity was a real thing in Balūchistān. For out of seemingly hopeless heterogeneity the old Ahmadshā Khān succeeded with consummate statecraft in welding together a powerful Confederacy embracing wellnigh all the tribes of Balūchistān south of Quetta. And uniting Sarāwān and Jhalawān as the Confederacy was called, were much the same bonds as unite the family and the clan and the tribe. Common blood, to be sure, there was little enough in the strict sense of the word for the members of the Confederacy were drawn from multitudinous sources nevertheless membership gave to one and all what amounts to much the same thing and what fiction often convert into the same thing—common status. That the Khāns knew the strength of the bond of common land, they have left evidence behind them in the tribal lands of the Kachhi. But the vital bond of unity was the bond of common weal and woe, and the common weal of Kalāt in the golden age of Nasir Khān the Great made Balūchistān one commonweal in the modern sense of the word. It is worth while to take a fleeting glance at the Kalāt of those by-gone days, the better to understand the Balūchistān of to-day. For Balūchistān under British rule is the lineal descendant of the old Brāhūi Confederacy with the important Pathān country north of Quetta thrown in. Balūchistān after all is really a misnomer. To be of geographical significance, it should include Persian Baluchistān. Politically the best title would be Brāhūistān, the land of the old Brāhūi nation. It is only in the not uncommon use—or rather misuse—of Balūch as a synonym for Brāhūi that the present title can find justification at all.

Ancient History

27. We need not linger over the ancient history of the country. Nor would our curiosity be rewarded if we did. Of ancient Balūchistān strangely little is known, yet it lies on one of the great highways trodden by the many conquerors of India. Achaemenian, Macedonian, Arab, Ghaznavid, Moghal, Afsharid, Durrāni, have sojourned in it, and after a brief sojourn passed on, leaving scarce a trace behind. A few mounds a few coins, a few bits of pottery a few legends, possibly a few names, are almost all that remain in the country as a memorial of their sojourn unless perchance some of their blood still runs attenuated in the veins of the people. And though the mists that brood over ancient Balūchistān are fitfully broken by Persian poet and Greek and Arab historian, nothing stands out clear from the written records except a vivid picture of Alexander's amazing march through the wastes of Makrān. Of the ancient inhabitants of the country they tell us tantalisingly little. From the Greeks we hear of the Gadrosi, the Oreitai, the Arabitai, who vainly sought to oppose Alexander on his march—strange names in which the eye of faith has variously read (among others) the present-day Gadjra or Gador of Las Bela, the Hot of Makrān or the Hoti of Jhalawān and the Arabs or the people about the Hab river. In the Arab chronicles we read of the Mēd and the Jāt. And while there seems little danger in recognising here the modern Mēd of the coast and the Jāt of the plains, we may well pause before we follow others in tracing their ancestry back to the Medes and the Gethae of the classics. It is a wise instinct to be mistrustful of the lure of imagined similarity of sounds.

At this stage of ethnological knowledge it is well to accept the tribes as we find them, without attempting what seems at present the unprofitable task of probing into their origins. That the Balōch slowly made their way hither from a westerly direction some time between the 7th and the 15th centuries, that the Pathāns have been lodged here round the Takht-i-Sulemān from time immemorial—so much seems tolerably certain. But whence and when these Brāhūi, who speak a Dravidian tongue and point to sacred Aleppo as their ancient home, really came to Balūchistān, is as much of a puzzle as who they really are.

28 Nor can we trace the process by which the Ahmadzai or rather the Mirwāri, once apparently an insignificant section of the Kambīārī Brāhūi, rose to be rulers of the country. Perhaps the Mirwāri had some accidental advantage over their fellows—a little more valour, a little more shrewdness, a little more wealth, and therefore a little more means of displaying that hospitality which is an irresistible loadstone to Brāhūi and Balōch to this day. Perhaps a mysterious halo of sanctity surrounded some family among them: what was spiritual influence in the beginning may have developed into temporal power in the end, the tribesmen perchance went forth to seek a holy peace-maker, and found a ruler. Whatever the history of the rise of the Mirwāri may be, the Khānate certainly sprang from mean beginnings. Tradition has it that when the petty chieftains in the neighbourhood of Kalāt, tired of their dissensions, called upon the Mirwāri to place one of their number at their head, none of the elder members would deign to accept the offer, and it was passed on to Mir Hassan who stood far down the line. From the time of Mir Hassan is supposed to date the division of the tribes into Sarāwān and Jhalawān, those above and below Kalāt, and it was as Sarāwān and Jhalawān that the Confederacy came to be known. From him too is supposed to date the furnishing of men-at-arms by the various tribes in set proportions, and also the allotment of certain lands and miscellaneous service for the upkeep of the ruler's position. But all this is vaguest tradition. Not till 1660, the year of the succession of Mīr Ahmad, from whom the dynasty takes its name, do we reach anything like history. And even here it is threadbare history at best, and the annals of the dynasty are little more than a string of names down to Mīr Abdulla, to whose political sagacity and martial enterprise during his rule from 1715 to 1730 the consolidation of the Confederacy appears to have been due.

The rise of
the Brāhūi
Confederacy

29 But famous ruler though he was, he is overshadowed by his son Nasir Khān the Great. There is no need to follow Nasir Khān through his long career, either in his hard apprenticeship at the Kandahār court, his military training with Nādir Shāh's army of conquest, or his long rule of forty-four years. It is the Kalāt constitution, on which he placed the coping-stone, with which alone we are concerned. Even here we have to peer through a haze of tradition, before we can make out its main outlines, its details are hopelessly blurred. Brāhūis themselves look back on everything connected with their national hero through rose-coloured spectacles. But even though their enthusiasm may partially succeed in distorting our vision, it would perhaps matter little after all. The Kalāt constitution as the Brāhūis think it ought to have been is a matter of hardly less lively interest to us than the constitution of Kalāt as it really was. For practical purposes at any rate the Brāhūi's Utopia is of greater moment than the reality: it is far more important that our own policy should reflect the fond dreams of the people, than that it should be susceptible of being traced back by learned research to historical precedent.

Its constitution
under Nasir Khān
the Great.

30 The old analogy—half metaphor, half reality—will help us again. The Confederacy was a family writ large, a fraternity of tribes, a mutual co-operation society, all the members of which contributed to the welfare of the whole, and derived their welfare from it. The Khān—or *Bēglai Bēgl*, the Chief of the Chiefs, to employ the title conferred by Nādir Shāh—was the father of his people, and it was from the people, through their representatives the chiefs, that he derived his authority. This authority was given him freely by virtue of his birth, for the Brāhūis have a deep-rooted feeling that a son should sit in the seat of his fathers. And the authority, once given, was loyally acknowledged by virtue of the divinity that hedged his person. And what applies to the Khān himself, applies also to the chiefs. A chief was not, indeed is not, a despot, any more than the Khān. His authority is derived directly

The Khān and
the Chiefs

from his tribesmen. In formally recognising his chiefship the Khān (or for the matter of that, the British government) is simply ratifying the choice of the tribe. And the chief like the Khān maintains his position over his people not merely because they themselves have given it to him as his birthright, nor because he uses it or is supposed to use it for their welfare, but very largely because of that semi religious veneration with which all Brāhūis and Baluch instinctively regard their rulers. Though this veneration is often severely tried in these self seeking days, it is marvellous how well it stands the strain.

31. In all internal matters the Khān—I am still speaking of the days when Khāns were philosophers and philosophers Khāns—interfered with the chiefs as little as possible in the control of their tribes. He was in short a staunch upholder of the tribal system the key note of which is decentralisation all down the line. The head of the family the *kandaks* or section leader the *fakari* or clan leader the *sardar* or chief—each was left to the management of his own charge. In the maintenance of his authority in his allotted sphere those above and below him were almost equally concerned. To those below him he was not only the first court of appeal he was their representative their mouthpiece and their champion in the larger whole of which their group formed a unit. It must needs have been a serious dispute that would not resolve itself at the interposition of the head of the group who could bring into play not merely his authority as such but the pressure of public opinion within the group, the ancient customary modes of conciliation and settlement the mediation of Sayyids and other holy men, and in the last resort the entreaties of the whole body of womenfolk. And on the measure of success with which he carried his group with him, hung the measure of his influence with the powers above him. A chief was naturally inclined to lean on a *fakari* who showed that he had the corporate goodwill of the clan behind him by never allowing disputes to pass beyond him to the chief. Similarly the influence of a chief with the Khān depended on his authority over his tribe, and this in turn depended very largely on his making every officer in the tribal hierarchy control his own particular group. And when disputes did come before the Khān, either because a chief could not or would not bring about a settlement between his own tribesmen or because two chiefs were at loggerheads among themselves, they were heard by the Khān in his *Darbar* and justice was swift, simply because, 'though delay—like justice itself—cost the litigants nothing it cost the Khān a good deal, as he charged himself with their maintenance, with their *rōza* and *firs* as it was called, so long as they remained at his court. And here we stumble up against one of the main secrets to which not only the Khān but the chiefs owed their extraordinary hold over the tribesmen—a lavish display of hospitality. "Hold out a joint, Naur Khān used to say "and the Brāhūis will flock to you from all sides for a bite.

32. Unfortunately there is as much truth in the axiomatic with which he concluded. "And when they have torn off the flesh, they will squabble among themselves like dogs for the bone." Not without good cause does he appear to have recognised in a forward policy abroad the best means of securing peace at home. Now while the Khān left the various units a free hand to manage their internal affairs, he kept the foreign policy in his own hands. Here his word was supreme. But it was supreme simply because he took the precaution to carry his people with him. Just as in the Kandahār representative at his court and in his own representative at Kandahār he had counsellors who could keep his policy from coming into serious conflict with the wishes of the sovereign power so in his chiefs, and more especially in the Baluch and Zarakzai, the premier chiefs of Sarwān and Jhalawān, he had counsellors who could keep it in harmony with public opinion at home. Once he gave the word for war the conduct of the war rested with the war-council composed of the chiefs and war-tried veterans. The tribesmen ranged themselves under the Sarwān and Jhalawān banners, and took the field in two wings under the premier chiefs. But though the leadership of the Khān in war-time seems thus to have been somewhat shadowy it fired the whole army with an ardour born of the pious belief that they were fighting under one who, if not quite divine himself, was under the special favour of the God of Battles.

33 The constitution built up with such admirable statecraft by Nasir Khān the Great and his forefathers contained one fatal flaw it provided no safeguard against the consequences of a possible lack of statecraft in the Khāns who were to come after. Before long it began to decay from the top, sapped by a spirit of individualism, which in time spread through the whole organism. The later Khāns gradually—and in the beginning, it may be, unconsciously—attempted to rise from constitutional heads of a Confederacy to autocratic rulers of the country. To this end they began to amass treasure, in striking contrast to Nasir Khān, who more than once found his privy purse so drained by his lavish hospitality that the trappings of his horses had to be pledged to raise money for his periodical tours through the country. Even when they could bring themselves to spend from their hoards, it was for their own selfish pleasures. There was no shorter cut to the loss of their hold over the tribesmen than this departure from that fine old tradition of hospitality to which their forefathers owed so much of the veneration they inspired. They tampered with the tribal system at every turn. False to the old motto of the Confederacy that “Union is strength,” they found the maxim “Divide and rule” more suited to their personal aggrandisement. Whereas their forefathers took pride in being the peacemakers of the Confederacy, they began to undermine the authority of any chief who held his head high, by setting his various *takharī* against him, chief they played off against chief, seeking to draw the one closer to their side by crushing his rival, with the inevitable result that the chiefs retaliated by sowing dissension within the ruling family itself. Instead of inviting the chiefs to their councils, they leant more and more on the body of alien officials and hangers-on at the court, whose interests clashed all too often with the interests of the tribes. And—perhaps most significant of all—not content with relying on the tribal levies for the prosecution of their foreign policy, they gathered round themselves a mercenary army to enforce their authority at home. The modest ceremonial guard of trusty tribesmen with which Nasir Khān the Great surrounded himself had developed under Nasir Khān II into an imposing bodyguard of six officers and six hundred men, by the time of Khudādād Khān it was a standing mercenary army, recruited by adventurers drawn from India and Afghānistān, who were always on the war-path, fighting for the Khān against the members of what it would be irony to call a Confederacy of tribes any longer.

Decay of the
constitution

34 It would of course be folly to suppose that all the faults were on one side, or to ignore the disintegrating influence of accidental causes such as the accession of several of the Khāns while still in their minority. Nor must we overlook the part played by external causes in helping on the decay of the Khānate. Even in the hey-day of its prosperity Kalāt was never a wholly independent power. It appears from the Āin-i-Akbarī that Mastung alone used to furnish a hundred horse and five times as many foot, besides a tribute in money and grain, to the Delhi kings. Even Nasir Khān furnished men-at-arms to the rulers of Kandahār, first to Nādir Shāh and then to the Durrānī dynasty that succeeded. The great Khān stood in wholesome awe of the suzerain power. The story goes that he used to keep a pet tiger, which he never failed to visit when one of his rebellious fits was on him. “Its eyes,” said he, “are as the eyes of Nādir Shāh, I have only to look into them for my loyalty to return.” And though his reign was marred by one outburst of rebellion against Ahmad Shāh, his general loyalty and his gallantry in the field appear to have won for his country a relief from the payment of tribute and some relaxation at any rate in the furnishing of men-at-arms to the suzerain power. The rulers of Kandahār never again made good their hold on Kalāt. What they lacked in authority they seem to have made up in the peremptoriness of their messages, if one may judge by this specimen which still lingers in the memory of the people. “What means this knavery that has come to my ears, Oh Brāhūī, you fox of the hills! Beware, beware! What, have you never heard of the captain of the blood-sucking guard? If I give but the word, he will seize you by the tail and dash your body against the rocks, so that the marrow of your bones will ooze from your nostrils! Beware, beware! And again I say Beware!” It is possible that a resolute suzerain power would have proved a blessing in disguise to the Brāhūī Confederacy and postponed its break-up.

Contributory
causes from
without.

at any rate for a season. But troubles nearer home left the Durrani scant leisure to devote their attention to Kalāt.

35 Our early interference in Kalāt affairs forms a somewhat characteristic episode in the inglorious history of the first Afghan war. Inspired as it was by a radical misconception of the nature of the Khanate and a curiously perverse misreading of the local politics of the day it was hardly calculated to arrest the decay of the Kalāt constitution and by the time Sandeman appeared on the scene the breach between the Khan and the chief was wellnigh complete. But though the old Confederacy was disrupted past repair Sandeman succeeded in building up a new and wider union on its ruins, and Baluchistan now embraces not merely the old Confederacy of Sarāwān and Jhalawān with its appendages Las Bēla, Kachhi, Khārān, Makrān and Chāgal, but also areas formally ceded by Afghanistan in the second Afghan war as well as the Pathān country to the north over which Afghan rule had never been wholly effective.


36 No analysis of his policy could convey an adequate idea of the lasting impress left by Sandeman on Baluchistan. On the frontier personality often counts for more than policy. And the personality of this strong but simple man would live long in the memory of the people even though the Sandeman policy were infringed, reversed, forgotten. As for the famous policy itself it is the fashion in some quarters to summarise it briefly as the bolstering up of the chiefs. We should do scant justice to Sandeman's political wisdom if we allowed ourselves to be deceived by this plausible catch-word. Had he struck no deeper than this, his vaunted policy would have been little more than a makeshift policy of expediency along the line of least resistance. But Sandeman was no mere opportunist with an instinct for right judgment. He was a statesman gifted with rare imaginative insight and broad sympathies, which enabled him to divine and understand the social institutions, customs, and needs of the people whom he was called upon to rule. He had no belief in short cuts to civilisation or in the development of the material prosperity of the individual at the expense of the community as a whole. Instead of battering down the walls of tribal society he sought to further its slow but sure evolution towards civilisation by helping the tribesmen to repair them. First and last his aim was to preserve the ancient tribal system. In so far as the chief is the head and embodiment of the tribal system he assuredly received Sandeman's whole-hearted support. But Sandeman's support of the other elements in the corporate body of the tribe was none the less whole-hearted because it was exercised in a less ostentatious and less obvious manner. A chief who carried his tribe with him because he never lost sight of the fact that his authority was derived from the tribe was grounded in the tribe and was to be exercised for the welfare of the tribe—this was Sandeman's ideal. A chief who flouted his tribal officers, encroached on the ancient liberties of his tribesmen and sought to change his status from that of a constitutional tribal chief into that of an irresponsible despot, looked for his support in vain. Sandeman never mistook the part for the whole. It was not the chiefs alone, it was the entire fabric of the tribal system that he like Nasir Khan before him laboured to uphold. And the life-blood of the tribal system is tribal law the essence of which is reconciliation—the satisfaction of the aggrieved, not the punishment of the aggressor. It is on the well tried lines of ancient custom that the chief and the other tribal officers patch up disputes within the tribe. And it was to provide for the customary settlement of disputes with which the chief failed to cope, or which overlapped into another tribe, to say nothing of disputes between the chiefs and the Khan's personal subjects, that Sandeman set up councils of Elders, or *jirga* as they are called. In other words Sandeman's *jirga* system provided a final court of appeal not altogether dissimilar from the Khan's Darbar in the old days. And finally as a means of enforcing tribal responsibility and at the same time of giving the tribes a stake in the wider government of the country Sandeman devised a levy system—he employed it by the by less in Kalāt itself than in other parts of the province—under which chiefs and headmen were given allowances in return for the furnishing of tribal levies for tribal work within tribal limits. This again had its counter

British
administration.

The Sandeman
policy

BALŪCHISTĀN

SHOWING ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS



part under the old regime in the furnishing of men-at-arms and tribal levies in return for a share in the wai-lands. In fact it does not make much demand on the imagination to see in the Sandeman policy a modern revival, half conscious, half unconscious, of the old constitution of Nasir Khān the Great, remodelled, it is true, to suit the changes in the times.

37 Times have changed again since the days of Sandeman. Here and there tribal bonds have been loosening, chiefs and tribesmen have been drifting apart into individualism, and it almost looks as if the tribal system were slowly sinking into decay. But if there is a spirit of change in the tribal life, there has also been a gradual declension from the Sandeman policy, unwittingly occasioned by the over-emphasis of some particular element in it. From time to time we have fallen into the temptation of bolstering up not the tribal system but the chief, and of regarding him as the creation and creature of government and not of the tribe. On the other hand there has been an unconscious tendency to enlarge the scope of the *jūga* and so to undermine the chiefly authority by placing disputes before a *jūga* without first entrusting them to the chief. And by degrees the levy system has lost much of its purely tribal character and become infected with the fashionable spirit of individualism, and tribesmen may now be found serving in some part of the country with which their tribe has no concern at all. Possibly these and similar departures from the Sandeman policy are for the better after all. It is infinitely more probable that they are for the worse. But even though they are among the causes that make for the loosening of the ancient ties of tribal society, there are other causes of a much more intimate and insidious nature, on which I shall have occasion to touch up and down this work. Nevertheless, if the tribal system should prove to be really in need of a physician, it would probably be hard to prescribe a more invigorating tonic than 'Back to Sandeman'.

Statistical.

38 But it is high time to get at closer grips with the census, the fascination which these speculations cast over all disciples of the great Sandeman has already led me too far astray. Now for census purposes we divided Balūchistān into six districts and two native states, a grouping which follows closely on administrative lines, though both the native states, Kalāt and Las Bēla, and one of the districts, Bōlān, are under the charge of one and the same Political Agent. From a legal point of view matters are in a bit of a muddle, as may be judged from the map on the opposite page. The two states stand, of course, apart in the rest of the province two divisions are recognised, British Balūchistān and Agency Territories. For workaday purposes it is a distinction without a difference, a pallid reflection of past history that vaguely reminds us that the portions which make up British Balūchistān were ceded by Afghānistān at the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879, and that the portions which make up the Agency Territories have been leased from Kalāt, or taken over at the request of the tribesmen, or have fallen on our side of the border as the result of boundary demarcations with Afghānistān. And the legal conception of the country is incomplete. It ignores on the one hand the whole of the Chāgai district, where matters have still to be put on a legal footing, and on the other the Mai and Bugti tribal country, once a member though a very unruly member of the Brāhūi Confederacy, now tacked on conveniently if incongruously to the Sibi district. In Chāgai, administration proceeds on the usual lines by executive order, as if it were an ordinary Agency Territory. In the tribal country the reins are slackened, and the tribesmen are given their head as much as possible to follow their own bent, revenue-free.

39 The only portion of the Quetta-Pishin district which lies outside British Balūchistān is the Quetta *tahsīl*. For while the rest of the district formed part of the Kandahār province up to the Treaty of Gandamak and was then ceded to the British government, Quetta was handed over to Kalāt by Ahmad Shāh in the middle of the 18th century, and is now held by us on perpetual lease. To the Brāhūis Quetta is known as Shāl, a name much more ancient than their pretty legend that the country was presented by Ahmad Shāh to the mother of the great Nasir Khān as a *shāl* or shawl. The fact that the town

itself as distinguished from the surrounding country is sometimes referred to as *Shālōt* is, I suppose, at the bottom of the strange but common idea that the modern name of Quetta is a corruption of *kōt* a fort. It is simply the Pashtō word *kwaṣ*, a heap. But whether the name contains a sneer at the old Quetta fort—that most ancient debris of mud volcano, as a picturesque but dangerously imaginative authority describes it—or whether there is truth in the local tradition that here was heaped the earth with which some Afghān army of old had burdened itself for fear this daily necessity of Muhammadan life might not be forthcoming in so heathenish a country I will not stay to enquire.

The district is essentially Pathān, though it merges into the Brahūi country towards the south and contains a large Sayyid leaven and more aliens than the rest of Balūchistan put together. It consists in the main of upland valleys or plains 4,500 to 5,500 feet above sea level, squeezed in by ranges of majestic but uninhabitable mountains, which are crowned by a peak overtopping

11,700 feet. The average rainfall varies from 6 inches in Chaman to a humble maximum of 10 inches in Pishin. But more important than the rain or snow that falls in the valleys, where alone recording-stations are maintained, is the snow on the surrounding heights which feeds the springs and the streams and the *kārs* or underground channels, chief and most characteristic of indigenous methods of irrigation. Despite the mountainous blocks of uninhabitable desolation which take up so much of the area, many causes combine to make the district not only the most advanced but the most thickly populated in the province: excellent communications by rail and road, fertile soil in the centre of the valleys, sources of irrigation to an extent unusual in Balūchistan, and a large military station in its midst which offers a ready market for its surplus produce.

The density of the population—the word has a curious sound in Balūchistan—is of course very unequally distributed. In the Quetta *takail* it stands at an abnormal figure owing to the presence of Quetta itself. But even though the density of the *takail* on the

exclusion of Quetta with its 33,022 inhabitants and 20 square miles drops from 100 to 40 its position remains unchallenged. Second on the list—but a very bad second—stands Pishin, thanks in some measure to two Government irrigation works, the Shebō canal and the Khushdīl Khān reservoir whose settling influence on the inhabitants is not confined to the fact that they bring some six or seven thousand acres under cultivation every year of favourable rainfall. There is a biggish drop in Chaman. But here conditions are very different; the population is dependent almost wholly on pastoralism, and shifts freely now this now that side of the border: cultivation there is very little. Shamarūd—valley of the brackish river—comes last and last it is likely to remain until its lethargic inhabitants learn to develop the not unpromising agricultural resources of their country.

40 The Loralai district has come into being since the last census, having been formed in 1903 by the severance of Mūmakhal and Bōri from Zhōb, and the absorption of Duki, Sanjāwī and Bārkhān on the break up of the old Thal-Chōtāli district. Duki is the only portion that lies within British Balūchistan. The district

consists like Quetta of upland valleys hemmed in by rugged mountains but both valleys and mountains lie somewhat lower except towards the west. The mass of the population is Pathān, even the nucleus of the Khetran, who nowadays claim Balūch status, is probably Pathān by origin (§284). The majority of the tribesmen are small cultivating proprietors, but there are not a few who subsist almost entirely on their flocks. The density is less than half the density of Quetta at the same time it is much more evenly distributed. Yet the conditions vary not a little. Thus, while Bōri, Sanjāwī and parts of Duki are fairly well irrigated, in Mūmakhal only 85 per cent of the irrigable area has a perennial water-supply; the rest is dependent on floods. The permanently irrigable area in

Bārkhān, the home of the Khetran, is less than half that in Mūmakhal; yet this

Quetta-Pishin	331,042
Indigenes	27,238
Pathān	63,280
Brahūi	9,804
Sayyid	8,718
Others	2,980
Non-Indigenes	8,500
Aliens	24,822

Density	
Quetta-Pishin	34
Quetta	100
Pishin	17
Chaman	14
Shamarūd	4

Loralai	38,786
Indigenes	24,158
Pathān	42,784
Khetran	12,976
Others	8,698
Non-Indigenes	11,048
Aliens	4,514

Density	
Loralai	31
Bōri	20
Duki	10
Bārkhān	14
Mūmakhal	11
Sanjāwī	9

is the most thickly populated portion of the district. The truth is that flood irrigation, if less certain, is usually more productive than permanent irrigation, and so long as the rains do not fail, all is well, especially as the district contains excellent grazing-grounds for the herds of cattle and the sheep and goats which form a large portion of the wealth of the tribesmen. But a failure of the rains, which only average about 11 inches, is disastrous in parts that are unprotected by a permanent water-supply.

41. The whole of the Zhōb district lies outside British Balūchistān. Its ^{Zhōb.} tribal population is remarkably homogeneous—Pathān almost to a man, as befits the ancestral home of the Pathān race, many of the odd thousand who now call themselves Sayyid might probably with greater propriety be called Pathān like their fathers before

Zhōb		70,386
Indigenous		61,104
Pathān	59,541	
Others	1,563	
Semi indigenous		4,954
Aliens ¹		4,308

them. It is another highland district, broken up in all directions by mountains, which are sometimes well-wooded, more often barren, but, wooded or barren, rarely without a rugged grandeur. Chief among its many valleys is the great alluvial plain fed by the Zhōb river, which gives its name to the district. Except in the large but desolate area known as Kākār Khurasān, conditions are pretty much the same throughout the district. The most populated portion, the Fort Sandeman *tahsīl*, has unfortunately not been surveyed for revenue purposes,

but seeing that barely four acres in every square mile are cropped annually in Hindūbāgh, where the density is almost as high, it is hardly surprising that there are not seven persons to the square mile in the whole of the district. The rainfall is scanty, varying from 6 inches in Hindūbāgh to about 9 inches in Fort Sandeman, and little rain-crop cultivation is attempted except in the centre of the district. There is a certain amount of irrigation from springs, and still more from streams, though the high banks of the Zhōb river in its upper reaches overtax the by no means despicable engineering ingenuity of the tribesmen. By far the chief source of irrigation is the *lārēz*.

42. The Bōlān Pass and Nushkī Railway district—to give this artificial ^{Bōlān.} little district its full official title—is geographically and historically part of Kalāt, and simply owes its creation into a separate entity and its inclusion among the Agency Territories to obvious considerations of administrative convenience. It includes not only the famous pass itself, which starts from Rindli at the foot of the plains and rises more than 5,000 feet in 54 miles, but also the present alignment of the railway at the lower end along the Mushkāf valley, and so much of the recent railway extension towards Nushkī as lies outside the Chāgai district. It is a mountainous tract cut by numerous hill-torrents, which after heavy rain fling themselves with amazing force and suddenness into

Bōlān		2,096
Indigenous		852
Brāhūi	236	
Balōch	461	
Others	165	
Semi indigenous		6
Aliens		1,238

the Bōlān river. It has hardly six inhabitants to the square mile. Even so, a large proportion of the population are temporary immigrants at work on the railway, the indigenous inhabitants are chiefly Kūrd and Sātakzai Biāhūis and Kuchik Balōch, in the spring and autumn it is thronged by swarms of Biāhūis on their annual migrations. But the importance of this pigmy district lies of course, not in its tiny population, but in the fact that in its historic pass, once trodden by many a proud conqueror of India, now pierced by a railway which ranks among the engineering feats of the world, it possesses one of the main arteries between India and Central Asia.

43. The Chāgai district is called after Chāghai, the head-quarters of the ^{Chāgai.} Sanjrānī tribe, which is popularly supposed to have earned its name from the enviable number of *chāh* or wells that it once possessed. But to thousands who have never heard of Chāgai this part of the country is familiar as Nushkī, the terminus of the world-famous trade-route which traverses the district from end to end before it branches off northwards to Seistān. Folk-etymology has been busy with Nushkī also, and refers it back to *nōsh khañē*, 'fall to the food,' a treacherous signal with which the Rakhsānī Balōch are said

¹ In the 4,308 aliens are included as many as 144 Europeans, simply because some troops happened to be marching through the district on the night of the census. The normal European population of Zhōb hardly reaches 30.

to have fallen upon their Moghal tyrants whom they had invited to a feast. Baloch and Brāhūi divide the country between them in almost equal and equally small numbers. The district, it is true was abnormally empty during the census owing to the drought to which it is often exposed. But even at the best of times it is never otherwise than very thinly populated. In many ways it is one of the least inviting parts of the province: hills on the east, hills on the north, hills on the south, hills on the far west, and in the centre vast plains (very occasionally alluvial and fertile, as in the neighbourhood of Nushki) more often desolate wastes covered with stones or crescent-shaped sand-dunes) 3,000 feet above sea level on the east, but sloping down westward to the howling wilderness that drains fittingly into the dreary swamp of the Hamūn! Māshkel. To speak of density and of Chaghi in the same breath is almost laughable.

there is hardly a man to the square mile in the district as a whole. By far the most populated portion of the country is Nushki where there is excellent land and a goodly amount of water but considerable difficulty in wedding the two together. Here the people have taken to agriculture and have become more or less settled. In Chaghi there is little cultivation; in Western Sanjirān there is hardly any at all. Throughout the district drinking water is scarce in many parts it is so impregnated with sulphates and other minerals, that it almost looks as if an extension of the railway onwards from Nushki were all that is required to turn the district into a resort of future valetudinarians. Backward though the district is, it would be hard to summon a better witness to the benefits of our rule. If it is thinly peopled to-day it was all but a desert a short generation back here, at any rate, we can boast that two blades grow where one grew before. And if the development is slow it is sure and continuous. The trade-route alone is a monument of our enterprise in overcoming the difficulties of nature in this desolate region its absolute security a monument of our civilising influence on its rugged inhabitants.

44. In Sibi almost all the characteristic features of Balūchistān are to be found in miniature. From a legal point of view the district is as much of a muddle as the province itself. While the Sibi and Shāhrig *talukis* are part of British Balūchistān and Kōhlū and Nasirābād are Agency Territories, the tribal country occupied by the Mari and Bugṭi is neither the one nor the other and to add to the confusion, the tribal country occupied by the Dōmbki and Kahēri, which really belongs to Kalāt, is lumped up with the district for most purposes of political control. Matters are cleared a bit if we treat the tribal countries apart. But even in the district proper the physical contrasts are striking enough whereas Sibi and Nasirābād are level low lying plains, which in reality belong to the great Kachhi plain the rest of the district is as mountainous as any portion of Balūchistān. And the jumble of its physical contrasts is borne out by the heterogeneous character of its population, for it is the meeting-ground of all the four chief peoples of Balūchistān. The density of the population is very unevenly distributed. In Nasirābād it reaches its highest figure—a figure only overtopped in one other portion of Balūchistān. But the conditions here are such as are to be found nowhere else in the province, for one-sixth of its whole area is irrigated yearly from the Sind canals. The density in Sibi is little more than half that in Nasirābād, yet even so it remains at a figure unusually high for Balūchistān; and here again the irrigated area (irrigated for the most part from the Mari river) is above the normal, averaging about one-fiftieth of the whole. In the mountainous parts of the district the density drops to the ordinary level of Balūchistān districts. There is of course a tremendous range of temperature between the scorching heat of the plains in the summer and the icy cold of the uplands in the winter. The variation in the rainfall is no less marked. In the plains it averages about 7 inches; in the hills it is much greater in fact Shāhrig with an average of well over 12 inches can usually boast the highest records of the year. Of the various

Chaghi	34,344
Large towns	13,178
Sub- divisions	6,694
Brāhūi	6,113
Baloch	871
Others	1,681
Non-indigenous	494
Afghan	573

Density	
Chaghi	1
Nushki	1
Others	1
Western Sanjirān	

Sibi district proper	59,823
Indigenous	57,280
Sub- divisions	36,543
Brāhūi	15,877
Baloch	416
Others	1,650
Non-indigenous	2,543
Afghan	3,077

Density	
Sibi district proper	21
Sub- divisions	22
Nushki	41
Brāhūi	19
Kōhlū	13

divisions of the district Shāhrig is on the whole the best protected against famine. Even Nasirābād, for all its canals, is subject to bouts of scarcity, as it is generally the first part of the country under the Sind canal system to feel the pinch when the water runs low. And scarcity comes home with greater force to the people of Nasirābād, because they have lost much of the nomadic instincts of their forefathers.

45 The whole of the Mari and Bugti tribal country, which is conveniently split up north and south by a mountainous barrier between these two ancient enemies, is much the same in character from end to end: barren, closely packed hills, which gradually break the fall of the great Sulemān range to the plains, hill-torrents and ravines innumerable, here and there good pasturage and a few valley patches of cultivation. Of the two tracts, the Bugti country on the south is the bigger by nearly five hundred square miles. It is also the more thickly, or rather the less thinly, populated. Both tribes are nomadic: there are only five collections of huts in the whole country that can be called villages at all. The rainfall is scanty and precarious in both areas, and both are constantly victims to drought, from which the tribesmen escape by extending their migrations to Sind and the Panjāb.

	Density
Mari country	4
Bugti country	5

46 The Kalāt state derives its name from its capital Kalāt, often styled Kalāt-i-Sēwa after its possibly mythical Hindu founder, or Kalāt-i-Nasir after the great Khān, to distinguish it from Kalāt-i-Ghulzar and many another Kalāt. It takes up more than half of the whole area of the province. Yet it falls far short of its area in the palmy days when it not only included Quetta, Nushkī, Nasirābād, which have been taken over on permanent lease, and the Bolān, where the Khān's right to levy transit dues has been commuted for an annual subsidy, and the Mari-Bugti country over which the Khān's control, it is true, was rarely otherwise than nominal, and Las Bela, eventually successful in setting itself up as a virtually independent state, but also stretched over to Dājal and Hamand in the Panjāb and down to Karāchī in Sind. And if the Khān's territories have shrunk from their ancient dimensions, so also has his authority. Throughout his state it is wholly effective only over his personal subjects in the crown-lands or *mābat* as they are called, and the independence openly claimed by the chief of Khārān is little more than an extreme case of the independence now enjoyed by the tribal chiefs in all parts of the country. The most numerous race is the Brāhūi, and this is the race to which the ruling family belongs. In some tracts the Balōch are in the majority, in others the Jatt. There are four or five persons to the square mile in the state as a whole. But the density is so unevenly distributed, varying from 23 in the Kachhī to but 1 in Khārān,

Kalāt	359,086
Brāhūi	138,591
Balōch	83,432
Dahwār	6,712
Jatt	60,238
Others	70,093

is little more than an

	Density
Kalāt	5
Sarāwān	12
Jhalawān	4
Kachhī	23
Dōmki-Kahērī	17
Makran	3
Khārān	1

that it is well to say a word or two about each of the main divisions.

47 In olden days all Kalāt or rather the whole Brāhūi Confederacy was divided into two divisions only: the tribesmen of Sarāwān, who lived up-country to the north of Kalāt, and the tribesmen of Jhalawān, who lived down-country to the south, the Kachhī was divided between the two of them. In its 5,230 square miles, accordingly, Sarāwān of to-day retains but a portion of its former magnitude. It is a highland country, in general character not unlike Quetta-Pishin: its valleys lie between 5,000 and 6,500 feet above the level of the sea, the most majestic peak among its mountain-ranges is Kōh-i-mārān, 'the hill of the snakes,' which reaches up to 10,730 feet. In the centre of the valleys, some of which are spacious and broad, the soil is remarkably fertile, and the wheat, tobacco and orchards of Sarāwān are famous throughout the country, for though the rainfall is scanty as everywhere in Balūchistān and the large dry-crop area accordingly seldom yields a full out-turn, there is a good deal of permanent cultivation by means of *kāñēz*, springs and streams. With the exception of the Kachhī plain and the connected Dōmki-Kahērī country, Sarāwān is the most prosperous and thickly populated portion of the state. The Brāhūis are of course in the great majority, but many of them

Sarāwān	63,781
Brāhūi	47,816
Balōch	2,097
Dahwār	6,537
Others	6,731

still cling to the pastoral pursuits of their fathers, and much of the development of the country has been due to the husbandry of the thrifty Dēhwar

Jhalawān.

48 In fact though nature has doubtless treated Jhalawān with a far more niggardly hand, it is quite possible that the real reason for the vast difference between its poverty and backwardness and the development and prosperity of Sarawān lies in the presence of the thrifty Dēhwar in the one and his

absence from the other. No one at any rate can help being impressed by the palpable fact that the Jhalawān, partly from innate laziness, partly from ignorance, fails to make the most of his country. Much of the

cultivable area to be found in the valleys between the mountain-ranges and on the *bars* or flats along the river-courses is either left uncultivated altogether or is merely scratched. It is true the Jhalawān can plead a scanty rainfall and the scarcity of permanent water the sole means of irrigation at his command are a very few *kīrās*, a few streams, and any channels he can dig at favourable places from the rivers of which moreover not one has a continuous flow of water throughout its course. A race of husbandmen would doubtless make light of many of the difficulties. But it is perhaps not surprising that a race of nomad pastoralists like the turbulent though hardly warlike tribesmen of Jhalawān should find little inducement in their mountainous country to beat their swords into ploughshares and to turn their shepherd's crooks into spade handles, more especially when they have eked out their pastoral life from time immemorial with a winter migration into the plains. As it is, Jhalawān remains a poor country at best though it is possible that the census figures, taken in a year which was bad from many points of view give an unduly unfavourable impression of the sparsity of its population (§ 61)

Kachhi.

49 An amazing contrast confronts us when we turn to the Kachhi, those much prized war lands of Sarawān and Jhalawān both. Here the mountains are left behind for a vast alluvial plain, which except for one small group of hillocks does not rise above 500 feet at its highest point. Hardly anywhere is the rainfall so scanty but even complete failure is not very disastrous so long as there has been enough rain in the uplands to bring down the Nāri and the Bolān and the Māla and the Suklāji in full flood, to be dissipated in numberless channels over the country or brought on to the fields by an ingenious system of dams. So fertile is the soil that it is indeed a bad year when three crops are not harvested. The autumn harvest, which consists chiefly of a *jowār* justly renowned for its excellence, is the most important of the three. Given good rains as well as good floods, prosperity smiles on the land large areas are reclaimed from the seeming desert and there is an abundance of forage and grazing not only for the live-stock of the country itself—for the far famed Rind and Magasi breeds of horses and the equally famous Bhāg Nāri and Bālā Nāri breeds of bullocks—but also for the camels and sheep and goats which in the winter are brought down in their thousands by the Brāhūis from the uplands. But if the rain fails both in the uplands and the Kachhi itself the only refuge from the certainty of scarcity and the probability of famine is a wholesale

Kachhi	22,790
Brāhūi	4,145
Baloch	24,572
Jat	43,103
Others	14,037

migration into Sind. Though all the Brāhūi tribes are supposed to own war lands in the Kachhi, few Brāhūis actually live here all the year round the scorching heat of the summer is little to the liking of these mountaineers. The most important elements among the permanent inhabitants are the Magasi and Rind Baloch, of whom the former are still reckoned with Jhalawān and the latter with Sarawān. More numerous still are the Jat who are to be found everywhere as cultivators.

Dōmbki-Kachhi country

50 The Lahri *waddat* commonly known as the Dōmbki Kachhi country is an integral part of the Kachhi, and has only been separated from it for census purposes because of the peculiar nature of its administration for whereas the Kachhi is treated in the same way as the rest of Kalāt, the general control of the Dōmbki Kachhi country is vested in the district officer of Sibi. It is unnecessary to describe it it resembles the rest of the Kachhi in its main features. What the Bolān, the Nāri, the Suklāji and the Māla are to the Kachhi, the Lahri and the Chhattar

Dōmbki-Kachhi country	22,260
Brāhūi	4,147
Kachhi Sayyid	9,0
Jat	12,563
Others	6,514

and many smaller hill-torrents are to this portion of it. The chief inhabitants are the Dömbkī and Umrānī Balōch, the Kahēri, who were lately content to be reckoned as Balōch but have now blossomed forth into Sayyids (§ 281), and the Jatt

51 As for Makrān (or to be precise Kēch-Makmān, in distinction to the Makrān Makrān across the Persian border) I am almost tempted to echo the Lament of Sinān Ibn Selāma "Thou shewest me the road to Makrān, but oh! the difference between an order and its accomplishment! Never will I set foot in a land whose very name strikes terror within me!" Whatever the origin of the name—and there is a wilderness of guesses to choose from *maka-aranya* or the waste of Maka (and of course either the Maka of the Behistūn inscription or the Mekia of Herodotus or the Makara of the Dravidians), the land of Mokrān the great grandson of Noah, *mā-kēiān* or the land by the sea, *māhi khurān* or the Ichthyophagor or fish-eaters, the land of *maki* or deceit—Makrān, has had an evil reputation from time immemorial. To the ancient Greeks, to whom it was known under the name of Gadrosia, it seemed a waterless waste of sun-scorched sand, across which Alexander deliberately chose to pass his army simply to prove, as Arrian puts it, that he could succeed where Cyrus and Semiramis had failed before him. In the Arab chronicles it is commonly described as a vast country, mostly barren. Among natives of other parts of Balūchistān a two-year sojourn in it is regarded as docking ten years off life. Along the grim sea-coast life is barely possible except for a few fisherfolk. Inland the country is gridironed across by three ranges of hills, which enclose valleys of varying width, rising in elevation as the coast is left behind. Though the rainfall is scanty, damp fogs are so frequent and mosquitoes so abundant that every native of the country equips himself with mosquito curtains against both as a matter of course. The rivers are more often dry than not, but they carry heavy floods, and, more important still, leave behind frequent pools of water which are drawn off for irrigation. These pools with a few streams and a hundred odd *kāiēz* (or *lahn* as they are called in Makrān) are the only sources of irrigation, outside Kēch and Panjgūr they are rarely to be found at all. Elsewhere most of the cultivation is dry-crop, and more than usually precarious owing to the capricious nature of the rainfall. The real harvest of Makrān, that which provides food for man and beast during the greater part of the year, is the date-harvest. There are date-trees studded up and down most parts of the country, the richest and most famous groves are those of Panjgūr and Kēch. The population is sharply divided into three layers of society: first the *hākīm* or dominant landowning families, which consist of the Gichkī and Naushērwānī (§ 269), and the Mīrwārī and Bīzānjau Brāhūis; then the Balōch or middle-class cultivators—for the word Balōch has none of the proud ring in Makrān that it has in eastern Balūchistān (§ 268), and finally the *hizmatgār* or menials.

Makrān	71,942
Balōch	35,789
Brāhūi	9,167
Mīd	405
Others	26,491

52 When we pass northwards over into Khārān, there is little change in the general conditions, and what there is is hardly for the better. The greater part of the country is one vast plain, which lies about 1,600 feet above sea-level towards the west, and rises some nine hundred feet higher to the east. Into it drain the many streams that run off the surrounding hills. There are some goodly patches of cultivation near the skirts of the hills and along the Māshkēl and Baddō rivers, but an enormous part in the centre, known as the Lut or Rēgistān, is a dreary ocean of shifting sand. There are rich date-groves in Wāshuk and Māshkēl, but wheat is the staple food of the country. The whole country is ruled by the Naushērwānī chief, and the population is divided into the Naushērwānī, the dominant race, and the Balōch (with whom are classed some miscellaneous groups), and the menials.

Khārān	22,663
Balōch	10,484
Brāhūi	7,700
Others	4,479

53 If the petty state of Las Bēla can hardly be regarded as typical of Balūchistān, it contains many of its characteristic features in little. It is mountainous on the east and to the north; in the centre it is flat and low-lying, sloping to the sea; towards the west it stretches out for miles along a narrow strip of coast as barren as that of Makrān. There are several rivers and mountain-torrents, but though their floods are diverted by dams for irrigation, nearly all of

them are dry for the greater part of the year. There is one large lake often as dry as the river-beds. The people are an unusually mixed lot in fact the tribal

Low RRA	21,886
Lal	28,400
Dehli	8,047
Mā	1,000
Others	24,232

system seems hopelessly moribund. The dominant class of Lal is divided into five groups known as the *panj rāj* which consist of the Jāmōt (to which the ruling family of the Jām belongs) Rānjha Angaria, Bāra and Shākh (§ 270). There are a fair number of Brāhmins, chiefly in the north the fisherfolk along the coast are Mād (§ 293). The rest of the population is largely composed of servile or menial elements. There are about nine persons to the square mile in the state as a whole. But the density varies considerably in the various parts, and is at its height in the well cultivated Wālpāt *siābat*. As the rainfall even at its best seldom exceeds seven inches, the country frequently suffers from drought, which drives the poorer classes wholesale over into Sind.

Summary.


54 Having hurried through the various districts and states we may now glance back at the country as a whole. Its most striking characteristic is unpeopled vastness—a vastness to which its estimated area fails to do justice. For in its reputed 181 038 square miles no account is taken of the mountainous superstructure reared on their surface. How far it affects the area, there seems no way of ascertaining at any rate I have been unable to cajole the merest guess out of the survey department. But if these mountainous piles add enormously to the vastness of the province, their barren ruggedness goes far to explain the extraordinary sparsity of the population. And sparse though the population is—so sparse that I can hardly bring myself to talk of

density in Balūchistan without an apology—there is a pretty general consensus of opinion that it is about as much as the country under present conditions could support. It is not easy to say how far this opinion is correct. A sceptic might possibly seize upon the not inconsiderable exports of grain from the Kachhi and Mastung (only to be exchanged into luxuries—not necessities—of life) as an argument against it and to rebut this argument one might speciously point to the imposing imports of food stuffs without which the alien population, and the Quetta town in particular could hardly subsist. But these vexed questions of economics may be left to sophisters, economists and calculators. The real assumption at the back of the opinion that the country is severely taxed in supporting its present population is that all the available perennial water is already used up as far as existing methods can use it, and that the only prospect of any expansion in the irrigable area lies in a change of those methods themselves. But though this may be substantially true of the districts, I very much doubt whether it is true of the native states. There has certainly been a considerable extension of the *kārs* system of irrigation and a consequent expansion of cultivation even in backward Jhalawān during the last few years, and the *kārs* resources of the country are far from being fully tapped. Not that I have any wish to attempt to prove too much. In one form or another density and rainfall are very closely correlated nearly everywhere in Balūchistan. Where conditions are favourable, as in the Kachhi density varies with the amount of land that can be brought under cultivation, and this in turn varies very largely with the amount of rain that falls, not necessarily in the particular locality but in the surrounding uplands. But in less favoured parts, in Khāran for instance or Western Santrāl, rainfall is not merely a matter of cultivation it is a matter of life or death. If the rains fail, there is no water for man or beast and both must wander on until they find it. The nomadism of a large number of Balūchistan's inhabitants is after all less a habit than a necessity. And though there are signs of change in the air nomadism to a greater or less degree is still so prevalent that an analysis of the density in the various districts and states and divisions is true only for the particular season of the particular year when the census was taken. Thus if the density of the Kachhi in the scorching summer months is 23, it must be at least half as much again when the bitter cold of the uplands drives the Brāhmins down-country. A scanty and precarious rainfall, scarcity of cultivable land and perennial water extremes of heat and cold—these are factors which will long make tribesmen cling to their

Though the regular census was carried on the night of the 10th March 1911, most of the synchronous census are carried in the previous summer.

BALŪCHISTĀN

SHEWING DENSITY



nomadic habit, and the only thing that is likely to bring about a wholesale change in their mode of life is government irrigation on a large scale

Towns, Villages, Houses.

55 Though there are nine towns included in our tables, most of them are only towns by courtesy. In fact the only unimpeachable towns among the lot are Quetta and Sibī, and the former at any rate is almost entirely the creation of British rule. And whereas Loralai, Fort Sandeman and Chaman are in some ways characteristically urban, they are after all mere garrison towns that have sprung up during our occupation. Kalāt and Bēla owe their place in the category more to the fact that they are the capitals of the two native states than to anything else. For Bēla is nothing but an overgrown village, the numbers of which are inflated by the inclusion of surrounding hamlets. Kalāt simply consists of the Khān's *mīrī* or castle and a largish but half-empty bazaar, whose rows of deserted shops witness pathetically to a bygone prosperity, that has passed over chiefly to Quetta, but partly also to Mastung, now the most thriving township in the state. Were it not for its hoary historical associations, Pishin, the ancient Fushan, would not have figured among the towns at all, and it has recently fallen into such decay that it looks as if it would have to drop out of the list at the next census. Such being the nature of our so-called towns, there would be something unreal in any conclusions we might attempt to draw from the proportion of rural and urban elements in the population of the province, and a crude comparison between the reputed urban populations at this census and the last would be hopelessly fallacious, seeing that Kalāt, Bēla and Mastung have been treated as towns for the first time in their history, though they had just as much claims to the title at the last census. But we may safely commit ourselves to this: the proportion of tribal inhabitants our towns contain is in inverse ratio to their urban character. The average tribesman still looks upon a town as a mighty poor place for his family to live in, yet an excellent place in which to secure temporary employment for himself, especially in government service.

Urban population	
Baluchistan	64
British India	11
Europe	01

56 How little attraction town-life has for the tribesmen becomes clear on an analysis of the population of Quetta, by far the largest town in the province. To its population of 33,922 the indigenous Pathān, Baloch and Brāhūī contribute no more than 1,127. Small though this figure is, its real significance only emerges when we divide it up between the two sexes, for there are but 385 females in the lot. Even though we assume (and we have of course no right to do so) that all the women are permanent residents of the town, this in itself is a pretty clear proof that when the tribesmen shift into the towns, their move is generally a temporary migration of individuals in search of employment. While the whole population of Quetta has increased by 9,338 since the last census, the tribal element in it has merely increased by 88. With the rapid development of the capital of their province into a thriving mart and an imposing cantonment, the military strength of which is second to none in India, the tribesmen have clearly had very little to do. And this development is much more remarkable than the census figures indicate. For the census was taken in the off-season when everybody tries to flit from the winter cold. One has only to glance at the margin, where the results of the census are compared with the results of an enumeration undertaken three summers before, to appreciate how thorough-going this winter exodus is. If we assume (and I see no reason why we should not) that the summer population to-day is at least as great as it was three years back, the winter flitting affects no less than one-fourth of the whole population. And as Quetta is in no sense a summer resort, its normal population must be regarded as much nearer forty-five thousand than the thirty-four thousand actually found in it at the time of the census. Yet Quetta a brief generation ago was a cluster of mud huts sheltering round a ramshackle fort.

	Quetta	Town	Cantonments
August '08	45,570	21,129	21,441
March '11	33,922	17,021	10,001
Winter shortage	11,648	7,108	4,540

Villages.

57 Not only are the tribesmen no lovers of town-life, very many of them are not even villagers. In saying this I may seem to be flying in the face of the statistics, but it is only in rare cases that the statistics are concerned with villages in the ordinary sense of the word. Wherever the country has been parcelled out into revenue villages, we followed the very artificial but orthodox procedure current elsewhere in India and treated the revenue village as our unit, but as often as not a revenue village is not a village at all but a collection of more or less unconnected hamlets. In the native states where there are no revenue villages, we endeavoured to bring about uniformity by bunching hamlets up together. But even in the districts there was nothing for it but to class as villages a number of localities—possibly altogether innocent of permanent inhabitants—which are regularly occupied by large groups of people at certain seasons of the year. And the result is necessarily so chaotic that we can hardly hope to glean much enlightenment from the number of the so-called villages in the tables. It is far more to the point to glance at the classification of the villages according to the size of their population. Here it is the smallness of the average village that at once strikes the eye, a smallness all the more remarkable because the average village is not a village in the English sense of the word but a cluster of several hamlets, ninety per cent of the villages into which the whole country has been divided contain less than five hundred inhabitants. For several reasons it is hardly possible to compare these figures with the figures of the last census. But it seems worth while to jot down a few impressions on the subject I have got by coming up with the people. British rule seems to have affected village-life in curiously different ways. In the Pathan country concentration into rudely fortified villages was more or less essential in the old days as a safeguard against attack and the peace that British rule has brought with it has usually led to a partial break up of the villages into several smaller hamlets. In the Kachhi, once the happy hunting-ground of the dreaded Mar and Bugti marauders, concentration was on a larger scale still, and the first-fruits of the *pac Britannia* was the springing up of smaller hamlets at the expense of the parent village but of late years the parent villages have been regaining much of their lost ground, partly as a consequence of healthy natural growth fostered by the increasing prosperity of the country partly by recruitment from people hitherto nomadic. In the Brâhûi country tribal warfare was more parochial and conducted according to more gentlemanly rules. It was war of tribe against tribe for tribal honour and glory not for plunder. Villages were deliberately avoided, even by those who were not pastoral nomads. They were useless as walls of defence for women and children were inviolate in tribal warfare, and the proper place for these non-combatants when the tribesmen were on the war path was the fastnesses in the hills. They were sources of weakness and not of strength, for the greatest possible disgrace in a tribal feud was to have one's village burnt by the enemy. In the Brâhûi country accordingly British rule has had the effect not merely of enlarging the few existing villages but of causing hamlets to spring up where there were none before. In Alakran, unlike Kalât proper an assault on a fort or a siege appears to have been among the regular tactics of tribal warfare. Every petty chieftain had his little fort to which his people flocked for refuge when an attack was threatened. But no chief ever allowed any one else to build a fort or even a mud hut if he could help it, not only because he was jealous of his prerogatives, but also because the mud hut might fall into the hands of his enemy and make it the more difficult to dislodge him. With the advent of our rule times have changed, and there are now mud huts everywhere. Speaking broadly I fancy that though the growth of village-life will be slow it will be sure from now onwards. Different conditions will doubtless give rise to different results. But the most notable trend of evolution, as pastoralism gradually gives way before agriculture will probably be from tents all the year round to mud huts in the winter from mud huts to hamlets, from hamlets to villages. Migration into towns will only be general when the tribal system falls hopelessly into decay.

Towns.

58 The mere mention of tents will have made it obvious that the term house is used in our tables in as wide a sense as the term village."

It includes not only houses of sun-dried bricks rarely to be found outside the towns, and the mud huts of the villages, but also *ghuggi* or summer shelters made of branches, and mat tents, known among Pathāns as *kighd'i* and among the Brāhūis as *gidān*, and even holes in the hillsides—in short any place where man can lay his head. It is only among the more progressive and well-to-do that sun-dried bricks are used in the construction of a house. Most villagers build their walls of stones and mud, athwart are laid rafters of any wood that is locally procurable, the roof consists of matting generally made of *pīsh* or dwarf-palm leaves, and on top are dumped thick layers of plaster. But certain Umrānī Balūch in the Kachhī deliberately refrain from plastering their roofs, because they assert (and who shall give them the lie?) that one of their forefathers died under a plastered roof. The ordinary village hut is a very primitive affair—four walls and a roof, likely enough there is no door, a hole in the wall covered with a strip of matting doing service instead. As for repairs, even the well-to-do seem to have an inveterate dislike to them. Many a chief takes pride in raising imposing edifices for himself, but once raised, they are allowed to fall gradually into ruins. In the colder parts of the country, like Kach Kāwās in the Sibi district, the huts are often built into a hollow in the ground, and the roof is made on the slope for the more easy removal of the snow. A *ghuggi* or summer shelter is easily made by driving a few poles into the ground and covering top and sides with strips of matting or with reeds or branches. Though it is a cramped abode, it affords a cool and pleasant refuge from the heat and mosquitoes in the villages, especially if there is water handy to sprinkle over it. But perhaps the most characteristic dwelling in Balūchistān is the *gidān* or *kighd'i*, which ordinarily consists of a few bent poles covered over with matting made of goat's hair. But those who live in *pīsh* growing areas generally make their *gidān* of *pīsh*, which if less warm than goat's hair is much less expensive. How chary the people are of changing their ways may be seen by the fact that though the Mardōi Mēngal Brāhūis near Kāhōzdār in Jhalawān have built several mud huts on their rain-crop lands, they use them almost entirely as barns or cattle-sheds, and only shift out of their *pīsh gidān* if the weather turns unusually cold. The chief has lately built himself a spacious fort, the ladies of his household still prefer to camp out in the courtyard.

59 In Balūchistān as a whole there are not quite five persons to each house or tent. But if we exclude the urban areas and thus exclude most of the abnormality arising from the artificial conditions in which aliens live, the house-population goes up to just over five. It makes little or no difference if we split the province into districts and states, the result remains much the same in both. There is even a remarkable uniformity throughout the various minor divisions, with two exceptions. In the Bōlān, the house-population all but drops to two, in the Marī-Bugtī country, it all but rises to eight. The explanation in the former case is obvious enough, the tiny population of the Bōlān is largely composed of alien railway employes living a life of solitude in gang-huts. In the Marī-Bugtī country conditions of course are perfectly normal, and the unusual size of the household (which also manifested itself at the last census but not to the same degree) seems clear proof that the joint-family still thrives in these Balūch tribes, for in Balūchistān the term 'house' really covers the household, representing as it does the members of a family that live under the same roof and take their food from the same hearth. But statistics based on localities are a little dangerous after all—even the Marī-Bugtī country is not inhabited by Marī and Bugtī alone. So we took the trouble to pick out 8,258 indigenous families at haphazard from all parts of the province and examined them by race and tribe. And our labour was certainly not misspent. Even the bare summary in the margin is not without significance, it is interesting, for instance, to learn that the average Balūch family is 7 persons strong and beats the average Brāhūi household by two. But anybody who has the curiosity to turn to the subsidiary tables for the detailed results, will find more abundant and more serious food for reflection. He will discover, for instance, that there is one disturbing factor that has to be discounted in these statistics—the size of a Balūchistān household is often swollen by servile elements who are

House population.

House-population	
Balūch	7.1
Lānī	6.8
Jatt	5.6
Pathān	5.2
Brāhūi	5.1
Sayyid	4.5
Mēd	4.3
Sikh	5.1
Hindu	4.6

members of the household but not members of the joint family in the proper sense of the word. And here what will probably strike him most is the absence of servile dependants among the Pathāna. To one who has the preservation of ancient social ties at heart, a much more significant feature in the statistics is the great contrast between the size of the family among the Mari (13.2) and Bugti (7.9) and the smallness of the family among their fellow Baloch (4.2) in the west—in some measure I cannot doubt a direct reflection of the robust vigour of the tribal system in the one and its hopeless decay in the other.

SUBSIDIARY TABLES.

I.—Distribution of the Population Classified by Density.

DISTRICTS AND STATES	TABLES SET, WITH A POPULATION PER SQUARE MILE OF									
	Under 5		5—10		10—15		15—20		20—25	
	Area	Population	Area	Population	Area	Population	Area	Population	Area	Population
BALUCHISTAN										
Districts										
Afka-Pishin	88,219	213,072	21,695	172,001	13,709	103,053	1,111	70,838	5,220	118,310
Baluchistan	657	257	161	207	101	196	12	92	19	111
Dera Ismail Khan	25,500	34,069	14,503	111,000	8,179	100,172	3,052	53,205	1,109	25,581
Dera Ghokhi										
Dera Gaudan										
Dera Ismail Khan	2,576	1,216								
Dera Ghokhi										
Dera Gaudan										
Dera Ismail Khan	10,622	16,314								
Dera Ghokhi	3,392	14,109	3,570	20,657	1,929	22,725			1,111	25,581
Dera Gaudan									1,109	25,581
Administered area										
Marr Bugji country	3,392	14,109	3,570	20,657						
States										
Baluchistan	62,629	170,003	7,132	61,205	5,230	63,781	1,359	23,513	4,060	92,750
Dera Ismail Khan	62,629	170,003			5,230	63,781	1,359	23,513	4,060	92,750
Dera Ghokhi										
Dera Gaudan										
Dera Ismail Khan	20,795	84,399								
Dera Ghokhi										
Dera Gaudan										
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III.—Urban and Rural Distribution.

DISTRICTS AND STATES.		TOTAL RURAL POPULATION PER VILLAGE		NUMBER PER HILL OF URBAN POPULATION RESIDING IN TOWNS WITH A POPULATION OF		NUMBER PER HILL OF RURAL POPULATION RESIDING IN VILLAGES WITH A POPULATION OF	
		Town	Village	Town.	Village	Under 5,000	Under 5,000
BALUCHISTAN							
Districts							
Quetta Pishin	6,618	210		71	929	769	195
Loralai	8,268	233		120	880	681	133
Zhab	12,224	220		57	711	0.5	
Bolan	2,936	175		7	671		
Chagai	3,391	241		14	602		
Sibi	6,607	313		50	1,111		
Administered area	6,597	225		50	929		
Mari Bagti country	563				1,000		
States							
Kalat	3,317	104		24	970		503
Sardawan	3,172	193		19	981		731
Jhalawan	3,473	177		109	891		731
Kacchi	201				1,000		
Dombki-Kaheri country	167				1,000		
Malran	1,070				1,000		
Kharan	169				1,000		
Las Bela	252				1,000		
Total	3,000	197		19	951		47

IV—House-population among the Indigenous Population
(8,258 houses examined)

All indigenous.	House- population.	Family	Sexes dependants.
Baloch	71	64	7
Barkere	81	76	5
Marl	133	133	2
Bugli	97	79	18
Rind	13	14	19
Mogul	57	50	41
Khetria	57	57	—
Wostera	23	19	21
Brakhi	51	5	1
Bardol	81	5	1
Shakwial	57	57	—
Kakhat	55	52	4
Jhalanda	51	50	1
Mumand	51	5	1
Zahri	41	43	1
Paithan	52	52	—
Kilay	46	46	—
Paqi	54	56	—
Yark	5	5	—
Idari	56	54	1
J H	56	553	56
Mud	43	42	1
Muyyid	45	44	1
Hindin	46	46	563
Sikh	51	51	—

CHAPTER II

VARIATION.

Statistical data

Subject	TABLES		
	Imperial	Provincial	Subsidiary
Variation in general	II		
Subdivisional variation		I	
Urban variation	IV		
Variation in density			V
Racial variation			VI
Racial variation by districts and states			VII
Fecundity of marriage			VIII

60 Though this is the third census undertaken in Balūchistān, it is any-
 thing but easy to measure the rise or fall of the population from one census
 to another. Before we can indulge in the luxury of drawing comparisons at
 all, we must be in possession of like to compare with like. But not only are

Comparison with
 past results
 impossible

Area		POPULATION		
		Total	Estimated	Enumerated
1891	20,508	171,752	142,473	29,279
1901	52,950	810,746	459,728	351,018
1911	134,338	834,703		834,703

there huge gaps between the areas censused on the three occasions, there is a world of difference in the various methods of enumeration adopted and the degrees of efficiency attained. The census taken twenty years ago was so fragmentary, its methods so primitive, its results so unconvincing that, though I have fought against the temptation to leave it alone altogether, I find it the best policy to succumb. The flimsy and uncertain information that might be won from it would not be worth the elaborate and bewildering calculations I should have to work out and the reader would have to unravel. And great as was the advance that was made ten years later, nearly two-fifths of the country were left untouched. It might be thought that the exercise of a little ingenuity was all that was required to bridge over the hiatus. Unfortunately, the population of considerably more than half the area censused—and still more unfortunately the population of just that portion of the country which ought to serve as a guide for the population left unnumbered—was calculated on very rough and, as it usually proved, very sanguine methods. And if we leave census failings on one side and turn to the real causes which make for an increase or decrease in the population, to wit the ratio of births to deaths, of immigration to emigration, we are almost as much in the dark as we were before. Apart from a very sketchy registration of births and deaths in Quetta itself, registration is unknown in the country, and there is nothing to take its place but what can be gleaned from such vital statistics as we had time to collect from heads of families (§ 67). Nor are we on much firmer ground when we pass on to the ratio between immigration and emigration. Simple though the sum appears to be, it contains one known quantity only. For while the volume of the flow of immigration is easily measured, we can only make a guess at the ebb of emigration (§ 68).

61 It will help us in groping our way through the uncertainties that
 surround us to analyse the population into its main component elements. The

Threefold
 population.

chief interest centres throughout round the true indigenous inhabitants of the country—the tribesmen, and their satellites, the Lari, the Delwār the domiciled Hindus and the rest. At the opposite pole stand those who are unmistakably aliens in an alien land—Europeans, Anglo-Indians, and orientals from this or that side of the Indus. And midway between these two classes are people who might fairly be lumped up with the aliens, and yet have some show of claim, grounded in the present or the past, to be treated as indigenous inhabitants. Typical of this class are the Ghilzai Pathans from Afghanistan and the Buzdar Baluch from the Panjab. For not only have the Ghilzai been wont from time immemorial to pass through Baluchistan on their annual migration into India a goodish number sojourn here for the winter and a few have recently come to stay. And though the Buzdar tribe is now settled in the Panjab it was of course once indigenous to Baluchistan—several members still keep up a temporary connection with the old country while a few families seem to have returned for good. Those and others like them I have accordingly treated apart, and have divided up the whole population of the country into indigenous, semi-indigenous and alien inhabitants. It is a little difficult at this eleventh hour to apply the same classification to the population of the last census, but I fancy we have got round the obstacles sufficiently well to justify a broad comparison between the results on the two occasions.

62. The threefold classification is especially useful when we turn to the districts. Take the districts *en bloc* or take them piecemeal—in either case there is an increase over the population of ten years back. It is hardly profitable to examine the several districts in any detail. There was a wholesale redistribution of administrative charges shortly after the last census, and though we have done what we could to readjust the population among the newly constituted districts of Zhōb, Lōralai and Sibi there is every reason to fear that we have not met—and could not meet—with full measure of success. But apart from this, much of the district population is of a floating character moving freely not only across the border and back again, but also from one district to another; and where the population is so fluid, it is idle to linger long over a rise or fall that may be literally ephemeral. Nevertheless some little light is shed on the meaning of the variations in the several districts by an analysis of the three elements in the population. How unevenly these have contributed to the increase of 8.5 per cent in the districts as a whole is seen clearly enough from the margin.

Variation.		
Districts	Absol.	Percentage.
Indigenous	17,081	5.6
Semi-indigenous	2,416	5.2
Aliens	+ 6,908	14.3

The indigenous population the into of increase has been modest enough. The semi-indigenous population, on the other hand, appears to have gone up by leaps and bounds, materially affecting the variations in Lōralai, Zhōb and Quetta-Pishin, where it chiefly dispenses itself. But this great influx has probably been more apparent than real—a more consequence, that is, of better enumeration, which could hardly have greater scope than among the wandering Ghilzai, who form the bulk of this element in the population. The increase among the aliens, though less marked, is still considerable, and unquestionably a good deal more genuine. Nearly the whole of it has occurred in Quetta-Pishin, where the aliens have been responsible for almost half of the goodly increase of nearly 12 per cent in the district population. On paper Lōralai shows a substantial increase of over 18 per cent—an increase much too good to be true, and in itself a very pretty proof of our faulty readjustment of the figures for the last census. Much of the increase should clearly be handed over to Zhōb, which otherwise appears to have been almost stationary spread over the two districts, it would work out to over 9 per cent. But some of it should probably go to the Sibi district as matters stand, the administered area simply shows an increase of about 5 per cent (representing 4,436 souls) which is more than accounted for by an increase of 2,046 in Sibi town and a remarkable but fictitious jump of 2,632 in the Kohli sub-*taluk*; the simple explanation of which is that at the last census the Mari colony in Kohli was lumped up with the population of the Mari Bugti country—yet another proof of the danger of placing blind reliance on the internal variations in the province. Thrown back at this census on its own resources,

the Marī-Bugṭī country not unnaturally finds it hard to show any advance at all. The Bolān, on the other hand, can boast an increase of over 8 per cent, but its population still remains microscopic. In Chāgar there has been a nominal increase of 4 per cent, that it can show an increase at all is simply due to the fact that Western Sanjānī, now censused for the first time, is included in its total. Had it not been for the bad season which sent many of its inhabitants out of the district, I should have anticipated a much larger increase, not so much as a result of better enumeration (for though Chāgar was merely subjected to a rough estimate at the last census, rough estimates in Balūchistān have usually overshot the mark) as on account of the strides this district has been making towards development during the past ten years.

63 The threefold classification is of little use when we turn to the states. Here the population is almost entirely indigenous. Nor do I put much faith

	Variation	
	Actual	Percentage
States	- 8,319	- 1.0
Indigenous	- 10,531	- 2.5
Semi-indigenous	+ 973	+ 610.1
Aliens	+ 1,209	+ 89

in the apparently enormous increase of the inconsiderable semi-indigenous and alien elements, for the excellent reason that the census of 1901 was a more estimate in which the non-indigenous elements ran the greater risk of being overlooked, because it was based (partially in Las Bela and wholly in Kalāt) on figures supplied by the tribal chiefs and headmen of sections. And in the nature of that estimate lies the secret of the seemingly serious decline in the state population, a decline all the more marked as half the state area was omitted from the scope of the last census. The explanation of this apparent decline is after all simple enough. Asked to furnish the number of fighting men at their command, chiefs and headmen would have been either more or less than human to have withstood the temptation of putting their numbers at the highest possible pitch. The more out of the way the tribe, the more would the chief be emboldened to pile on the agony. Nothing, for instance, would be more natural than for a chief of Jhalawān to exaggerate unblushingly, where a chief of Sarāwān would have to stick pretty close to actual facts for very shame. Equally natural would it be to find exaggeration much more frequent in the Brāhūī country, where tribal organisation is still strong, than in the Kachhī, which is largely inhabited by Jāt, who have become so split up that they can hardly be said to have any real tribal organisation at all. In fact where tribal bonds are loose or lacking altogether, it is not exaggeration of numbers that an estimate based on the assumption of the existence of such bonds is likely to produce, but wholesale omission. This or something like this was clearly the chequered history of the census of 1901 in the various parts of the country to which those methods were applied.

64 The estimates for Jhalawān were suspect from the beginning. They were regarded as inflated not only by the district officer, but by the officials primarily responsible for them. My predecessor, however, while recognising the possibility of exaggeration in individual cases, came finally to the conclusion that the figures had not been vitiated in any serious degree, and saw confirmation of his conclusion in the discovery that the density in Jhalawān worked out to very nearly the same figure as the density in Sarāwān. And here he unwittingly put his finger on a very telling proof that his conclusion could not hold water. For that Jhalawān is incomparably more thinly populated than prosperous Sarāwān, there is no possible question. How gradually and grudgingly we have come to realise the extraordinary dearth of inhabitants in many parts of this vast province may be traced in the successive attempts that were made to gauge the population of the three tracts omitted from the operations of the last census. Working on the analogy of Chāgar, my predecessor assessed the population of Western Sanjānī at over nine thousand souls, a couple of years later he found cause to cut down his estimates to six thousand, the writer of the district gazetteer would not commit himself to as many hundreds. More interesting still is the case of Khārān and Makrān. On the basis of the density in the Marī-Bugṭī country my predecessor assessed their population at 229,655, as soon as he was able to have a rough estimate made on the spot, the figures went down with a bang to 97,800, and big though the drop, the total is still some three thousand in excess of the figures for the

present census. Now if we could assume that in 1901 the same degree of error crept into the rough estimates of Jhalawān as into the rough assessments of Kharān and Makrān and could assume further that the forces that make for progress and decay had operated evenly during the past ten years in all three parts of the country the present-day population of Jhalawān would pan out to 93,300 souls, as against the 81,305 actually enumerated at this census. And though it is hardly more than a coincidence, I am inclined to think that this figure would not be very wide of the mark. The district officials, it is true, seem fairly confident that our census netted in pretty nearly all there were to be found in Jhalawān. But parts of this somewhat backward tract were in so troublesome a condition as to make it probable on the face of it that a fair number of the inhabitants escaped enumeration. It is at the same time almost certain that there had recently been a considerable exodus from the country to avoid not only the political trouble but the prevailing scarcity. Thus we should not be far wrong if I fancy in reckoning the actual population of Jhalawān in 1911 at about 90,000, and its potential population in a good and peaceful year at about 100,000. But if I am not mistaken, Jhalawān is nowadays slowly draining into Sind (§ 78) and unless conditions take a turn for the better it may be long before Jhalawān sees 100,000 inhabitants again. Even in Sarawān, which is much too well known from end to end for the chiefs to have launched out into wild over-statements of their tribal strength like the chiefs of Jhalawān, there appears on paper to have been a slight drop since the last census. On the other hand there appears on paper to have been a gigantic increase of over 40 per cent in the low lying plain composed of the Kachhi and the Dōmbki-Kahārī country. Such an increase can hardly be genuine even though this plain is acutely sensitive to the nature of the seasons and was certainly in much better case during the present census than it was ten years before. I have no doubt that a very large proportion of the apparent increase is simply due to the facts that many of its tribal inhabitants were lumped up at the last census with their tribes in Jhalawān and Sarawān, and that hundreds of Joff and others of similar character were overlooked, simply because enumeration on a tribal basis breaks down hopelessly when it is applied to people who have lost their tribal organisation.

65. We need waste little time over the petty state of Las Bela. Most of its inhabitants are less unruly and less unsettled than the tribesmen of Kalat and it was found possible in a largish portion of its area to conduct the former census on more orthodox and trustworthy lines. Not that the whole of the apparent increase of nine per cent in its population from the one census to the other can be placed to its credit. Something at any rate must clearly be put down to a more effective enumeration. Nevertheless, though there is nothing in the economic history of the past ten years taken by themselves to explain a rate of increase which, even after due allowance is made on the score of better enumeration, remains at a figure abnormal for Balūchistan, it becomes explicable enough when it is remembered that at the date of the last census the state was only just beginning to recover from a bout of scarcity long drawn-out, and had not had sufficient time to attract back the many hundreds of its inhabitants who had taken refuge in India.

66. The more clearly the nature of the problem is realised, the more hopeless it appears to attempt to measure the increase or decrease that has occurred in the population of Balūchistan during the last ten years. Where—as in a large portion of the district area—there was a reasonable amount of uniformity in the methods adopted at the one census and the other some allowance at any rate ought to be made for the palpable improvement that has come over those methods. Where the methods were widely different—and even the districts had their roughly estimated areas in 1901—much greater allowance ought to be made for errors of exaggeration and the lesser errors of omission. In dealing with areas that have never been censused before, we are of course thrown back on sheerest conjecture. It is idle to enter upon a disquisition on the economic conditions that prevailed before the last census and in the ten years that followed. For large numbers of the people never stay in the country to see the lean years out. On the first symptoms of scarcity they decamp wholesale, and abroad they remain till they get news of better times

in their own country. In other words, adverse conditions have little permanent effect on the population, they simply lower it for the time being. It is only when dire calamities come suddenly and act swiftly that the people are baffled in their attempts to escape, and from such—save for a fierce outbreak of cholera in Makrān and a terrible earthquake in the Kachhī—Balūchistān of recent years has happily been spared. It is more to the point to take a broad view of the conditions that prevailed during the census operations of 1901 and 1911. In the Pathān country conditions were much the same in 1911 as they were in 1901, in the Jhalawān part of the Brāhūī country they were a good deal worse, in the Lāsī and the Jatt and the typically Balōch countries—that is to say, in Las Bēla, in the whole area occupied by the Kachhī plain, and in the Maii-Bugti country—they were distinctly more favourable, in Ohāgai they were distinctly worse. As Makrān, Khārān and Western Sanjrānī were not censused in 1901, comparisons are a little irrelevant, but it may be said that Makrān was certainly not at its best, that Khārān was unusually well populated, and that Western Sanjrānī seems to have been as full—or as little empty—as it ever is. This hasty review is in itself enough to show how dangerous an artless comparison of the two sets of statistics would be, even if there had been no gaps in the last census and its methods of enumeration had been above reproach. Amid so much that is doubtful, guess-work is really vain. But if guess I must, the convenient guess that is nearest to hand will do as well as any other. It is quite possible that if the total for 1901 is held to cover not only the portions that the last census professed to cover but also the portions that it left untouched, it is about as near

Variation		
	Actual.	Percentage
Balūchistān	+ 23,957	+ 2.9
Indigenous	+ 8,550	+ .9
Semi indigenous	+ 9,389	+ 58.6
Aliens	+ 8,018	+ 16.4

as we are likely to get to the true facts for 1901. That the alien population has increased with great rapidity is a demonstrable fact, it must not be assumed that it will be able to keep up the same pace much longer. In all probability the explanation of the great increase in the semi-indigenous population lies largely in the fact that we were more successful than our predecessors in enumerating the elusive Powindahs. As for the tribesmen and other indigenous peoples, the very general impression is that they are barely holding their own. If one year finds more in the country than another, this is simply because large numbers of them are nomadic—or to use their more expressive term, *khāna-ba-dōsh*, 'house-a-back'—people ready to shift in or out of the country at a moment's notice, as conditions change for the better or the worse.

67 It will be many a long day before we can put this general impression to the test of vital statistics. In the absence of any registration of births and deaths outside Quetta town, we utilised the census machinery to ascertain from 6,641 fathers in all parts of the country the number of children that had been actually born to them and the number still alive. The results of our enquiry are summarised in a table at the end of this chapter, the gist of them is given

Average family per father		
	Births	Survivals
All	5.9	3.6
Balōch	6.5	4.1
Brāhūī	4.8	3.0
Pathān	6.0	3.4
Lāsī	5.6	4.2
Jatt	5.8	3.9
Sayyid	5.4	3.3
Miscellaneous	6.0	3.9
Hindus	5.2	2.8

in the margin. But the statistics must be read with some reservation. Our enumerators unfortunately ignored sterile unions as irrelevant to the object of the enquiry. Nor were they able to make any nice distinction between the issue of an only wife and the issue of a plurality of wives, contemporaneous or successive. Not that sterile unions appear to be common in this country, when they do occur, they are usually short-lived. If the husband is palpably the one to blame for the childlessness of the union, the wife appeals to the elders for a dissolution of the marriage, if the wife is the one at fault, the husband takes to himself another wife—to beat the first withal, as the proverb says. And though the average tribesman usually marries again if his first wife dies, probably not one in a dozen takes a second wife if his first is alive and has borne him children. The fathers of course were of all ages, some no doubt were in the vigour of manhood, others must have had a foot in the grave.

Vital Statistics.

There is in consequence considerable disparity in the ages of the surviving children. In a word, the general purport of the statistics is nothing more than this 9,011 fathers, taken at haphazard from among the indigenous population in all parts of the country were found to have had 38,912 children of whom 28,637 were still alive and in considering these statistics we have to make allowances for the omission of sterile unions on the one hand, and on the other for the fact that several unions had not reached the maximum of their fecundity. It ought to be possible to weave many a pretty theory out of the various figures that go to the making of this result. But I have been unable to stumble across any statistics exactly comparable, and am thus in the ignominious position of having to leave to others the task of gauging the precise value of my contribution to the problem. I hardly like to commit myself to more than the general conclusion that the fecundity of the average marriage in Baluchistan seems respectably but hardly surprisingly high. Of the various races the Baloch are the most prolific with 0.5 the Brahûls are the least prolific with 4.8. If we analyse the birth-rate by localities, Makran comes out an easy first with 7.8, and this has had its effect in raising the Baloch figures. Sarawan and Jhalawan, the heart of the Brahûl country is a bad last with 4. As for infant mortality in Baluchistan, it is very commonly believed to be appalling but whether this is borne out by our statistics, which show that 387 out of every 1,000 children have predeceased their fathers, I hesitate to say for several European countries a few decades ago could cap our dismal figure with a somewhat analogous and an even more dismal death rate under the age of five. In Jhalawan however the children seem to die off like flies, for not one in two was found to have survived its father and as the birth-rate itself is painfully low the outlook would be hopeless indeed, were it not for the consolation that it would take a much larger set of statistics than those before us to drive home the mournful suspicion that the peoples of Jhalawan are rapidly dying out. This then is the conclusion of the whole matter though a man of Baluchistan can reasonably hope to beget a goodly family of 5 or 6 children he cannot look to see more than 3 or 4 survive him. And this is surely a very meagre surplus margin to carry on to the next generation, seeing that it has to replace the man and his wife or wives, sterile unions and deaths before maturity. So meagre is it that to say that the tribal population is standing still, is possible to overstep the mark.

SUBSIDIARY TABLES

V.—Variation in Relation to Density

NOTE.—The 1901 census was largely based on estimates, which were for the most part unduly sanguine, on the other hand vast areas were omitted. As these two factors possibly balance one another (§ 66), no adjustments have been attempted in this or the following tables

District or State	MEAN DENSITY PER SQUARE MILE		Percentage of variation, 1901 11 Increase + Decrease—
	1911	1901	
BALŪCHISTĀN	6 19	6 02	+ 2 95
Districts	7 64	7 05	+ 8 45
Quetta-Pishin	24 45	21 86	+ 11 68
Lōṛālai	10 78	9 08	+ 18 20
Zhōb	6 82	6 76	+ 0 92
Bōlān	5 93	5 48	+ 8 26
Bōlān	0 83	0 79	+ 4 17
Chāgar	10 46	10 03	+ 4 31
Sibi	21	19 86	+ 5 69
Administered area	4 78	4 72	+ 1 19
Marī Bugṛī country	5 23	5 33	— 1 94
States	4 90	5 03	— 3 60
Kalāt	8 58	7 86	+ 9 08
Las Bēla			

VI.—Racial Variation.

RACE	1911						Variation, 1901 11 Increase + Decrease —
	REGULAR CENSUS			TRIBAL CENSUS			
	Persons	Males.	Females	Persons	Males	Females	
BALŪCHISTĀN	63,007	49,271	13,736	771,696	417,148	354,548	+ 23,957
Indigenous	8,447	6,505	1,942	743,947	401,258	342,689	+ 6,550
Balōch	1,158	889	269	168,032	91,070	76,962	+ 68,960
Brāhūī	1,478	1,146	327	166,314	91,949	74,365	— 124,482
Paṭhān	3,499	2,983	561	184,594	99,210	85,384	+ 5,019
Lōṛī				27,779	14,857	12,922	+ 1,162
Jatt	432	324	108	77,965	42,346	35,619	+ 19,005
Sayyid	238	202	36	21,058	10,806	10,252	+ 6,696
Other Muslimān	906	518	388	81,162	41,949	39,213	+ 30,579
Hindu	783	481	252	14,252	7,641	6,611	} — 439
Sikh	8	7	1	2,791	1,480	1,361	
Semi-indigenous	2,570	2,133	437	22,841	12,634	10,207	+ 9,389
Balōch	18	11	7	3,076	1,709	1,367	+ 1,405
Paṭhān	2,552	2,122	430	19,765	10,925	8,840	+ 7,984
Aliens	51,990	40,633	11,357	4,908	3,256	1,652	+ 8,018
European	4,210	3,382	828				+ 731
Anglo Indian	123	64	59				+ 1
Oriental	47,857	37,187	10,470	4,908	3,256	1,652	+ 7,286
Trans-Indus	6,379	5,332	1,047	761	464	297	
On Indus	41,278	31,855	9,423	4,147	2,792	1,355	

VII—Racial Variation by Districts and States.

Districts and States.	T. L.	Indigenous.	Semi-Indigenous.	Albin.
DAKUCHISTAN	22,837	6,530	9,389	8,018
Districts	+ 32,398	17,081	+ 8,418	8,809
Quetta-Pishin	13,861	4,114	2,864	6,903
Bolton	189	111	—	71
Chagai	643	—	49	120
Lahore	+ 17,870	12,812	4,804	512
Thak				
Salt				
States	+ 8,349	+ 10,531	+ 973	1,899
Kash	—	12,415	+ 1,081	2,063
Las Hila	2,004	+ 6,090	—	181

VIII—Fecundity of Marriage

(Age of the ad. persons per cent.)

PARTICULARS	Number of fathers.	Number of births	NUMBER OF BIRTHS			Average births per father.	Average survivors per father.	Deaths per mille births.
			Total	Non-adult.	Adult.			
DAKUCHISTAN	6,641	38,913	22,837	13,853	9,984	5.0	3.0	3.87
Districts	4,328	21,818	18,964	9,323	9,641	5.0	3.0	3.06
Quetta-Pishin	694	4,271	2,123	1,314	771	6.1	3.8	4.16
Lahore	1,121	6,817	3,936	2,413	1,523	6.2	3.8	4.23
Thak	710	4,513	2,745	1,875	870	3.6	2.5	3.05
Bolton	120	664	330	207	123	8.2	2.6	6.03
Chagai	303	1,363	762	541	221	8.6	2.4	3.77
Salt	864	4,906	3,061	1,939	1,122	5.7	3.6	3.60
Kash-Baghi country	278	2,135	1,715	806	909	6	4.7	2.13
States	2,415	12,964	8,773	4,580	4,193	5.8	2.6	3.78
Kash	2,544	12,819	7,830	4,093	3,747	5.7	3.5	3.61
Swatland	277	1,861	1,093	615	478	4.1	2.7	3.61
Thakland	228	8,02	394	211	183	3.8	1.8	1.23
Kash	623	4,123	2,973	1,134	1,839	6	2.7	2.51
District Kash country	317	1,804	1,098	570	528	5.1	2.9	3.61
Malak	836	4,190	2,808	1,238	1,570	6	4.3	3.91
Kash	705	3,17	477	269	208	5.1	2.9	3.65
Las Hila	171	1,145	521	471	56	6.7	5	1.53
(II) By race								
Muslims	6,381	37,832	22,851	13,430	9,421	5.9	3.0	3.21
Beloch	1,828	10,836	6,47	3,40	3,077	6.3	4.1	3.00
Brick	661	4,270	2,077	1,364	1,053	4.8	3	3.73
Farhan	2,154	12,840	7,736	4,996	2,741	6	3.4	4.29
Lah	87	404	308	216	152	5.6	4.2	3.41
Jat	720	4,245	2,436	1,364	1,072	5.3	3.9	3.21
Sayid	429	2,330	1,414	901	513	6.4	3.3	3.03
M. wallaween	303	1,115	710	406	304	6	3.9	3.60
Hindu	260	1,600	886	453	433	5.2	2.6	4.73

CHAPTER III

MIGRATION.

Statistical data

SUBJECT	TABLES		
	Imperial	Provincial	Subsidiary
Birthplace	VI		
Race	VIII		
Domileem		I	IX
Birthplace in Sind			X
Loss and gain over "migration"			VI

68 In departing from the orthodox method of gauging the ebb and flow of migration by the statistics of birthplace, I have been largely influenced by the uneasy feeling that birthplace is a singularly treacherous guide to rely upon after all. Stated in the rough, the theory seems to be simply this: that persons enumerated in one province but born in another are emigrants from the latter to the former. On this theory all migration difficulties at once resolve themselves into a delightfully easy sum of addition and subtraction. Take

Census population 834,703
 Subtract "immigrants" 58,500
 Add traceable "emigrants" 76,273
 "Natural" population 852,476

the population actually enumerated in the province, subtract the population born elsewhere, add the population born in the province but absent at the time of enumeration (but how you are to get the figures from Afghānistān or Persia, for instance, I cannot tell you), and you arrive at once at the so-called natural population—the population of the province purged of its alien immigrants and with its absent emigrants restored to it once more. A very pretty theory this, but one that will never reflect the real facts of life so long as immigration and emigration exist. For until migration ceases, there will always be people born where, according to the theory, they should not be born—outside their mother country. I freely admit that errors will tend to adjust themselves where emigration and immigration are fairly equal in volume, I admit also that birthplace statistics may be put to other and more legitimate uses. But I cannot help thinking that, if we frankly laid ourselves out to collect statistics not of birthplace but of mother country, we should get much more useful results. And the results, I fancy, would be much more trustworthy at the same time. As it is, I have a shrewd suspicion that birthplace statistics in India are plentifully adulterated with statistics of mother country. In the primitive society of Balūchistān, at any rate, mother country is so uppermost in the minds of the people that it naturally prompts their ready answer to a question about birthplace. Better still would it be to collect statistics of birthplace and mother country both¹, the people would then know what we were driving at, and we ourselves could tackle the statistics without the uncomfortable feeling that we were racking them beyond their legitimate uses. As a guide to emigration, birthplace statistics are a makeshift at best, only to be pressed into service in the absence of something better. In Balūchistān we have no need to rely on such a broken reed. Here there is a great gulf-fixed between aliens and the true natives of the country,

Birthplace no
 criterion of
 migration.

¹ An alternative suggestion that involves no change in the standard schedule is put forward in the footnote at page 46

and it will probably be many generations before it is bridged. Race, and race alone, suffices (except in a few very special cases) to weed out the immigrants and to sift the whole population into three heaps—Indigenous, semi-Indigenous and aliens (§ 61).

69 And, truth to tell I have discarded birthplace for another and a very different reason. While in the regular areas we fell into line with the rest of India and recorded birthplace as a matter of course, we were faced in the tribal areas with the obvious difficulty of recording the birthplace of individuals on a schedule which applied to the family as a whole. Had the matter been of vital importance, we could, I dare say have found a way round the difficulty. But if birthplace is of little value in tracing the movement of aliens into the province, it is of still less value in tracing the movement of the indigenous population from one part of the province to another. So shifting are many sections of the indigenous population, that what is true of it in the spring is almost certainly wide of the mark in the summer or autumn or winter. Where movement is so common, local knowledge—backed as we took care to back it, by general statistics of nomadism (§ 71)—is a much safer guide to the many channels in which it flows than any bookish comparison between birthplace and the place of enumeration at some particular date. And this constant movement is itself a factor which in some ways would tend to invalidate birthplace statistics in direct proportion to their accuracy. For the winter exodus of the Brāhūis to the plains, for instance, would be marked by births all along the march, and Quetta and Bolān and Sibi and Las Bela would be accredited with more Brāhūis than is their proper due. Not that scrupulous accuracy could be expected. Strange though it may seem to us, many a tribesman would be at a loss to give the birthplace of all the members of his family. It would not seem strange to the tribesman himself, whose life is often spent in one long weary tramp—here to-day gone to-morrow. And even if his poor memory found room for such worthless lumber as the precise sites of the various and, very possibly nameless localities where his offspring first happened to see the light of day, what should he know of their position in the several districts whose boundaries belong for the most part to the artificial geography of British administration? Thus all that seemed really necessary in the tribal areas was to record the birth place, first, of those whose race stamped them as aliens, then of Hindus and others who (as far as race went) might or might not be natives of Baluchistan, and finally in a few special cases, of tribesmen who were enumerated in some part of the country with which they had no recognised concern. In other words, not only did we assume that all members of races and tribes indigenous to Baluchistan were actually born in Baluchistan, and ignore the existence of inevitable exceptions to the general rule, like births on the other side of the Afghan frontier or births in Sind during the winter migrations of the Jhalawān Brāhūis down-country, we also assumed that all members of races and tribes indigenous, in some sense, to the district in which they were enumerated, were actually born in that district, and ignored the existence of inevitable exceptions to the general rule, like births in the course of wanderings outside it. In either case the exceptions, though common enough, are mere accidents; had they been recorded, we should have had to exercise a deal of caution in groping our way through the treacherous fog of statistics.

ing as a
population.

70 Probably no feature of Baluchistan life impresses a new-comer more forcibly than the apparent fact that the population, such as it is, is always on the move. If he travels through Zhōb and Lōralai at the fall of the year he will come across swarms of Afghan Pōwindahs on their yearly journey into India, shedding some of their numbers here and there to seek pasturage during the winter within Baluchistan itself. If he travels up the Bolān, he will have to thread his way through a moving mass of Sarāwān Brāhūis, leaving their native highlands with their wives and their children, their flocks and their herds, for the warmth of the Kachhi. And if he travels up the Mūla or any of the other passes to the south, he will be met by hosts of their Jhalawān brethren, wending their way into Sind. These are extreme cases, where whole masses of the population move down-country like a slowly advancing glacier. But wherever he travels, he will—if only he travel long enough—come across families camped in blanket-tents, or living in temporary huts made of bark or dwarf palm leaves or similar material, or even sheltering in holes in the hillside.

And if he chance to revisit the spot a short while later, he will find the tents gone, or their places taken by others, and the huts maybe abandoned, and the holes tenantless. As for the permanent villages which jostle one another on the maps, he will look for most of them in vain. Even in the more settled parts of the country many of the permanent villages he descries from afar are permanent only in the sense that the same structures on the same sites serve as dwelling-places year after year - to night there may be no room for the traveller to sleep in, to-morrow, before he awakes, half the inhabitants may have flitted, to summer abroad in the open. Now and then he may be drawn to a village of fairish size, only to regard it as a village of the dead, until he stumbles up against a few unfortunates who have been left behind to look after the crops.

71 If the picture appears to be overdrawn, it is well worth while to glance Nomadism.

Tribal Census.	
Total	577,379
Settled	106,175
Not settled	471,203

at the bald figures in the margin. They are the gist of not the least important of the special statistics we collected in the tribal census. Of the total population netted in by that census, only 54 per cent spend their days, year in, year out, in a permanent dwelling. Thirteen per cent divide their time between life in a village and life in the open. As many as 33 per cent have no roof worth the name to bless themselves with at all. Significant though these figures are, they lose nothing in significance when it is remembered that they relate not to individuals but to whole families of men, women, and children, and that they include neither temporary migrants who were censused in the regular areas within Bīlūchistān or in India, nor the swarms of nomad families who had wandered into Afghānistān and Persia owing to the drought. Even more significant do they become with a little sifting. A large proportion of the settled population is taken up by the Jatt, Dhawār, Hindu, Sayyid, and other satellites or parasites of tribal life. If we wish to examine the mode of life of the true tribesmen of the country, we must leave these out of the count, and turn to the Brāhūi and the indigenous Balōch and Pathan. Among these, nomadism still claims no less than 10 in every hundred as its own, 18 are now wavering in their allegiance, only 12 have freed themselves wholly from its thrall.

72 The migrations of the three peoples have much in common. All its causes three are largely seasonal migrations. All three are migrations not of casual individuals but of whole families. At bottom all three are induced in a greater or lesser degree by three interrelated causes—extremes of heat and cold, pastoralism, lack of perennial water and cultivable land. Put in a very general way—there will be enough evidence brought forward presently to check the generalisation—it may be said that the Brāhūi is affected in the main by the first of these causes, the Balōch by the second, and the Pathan by the third. Though the world itself has scarce bounds for the adventurous spirit of the individual Pathan, the Pathan family of this country (in striking contrast to the Powindah) rarely wanders far from home. The Balōch, if we take the Mai or Bugī as typical, circles round and round his own country, only occasionally leaving its limits for Sind or the Panjāb, except of course under the pressure of drought. Home-keeping though the Brāhūis are, it is they who are perforce driven furthest afield in their wanderings.

73 Among Pathāns nomadism flourishes in many forms. There are Pathan nomadism nomads pure and simple, living wholly on their flocks, constantly moving their *hildā*¹ or blanket-tents from place to place in search of pasture and more congenial climates, but usually keeping pretty close to the same old beaten tracks.

Pathāns	
Nomad	21
Semi nomad	33
Settled	46
	100

More characteristic of Pathan nomadism are the semi-nomads. Of these, large numbers live partly on their flocks and partly on agriculture—some relying more on the former, some more on the latter—and usually quit their blanket-tents for huts on their fields in favourable seasons of the year. There are others, dependent almost wholly on agriculture, who possess lands in different parts of the country, and shift their quarters with the different sowing and harvest seasons. Then there are villagers who leave their villages in the

¹ The percentages in this and the following paragraphs necessarily relate to those censused in the tribal areas only. There is nothing to show the mode of life of the few thousand tribesmen censused in the regular areas: it would certainly be rash to assume (though it was found convenient to do so in Provincial Table I) that all or even the majority of them are settled.

warmer months and squat on their fields close by where some live in *high*7, others in summer shelters most of these last have doubtless been returned as settled. Over and above all these there are of course temporary migrants, drawn chiefly from the settled classes, who wander off to India or Afghanistan in search of labour and trade. That the Kšai is the only tribe of any importance in which all the tribesmen are settled is a suggestive commentary on the nomadic character of the Pathāns of this country. The varying degrees of nomadism in the larger tribes are given in a table at the end of this chapter. An analysis of the figures in any fulsome would be a very laborious undertaking. Happily there is no need to attempt it. The details are of hardly more than local interest; their main features are fairly familiar to local officers and to map out the itineraries of the several tribes would be to cover ground that has already been worked elsewhere. One or two facts, however should be borne in mind. On their seasonal movements, tribes cross and recross from one district to another the general trend being from the uplands to the lowlands in winter from the lowlands to the uplands in summer. Moreover these movements sometimes extend beyond the confines of Balūchistan either into independent territory as in the case of the Shirani, or into Afghanistan as in the case of the Achakzai and the Barēch. And lastly although one type of nomadism may seem more characteristic than others in some particular tribe, other types exist almost always side by side with it.

74 Of the Pathāns known as Powindah, *puṇḍā* or "nomads *par excellence*" I need say little. Though Balūchistan has been one of the regular stages on their annual migrations from time immemorial though several of them treat it

Powindahs.	
Known	61
Semi-known	3
Settled	11
	75

as their journey's end, some never going further south, a few never going further north and though a small colony of refugees has taken up its abode in Balūchistan apparently for good, the Powindahs as a body hail

from Afghanistan and are hardly to be classed among our indigenous inhabitants. Chief among the clans that visit us year by year are the Sulamānkhal, the Nāsar the Kharōṭ, the Tarak and the Andar—Ghilzai all, it would seem though in a recent authority¹ the term appears to be more especially confined to the Sulamānkhal. They first begin to swarm into Balūchistan in October and gradually spread over the northern districts. Thence the main body moves slowly on into India. Here they pass the winter grazing their flocks in the plains, bartering furs and dried fruits and other goods brought from the highlands, plying their camels for hire, or engaging in manual labour. Towards the beginning of March the first stragglers re-enter Balūchistan on their homeward journey. But with the Powindahs who extend their migration into India, our statistics have little to do for we took pains only to enumerate those who actually wintered in Balūchistan and the few early stragglers who had already passed up from India by the date of the census. Thus, nearly all our nomad and semi nomad Powindahs (to use a tautology) are at least semi indigenous to Balūchistan the "settled" Powindahs (to use a contradiction in terms) are members of the tiny Ghilzai settlement.

75 There is a smaller degree of nomadism among the Balōch than among either the Pathāns or Brāhūis. This is chiefly due on the one hand to the settled

Balōchs.		
	Eastern.	Western.
Known	30	30
Semi-known	4	6
Settled	57	55
	91	91

character of the Sind and the Magahi and the other tribesmen who have colonised the plain which stretches over the Kachhi and Nasrabād and the Pūmbki Kahari country and on the other to the more unstable yet settled character of many Balōch in Makran, where

there are a fairish number of permanent villages and a still larger number of temporary hamlets, which are regularly shifted at periodical intervals. But these Balōch of the east and west are no longer true to the ancient Balōch spirit, that spirit of unfettered pastoralism that inspires many a famous ballad —

For a fort the Balōch has his hills !
 If that wind-catching mansion is grander ?
 If white sandals he has for a steed,
 In his brother a sword and defender

For the old-fashioned Balūch we must turn to the Marī and Bugtī, the great majority of whom never sleep under a roof, but move up and down their country with their flocks, rarely resting a week in the same encampment. Most of their movements are confined to their own tribal limits, but there is a seasonal overflow into Sibi and into neighbouring districts in the Panjāb and Sind, while several Marī pay regular visits to the Kōhlū valley, where some families have even settled for good. Or we must go to Khārān, where the ancient nomad spirit is still strong—so strong, indeed, that I fancy that many of the tribesmen who have been returned as settled are really semi-nomads who only live in permanent villages for a few months in the year. Even Makrān, with its large proportion of settled Balūch, is the scene of constant movement. Some of the tribesmen spend their life circling round and round within a limited beat, others wander all over the country. The very fisherfolk on the coast are infected with the wander-spirit when the date-harvest of Kēch and Panjgūr is in full swing. During the whole four months of that rich harvest both these favoured spots are centres of attraction to men, women and children, from far and near. And apart from nomadism altogether, the individual Makrāni shares with the Pathān the distinction of being the most adventurous traveller beyond the borders of Balūchistān.

76 More interesting and in some ways much more important than the nomadism of the Pathān and Balūch is the winter migration of the Brāhūis into the Kachhī and Sind. This seasonal migration must be as old as the Balūchistān hills themselves, life would hardly be possible for man or beast

Brāhūis.
Nomad
Semi nomad
Settled

60
13
27
100

without a refuge from them in the rigours of the winter. Yet it is probable enough that the tide sets to-day in a very different direction. The streams must once have run northwards into Afghānistān—there are still plenty of Brāhūis in Shōrāwak—and westwards into Persia, for the easy channels that

now lead into Sind and the Kachhī (which of course was once a part of Sind) were long blocked at the mouth by a hostile power. But a vigorous body of nomad tribesmen could not be debarred indefinitely from the promised land that lay within such easy reach. It was no mere motives of ambition or aggrandisement or territorial greed that made the Khāns lead their tribal hosts time after time against Sind. The Brāhūi swarms were borne down into the plains by the irresistible force of gravity. No, I think, shall we read traditional history aright, unless we regard the earlier at any rate of the much-fabled expeditions against Sind, not as organised expeditions at all, but as futile attempts, often frustrated and as often renewed, on the part of small nomadic groups to win pasturage for their flocks in the genial plains that lay at their borders. Not that it was by their own prowess that the Brāhūis at length wrested the long-coveted Kachhī from Sind. It fell to them almost by accident, when things looked blackest. Their warrior hero Mir Abdulla, who of all men seemed destined to lead them into the promised land, had fallen in battle with the Kalhōra of Sind, and the remnants of his shattered army had fled to the hills. But a greater power now appeared on the scene, greater than either Kalāt or Sind. And as soon as Nādir Shāh set foot in Sind with his all-conquering army, Nūr Muhammad the Kalhōra threw himself on his mercy. The story goes how Nādir Shāh sent Nūr Muhammad laden with chains to Nasir Khān's tent, and bade the Khān slay the Kalhōra and so avenge his father's death. But the Khān, to his deathless renown and, as it turned out, to the lasting gain of his countrymen, sent the Kalhōra away with a robe of honour. "I'm a mere Brāhūi," he explained to Nādir Shāh, "too faint-hearted to butcher my enemy in chains." "And by the by—" he added, "a poor Brāhūi can ill afford a *shalvār*, or pair of breeches." So Nādir Shāh took the hint and gave him the Kachhī as his *shalvār*. And to this day, a Brāhūi talks of the Kachhī as Abdulla Khān's blood-money or as Nasir Khān's *shalvār*, and whenever he is asked why he is off to the Kachhī, he will say it's to get him a new *shalvār*.

77 The Khān reserved a goodly portion of the Kachhī for the ruling house, and divided the rest between the Sarāwān and Jhalawān tribes, allotting

Sarāwāns migrate to the Kachhī, Jhalawāns to Sind.

¹ As a matter of fact, it was not Nasir Khān but his brother Mahabbat Khān who was actually ruling at the time, but the former's presence in the camp is enough to make the Brāhūi regard him and not his worthless brother as the hero of the episode.

to the former the lands towards the Bolan and to the latter the lands towards the Jhalawân hills. The initial division of the spoil may have been fair enough, but the fact remains that the Sarāwāns are to-day in happy possession of the lion's share. More enlightened then as now than their brethren of Jhalawân—thanks very largely to closer touch with the wider world—they apparently had no time in getting their Jaffi vassals to improve the lands they had acquired, and seized every possible opportunity to slich still more from the lands reserved to the Kāhān, with the result that they now possess not merely rich culturable lands but—what is almost of greater importance to the tribesmen at large—ample tracts of pasture. So firm a footing have the Sarāwāns gained in the Kachhi that it takes an exceptionally bad season to force them to extend their winter migration in any numbers beyond its limits. It is otherwise with the Jhalawāns, next-door neighbours to the Kachhi though many of them are. And the difference in the past history and the present stage of development of these two great branches of the Brāhūi Confederacy is mirrored in the

	Sarāwāns.	Jhalawāns.
Now all	3	18
Season-bound	2	5
Settled	2	20
	(100)	(100)

that though most of the chiefs have Kachhi domains to which they themselves resort, the Jhalawān tribes at large have been gradually elbowed out of the Kachhi, and are driven by the inhospitable nature of their Jhalawān hills to seek a winter home in Sind.

Jhalawān
migration to Sind
becoming
permanent.

(8) Nothing in the emigration statistics can vie in interest with this Jhalawān migration into Sind. As the Bombay figures of race and birthplace give us a very vague idea of it I had the less scruple in bothering my courteous colleague in Bombay for duplicate slips of the 60,850 Brāhūis enumerated in Sind. It is a pity that the various tribes to which these Brāhūis belong were not recorded: among the lot there must be a sprinkling of Sarāwāns, possibly even of people who in Baluchistan would not be reckoned as Brāhūis at all, on the other hand, I have little doubt that many Jhalawāns (and indeed other Brāhūis) might have been found masquerading as Balūch (§ 277). But with all their shortcomings, the statistics doubtless give us in the rough a fairly faithful picture of the Jhalawān migration. Look at the picture from whatever stand-point I will, it seems to have the same tale to tell—that the once purely seasonal migration is tending to become permanent, that Jhalawān is slowly but surely draining into Sind. Take first and foremost the way that the numbers of Brāhūis in Sind have been going up by leaps and bounds in the last twenty years. To-day there are more than twice as many as there were in 1891, in the last ten years alone they have increased by over 12,000. A flood of light would pour on to the statistics, if we could compare the relative numbers of those who returned Sind and those who returned Baluchistan as their birthplace at each succeeding census: unfortunately the figures for the present census are the only ones on record. Birthplace divides the sixty thousand odd Brāhūis now enumerated in Sind almost half and half between the two countries. This might be thought a very natural reflection of the way that the Jhalawāns divide their time between this country and that. But apart from the fact that they actually spend much more of the year in Baluchistan, patriotic Brāhūis (as I know by experience) are far more likely to give Baluchistan than Sind as the birthplace of their Sind born children, simply because birthplace conveys to their mind not so much place of birth as mother country (§ 68). In short, I am inclined at the outset to read a good deal of permanent settlement into the figures of those Brāhūis who are supposed to have been born in Sind: to regard them in the main as a catalogue not merely of Brāhūis actually born in Sind but of Brāhūis who, wherever born, have now settled in Sind for good and all. This may seem a daring generalisation, but that there is something in it may be seen from the highly significant way in which birthplace

My experiment might be worth more extended trial. One would simply have to copy the entries of persons born in India but not in the province of enumeration on duplicate slips, tear off the duplicate and send these to the province of birth. Should this be too much of a good thing, the procedure might at least be adopted for any particular caste or tribes in which the various provinces are specially interested.

divides these Sind Brāhūis all down the line in matters of sex-proportion, civil condition, language literacy and occupation. Take sex-proportion, for instance. Among Sind Brāhūis as a body, there are 800 females to every 1,000 males. Divide them up according to birthplace and the proportion among the Sind-born jumps to 865, among those born in Baluchistan it drops to 758. There must be some very potent influences at work to produce so wide a discrepancy, influences much more far reaching than mere accident of birthplace. Take language. For every Brāhūi in Sind who talks Sindhi, there are roughly four who speak Brāhūi. Divide them up by birthplace for every Sind-born Brāhūi who speaks Sindhi, there are but two who speak Brāhūi, yet for every Baluchistan-born Brāhūi who speaks Sindhi, there are nine or ten who still speak their mother tongue. Clearly no accident of birthplace can explain away discrepancies such as these, or the similar discrepancies that might be traced in other branches of the statistics. We are here face to face with no mere casual migration, but with a migration that in a large part has already developed into permanent settlement. The crude figures of language and race

	Sind	General
	Brāhūis	Brāhūi speakers
1881	7,127	1,000
1901	17,200	2,000
1921	25,000	2,500

are enough to show that this must be so. Just look at this amazing paradox: in the last twenty years the Brāhūis in Sind have more than doubled their numbers, yet the Brāhūi language has not even held its ground, in the last ten years alone the Brāhūis have gone up

by well over 26 per cent, yet the Brāhūi language has gone down by 10. To me these figures came as a revelation. Consciously though I was that Brāhūi must almost inevitably succumb if brought into real and lively conflict with Arvan languages, I little thought it would succumb so swiftly and seemingly without a struggle. Consciously though I was that Sind was luring Brāhūis away from their own country, I little thought that Jhalawān was veritably draining into Sind

Influences at work

79. And the explanation? Well, a searching analysis of the many causes that are bearing to the self-extinction of the Jhalawān would probably carry us far afield. Yet it is not difficult to picture the gradual stages by which a typical Jhalawān settles down in Sind. Visiting Sind winter after winter, he may well come to look upon it as a land of ease and drawsherd after his own inhospitable mountain country. Things that he learns to treat as necessities in Sind, at home are luxuries, things that are pleasant luxuries in Sind, at home he has to go without altogether. And a change comes over his whole standard of living accordingly. To-day it irks him to be clothed as his chief was clothed a couple of generations ago, to-day he has no stomach for the handful of parched wheat which was once his only provision on a journey, he must needs have his ball of leavened dough, his slice of mutton and his pit of butter. Small wonder that, once having tasted of the flesh-pots of Sind, he is loth to quit that pleasant land. After all there are few temptations for him to shift. Labour is abundant, judged by his humble standards, it is highly paid, and—better still—though many kinds of labour are beneath his dignity at home, in Sind his dignity is no man's business but his own. At first, perhaps, he simply intends to drag out his stay in Sind a few months longer than usual, but the more he puts off the evil hour, the more difficult he finds it to tear himself away. And if in the end he can resist the call of his hills no longer, the dreariness and the hardships of the old home-life come back to him with doubled force on his return. It is not only the slothful ease and the fine food and fair clothes that he misses, crushed by the demands of his tribal chief (for unlike his brother of Sarāwān he usually has to pay revenue to his chief—no one seems to know why) he yearns for his untroubled life in Sind, where he was free to go his own way so long as he kept on the windy side of the law. If this is indeed a faithful picture of the typical Jhalawān's progress, it is a foregone conclusion that the last scene of all will see him settled in Sind—lock, stock and barrel. And every Brāhūi family settled in Sind is a loadstone for others. This, to be sure, is one of the most characteristic features in the past and present history of the Brāhūi settlement in Sind. It began ages ago when a few Brāhūi families acquired plots of land on the canals, and speedily found themselves the centres of attraction for their kith and kin. To-day this process of attraction often takes a more peculiar form. Many a Jhalawān on his winter wandering finds it hard to resist the temptation of marrying off his

¹ The race figures for 1881 are unfortunately not on record.

women at a high bride-price to some Sindhi husband. But bride-price is not the only thing that he has in his eye. If the Sindhi husband fancies that, once having married the lady and paid up like a man, he is quit of her family for good and all, he is mightily mistaken. Her kinsmen and kinswomen unto the third and fourth degree will hang like a millstone round his neck. For what says the Brāhūī proverb? Never spread out your rug save where you intend to lie upon it.

Emigration to India.

80 Of the volume of emigration to other parts of India we can get some sort of inkling from the statistics of people born in Balūchistān but enumerated in other provinces. Precise enough in themselves, the statistics are of course far less illuminating than they seem. They profess only to persons enumerated elsewhere whom birthplace—not necessarily birth—marked out as natives of Balūchistān. Birthplace was the sole determining factor race and mother country went by the board. At one time the net must have been cast too wide, at another drawn too close we have doubtless had thrown a back on us several whose one accidental concern with Balūchistān was that they happened to be born in it we must have been deprived of others, true sons of Balūchistān though they were because they happened to be born outside it. Of other disturbing potentialities in the statistics I will mention but one. That an Afghan must be a native of Afghanistan may well have seemed to an enumerator in some distant corner of the Indian Empire as self-evident as that a Balūch must be a native of Balūchistān. In either case he would be sorely tempted to take the answer regarding birthplace for granted and who shall blame the overworked man for falling into the temptation, when question and answer had to be banded to and fro in mutually unintelligible languages? And the very large majority of cases where Balūchistān pure and simple, and not some particular district in Balūchistān was put down as the place of birth, makes me suspect that the temptation proved irresistible often enough. But it would be ungenerous to look a gift horse too closely in the mouth. We must take the statistics for other provinces as we find them, merely tempering our faith in the happy knack of largish numbers to round themselves with the mental reservation that these and other sources of error must be at the bottom of any returns in which local knowledge seems to scent out something wrong.

The chief directions.

81. A case in point is the Hyderabad State notoriously a happy hunting ground for huckstering Sayyids and Pathāns of Pashān, which has returned a paltry total of 181 persons born in Balūchistān a goodish number of those shown as born in Afghanistan have probably never set foot in Afghanistan at all. Possibly an example of the reverse is to be found in Baroda for what 41 natives of Balūchistān were doing there, I cannot imagine there were none ten years ago. I am told that there were 11 solitary females from Khāshān enumerated in Bengal I should be sorry to believe it. To the 39 males in the Andamans we must regretfully plead guilty. But those, like the 20 in Kashmir and the 30 in Burma, and the 120 in Madras even the 1,064 in the Central Provinces, are mere dribblets after all. It is more interesting to follow up the broader streams of emigration that flow into the provinces on our borders. The volume of emigration into the Panjāb and the North West Frontier Province has risen in ten years from 3,415 to 3,978. It is made up of migrations of all kinds—casual, temporary seasonal and permanent, but it seems almost hopeless to attempt to differentiate between them. It is recruited chiefly from Pathāns and Balūch. Inter-marriage, especially among the Balūch trading and transport especially among the Pathāns and pastoralism, are among the chief causes that give rise to it. But the main flood of emigration, 60,878 in volume finds its way into the Bombay Presidency where, however it rarely advances further than Sind. The stream of Brāhūīs which flows down in a broad and ancient bed into Sind is joined by many rivulets. To Sind come the Māhmān in quest of day labour in the Karachi docks or on the canal works, the Lāsi from Belā, and the Balūch from Nasrābād and the Māri and Bugṭi hills seeking to tide over bad times at home by field labour.

The numbers analysed by sex-properties.

82. It requires no local knowledge to realise that the Brāhūī migration to Sind is not the only element in the emigration to the Bombay Presidency that is of a family character. One can see this at once from

the comparatively large proportion of females in the figures. And though there are palpable but inevitable gaps in the argument, I fancy that we shall not be far wrong if we use sex-proportion as a basis for a wider generalisation. Let us shut our eyes for the moment to the ambiguities attaching to birthplace, and accept the figures of the Balūchistān-born enumerated in other provinces as a sufficiently accurate indication of the numbers of the emigrants from Balūchistān to India. Now we know that most of the emigration from Balūchistān is either of a family character or else confined to individual males, with the exception of an occasional woman who leaves the province to get married, there is no emigration of individual females. We know, further, that there are 845 females to 1,000 males in the indigenous population of Balūchistān (§ 138). As males are much more subject to the drain of emigration than females, the female proportion should obviously be pitched lower. But we will let it stand, any adjustment would only accentuate the point I am driving at. And my point is this. According to our very rough-and-ready line of argument, every 845 females in the so-called emigrants can be fairly paired off with at least 1,000 males. And as there are 31,765 female emigrants in all, 37,592 males out of the grand total of 44,266 are at once disposed of. In other words, if we ignore the emigration of a few females on marriage, gloss over other difficulties, and accept the argument in principle, we seem to be well on the safe side in concluding that over ninety per cent of the emigration to India is of a family character, and that 6,674 male emigrants or thereabouts make up the balance. We can even go one step further, I think, and assume that this surplus emigration is made up of able-bodied men, for the boys of Balūchistān are not given to running away from their parents and seeking their fortunes abroad.

83 But what of emigration out of India? Though the main channels that lead into India are fairly easy to follow, we are thrown back almost entirely on our own resources in tracking up the streams that flow beyond its limits. Except into Persia and Afghānistān they flow, it is true, in very languid trickles constantly on the move though the tribesmen are, they rarely venture out of the beaten tracks, and we may ignore the few but gallant adventurers like the Makrānī, who takes an occasional trip across the sea to Muscat and the neighbourhood, or like the Pathān, who is ready to seek his fortunes in Australia or China or Turkistān or Somaliland or Uganda. But it is a very different matter with emigration into Afghānistān and Persia. Many Pathāns on the Afghān frontier would be hard put to it to say whether they were domiciled in Afghānistān or Balūchistān. Hundreds of families are equally at home on this and that side of the border, shifting their quarters as often as pasture, or friction with their neighbours, or trouble with the different powers that be, may make it desirable. Much the same applies to Shirānī Pathāns, who divide their time between Balūchistān and independent territory, to many Brāhūis and Barēch Pathāns who hover between Nushkī and the Afghān district of Shōrāwak, and to the frontier Balōch who hover between Makrān, Khārān or Chāgai on the one side and Persia on the other. On the north-east frontier conditions were fairly normal at the time of the census. But conditions on the west and the north-west were so generally unfavourable that not only has there been a serious wastage of Brāhūis and Balōch who waver on the borderland, but numbers of Brāhūis ordinarily domiciled in Chāgai and numbers of Balōch ordinarily domiciled in Makrān had passed over into Afghānistān and Persia, seeking a refuge from the drought. Within a month of the closing of the census the tide had begun to turn, and the population of Chāgai alone went up by 10 per cent.

84 The wastage in the indigenous population owing to the drought was not the only cause that made for an unduly low census of Balūchistān. So long as the census of India is fixed at an early date in the year, so long will

Aliens	56,898
Europeans	4,210
Anglo Indians	123
Natives	52,556

the numbers of aliens returned in Balūchistān and more especially in its capital town (§ 56) be an inadequate representation of the wave of immigration, for during the winter months there is always a temporary flow back into India, chiefly affecting the women and children. The main inducements that bring aliens to the country are Government service, labour and trade. The majority of the Europeans are absorbed in the army the

Emigration out of India.

Immigration.

European commercial community though vigorous and growing is still in its infancy. The aliens from India not only man most of the billets in the army, the police, and the administration they monopolise most of the trade in the towns, and a good deal of the labour market. They come from far and near but the chief recruiting-grounds are the Panjāb and the North West Frontier the United Provinces, and Bombay. From the Panjāb Balūchistān draws most of its sepoy, policeman, and clerks; from the United Provinces most of its gardeners, washermen and other domestic servants; from Bombay or rather from Sind many of its traders. The extent to which the alien population follows in the wake of Government, and thrives under its protection, very largely by supplying its multifarious needs, may be gathered from the fact that it packs itself almost entirely into civil and military stations. If the British Government ever quitted Balūchistān, the great mass of the immigrants would quit it at the same time. All that would remain would be a stream of Powin dāh sojourning as of old for a brief season on their wanderings, and here and there a few petty but adventurous traders.

SUBSIDIARY TABLES.

IX.—Nomadism among Selected Tribes.

Tribe	TRIBAL CENSUS						REGULAR CENSUS	
	NOMAD		SEMI-NOMAD		SETTLED		Males	Females
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females		
Balōch (Indigenous only)	34,911	28,572	4,311	3,615	51,818	44,775	880	200
(i) <i>Western</i>	24,112	19,000	2,753	1,877	24,700	21,400	431	156
Lezgi	10,411	8,100		27	717	592	14	2
Pashai	24	20	78	70	7674	2,270	20	8
Jakli	7	4			10	40		
Dehshai	100	100	447	611	1,274	774	12	2
Makhi	201	4			911	720	22	13
Makhi	10,000	7,000	1,000	1,000	0	7,000	64	4
Uzbek	10,000	1,100	4,000	770	14,400	12,700	102	60
Uzbek					1,000	400	14	4
Uzbek					77	27	84	64
Ozbek	7							
(ii) <i>Western</i>	17,740	1,500	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	458	113
Brāhmī	55,586	41,335	12,228	9,068	24,133	20,062	1,140	327
(i) <i>Original as last</i>	5,218	4,418	477	70	2,000	1,214	72	13
Chitral					7	0	8	1
Chitral	67	40			22	31		
Chitral	64	70	13	17	147	117	6	2
Gazdhar			97	91	270	210	3	
Kabul	410	67	177	110	727	612	0	7
Kabul	20	70	16	11	411	390		
Mirzai	207	200	11	72	416	306	7	
Pashai	1,807	1,700	144	117	207	198	70	3
Surkh	10,207	8,000	8,000	7,000	11,000	9,250	623	178
(ii) <i>Kabul</i>	2,000	1,400	1,000	1,200	2,000	2,118	127	36
Bargulzal	401	188	801	725	610	472	73	3
Kabul	1,001	1,000	616	476	1,011	827	46	6
Ishti	1,077	872	3,075	1,087	1,176	907	80	36
Ishti	800	742	107	134	1,017	820	04	18
Mamashai					801	713	21	6
Malikani	101	77	71	58	732	200	8	16
Rustumzal			1					
Farjara	118	111	702	261	726	623	67	4
Sitakral	654	511	6	6	43	37	13	7
Shahwani	1,018	1,170	1,029	779	1,840	1,002	107	25
Uzbek Mongal	1,170	901	429	300	911	766	51	16
(iii) <i>Jhalawān</i>	39,701	31,276	2,610	2,126	10,320	8,479	876	180
Bharnjav	5,000	4,200	30	10	777	678		
Hirudi	109	910	104	92	107	170	4	2
Mamashai	6,801	4,761	181	162	1,376	1,088	54	21
Mingal	12,000	9,212	700	637	2,126	1,001	188	63
Nichari	1,327	1,075	60	30	617	461	66	16

IX.—Nomadism among Selected Tribes—continued

Tribe	TRIBAL CENSUS.								Resident Census.	
	Nomad		Semi-Nomad		Settled					
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females		
Pathan	230	213	181	141	300	314	8	1		
Bajji	1,709	1,411	16	14	433	306	1	1		
Kabri	12,547	10,961	1,219	1,023	4,177	3,573	54	37		
() Microthamnus	408	363	301	236	499	430	73	11		
Khikhi	141	131	40	313	177	140	—	—		
Pir-Khikhi	239	219	9	6	10	5	—	—		
Rikhal	3	2	90	73	243	195	—	—		
Others	4	4	3	1	0	30	73	11		
Pathan (Indigenous only)	24,000	19,854	32,394	23,440	22,210	37,000	2,333	561		
Path	2	1	1	3	136	140	11	8		
Patha	104	103	13	13	374	310	34	47		
Jahar	91	72	133	123	429	301	8	1		
Kikhi	10,081	8,236	20,333	17,706	23,037	21,118	1,900	200		
Dahar	29	12	—	—	120	116	30	—		
Dumay	715	660	1,412	1,134	2,091	1,731	60	13		
Lamay	46	43	—	—	223	173	—	—		
Samarkhal	6,323	4,073	11,943	12,227	9,058	6,341	633	21		
Sargaya	27	14	478	423	134	613	36	4		
Sargha	2,343	1,963	2,736	2,736	7,344	6,080	337	74		
Targaya	897	439	543	463	6,413	3,323	208	34		
Others	109	109	36	33	143	119	141	64		
Khal	—	—	1	1	637	613	47	16		
Lhal	104	205	7	4	1,136	1,048	6	1		
Path	1,364	1,330	2,064	7,336	4,361	4,101	230	13		
Malik branch	364	470	436	433	2,343	2,303	37	43		
Jah	364	213	349	373	234	108	36	—		
Namarkhal	144	127	2,373	2,061	143	136	79	—		
Mamarkhal	309	304	4,774	4,136	377	308	73	9		
Karito	43	31	3	3	396	301	3	—		
Mikhal	123	123	2,013	1,544	2,307	2,013	31	30		
Turk	11,704	9,307	1,303	1,136	4,351	3,954	637	117		
Abdull. Abdull.	2,623	2,366	436	323	1,303	1,736	417	43		
Syia Turk	713	663	361	777	1,343	1,013	36	3		
Tur Turk	2,090	1,367	34	30	2,736	2,363	364	43		
Others	—	—	34	30	4	3	31	14		
Kamrad	14	13	63	39	610	403	7	—		
Others	36	34	3	3	323	133	43	31		
Ghilmal	7,300	6,130	450	371	1,341	943	1,523	303		
Kharab	1,300	1,362	12	13	40	23	30	6		
Khar	1,137	1,023	47	30	313	164	20	13		
Sulemanikhal	1,943	1,303	91	30	377	198	310	53		
Turk	1,014	773	7	3	173	147	133	33		
Others	1,314	1,363	303	241	634	450	706	33		

X.—Brāhūis Censused in Sind.

District or State of enumeration	BORN IN									
	TOTAL.					SIND				
	BALUCHISTAN					OTHER PROVINCES				
	Persons.	Males.	Females.	Persons.	Males.	Females.	Persons.	Males.	Persons.	Females.
<i>Total</i>	60,389	33,383	27,006	29,901	17,012	12,889	29,749	15,952	739	119
Hyderabad	3,445	1,852	1,593	870	532	347	2,513	1,283	53	37
Karachi	10,147	5,612	4,535	2,264	1,334	930	7,860	4,207	23	11
Larkana	21,008	11,878	9,820	14,039	8,042	5,997	7,570	3,811	80	25
Sukkur	4,624	2,611	2,013	1,644	986	658	2,811	1,527	160	98
Thar and Parkar	1,089	598	491	96	50	40	984	542	9	6
Upper Sind Frontier	10,110	10,684	8,426	10,935	6,054	4,901	7,750	4,368	405	242
Kharipur	270	148	128	24	14	10	262	134		118

Total

Hyderabad

Karachi

Larkana

Sukkur

Thar and Parkar

Upper Sind Frontier

Kharipur

CHAPTER IV

RELIGION.

Statistical data

SUBJECT	TABLES		
	Imperial	Provincial	Subsidiary
General	VI		
Local distribution		II	XII
Urban religions	V		
Christian sects	XVII		
Variation in Christianity			XIII

Statistical.

85 Islām easily tops the list of religions in the province, claiming as its own nearly 94 per cent of the total population. The summary in the margin puts the matter in a nutshell. Of the indigenous population, Islām claims over 97 per cent, the residue are Hindu or Sikh. By profession indeed, all tribesmen are Musalmān—for I suppose the Zikrīs must be reckoned as Musalmāns, though they are certainly not Muhammadans. The semi-indigenous population is Musalmān to a man. But though Balūchistān is essentially a Musalmān country, most of the main religions found in India can nowadays count on their local devotees, thanks to the steady influx of strangers from far and near. Animism, which seems to be the only absentee of any importance, is no exception at all, for animism is the mainspring of the religious beliefs of many tribesmen who profess and call themselves Musalmāns. For the present, however, we will assume that the various religious labels have their usual connotations, and take the statistics as we find them. A discussion of the tribesmen's actual beliefs and usages may be reserved to the end.

	Indigenous.	Semi-indigenous	Aliens
Musalmān	784,610	25,411	22,627
Hindu	14,985		22,817
Sikh	2,799		5,591
Neo Hindu			724
Christian			5,085
Parsee			170
Jew			57
Jain			10
Buddhist			16
No religion			1

86 The fact that, except for the few old Hindu families dotted here and there, all indigenous peoples of Balūchistān—Pathāns, Balōch, Brāhūi, Jatt, Mēd, Lōri and the rest—are professedly Musalmān, greatly simplifies the task of analysing the statistics, for it enables us to treat the whole country in its religious aspect as a whole. No difficulty was experienced in ascertaining the various sects under which the Musalmāns range themselves. But the simplicity of the results as they are depicted in the margin is a little misleading. The Islām of the average tribesmen is so crude that it would be a trifle unreasonable to expect them to have any very clear idea of the sect to which they are supposed to belong. All but a very humble minority are Sunnī. Perhaps it would be nearer the mark to say that the haughty majority are obsessed by a fanatical abhorrence of the very name of Shīah. This abhorrence is strong simply because it is absolutely unreasoning. It is shared to the full by many

Musalmān	782,618
Sunnī	740,909
Shīah	4,823
Zikrī	27,565
Ahmadi	47
Abī ḥ Hadīs	17
Sūfī	1
Chūbrā	263

Islām. The Islām of the average tribesmen is so crude that it would be a trifle unreasonable to expect them to have any very clear idea of the sect to which they are supposed to belong. All but a very humble minority are Sunnī. Perhaps it would be nearer the mark to say that the haughty majority are obsessed by a fanatical abhorrence of the very name of Shīah. This abhorrence is strong simply because it is absolutely unreasoning. It is shared to the full by many

who have never heard of the word *Sunnī* at all. Great was the wrath of a *Jāmāt* when the enumerator taking his cue from his loud execrations of the *Shīahs*, remarked that he was putting him down as a *Sunnī*. "*Sunnī* yourself!" was his indignant retort. "How dare you dub me *Sunnī*? —the simple explanation of his ebullition lying in the fact that *sunnī* or something very like it means ill fated in *Lāl*. The truth is that *Shīah* to most tribesmen is not so much the antithesis of *Sunnī* as something unspeakably abominable in itself. And it will be a rude awakening if the day comes when they discover that to the *Sunnī* of India their own religious practices appear tainted with *Shīah* heterodoxy. The only tribesmen who have proclaimed themselves to be *Shīah* are certain sections of the *Dōmābki Bakōch* with the Chief at their head and even these have bowed to the prevailing prejudice by styling themselves not *Shīah* but *Jafari*. To all appearance, the only distinctive features of these local *Shīahs* are that they leave the hair on the upper lip untrimmed don dusky turbans during the *Muharram* mourn round a bier lamenting "Yā *Husain!* Yā *Husain!*" on the eve of the tenth day and proface all new undertakings with the invocation "By the help of *Ghaus Bahāwal Haq*. Most of the other *Shīahs* enumerated in *Balūchistan* are *Hazāra* from across the border.

Was Kōrī sect.

87. The curious *Zikrī* sect has its head-quarters in *Makrān*, but it also spreads into south western *Jhalawan* and *Lās Bēla*, while a fair number of its sectarians were doubtless consigned in *Sind*. It is strongest among the *Makrānī* the *Sāydi Māmāsani* and *Bikanjār Brāhūis*, and the *Sangur* in *Lās Bēla*. It appeals more especially to the nomadic and lower classes. But though it is looked

upon with contempt, and has been subject to a certain amount of persecution from the days of *Nasir Kibān* the Great onwards, it has always attracted a few men of higher status and it may be questioned whether there are any real signs of its decay. Persecution, as usual, seems to give it new strength. For its gradual disappearance, one must probably look to the slowly increasing association of its followers with the wider world. In its origin it is apparently a backwash of the *Mahdawi* movement started in India by *Sayyid Muhammad Jaunpuri* towards the close of the 15th century. How the movement flowed into the country—whether directly from India or by a circuitous route through *Persia*—it is difficult to say. There is a good deal of obscurity and confusion in all that pertains to the sect. The very identity of the *Mahdi* who is claimed to have supplanted *Muhammad* as God's latest Prophet is curiously shadowy. Whoever the *Mahdi* may have been in the beginning, he is certainly *Muhammad Jaunpuri* no longer except to a few *mullas* who have begun to pick up a smattering of book learning. To the mass of the people he is known variously as *Mulla Murād* (perhaps the *Gichki* chief of that name who broke the *Bulēdai* power in *Makrān*) or more commonly if more vaguely as *Dāi* who is believed to have miraculously extracted a new holy writ of revelation from the heart of a living tree. The sect is known more or less indifferently both among themselves and others as *Zikrī* or *Dāi*. *Zikrī*, because they hold that the age for *remembrance* or prayer has given way to the age for *gīkr* or the mention of God (for is it not written in the *Koran* "Make *gīkr* of Me, that I make *gīkr* of you, and again "Verily We have sent down the *gīkr* and verily We will guard it.") *Dāi* or *Dāhī*, because they are followers of *Dāi*, so styled because he was the bringer of the *dāh* or "alarm." But there is confusion everywhere. The *Koran* itself is known to them as *dāi* though the alarm that *Dāi* brought them was presumably the new revelation he found growing in the tree. The word *dāi* by the by bears a superficial resemblance to the Arabic *dā'i*, "propagandist, so common in Persian revivalist history but the sounds are really distinct, and though a phonetic relationship is perhaps not altogether impossible, the partial coincidence of meaning is probably a pure accident.

The sect.

88. The *Zikrī* faith is a curious jumble of *Islām*. In form it is the negation of *Muhammedanism*. "There is no God but God, and the *Mahdi* is His Prophet" is the cardinal article of the faith. In reality it is not so much a negation of *Muhammedanism* as a hazy imitation of it. *Zikrīs* accept the *Koran* but repudiate its orthodox interpretation ignoring everything that

tells against them, exaggerating everything that can be twisted to their side. All down the line they are sturdily protestant. Instead of the pilgrimage to Mecca, they trudge on the ninth day of the Zi-ul-hajj to Kōh Murād, a hill in Kēch a few miles from Tūrbat, close by the sacred tree of the new revelation, which still survives the ruthless hewing of bigoted Sunnis. Instead of *zakāt* or alms at one-fortieth, they preach the bestowal of a tithe of their worldly goods. But then most distinctive dogma is the iniquity of *numāz*, and then most distinctive practice is the performance of *zikr*. By rights it should be performed six times a day according to an elaborate ritual, but as a rule three times appear to suffice—at dawn, at noon and at night. Regular services or *kishtī* are held on set occasions in circular places of worship called *zikriāna*. In villages there is some special spot, surrounded by a wall or dwarf-palm enclosure, set apart as the *zikriāna*, but nomads merely mark out a circle with small white stones, wherever they happen to be encamped. Though women worship apart from the men in the villages, both sexes worship together among the nomads. The congregation group themselves round in a ring, while the priest stands in the centre and conducts the service. He intones the praises of the Mahdī, and the congregation chime in after him. At first all is reverential quiet and orderliness, but the service soon degenerates into fanatical ecstasy, and ends in an uproar. The harrowing tales of promiscuity at the end of the service and of the deflowering of brides by the priests seem to be fabrications of bigoted orthodoxy. Though their form of worship is grotesque and their faith founded on the grossest superstition, the Zikris seem simple and harmless folk enough.

89 It is a little surprising that the Tāib or "Penitents" have fallen out of the returns. This quaint puritanical sect was started some twenty or thirty years ago by Hājī Muhammad Fāzil, a Raisāni Brāhūi of good birth, and at one time attracted a fair congregation in the Kachihi. The universal brotherhood of all Musalmāns—a reaction by the by against exclusively tribal bonds of good and ill—the seclusion of women, and the repudiation of the saints and their worship, appear to have been chief among the founder's doctrines. How far the many eccentricities attributed to the sect were really part of his teaching, how far they were later extravagances of his followers, or simply the invention of their scoffing neighbours, it is not easy to determine. He clearly made a stand against undue show and expenditure at domestic ceremonies—at weddings the customary drummings were forbidden, mournings for the dead were abandoned altogether. His followers appear to have carried his puritanical ideas a good deal further. The sound of a drum became then idea of the embodiment of all that was sinful, every good Tāib stuffed his ears against such naughty music. In the founder's preaching much stress was laid on the sanctity of the marriage-tie. Bride-price was forbidden. The marriage-service was celebrated afresh weekly, or at any rate fortnightly, throughout life. An erring wife had to wear bells on her fingers and bells on her toes as a public penance, when first she returned to the bed of her forgiving husband. So much seems fact. But these practices gave rise to a sheaf of absurd and unrepeatable yarns regarding conjugal relations among the Tāib, which lost nothing in the telling because a Tāib is taught to answer abuse with meekness. The ridicule heaped on the sect may possibly account for its bashful absence from our returns. But it is by no means impossible that the sect has been killed by ridicule altogether.

Apparent
extinction of the
Tāib sect

90 Proverbially elastic though the term is, Hinduism is stretched almost to breaking-point in Balūchistān. It is not merely that the Hinduism of the domiciled Hindu families (§287 *seq.*) is widely different from the Hinduism they see practised among the alien immigrants, there is precious little in their religion that would pass for Hinduism in more enlightened parts of India. It almost looks as if the singular freedom from persecution which the old Hindu families have always enjoyed at the hands of their Musalmān overlords had given Islām greater scope to impart its subtle influence to their inward beliefs and outward practices. Knowing no sacred books but the Sikh scriptures, and with priests (Brahmans though they may be) as ignorant of the Shāstras as themselves, these benighted Hindus have allowed nearly all their rites and ceremonies to become coloured with an Islāmic tinge. They reverently resort to Muhammadan shrines, they invoke Muhammadan saints, in times of trouble they are glad of the help of charm-mongering mullas. It is not uncommon to find them observing Muhammadan

Hinduism

Hindu	37,692
Indigenous	14,955
Aliens	22,617

fasts, or participating in the Muharram and other Muhammadan festivals. They have little scruple in performing the investiture with the sacred thread at Muhammadan places of sanctity. Still less scruple have they in keeping Muhammadan men-servants and maid-servants to sweep their dining floor to fetch their water to cleanse their eating vessels and their cooking pots. Not only they themselves but their Sāraut Brahmans drink freely from water-skins they even use these waters of defilement—*horresco referens*—in their offerings to the family deity. How those who indulge in such practices as these, who know nothing of caste but the difference between Hindu and Brahman and Muslimān, who know nothing whatever of caste-rules, who have allowed members of their community in the past to take Muslimān women to wife, who still resort not infrequently to the unspeakable heretical practice of divorce—how men who unblushingly perpetrate these and similar outrages on what Hindulism professes to deem most sacred, can claim admittance to the Hindu brotherhood and find a welcome, I am at a loss to understand. But these are happily matters on which one who is himself outside the pale can hardly be called upon to sit in judgment.

X. SYSTEMS OF
Bām Mārg.

91. As for sect, the old Hindu families care less than nothing. At a pinch, they may be able to remember that they are supposed to belong to the orthodox *Sandhya-dharma* but this shred of knowledge is beyond the reach of most of them. There is accordingly little of interest in the statistics of Hindu sects that we collected. In fact the only matter of any real interest lies in one curious omission. But though it is notorious that Śāktism, the worship of the female energy thrives not only in Quetta under the name of Bām Mārg but also in Bārkhan and Mākhitar under the name of Dēv or Andar or Sundarī Mārg, I was hardly surprised that it found no place in our returns. Even in India the worshippers draw a veil over their unsavoury worship not a word is willingly allowed to leak out regarding their rites. And the rites, it would seem, are unholy indeed. They are based on the observance of the so-called “five M’s”—each of the five a reckless outrage on something that Hindulism esteems holy. And the greatest of these is *Māstaka* or Lechery—the more unspeakable the lechery the more meritorious the worship. How far the local sects indulge in the worse abominations of the ritual, it is impossible to say not only do the worshippers in Balūchistan disavow their sect a novice is only admitted under awful vows of secrecy after his good-faith has been shrewdly put to the test. Of an initiation I can, however give some slight account on unimpeachable authority. The congregation meets at dead of night within closed doors and the novice is brought into the assembly blindfolded, with ear-rings of dough dangling from his ears. First he is made to swear a solemn oath never to divulge a word of aught that hereafter shall be revealed to him then he is conducted through a weird ritual which centres round the adoration of Durgā and the initiation is crowned by a feast at his expense. The chief items in the fare are flesh and wine and *dhāng* but the all important feature of this part of the ceremonial is that four or five worshippers—and the more diverse their castes, the better—should eat out of the same platter drink out of the same cup wash their hands and mouth in the same basin, and wind up the orgy by swilling down the filthy water. If this wanton flouting of common decency at initiation is a fair sample of the worship itself, it would be only in keeping for the local worshippers to luxuriate in the unmentionable abominations attributed to the sect elsewhere. A perverted but reasonably innocent form of eccentricity is the verdict passed on the local ritual by apparently all informed opinion. And if it were true as is sometimes asserted, that all women are excluded from the revels, this verdict might stand. But Śāktism with women barred seems such a strange contradiction in terms, that one doubts whether the apparently well informed opinion is particularly well informed after all.

Śādhism and
Bhāg-Śādhism

92. Of the later developments from Hindulism, I need say but a word. Nearly all the old Sikh families of the country belong to the great Sahjdhārī branch of the Sikh faith few if any are Kāśdhārī—the only branch that is Sikh in the sense in which a recruiting officer would use the term. And here by the by we seem to be in the presence of an unmistakable change in the age. Time was, and not so very long ago, when the Sahjdhārī Sikhs still clung to Hindulism as the ancient mother of them all. At this census but 13 Sahjdhārīs were found in the whole of Balūchistan who did not, apparently

Sikhism	8,396
Sahjdhārī	4,613
Kāśdhārī	3,777

deliberately, omit all mention of Hinduism from their returns. As for Neo-Hinduism, neither Ārya nor Brahmō can claim any congregation among the domiciled community. These reform movements are so far confined entirely to the alien Hindus from down-country and it will be long before they are able to strike root in the old Hindu families of Balūchistān.

93 Among religions which have no adherents in the indigenous population is Christianity, for conversion of the tribesman plays no direct part in the work of the good Samaritan undertaken by missionary effort in Balūchistān. The increase of a thousand odd souls in the Christian fold since the last census is merely another phase of immigration, Quetta alone accounts for nearly the whole of it. As for the various denominations, the tables may almost be left to tell their own tale. The Christian population shifts from year to year, and the chief factor in the ups and downs of the sects is the territorial composition of the British regiments who happen to be stationed in Quetta. It is perhaps worth mentioning that the five Europeans for whom no denomination has been recorded, expressly stated that they belonged to no denomination at all, and that of the couple whose beliefs are recorded as "indefinite," the European is a disciple of Theosophy and the native a Unitarian. Of the 752 Indian Christians, the Anglican Communion claims 418, and Roman Catholicism 278, leaving 56 to be divided among other denominations. Goanese servants form the bulk of the native Roman Catholics. The ranks of the Anglican Communion are largely swelled by converted Chūhra or sweepers, who have been locally given the jocular nickname of Chūharkhēl, a tribal appellation they may possibly affect in all seriousness before long.

94 There remain 254 followers of religions locally so microscopic in strength that they have had to be swept together into one incongruous heap. All but 15 were censused in the towns, all but 51 in Quetta. Chief among the lot are the Parsees, whose numbers remain almost stationary—the males have gone up by six, while the females have gone down by two—though one might not unnaturally have anticipated a substantial increase in this sturdy trading community, in sympathy with the remarkable expansion of Quetta. The Jews have gone up by nine, the Jains by two. The Buddhists appear in our statistics for the first time. One solitary individual (a French cook by the by), who stoutly declared that he was of no religion at all, has the field to himself, indeed he is the only man in the length and breadth of India to sum up his beliefs in such blank negation.

Descriptive.

95 So much for the statistics. In so far as they relate to the alien population, we need not trouble to go behind them. But the living beliefs of the tribesmen of Balūchistān have little to do with the religions which they profess, or the various sects under which they range themselves. There is as much difference between the Islām of the average tribesman and the highly developed Islām of the Indian *maulvi*, as between the Hinduism of the domiciled Hindu families and the Hinduism of orthodox Brahmanism. As regards outward observances the Pathān stands no doubt on a fairly high level, for all his ignorance of the inner meaning of his Faith and his weakness for ancestor-worship he is usually as punctilious over his prayers and his fasts (if not over the pilgrimage and alms-giving) as his more enlightened co-religionists, what he lacks in doctrine he is quite capable of making up in fanatical zeal. The Balōch lags far behind. Though there are signs of a religious revival, ancient custom still holds sway in the vital affairs of his life, to him religious precepts are little more than counsels of perfection, religious practices little more than the outward and awe-inspiring marks of exceptional respectability. Among the Brahūis a truly devout Musalmān, learned in doctrine and strict in practice, is rarer still, with the vulgar mass Islām is merely an external badge that goes awkwardly with the quaint bundle of superstitions which have them in thrall.

96 To judge by the answers made to the enumerators on the score of religion among the wilder sections of the community in all parts of the country

It would almost seem as if many people had never heard of Islām and Musulmān at all. "Put me down the same religion as the chief" was perhaps the commonest answer of the lot; its absurdity becomes apparent when it takes the form "I used to follow the Mēngal chief but I've shifted quarters and adopted the religion of the Bangulzal. I'm a Kākār by birth, so of course I'm Kākār by religion. "I'm a Mīr Zangī (the name of some dead worthy in the tribe) my religion is Mulla Ishāq" (the name of the village priest)—these are typical of many others. More amusing but hardly less common was the non-committal request

Just wait till sun-down, and I'll enquire of the mulla. I do not mean to imply that Islām is a sealed book to the more advanced in the community. But when such answers among the ruck of the people meet scarce a smile and certainly occasion no surprise, it is sheer waste of time to attempt to discuss how far the spirit of Islām permeates the life of our tribesmen.

97 Even as regards the external practices of religion there is extraordinary ignorance everywhere. Many are the tales told of the utter darkness that broods over the wilder parts of Jhalawān. And though, thanks to the security of British administration some light is flickering in from Sind, it will be long before it penetrates into the furthestmost corners of the country. A wayfaring mulla may still run some risk of being driven from a Jhalawān encampment for scaring the flocks with his cry to prayers—a strange and unlucky sound to the unaccustomed ears of the nomads. Nor would I be surprised if history repented itself any day and some piddling Hindu were hauled off his nag to read the marriage service—surely an everyday task for so learned a bookworm—and were made to join in the feast and stay overnight, in case the bridegroom stood in need of an amulet to help him through his ordeal. Even among the Balōch in the Bolan I have come across a case of a disputed marriage where the mulla naively admitted to the court that he for one could not swear to the marriage for the simple reason that he was still in the dark as to how a *nikāh* should be performed but if the recting of the *kalīmas* could do the trick man and wife they undoubtedly were, for he had recited the *kalīmas* with the best of them. Such gross ignorance would hardly be found among Pathāns, who are usually great sticklers for religious practices. Yet in any Yāstūzal Kākār hut you may see a string hanging from the roof during the winter months, in which the Goodman of the house ties a knot whenever the cause for an ablution arises to serve as a reminder of the number of ablutions he must get through when summer comes and washing is less of a nuisance.

98 There is, however one religious ordinance rigorously observed by every body and that is the one which finds no mention in the Koran. I do not doubt that the reason for the universality of circumcision is that it is older than religion itself. The only uncircumcised followers of the Prophet I have ever heard of in Baluchistan were among Mahsūd recruits, and these of course do not belong to the indigenous population at all. Now while the well-to-do get their sons circumcised at an early age, the poor may find it necessary to postpone the ceremony for some years. Like all ceremonies it is largely a matter of money. But it must be performed before puberty at all cost and the sooner the better for a male is no full Musulmān until he has been circumcised. As a rule the operation is entrusted to a barber who generally seizes the opportunity to use his razor when the lad's attention is distracted by the supposed appearance of some strange bird in the sky. In most tribes it is a point of honour for the lad to retaliate by giving the barber a blow or a tug of his beard, and the force he puts into the blow or tug is regarded as the measure of his pluck. In some tribes this belabouring of the operator is almost a recognised portion of the ceremony and if the boy is too small or too upset to play his part, one of the bystanders acts for him. As a rule the foreskin is carefully threaded and tied round the boy's ankle. The colour of the thread is a matter of no small moment thus the colour among Brāhūis must be red, among the Mārī Balōch it must be green. The Snaṭia Kākār Pathān vary the custom by tying the foreskin round the boy's neck. And on the day it remains, a sure talisman against evil spirits, until his wound is healed it is then buried under a green tree. This at any rate is the common practice but some Brāhūis prefer to bury the foreskin forthwith in damp earth, as the simplest means of healing the burning of the wound. Though womenfolk are ordinarily debarred from the ceremony proper they generally perform some ceremonials while it is going on. The Brāhūi mother for instance, puts a hand

Ignorance of
fundamental
doctrine.

Universal
observance of
circumcision.

mill on her head, the kinswomen put a Koran on theirs, and they stand facing the west and pray for the lad's welfare, until the circumcision is over. Among the Maī the mother stands in the centre of singing women, bearing in her hands an upper mill-stone, which is sprinkled with red earth and covered with rue, an iron ring, a green bead and a red cloth, tied together by a red thread—all symbolical, I imagine, of procreative virility. Among the Brāhūis, the Gichki, the people of Khārān and possibly others, a father is expected to make over some piece of property to his son on the occasion of his circumcision. This custom, by the by, has landed one of the biggest Gichki chiefs in an awkward fix. For years he had remained sonless. To his delight a son was unexpectedly born to him late in life, and in the exuberance of his pride he endowed him on his circumcision with the bulk of the family property. Unfortunately the old gentleman married again in his dotage, and as his young wife has recently presented him with sturdy twins, he is now at his wits' end trying to get his first-born to cancel the deed of gift.

99 Among the Gharshīn Sayyids of Mūsakhāl, the Khetian, and the Jat—and the list should probably be longer—circumcision is looked upon as almost as essential for the other sex. Precise details of female circumcision are naturally not easy to secure in Balūchistān. Indeed the wonder is not that we know so little about it, but that we know anything at all. Many tribesmen themselves would be hard put to it to say much on the subject, even if they cared to do so, for the operation is generally conducted apart among the women with no small amount of secrecy. Unfortunately, our information is not only meagre but confused. But it seems pretty clear that there are two distinct methods of female circumcision among some peoples: the tip of the clitoris is clipped off, among others the *labia* are scarified, in both cases the operation is performed by some discreet old dame with a razor. Now while the operation is usually described as being performed at about the same age as circumcision proper in the case of the boys, there is yet another operation of a similar kind performed among these Gharshīn Sayyids and the Jat (but not among the Khetrān) on the bridal night. It is sometimes described as if it were an alternative operation, in all probability it is not alternative but additional. Among the Jatt (and also apparently among the Jafar Pathān and the Maī Balōch, but here our information is very vague) the bridal operation appears to be the only one practised at all. But of female circumcision and artificial defloration (for this is clearly what the bridal operation really amounts to) I shall have something to say in another place (§177).

Female
circumcision.

100 Perhaps the most obvious among the outward signs of the Pathān's superior orthodoxy, as compared, let me say, with the Brāhūi, is his attitude towards the priesthood. Though the Pathān of Balūchistān is far from being as priest-ridden as his brethren in Tiāh, he treats his mullas with marked respect and often bows himself deferentially to their influence, even in matters that might be thought purely secular. With such a feeling abroad, it is only in the nature of things that the priestly profession should be popular among Pathāns and that the priesthood outside the Pathān country should be largely recruited from within it. In nearly every Pathān mosque there are a number of *tālib-i-ilm* or "searchers after knowledge," youths preparing themselves for the priesthood under the mulla's guidance. The mosques are humble enough structures in themselves, but they are imposing edifices compared with the so-called mosques in the Brāhūi country. Brāhūi mosques are as plenty as blackberries. It is just as well that nothing is more easy to make, for a mosque is frequently required on the spur of the moment in all sorts of out-of-the-way places, a corpse, for instance, which has been disinterred from its temporary resting-place for burial in the family graveyard, must lie in a mosque at every halting-stage on the weary march home. Range a few stones in a ring, leave a small opening on the east, raise a small arch on the west—and the Brāhūi's mosque is complete. My own impression is that these so-called mosques are much older than Islam itself, probably developments of something of the nature of magic circles. Mosques in the ordinary sense of the word are conspicuously rare in the Brāhūi country. As for a mulla, he is no doubt useful for marriages and burials and the like, but he is looked upon as a somewhat despicable creature at the best, and in any case "the power of a mulla should reach as far as the mosque," say the Brāhūis,—and no further. In fact what a Brāhūi

Mullas and
mosques.

was discharged and with that he sent him packing to his old master. So the dog bounded off home, as pleased as pleased could be. But his master was mighty angry to see him; for he was an honest fellow and much as he loved his dog he set more store on being a man of his word. And as a warning to all breakers of pledges he hacked him limb from limb. But when in the end he saw the label round his neck and heard of all that he had done, he was exceedingly sorry. So he gathered up the limbs and buried them in a grave. Had the limbs been the limbs of a true believer and not the limbs of an unclean beast, he could not have made more pother over the burial. And to the grave of this faithful dog Jhalawan folk resort to this day. And there they sacrifice sheep, and distribute the flesh in alms, in the certain belief that whatsoever they seek, that they will surely find.

Another in the
Pathān country

108. If it is a trifle curious for a dog and a dead dog at that, to be an object of worship in backward Jhalawan it is doubly curious to find a parallel among Pathāns, who profess to be such sturdy Muslims that one would naturally expect them to be imbued with a wholesome abhorrence of this unclean animal. Hard by the shrine of the sainted Husain Nika stands the shrine of his dog. Never was there so wonderful a dog we are told. A world of trouble it used to save its holy master. For whenever visitors came along it would bark—for every visitor a bark, no more no less. Now one fine day up came four men to see the saint. But the dog barked thrice, and then lay down. And when the saint arose lo! there were not three men but four. And he was so incensed that without staying to ask the why or the wherefore, he slew the dog then and there. Well, there was an end to the dog there was no doubt about that. But imagine the remorse of the saint I ask you, when the fourth man stood revealed as an unbelieving Hindu, who in his naughtiness had dressed himself up for all the world like a true believer. All that a saint could do to make amends, Husain Nika did. For he gave the dog a decent burial, and ordered that he himself should be laid to rest close to the grave of his dog. Nay he ordained this moreover—that whosoever should come to worship at his shrine should first worship at the shrine of his dog. And so it was, and so it is to this day.

Stones of reproach

109. So rude are many of the shrines and mosques that a stranger might well be excused for lumping up into the same category the countless artificial collections of stones strewn all over the country. But a little local knowledge soon enables one to read the meaning of some at any rate of those on their face. Such for instance are the stones of reproach in the Bugti country called *paṣ-gāri*, which tell of some tribesman's black deed, incest maybe or flight from the field or foul murder. Of these cairns there is no mistaking the meaning for they are generally topped by a stone as black as the black deed itself. And their size alone is enough to suggest that the larger cairns dotted about Baluchistan are memorials of some famous battle-field. But I have never been able to differentiate between the various kinds of cairns in the Brāhūi country where they are often enough the most conspicuous features on the landscape. If a man is a miser his neighbours vent their spleen by piling up a cairn against him. If a man flies from battle a cairn will commemorate his cowardice. If a man brings down a fine head, there will be a cairn where he stood and another where the beast fell. If a man dies heirless, a cairn will be raised to his pitiful memory. Every little thing seems to prompt the Brāhūi to pile one stone upon another. A whole mile along the path from Pandran to Zahri is dotted out by cairns half a dozen yards apart—they cover the hoof marks of the horse on which some saint of old gamballed on his way. Fifty years ago a man was done to death by his rutting camel, and to this day cairns mark the course of his desperate flight and the scene of his cruel death. Yet one cairn looks very much like another and all suffer the same fate. If they lie on the beaten track they grow in height week by week. Each passer by will add his stone to the pile, but whether with a muttered prayer for the heirless wretch or a curse for the coward or the miser heaven alone knows much depends, I suppose, on his frame of mind. And to add to the confusion there are everywhere circles of stones, called *chāp-jāi* or dancing plots, which mark the sites of the frequent dances of some wedding procession from the village of a Brāhūi bridegroom to the village of his bride.

110 We seem to get interesting glimpses of the religious development of the tribesmen in their attitude towards the forces of nature. Here, I fancy, we are in the presence of great, if seemingly gradual, changes. Old and cherished superstitions are slowly breaking up with the advancing tide of civilisation. In a short time many of them will lose all vitality, only lingering on in weird and unintelligible survivals or here and there perhaps in harmless games, their original meaning entirely lost to tribal memory. Typical instances in my mind are ancient customs relating to rain-making—how priceless a gift in Balūchistān, only those who have lived in this arid country can appreciate—casually mentioned to me as relics of a bygone age, too obsolete or obsolescent and too puerile for my notice. But it is well worth while to catch at the old ideas before they fade away. For the old ideas are not only valuable for their own sake, they are valuable as throwing light on the newer ideas that are displacing them. And though I shall have little to say about rain-making or pest-driving or fruit-producing in Balūchistān that is not familiar to everybody who has dabbled in anthropology, it is after all the common kinship of the human mind, evidenced all the world over in the very universality of such ideas, that lends them half their interest and more than half their value.

Attitude towards
nature

111 In the old days a halo of divinity surrounded the leaders of the Brāhūi Confederacy. Accredited with authority over the forces of nature, they were held directly accountable for seasons good and bad. When famine was sore in the land, the Brāhūi would look to the Khān to exercise his divine powers and bring down the rain for which the earth cried out. Then would the Khān doff his fine clothes for the woollen overcoat of the peasant, and drive a yoke of oxen across a rain-crop field. Twice has my informant himself seen the ruler of the country put hand to the plough to compel rain to fall, and so efficacious was the second ploughing that the people began to fear another Deluge. But my informant is now an old, old gentleman, and the ruler he saw ploughing was Nasir Khān II, who has been dead these sixty years and more. The last attempt at rain-making by a Khān was apparently in the early days of Mir Khudādād. The Jām of Las Bēla and the various chiefs were doubtless credited with similar powers in the old days, but when the Zarakzai chief recently tried his hand, he ploughed from dawn to night-fall with never a drop of rain to reward him—"and small's the wonder, when he had no right to the chiefship at all," muttered a malcontent who was watching him.

Brāhūi rain
making

112 But happily for them, the Brāhūis are not wholly dependent on their chiefs. When the flocks are dying for want of rain, a sham-fight is arranged between the womenfolk of two nomad encampments. The opposing forces come together in the afternoon at some lonely place, armed with thorn-bushes, their head-dress thrown back and girt round their waist. Here, unseen by the men, they belabour one another till blood begins to fall. And with that they call a truce, for the falling of blood will surely induce the falling of rain. In some tribes the men take matters into their own hands. The men of one encampment march off to another in the neighbourhood, and there make a great noise, and are soused with water for their pains. Then they are given alms and sent about their business. Both customs appear to be on the wane, but it is safe to prophesy that the women will be the last to abandon theirs.

Sham fights among
adults

113 Less obvious is the idea underlying another old rain-making custom, now fast degenerating into a game occasionally played by boys in Kalāt and other settled villages in times of drought. One of the boys acts as the *pīr akā*, dressed up like a little old man (for this is what the word means) with a hoary beard of cotton-wool on his chin, a felt cap on his head, a *zōr* or felt coat on his back, and a string of *gungarī* or bells jingling about his waist. Round his neck his comrades put a rope and drag him through the village. And when they come to a door, they stand and shout this Dēhwārī doggerel—

The boys' game of
pīr akā

*The buffoon! The old mankin!
Down fell the grain-bin
On top of poor granny!*

This is the signal for the goodman of the house to come out with an offering

of money or grain. And the *pirāḍ* shakes himself and makes his bells jingle and bellows like a camel, while the boys shout in chorus :—

*Good luck to the house of the giver !
And a hole in the bin of the miser !*

And so they move on from house to house. In the end their collections are clubbed together a pottage is prepared and distributed among the people, and the game is closed with prayers for rain. I suppose the *pirāḍ* s bellowing and the jingling of the bells are imitative of thunder and the swish of rain, but I can volunteer no explanation for his general get up unless his snow white beard is imitative of snow the game at any rate is generally played in the uplands in the late autumn.

The girls' game
of *shāh*.

114 There is a somewhat similar rain making game among the girls. Each girl makes herself a small wooden frame called *ṣikālo*, something like the framework of a kite, by tying two sticks cross-wise, joining the ends at top and bottom with two more sticks, and tying another stick right down the centre as a handle. Then they go in a body through the village, attended by a female minstrel, and sing at each door —

*Tikṣālo! Māṣālo!
Kāsim a dwelling I'll plait you your tresses !
Hows of Bala mulberries and raisins !
Arṭab's house white bread and roast meat !
Bash rain rush !*

Bala and Arṭab are the titles of headmen among the cultivators, but I can throw no light on the identity of Kāsim the bread and the meat and the fruits are symbolical, no doubt, of the produce that the earth will yield if only the rain will fall. Having collected dokes from house to house in the village they give them away in alms and pray for rain. Not until the time comes for the distribution of the dainties do the males or the older women take part in the fun.

Rain-stopping.

115 One or other of these rain-making devices is occasionally so successful that folks have found themselves before now in danger of being swamped in the inundation conjured up by their own magic, like Goethe's *Zauberlehrling*. So it is just as well, even in Balūchistān, to be armed with antidotes to banish the rain when it becomes a nuisance. Some people stop rain by hanging a wooden ladle out in the air others believe in putting antimony in a cock's eye women light a small fire in the open and damp it down with green leaves, to make it send up a column of smoke into the sky. Any one who can put two and two together will surely admit that the rain is bound to die away if it falls on a dead body so the Jamālī Balūch of Las Bala are doubtless wise in their generation in never taking their dead out to burial if it's raining, unless of course there has been enough rain and to spare. But corpses are not always procurable, and I am assured on all hands that the best all round device to stop rain is to run a thread through a frog's mouth and then let it go with the thread tied round it. Unfortunately the hated miser who hoards up grain in his bins and spends his days praying for drought, has learnt to turn the frog to his own base use. When the rains are withheld, folks soon begin to suspect that he has hidden some frogs away in his house in a jar of water and so stopped the rain. And sure enough, driven to desperation, they have more than once ransacked some miser's house and exposed his shameful trick. At least so they tell me. The survey department may possibly have wondered why their constructions are occasionally demolished in the wilder parts of the Brahūi country. It may be of interest to them to know that they are joint-accused with the hoarders of grain, and stand charged with locking up the rain by means of their survey pillars.

Rain-making
among Pathāns.

116 To most Pathāns any attempt at rain making by human agency would savour of blasphemy. The common idea is that above the heavens there are vast oceans of water—so vast that if God gave the word for them to fall, the earth would become a mere bubble floating on a mighty sea. And when clouds are scudding overhead, a Pathān will say that they are thirsty and hurrying off to their drinking-grounds. So if there is drought in the land, it is to God that he turns, and calling his comrades together he goes in a procession to some open

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field, and there slaughters a sheep and offers up prayers for rain. But that which a Pathān thinks rank blasphemy to-day, he may have regarded in a very different light yesterday. For an interesting rain-making custom still survives in what is now a mere boys' game. In times of drought boys make a round bag out of white cloth and stuff it with rags. And they paint the eyes and nose and mouth of a woman on one side of the bag, and bedaub the face with flour, and stick a pole through the bag, and go in a body from house to house, one of their number carrying the doll, or *Lādō Ladanga* as it is called. At each door they sing this chorus —

"Lādō Ladanga ! What do you want ?"

The sky's muddy rain is what I want ,

The earth's green grass is what I want ,

One measure of flour is what I want ,

Flavoured with salt—that's what I want !

Argōre ! bargōre !

God grant you a son to redound to your glory !

Amen

And the mistress of the house may be relied upon to give them a dole in return for their flattering prayer.

117 To a Pathān the stopping of rain must seem simple enough. For he has a sheaf of devices to choose from. Throw a handful of salt on the fire, nail a horse-shoe on to the wall, well out the reach of the rain, plaster a *patina* or wheaten bannock on a rubbish-heap, put a Koran into an oven when the fire is out, and bring it back to your room and distribute alms—it doesn't seem to matter much which of these methods you adopt, all are pronounced to be immediately effective. But after all the only ones to dabble in rain-stopping are the grain-hoarders who always hanker after drought, and the women who get bored with a few days' rain. Two other Pathān ideas about rain are perhaps worth adding. Pathān lasses are fond of scraping up the last titbits on the dish with their fingers and licking them off, much to the disgust of the old ladies, who know well what the consequences will be. "For the hundredth time of asking," they will say, "don't lick the pot, or there'll be a downpour on your wedding-day." And any Pathān can tell you that if you want to change your sex, all you have to do is to go and roll underneath a rainbow.

Rain-stopping
among Pathāns.

118 But in these days even Bīahūis are beginning to lose faith alike in the efficacy of their own magic over the powers of nature and in the divine right, or, at any rate, the divine power of their chiefs, and are tending more and more to rest their trust in the advocacy of their holy men with the Almighty. In almost every locality throughout the land there is some holy man who receives a share of the produce known as *tul* as a retaining-fee to produce rain, ward off locusts and mildew, and otherwise control nature for the good of the community. In the more civilised parts the *tul-khōr* or fee-receiver is a Sayyid, but in the wilder parts any holy magic-monger may be found playing the part with apparently equal success. They go to work in various ways. In Bāghbāna a Shēkh reads some charm and lures distant clouds to the valley by waving his turban in its direction. But if there has been some hitch over his *tul*, he is quite capable of driving the clouds over the hills and far away. Not that a *tul-khōr* has always the best of the matter. If rain holds off, the people seek to spur his flagging efforts by stopping his payments. If this fails, and their distress is great, they bind him hand and foot with a rope and leave him to swelter in the blazing sun the livelong day, holy Sayyid though he may be, in the pious hope that he will repent him of his slackness, and call in his frenzy upon God and his sainted forefathers to save his honour by sending rain. There is nothing like this, so I am told, for bringing a lazy *tul-khōr* to his senses, instance could be piled on instance to prove that rain has fallen within a few hours of his punishment.

Rain making
by holy men

119 Some holy men specialise in one particular department of nature. Such is the *Makrī* or Locust Sayyid of Dhādaī, who holds his title by virtue of having the locusts under his charm. Father passes on the charm to son, brother to brother, by simply spitting into his mouth. For a day or two the only result is that the man initiated into the mystery goes stark staring

Locust driving

mad. But the madness soon passes off leaving a wonderful power in its place. For when a swarm of locusts infests the country all the Sayyid has to do is to catch a locust, spit in its mouth and let it go. Off it flies spreading the news among its fellows, and in alarm they take to flight towards pastures now where Sayyids come from troubling. Not so long ago the people presented a petition to a native official, complaining that the *Alakri* Sayyid was so slack that the locusts had become a burden. The Sayyid was summoned, and at once explained that it was the people's own fault for falling into arrears with the payment of his dues. The official assured him that if that was all he would be personally responsible that there were no grounds for complaint on that score in future. I knew it, rejoined the Sayyid "and took the precaution to spit on a locust before I came along." And lo and behold, the people presently rushed up with the news that the locusts had just taken to flight.

Blowing wheel
of rust.

120. At least once every five years a disease, variously known as *sarhāi* or *rāfi*, red rust, attacks the wheat in *kalāt*, and the more thickly growing and well watered the crop, the severer the attack. It comes with the *namā*, the moist south wind, which carries it rapidly from field to field; but it soon disappears if the wind veers round to the north. If the *gōrich* or north-wind doesn't blow they get Sayyids to read charms over some earth and fling it on the fields. But if this fails, the *Brahūls* are not yet at their wit's end. They get hold of a boy seven years old, bathe him, and deck him out in red clothes, and make him drive a red *kul* through the fields attacked by the red rust. The *kul* is then slaughtered and the meat distributed in the name of God. A most effective remedy this, they tell me.

Fruit-producing.

121. They have a pretty war in *Makrān* of dealing with a mango tree or date-palm that fails to give fruit. The owner gets a couple of friends to bear him company and strides up to it in a threatening manner. "What's all this?" he bawls. No fruit? Do you think you can make a fool of me? I'll soon show you're mightily mistaken." And with that he gives it a stroke with his axe. Thereupon his comrades fling themselves upon him and seize his hands: only let him spare the poor thing this once and it'll be on its best behaviour in future, they'll be bound. But he wrenches himself loose, and gives it another blow before they can stop him. In time of course they wheedle him into a more forgiving frame of mind and turn to the tree and say: Harkoe, brother Mango! We've begged you off this time, or by the Almighty he would have had you down. And now that we've given our word for your good behaviour you'd best bear fruit next year and plenty of it or you'll catch it with a vengeance. It's marvellous, I'm told, what a bit of bluster will do to make a mango tree or date-palm mend its ways. Yet sometimes they resort to more artistic methods still. The owner comes and reasons quietly with the tree. What's up with you, says he, that you won't bear fruit? "Oh! say his comrades, "he's simply sick to death of a bachelor's life. A wife is all he wants. Off goes the owner and back he comes with fine new clothes, all red and green, and spreads them over the tree. And a sheep is killed, and rice is boiled, and the kinsmen are called together and they sit them down to a wedding feast to the beating of drums and the singing of songs. But before they break up, they take pains to make it clear to the tree that all the pollity is in his honour and in return he will kindly behave himself prettily ever after.

Unconscious
superstitions.

122. These, of course, are very obvious instances of that anthropomorphic humanising of Nature, that fusion or confusion of natural objects and human beings, which seems so ingrained in the primitive mind. The same fundamental feeling of kinship and sympathy between themselves and Nature is still alive in the peoples of *Balūchistan*, though magic-mongering has often transmuted it so ingeniously for its own uses, that many survivals of it run the risk of being unrecognized. In a sense far less metaphorical than Shakespeare's can one say that life in *Balūchistan* still finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in stones, and good—or harm—in everything. When the stone that is strung across a *Pathān*'s grave is rocked to and fro in the wind, it is sending up prayers for the peace of the soul: the pebbles that are

Remarkably close parallels (even down to the dialogue) having been met in such distant parts of the world as *Mah. Japan*, *Polynesia*, *India* and *Australia*, are given by Dr. Frazer in *The Golden Bough* Pt. I, vol. II, pp. 20 seq. And the same notion, I suppose, is embodied in our old saying: A woman's quarrel, and a maid's cry—the more you hear 'em the better they be. This is a delightful instance of the universality of the working of the human mind (¶ 120).

strewn over the grave of some wild Brāhūi are themselves a coverlet of prayers, still and motionless though they lie. And anthropomorphism had probably been at work before magic added its touch to many objects of nature, and transformed them into warning signs or harbingers of luck. Human fate is writ large on the shoulder-blade of a fresh-killed kid for those that can read it, if a partridge runs across your path from the left, it is as though it said 'Turn again, Whittington.' But notions of this kind are almost without number. Anthropomorphism may even have had a hand in the framing of the first and last rule of Brāhūi life (a rule followed also by many Baloch, though the enlightened of both races are rapidly freeing themselves from its shackles) never to go in the direction of the Star. For the Star is very commonly muddled up with the *chittan*, the forty *maidān-i-gharb* or invisible beings, who seem to be always lurking unwary mortals to their own invisible realms. In its zigzagging but appointed course, the mysterious Star is now south or east or north or west in the heavens, now sunk beneath the earth, and woe betide the man that ventures to follow in its track. But happily every Brāhūi knows the date of its appointed course. On the 3rd the Star is in the south, so if there's a corpse in the house and the door faces the south, the only way to get the corpse out-of-doors is to batter down a wall that has a more favourable aspect. This is bad enough in all conscience, but the battering down of all four walls is of no avail on the 9th or the 19th or the 29th, for these are the three days when the Star is in its underground quarters, and the burial will have to be postponed to the morrow. And after anthropomorphism has done its work, one touch of magic is all that is needed to make many an inanimate object spring to life, an obvious potency for good. Of such the Brāhūi rules of life are full. Tie the knuckle-bone off the hind-leg of a wolf round your leg, and you'll travel all day long and never tire. Pop a wolf's eye into your turban, if ever you want to sleep with one eye open. Hang a wolf's tooth round your child's neck, and there'll be no chance of the evil spirits troubling it. Give it a morsel of dried wolf's guts to eat, if it is threatened with consumption. Put the skin of a hyena's forehead into your grain measure, and your heap of wheat will increase. And if you're crazy with love, the skin will prove a very potent love-charm into the bargain. But the Dīhwār of Kalāt knows a love-charm worth two of that, and if ever you come across a much-wooded Dīhwār lassie, you may lay ten to one that she has got hold of a *Jus-i-afstār*—the dried genitals of a hyena bitch. Then there's the other side to the question. There are a whole host of taboos, things that are possibly all very well for other folk, but unspeakably evil for one's self. A Lāshūri Baloch will never touch *ālā*, a succulent plant of which women especially are very fond, partly because of its taste, partly because of the pleasant sound it makes when they munch it, a Marī Baloch will never touch tripe, a Rind Baloch will never touch camel's flesh, a Chīstī Sayyid of Kalāt will not eat sheep's head after dark, a Bīkak Chhuttā will never eat *lāl* or kidneys at all, nor will a De-larāu Chhuttā eat *larāu* or guts. Somewhat different are the fads of the Umrānī Baloch, who hate the very sight of a long-necked drinking-vessel called *ghuggī*, and of the Jamālī Baloch, who can't stand burning cow-dung. These seem more akin to the various abominations of the memals and artisans of the Kachhī, where the tool called *pūr* is an abomination to the weavers, *icakhā* or bits of rotten hide are an abomination to the cobblers, uncrushed pulse to the minstrels, a lemon to the gram-parchers, binjal to the carpenters, and honey to the barbers. A chief in the Kachhī used to have fine sport in the old days in trying to make the memals bring the names of their pet abominations to their lips, the very mention of them on the lips of others was enough to make them weep and wail and rend their clothes.

123 But if I once embark on a voyage among superstitions and magic of this nature, it would be many a weary page before I could reach the haven where I would be. As it is, it may be thought that I have already drifted far enough from my subject, yet the uncharted seas of religion abound too much in magic and superstitions for me to steer wholly clear of them. But on one other topic I must touch before I bring these fragmentary impressions of religious life in Balūchistān to a close. For a sketch of Balūchistān religion with the spirits of darkness left out would be as bald as *Paradise Lost* without the Arch-fiend. Here at any rate I return to the thick of my subject. Not even

in the Occident have they yet succeeded in pitchforking the devil out of religion and in Islam the Iblis and the Jann and the Jinn and the Shaitan and the Ifrit and the Marid have all their appointed spheres. In Baluchistan everything untoward seems to be put down to the Jinns—sickness among the children, murrain among the cattle, sudden death among the men. But worse perhaps than all, is the way the Jinns plague the poor women. I have before me the records of a case that occurred only a few months ago, where a council of Pathan Elders held an inquest over a woman who had evidently come by a violent death, and gravely pronounced that she had been strangled by a Jinn and the official in charge of the case, himself a Baluch, as gravely endorsed their verdict. In the length and breadth of the land it would probably be hard to find a household where a woman has not been possessed of a devil at some time or another. But if the Jinns are abroad, ever on the watch to do mischief there are happily talismans and amulets and charms to keep them at their distance. And even though a Jinn makes good his foothold in a woman, there are Sayyids and other holy men to eject him with their holiness and their prayers. Even if these fail, there are Shékh or devil-dancers to lure him out with their dancing. But this is ground where it will be better for me to stand aside and allow a man of the country to take up the parable.

124. Now as soon as a Jinn has entered into a woman (says a Bráhmī friend of mine) she falls to the ground, poor thing in a dead faint shivering and trembling with eyes fast shut, with teeth clenched, and arms and legs flung this side and that. And for the space of an hour or more she can utter never a word, and is deaf to the cries of her sorrowing kin. By those signs we know full well that a Jinn has got her in his grip and our first thought is to summon some holy man who shall drive the evil spirit forth with prayers and incantations and charms. Well, it's not for me to decry the skill of mulla or Sayyid in the casting out of devils in truth the efficacy of their amulets and charms is the measure of their power among the people. But old fashioned folks set more store by the Shékh and his dancing. Now a Shékh is not a member of any one tribe or race. You may come across one here and there all up and down the country. By his long long hair you will know him, and his skill on instruments of music, and his power over the Jinns. Some Jinns he has forever under his spell, and with these to do his bidding he can win the mastery over others. So if mulla and Sayyid have failed to free the hapless woman from the spell, her kinsfolk call in a Shékh at dead of night. But first they gather together men that are cunning on instruments of music. And when the Shékh enters the assembly where the woman is laid, the minstrels strike up a measure, and play right lustily. And as he listens to the strains, the Shékh's limbs tremble beneath him and he rocks to and fro and his face is as the face of a man in agony. For the wild music breeds a madness within him, so that he becomes like one possessed. And lo! he starts to his feet and dances madly whirling round and round and ever round. And his long, long hair now floats in the air and anon it sweeps the ground. On he dances, and the music grows yet more wild and the dance yet more crazy. And when he is so spent with his whirling that the sweat drips from him in great drops, he cries aloud on All Basāt and Lakā and his other saints, to help him in this his hour of bitter stress. Now when the frenzy is upon him, men and women gather round him eagerly—the old ladies foremost in the press—and question him touching this or that, bidding him prophesy. Is it a boy or a girl that neighbour's wife will bear him? is there rain in the air? will father return this month or the next from his travels? and how will his business speed, for good or for ill? And to all their questions he will make answer if so be the Jinns are in the humour to prophesy. And haply some old crone will totter forward with a blue thread in her hand, mumbling up many a prayer that a son may be vouchsafed her daughter and will piteously entreat the Shékh to tie a knot in the thread that it may safeguard the child against the Jinns. And the Shékh will tie the knot, sure enough but a deal he will mutter of the sacrifices she must offer and the rich presents she should give him. Then one in the company will cry out for

Here and elsewhere I have drawn freely from an essay on Baluch ethnology which I hope shortly to publish in separate form.

Shékh or devil-dancer.

sweetmeats, and all the assembly take up the chorus. So with a wild toss of the head, the Shēkh calls upon the Jinns, and lo! at a whisk of his hand sweetmeats come tumbling from the air. Or he takes an empty bowl and waves it aloft, and then shows it to the people all brimming with blood. And oftentimes he goes apart and talks aloud, as though he were holding communion with the spirits of darkness. And the hairs bristle on the heads of all that hear him. For 'tis in truth a gruesome thing to hear strange talk and weird sounds in the dead of night.

125 By and by the Shēkh returns to the assembly, and speaking like one who speaks in his sleep, he tells how he has wrestled long and manfully with the spirits of darkness. May be he will say that the Jinn must be appeased with the sacrifice of a he-goat or a ram of this colour or that. Or he will say there is nothing for it but *alēj*. Now *alēj* is a sacrifice that is made after this fashion. The beast must be slaughtered before the very eyes of her that is seized of the devil. And a little wool is soaked in its blood, and smeared on her hands and feet and forehead. But the flesh is cooked and served among the assembly. And so, please God, the devil is cast out for good and all. But often enough it all begins over again before long. For some women seem never free from the Jinns. They are always flying into a rage and beating their faces and plucking out their hair, Heaven alone knows why. Nothing provokes them more than the smell of roasting meat. So no one is surprised if a neighbour pops in when a joint is on the roast, and begs for a bit to soothe some Jinn-ridden woman next-door. But truth to tell, there are women so lost to shame as to put on the airs of one that is possessed of a devil, and all to compass some private end. One, I daresay, has a grudge to pay off against her husband. Another may fancy that folk will eye her with reverence when they know that she is in league with the Jinns. But of such idle women, and their tantrums, and the airs they put on, and the nuisance they are, I will say naught. The Jinns are of a surety a dread and awesome company. Trouble enough do they give us, and small's the need to add thereto trouble that is mockery and vanity.

The casting out
of the devil.

SUBSIDIARY TABLES

XII—Distribution of the Population by Religion

District or state	N. NUNS PER 1,000 OF THE POPULATION WHO ARE				
	Muslims.	Hindus.	Buddh.	Christians.	Others.
BALUCHISTAN	938	45	10	6	1
Districts	911	68	13	12	2
Quetta-Pishin	936	104	19	25	5
Lahore	950	87	11	1	1
Kash	905	18	19	2	1
Kohat	878	130	31	12	9
Chitral	874	23	2	1	
SWAT	936	61	9	2	1
Administrated area	899	81	13	2	2
North-West frontier	915	11	—	—	—
States	965	28	7	—	—
Kashmir	959	23	9	—	—
Barisal	953	26	2	—	—
Jhelum	994	6	—	—	—
Kashmir	910	77	12	—	—
District-Kashmir country	874	84	72	—	—
Madrass	987	2	—	1	
Madras	999	2			
Lee-Nam	970	29	1		

XIII—Variation in Christianity

Sect	1911						TOTAL		Variation or —
	EUROPEAN		ASIA-INDIAN		INDIAN		1911	1912	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females			
All denominations	8,852	228	61	59	461	237	8,096	4,006	+ 1,069
Anglican Communion	2,770	800	28	90	230	179	2,246	2,827	+ 409
Baptist		2					10	17	— 7
Congregationalist	2			—	—		2	—	2
Lutheran	1		—		1	—	2	—	+ 2
Methodist	112	40	—	4	19	10	191	163	26
Misc. Protestant denominations	1		—		4	2	7	5	+ 2
Presbyterian	111	29	2		8	11	160	80	+ 70
Roman Catholic	869	123	34	25	223	13	1,200	739	461
Sect not returned	2	2			—	—	5	151	— 149
Indefinite belief	1		—		1	—	2	2	—

CHAPTER V

AGE.

Statistical data

SUBJECT	TABLES	
	Imperial	Subsidiary
General	VII	
Puberal distribution by race		
Puberal distribution by locality		XIV XV

126 The only members of the community whose specific age was recorded were those censused in municipalities, military stations, and the few other scattered areas where the census was taken on regular lines. But the conditions here are so abnormal and accidental that it seems sheer waste of time to dwell on the statistics. The ages of the aliens, who of course form the bulk of this part of the population, simply reflect the artificial character of their temporary sojourn in Balūchistān, the ages of the few indigenous inhabitants simply reflect the artificial character of their temporary sojourn outside their tribal country. In both cases there is an abnormally low proportion of the very young and the very old, and an abnormal deficiency of females except among the children. The urban population in Balūchistān (for this is what the regular areas give us in effect, though on the one hand they do not include all of our so-called towns and on the other include several petty localities which cannot be called towns, to say nothing of a few travellers by rail, road and sea) is made up for the most part of men in the prime of life actively engaged in earning their livelihood. As the census was taken before the coming of spring, it gives a somewhat exaggerated idea of the scarcity of females among the aliens, for many of the alien women move down-country during the rigours of winter. Most aliens send away their children at an early age. Few tribesmen bring either wives or children from their homes at all.

Age statistics in the regular areas

127 Out in the districts, conditions are of course so normal and at the same time so primitive that accurate age statistics would have thrown a welcome flood of light on the darkness caused by the utter lack of registration of births and deaths in the country. Unfortunately they were not to be had. For one thing, age is a matter beyond the grasp of the ordinary tribesman. Ask a well-grown youth his age, and he will very possibly say ten or twelve. The answer, by the by, may not be quite so absurd as it sounds, in all probability it is roughly so many years since he was breeched. Ask another, and he will perhaps say twenty or thirty, if you look dubious, he may raise it to forty or fifty—even to sixty or seventy, if only you look dubious long enough. A third will say frankly that he has no idea, but supposes that you are lettered enough to know better. But similar difficulties crop up in every part of India, and had these been all, we would have got over them, I dare say, in much the same way and with much the same degree of plausible success as other provinces. In Balūchistān, however, we are faced with a far more formidable difficulty, and though the ages of the males might have been registered after a fashion, in the case of the female sex all reference to age had to be left discreetly alone.

128 Specific questions of any kind regarding individual women are best avoided in Balūchistān. Questions that touch on the marriage

however remotely—and questions of age touch it much more nearly in the minds of the tribesmen than in the mind of the most fastidious spinster at home—are questions that are rarely safe outside the frigid atmosphere of the courts. It is a little difficult for any one who has not actually lived on this frontier to appreciate the extreme delicacy of the subject. Let me try to give some faint idea of it with the help of a few illustrations. Take the case of the stranger who came to a Brāhūi camp, asked politely after the health of his hospitable host and his brothers and his sons, and incautiously wound up with the hope that his wife was in the best of health. The courteous bearing of the Brāhūi turned to a blaze of wrath. "And what concern is it of yours," he roared, "whether my wife is sick or whole? And brandishing his sword he sped the flying guest. Or take the case of the guard placed over a cholera camp some ten years ago who was accused and found guilty of "blackening" a Brāhūi woman all because he laid a hand on her to keep her from quitting the camp—the evidence hardly amounted to more. Or take an extraordinary case which occurred among the Mari Balōch while the census was in progress, where a maiden was claimed in betrothal by two men of different sections of the tribe and was done to death by her father because (so he said) he felt that she was blackened by a claim he was unable to countenance. Among Pathans sexual jealousy seldom touches so absurd a pitch but matters are bad enough. Where the Pathan lives cheek by jowl with Brāhūi or Balōch, he affects much the same measure of reticence. Removed from their influence, he is, it is true, amenable within reason but he remains at all times keenly sensitive to the opinions of the outside world. On the part of the Dumar for instance, there seemed no reason to anticipate any real objections to the standard schedule, for so little addicted are they to jealousy where their unmarried women folk are concerned, that they still regard the provision of a maiden for the night as one of the first duties of hospitality (§175). But as soon as they got wind of objections raised by a neighbouring tribe, they at once mounted the high horse, and gave me the flat answer as they called it, that nothing would induce a Dumar to submit to a catechism about his women which was held to be too searching for his neighbours.

Age statistics
would have been
constructively

129 To have had our enumerators go forth and record the women of such tribes individual by individual on the inquisitive lines of the ordinary census, would have been like asking them to take lighted torches into cellars full of gunpowder. After all, as one philosopher among the tribesmen consolingly remarked, even if the standard schedule with its prying questions regarding age and marriage state could have been adopted we should not have got at the truth. "Put the case" said he, "that I had (which Heaven forbid!) an unmarried daughter of thirty-two in my house do you suppose for a minute that I would own up to her? Never a bit! I would plead guilty either to an unmarried daughter of twelve or a married daughter of thirty-two or rather now that I come to think of it, it's much more likely that I would hold my tongue, and not mention her at all. And even granted that honour and decency allowed us to give the ages of our women do you think we know them ourselves? I guess your zealous enumerators would always be wanting to have a peep at the wenchies to see if they were really of the age we said they were. Or do you imagine, he added with a grin, that our pious and wealthy friend Mr. Sayyid So-and-so who, as all the world knows, has married five wives though the holy law allows him but four at a time, would publicly acknowledge the presence of the fifth?

Methods justified
by the full record
of families.

130 Thus by denying ourselves the luxury of statistics regarding both age and marriage, we thereby denied the tribesmen even the shadow of an excuse for the wilful concealment of their women. Under a more inquisitorial system such concealment must have been inevitable in many tribes. As it was, the most minute check and countercheck in all parts of the country and among all races revealed not the slightest evidence of it. The trouble we took to temper our enquiries to the susceptibilities of the tribesmen was more than repaid by the candour of their answers. Judged by what has come to be regarded as the touchstone of census work in India, our methods stood justified to the full. The only member of the household who ever ran any risk of being omitted was the useless old granny not because there was the vaguest wish to conceal her

existence, but simply because she was apt to be forgotten or ignored, as an unnecessary encumbrance who had outlived her utility. And whenever record and check refused to tally, it was the regular thing to seek the explanation in the person of the old lady, and roars of laughter never failed to greet the goodman of the house when he stood convicted of having overlooked the poor old body at the time of record or check. But the enumerators themselves soon learnt to eye her as a potential source of error, and the cases in which she finally escaped being recorded must have been few indeed.

131 And so, though we were losers in one direction, we were for that very reason gainers in another. And the balance was unmistakably in our favour. It is much more important to have the bare numbers of females complete than to have fanciful ages and very possibly fanciful marriage particulars of such females as the tribesmen might condescend to acknowledge. Not that age data are altogether lacking—unsatisfying though the information may be, it is something at all events to have the population divided up into those above and those below the age of puberty. A wholly inoffensive division this, one would think. Yet even here we were treading on dangerous ground and we found it advisable to temper our enquiries to the whimsies of the particular races we were enumerating. True, there is little false modesty about the Pathān on the score of *balūghat* or puberty; indeed one hoary-headed old dodderer waxed quite querulous at finding himself recorded as *bālugh*, and kept harping on the embarrassingly intimate detail that it was many a weary year since his last *ihlām*. Not even with regard to his women does the Pathān resent the point-blank question, though he appreciates the pious circumlocution “Has she started prayers yet?” which puts matters in just as clear and much more polite a manner. But the Balōch professed himself scandalised at the very mention of puberty, happily he saw no indecorum in dividing up his household into those over and under thirteen—or whatever the age that might catch our fancy. And the Brāhūi went one further. To his fastidious mind a definite age smacked as much of impropriety as the word puberty itself, and it was no small relief to find that our object could be attained just as well and without loss of decency by a mere division into big and small.

132 In abandoning years of age and confining ourselves to puberty, we score at any rate in the elimination of nearly all element of fiction. Puberty is not simply a matter of certainty in the family, it is a matter of common knowledge in the village. It is accordingly a little curious to stumble on so few ceremonial customs connected with it. There is of course the breeching of the budding youth. Among the Marī Balōch and the Sanzarkhēl Kākār of Lōialai and probably other Pathāns, a lad's first breeches (which by the by have distinctive red strips tacked on to the legs) are ignominiously pulled off by his comrades before he is suffered to wear them in peace. But breeches often forestall puberty nowadays, and Brāhūis usually don them at quite an early age. A Brāhūi mother sometimes passes sweetmeats round among the women of the house with a meaning smile when her son first takes razor to shave himself about the middle. For a Pathān girl to begin to say her prayers—or, as they put it, to stand up for *mumāz*—is the signal that she has passed the threshold to womanhood. The Brāhūi custom is much more picturesque. The mother takes three small stones at sun-down, and placing them thus ° ° °, bids her daughter jump over them thrice. “For”—and here I will quote my informant's own words—“if this be done duly and in order, three days and no more will be the span of her monthly issue. Now and then, to be sure, she may be troubled longer; but that it never lasts beyond four or at the most five days, I have the warrant of an old dame who knows all about it. And surely to a man who ponders over such things, 'tis strange to find three stones on the threshold of womanhood. For it's three stones a husband throws when he banishes a wife from bed and board.” As a matter of fact, there can hardly be any closer connection between the three stones on the two occasions than that they serve in each case to emphasise the number three—at puberty for the purpose of magical telepathy, at divorce as a mnemonic.

133 Whether scientists would rest content with the local definition of puberty, I do not know. The only sign of adolescence a tribesman looks for in

Division into
adults and
non-adults.

Puberty, unlike
ego fact not
fiction

Local idoms.

his daughter is the appearance of her first period of uncleanness; the only signs he looks for in his son are the cracking of the voice, the sprouting of hair and the intrusion of sex in his dreams. Old folks will have it that puberty is reached much sooner in these degenerate days than in the good old days of their fathers. This, they say is but one sign out of many that the end of the world—a never-flagging topic among Brāhṃī greybeards—is surely nigh. But as they also say that puberty comes earlier to the rich than to the poor a sceptic might take them at their word, and putting two and two together read therein a sign that the times were on the mend. It is just possible that increased exposure to the temptations of town life may breed thoughts in some of the rising generation calculated to encourage the early arrival of puberty but a general speeding up of puberty is I suppose, an old wife's tale. It is easy to see how the idea may have arisen. The breeching of lads, which is the outward sign of puberty was put off in olden times as long as possible because unbreeched lads were as inviolate in tribal warfare as a woman or a Hindu or a Lōṇī (§ 288). But the need has gone for any such precaution, and lads are nowadays breeched betimes, though truth to tell, one may still see in outlying parts youths in garb scant enough to bring a blush to the cheek of averted propriety.

The age of puberty

181 But whether or no there has been any speeding-up of the age of puberty the fact unfortunately stares us in the face that we are unable to assign any particular age to puberty varying as it does with the individual, with the race with sex and with environment. Hence much as I appreciate the accuracy of our statistics, it is a trifle embarrassing to know what to do with them now that I have got them. Comparison with other statistics seems scarcely feasible, for it would be hard to lay one's hands on any statistics that are really comparable. Here on the one hand, is the division of the Balūchistan peoples on the basis of puberty there, on the other are the complex classifications of the populations of India and Europe on the basis of age. The gulf between them can only be bridged by a common denominator. I can hardly drive a line through the statistics for India at some critical age like twelve or thirteen, and expect any very satisfying results from a comparison with the puberal cleavage in Balūchistan. Nor can I reverse the process and reduce our own statistics to terms of age. For what critical age could I select with any confidence? To fix upon the age of fifteen is merely to cut the Gordian knot in the first likely place that catches my eye. Not but what it might be difficult to find a better. Fifteen may err on the safe side yet the margin is not so great as those accustomed to life in the warmth of India may imagine. It seems to fit the males fairly well when we take them in the mass though it probably oversteps the mark among the Jatt and other dwellers of the plains, where development seems to set in much more rapidly than in the uplands. But if it fits the males, it must necessarily fall to do justice to the superior precocity of the other sex for a lass, as the Brāhṃīs say is like barley that shoots up apace, whereas a lad is like the more precious wheat that is slow of growth.

Female female development

185 This female precocity seems to be writ large over our statistics, even when—in an endeavour to discount the local dearth of females—we take a thousand of either sex and use puberty to divide each thousand into two heaps. Only among the erratic Hindus do the girls appear to have any difficulty in

Non-Indians in 1890 of each sex.			
	Male	Female	Male excess.
Jatt groups	891	890	0
Seyyid	430	367	63
Macdonaugh	278	242	+36
British	280	300	-20
Beluch	397	373	24
Pathan	413	380	33
Jatt	308	317	-9
Lāl	272	261	+11
Hak	225	208	17
Hindu	315	316	-1

in the race of life is shortened by the early arrival of puberty. Seyyid girls, on the other hand, show their brothers a remarkably clean pair of heels. Here the gap between the two sexes is so wide that, were the precocity of females the only factor in the case, our statistics might well be suspect. But though I certainly believe in this female precocity I am of

course conscious that there are many other factors at work—far too many, I confess, for the comfort of one who has no statistical bent. One obvious factor that plays havoc with this Sayyid proportion is matrimony. For while Sayyids cheerily recruit the number of their women by taking wives from outside their hallowed circle, they suffer no corresponding loss in the number of their guls for the simple reason that they disdain to give their daughters to outsiders in exchange. Among the Sayyids—to put it bluntly—there is many a woman that was never a Sayyid at birth. The full force of this matrimonial disturbance is probably concentrated on the Sayyid statistics, though the reverse of it, of course, dissipates itself over several of our other races. On the statistics of the province as a whole, it is hardly felt at all. If Sayyids take a woman or two from outside the province, others (like the Brāhūis) make up for it by sending a few of their daughters abroad, but the totals on either side are small, and the balance within the province remains, I fancy, pretty constant. It is very different with emigration, which disturbs the proportions throughout, and probably to a much greater degree. Unlike nomadism, which removes whole families from the province and thus fails to affect the balance, emigration upsets the balance not only among the several races but in the province as a whole by carrying off full-grown men and consequently exaggerating the relative number of boys in the population that is left behind. If only we knew to what races the emigrants belonged, a simple readjustment of the racial proportions would allow us to tackle them with renewed confidence. Unfortunately, all that emigration statistics tell us is that apart from the emigration of whole families (which does not concern us) there was a surplus emigration of males—full-grown males, we may safely assume—nearly 7,000 strong (§82), all that local knowledge can tell us is that most of them were probably drawn from the Sayyids and Pathāns and from the Makrānī Balōch and others of Makrān. Their absence from the province of course throws an unnatural damper on the proportion of men in it, and gives an unnatural fillip to the proportion of lads. The best we can do to put things straight is to lump the whole lot up with the total number of men in the indigenous population. This done, the number of lads in every 1,000 males drops from 391 to 384, and the true excess of lads over guls drops from 25 to 18. And, if this were the full measure of female precocity in Balūchistān, it would amount to nothing very serious after all. But there is at least one other disturbing influence to be taken into account—the fact (for it seems a well-established fact, though it runs in the teeth of all European experience) that there is much more infant mortality among the daughters than among the sons of Balūchistān (§162).

136 When we turn to the fluctuations in the relative number of children among our various peoples, we pass on to what should prove a much more

Proportion of children

Non-adults in 1,000 persons		
	Non adults	Survivals per father
<i>Indigenous</i>	379	3.6
Pathan	402	3.4
Sayyid	395	3.3
Balōch	385	4.1
Brāhū	375	3
Lāsī	367	4.2
Miscellaneous	360	3.9
Jatt	357	3.9
Sikh	317	—
Hindu	315	2.8

fascinating topic, for, other things being equal, the greater the proportion of children in a race, the more hopeful the prospect of its healthy development in the coming generations. Take our three chief races, for instance. On the face of it, things look rosy enough for the Pathāns, not nearly so rosy for the Balōch, far from rosy for the Brāhūis. And this may be a reasonably true account of the relative prospects of the Brāhūis and Pathāns. But a glance at the margin, where the childhood proportions are contrasted with extracts from our birth statistics (§67), makes one feel at once that there must be something wrong with the place of the Balōch on the list. And, sure enough, up crop the same old difficulties to spoil our simple calculations. Thus, if both or rather survival statistics are any criterion at all, the Lāsī and the Jatt should be at the top of the list or near it, instead of sinking, as they do, towards the bottom. The obvious explanation for their humble position on the list is not that they breed little or rear few, but that their children ripen early to maturity in the warmth of the plains they inhabit. The influence of locality is perhaps best seen in the local statistics themselves. In Las Bēla, which is hot enough, the average number of children in every 1,000 of the population is 369, in the Dōmbkī-Kahērī country, which is hotter still, it is 359, in the Kachhī, which is hottest of all—show me the tract in India that can vie with this burning fiery furnace!—

it is 849 the lowest childhood proportion in the whole of Baluchistan with the sole exception of the hopelessly exceptional case of Bôlân. And in illustration of other disturbing factors, let us turn to the sacred people that all but heads the list. That the Sayyids are really entitled to a highish place, I do not question they marry early they marry often, they live in comfort, and their children ought to thrive. But — and here is the rub — the presence of two mutually repellent but very possibly unequal factors leaves us in doubt whether we can take Sayyid childhood proportion at its face value. On the one hand, the relative number of Sayyid children is artificially lowered by matrimonial customs, which bring alien women into the Sayyid fold; on the other it is artificially heightened by emigration which drives many Sayyid men out of the country. And looking at the not particularly high survival rate among the Sayyids I am inclined to think that the proportion of children among them is artificially exaggerated. So here, once more, we sorely feel the absence of any information regarding race in our so-called emigration statistics. And all we can do is to repeat the old process and add the emigration surplus to the adult figures for the whole province, with the result that the provincial proportion of children drops from 879 to 876. But I am far from satisfied with the lame and impotent conclusions that I have been able to draw from this puerile division of the Baluchistan peoples. With proper handling it ought to be made to yield some very pretty results, I think. But my own confession of bungling will surely provoke some learned statistician to prove how dummily I have failed. And with this sincere but unflattering hope I gladly retire.

SUBSIDIARY TABLES

XIV—Puberal Distribution by Race.

(Indigenous only)

RACE OR TRIBE	Non adults per mille persons	PUBERAL DISTRIBUTION OF 1,000 OF EACH SEX			
		NON ADULTS		ADULTS	
		Males	Females _g	Males	Females
INDIGENOUS	379	391	366	609	634
Balōch	385	397	372	603	628
Eastern	384	393	372	607	628
Western	389	403	372	597	628
Brāhūī	375	386	360	614	640
Original nucleus	371	384	356	616	644
Sarawān	368	376	359	624	641
Jhalawān	378	393	360	607	640
Miscellaneous	393	400	398	600	604
Pathān	402	412	390	588	610
Kālaṛ	397	405	388	595	612
Panī	400	415	382	585	618
Tarūn	419	430	407	570	593
Lāsī	367	372	361	628	639
Jatṭ	357	366	347	634	653
Sayyid	395	420	367	580	633
Miscellaneous	360	376	342	624	658
Hindu	315	315	316	685	684
Sikh	317	325	308	675	692

XV—Puberal Distribution by Locality

(Indigenons only)

DISTRICT OR STATE.	Non-adults per mille persons.	PUBERAL DISTRIBUTION OF 1,000 OF EACH SEX.			
		NON-ADULTS.		ADULTS.	
		Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.
BALUCHISTAN	370	391	368	609	634
Districts	305	484	886	516	614
Quetta Ptoha	617	431	403	569	600
Loralai	165	300	801	691	609
Chitral	800	401	377	599	622
Boln	226	215	276	785	625
Chitral	365	362	390	638	611
Bal	393	220	273	610	623
Administrated area	373	391	363	619	627
North B. gfl country	603	409	401	592	599
States	596	826	850	626	650
Kabul	863	381	348	619	651
Barbada	362	371	361	629	639
Shahd	371	291	338	609	654
Kashmir	373	364	330	636	670
District-Kabul country	338	365	334	636	666
Mair	373	374	351	626	648
Kabul	411	434	326	576	604
Low B. B.	308	373	365	627	636

CHAPTER VI.

SEX.

Statistical data

SUBJECT	TABLES	
	Imperial	Subsidiary
Actual population— Variation by age	VII	
Natural population— Variation by 'migration'		XI
Indigenous population— Variation by locality Variation by race Variation by nomadism		XVI XVII XVIII

137 Unless a country is entirely cut off from all intercourse with the outside world, there is of course no reason to expect the sex-proportion of its population to coincide with the sex-proportion of the population born in it. Emigration and immigration upset the balance at once. In so far as an undue number of males is usually carried to and fro on their flood, they often tend to counteract each other, but it is only when they are equal in volume and alike in character, that it is safe to ignore their disturbing influence. The population actually enumerated in Balūchistān is a very artificial medley, made up of indigenous inhabitants of the country, large numbers of alien immigrants, and a sprinkling of people who are hardly the one or the other (§ 61).

	Males	Females
Actual population	1,000	790
Natural population	1,000	833

It is accordingly not surprising that the sex-proportion is also artificial, for there is as usual a great deficiency of females among the immigrants, a deficiency exaggerated in the statistics by the by owing to the particular season of the year when the census was taken. If we endeavour to adjust matters by weeding out of the population those born outside Balūchistān and by bringing in those born within it but enumerated elsewhere in India (for all who had ventured outside the limits of India are of course beyond our control¹), the sex-proportion is materially altered. But the natural population, as the resultant of these simple sums in addition and subtraction is called, is a very unnatural population after all (§ 68). It simply reflects the accident of birthplace, and even that it fails to reflect faithfully. For all it amounts to is the total number of persons, whatever their creed, their race or mother country, who happen, first, to have been born in Balūchistān, and, further, to have been enumerated within the Indian Empire at the time of the census. There is a place in it allotted to my child, simply because she happens to have been born in Quetta; my Brāhūi orderly is sent packing, simply because he happens to have been born in Karāchi. Much that is of interest could, I suppose, be gleaned from a comparison of sex in the actual and natural

¹ This is not strictly accurate. I have since received the returns of 242 persons (including 15 females) who were born in Balūchistān but censused in Ceylon, Uganda and Malaya.

populations of Baluchistan. But a glance at the two sets of statistics falls, I confess, to what my curiosity. For neither the one nor the other can profess to represent the sex proportion among the true natives of the country—among those, that is, whose home, like the home of their fathers before them and the future home of their sons and their sons sons after them, is Baluchistan.

Paucity of females
in the indigenous
population.

138 And so, rather than look on this picture or on that, I prefer to turn to the sex proportion among those who are natives of Baluchistan in the living sense of the word. Here we leave the shifting sands of accidental birthplace for the firm ground of birth right or race. All aliens are banded out of the statistics neck and crop, and the semi indigenous may go with them. Of the emigrants from this country there are so few whom there is any point in hailing back, that I propose for the present to leave one and all where they are. For on the great tidal wave of emigration into Sind are borne not so much casual individuals as whole families—men women, children and all and for aught we care with our present object in view whole families may go and welcome, for in the mass they obviously leave sex proportion as it was before. Once the stream of family emigration is cut off the drainage into Sind and Bombay dwindles away to little. To other parts of India emigration runs in mere dribblets and even in the Panjab, where the stream is a little stronger it is swollen by the emigration of family groups. Emigration beyond India need not concern us at all. Even if we could come by the statistics, they would hardly tell one way or the other here again emigration is almost wholly of a family character except to countries outside the regular beat like Ceylon or Malaya, where it is so small as to be negligible. The net result is that there appear to be six or seven thousand males who should, properly speaking be added to our figures (§ 8*)—to be distributed for the most part among the Pathan, the Sayyid, and the Makrani. If a dearth of males in Baluchistan were in question, or if males in Baluchistan were for some strange reason more likely to evade enumeration than females, I should certainly be loth to let these male deserters escape my clutches. As it is, I prefer for the present to leave them where they are. For to me it falls to discuss an abnormal dearth

Indigenous population.

Males.	Females.
1,000	514

of females, and I shall clearly run less risk of being suspected of overstating a case remarkable enough as it stands, if I refrain as long as possible from calling these male absentees back to the province, and deliberately forge a tempting opportunity of laying the colours on thicker at the outset.

Intense desire for
male issue.

139 Now there is a curious conflict of opinion among the people themselves as to the modern drift of the proportion between the two sexes. Brahûi gaffers are always harping on the lamentable increase of females as the world grows older gloating over it with melancholy pride as not the least of the many signs that the next world, which is to be heralded in by a grievous famine of males, is surely nigh. Yet the tribesmen at large, unconsciously glorifying their old tribal struggles, which in reality seem usually to have been very bloodless affairs, are fond of airing the view that the relative number of females has recently gone down by leaps and bounds, simply because the males are no longer subject to the drain of war. Unfortunately we are not in a position to check either notion further for ancient statistics there are none. But of the dearth of females in Baluchistan at the present day even judged by the low standards of India, there is no possible question. The people themselves complacently attribute it in no small measure to their overwhelming desire for male issue, a desire which is as intense among the mothers of Baluchistan as it was among the mothers of the Jewish world, where by the by it had roots much more ancient and much more deep down in human nature than that divine hope of bearing the promised Messiah in which we were taught to believe. And without in any way posing as being of the tribesman's artless faith in the direct power of the wish to become father to the fact in this simple manner I cannot but feel that the intensity of the desire for male issue and the universality of the belief in the inherent inferiority of the female sex are factors not to be overlooked in any discussion of sex proportion in Baluchistan.

Fertile
women.

140 To leave a son behind is the lifelong prayer of every man in the country. To have no children at all is of all calamities the most calamitous.

But hardly less pitiable is the plight of the man who has nothing but daughters, for a daughter (as the shrewd proverb puts it) is little better than a gift to your neighbour after all. Nevertheless the first concern of a newly wedded couple is to get a child at all cost, no matter what the sex, for, as far as I can make out, there is a very general scepticism regarding the possibility of regulating the sex of the first-born. If the various fertilising customs connected with the marriage ceremonies fail to achieve their object, folks soon look around for the cause. Should the wife peak and pine, the Brāhūis put all the blame on the husband, and it is for him to try what drugs and charms and the like can do to set him right, and in passing I may add that actual impotency is almost everywhere regarded as ample grounds for the wife to appeal to the Elders for a dissolution of the marriage. But if the wife grows fat and well-liking, the blame for the sterility of the union rests obviously with her. Throughout the length and breadth of the land a barren wife is a very fruitful source of gain to holy men and beggars and quacks and magic-mongers of all kinds. Possibly they may content themselves with palming off some charm or amulet on her. But highly prized though these are, they do not exhaust the resources at their command. One very favourite device is to hold a staff against a wall and make the barren woman pass under it thrice, other faith-curers with more dramatic instinct vary the cure (or are they perhaps simply retaining a more archaic form of it?) by crooking one leg against the wall to make the archway. Shrines, needless to say, are a very popular resort of the barren woman. Some shrines have a greater fertilising reputation than others, and the most famous of all is perhaps Shāh Wasāwa's *landi*,¹ a tree that grows in the Nasirābād *tahsil*. The legend connecting the saint with this tree is a little too broad to be repeated here, but we have the saint's own word for it that any woman who comes to the tree and embraces it in true faith, shall be the joyful mother of children. Unfortunately the tree was hacked down some little time ago by a priest out of jealousy or bigotry. The people at first threatened to wreak their vengeance on the priest for this act of sacrilege, but quieting down wrapped the trunk in a shroud and gave it decent burial. True, the roots have begun to sprout afresh, but I understand that the enthusiasm of the women has been somewhat damped. If all else fails, the last resource known to the Brāhūis and Marī Balōch in cases of barrenness is to snip off the tip of the woman's clitoris (§178). The cure is possibly much more common than my reports seem to imply—I have also heard of a case by the by in Makrān—for this is a matter that the women keep dark from their menfolk as much as possible.

141 So intense is the universal yearning for a son that once conception becomes certain, the sex of the unborn babe arouses very lively speculation. Nature is ransacked for portents. The condition of the goodwife herself is of course full of them. The various signs are not always read in quite the same way, but the general idea that a son taxes the mother much more severely than a daughter is rarely challenged. You can read the sex in her whole demeanour: if she is weak and ailing and listless and querulous, it's surely because there's a male child in her womb slowly sapping her strength. You can read it in her face: for she can only hope to keep her plump cheeks and bonny looks during this trying time if she has nothing but a daughter to nourish. You can read it in her gait: for small's the wonder if shoulders droop and feet drag behind her when a son is bearing down upon her, (but a Jatt thinks it's a much better symptom if she unconsciously starts off with her right foot). You can read it in her figure: for a daughter humbly nestles low down and towards the left, but a son sits higher up, as befits his lordly sex, and of course on the right. You can read it in her appetite: for though a son requires more nourishment, she is so weakened by his demands and so nauseated by his lusty kicks, that she is left with small inclination for food. You can read it in her nipples: for they flush red at the joyous prospect of a son, but grow black (as a sign of mourning I suppose) if a daughter is coming to suck them.

Sex diagnosed from the expectant mother's condition.

142 But the milk in her breasts is perhaps more tell-tale than anything else. Among the Brāhūis, the Jatt and the people of Makrān at any rate, there is a wide-spread belief that it varies in consistency with the sex of the babe in.

The milk test.

¹Prosopis Spicigera

her womb. If the milk is thick, such strong food is obviously being stored up for a son; if it is thin, they must just resign themselves to fate. But as it is not easy to say whether milk is thick or thin by merely looking at it, a simple plan is to draw off a little from her breasts and test it in water. All is doubtless well if it sinks to the bottom, but there is sure to be a girl coming if it spreads out and dissolves. Another of their tests is to sprinkle a few drops on a stone and lay it out in the sun, and it is a sad business if the milk runs off instead of caking on the stone. A still more favourite test is to pick a louse from her hair and plunge it into some of her milk; then if the milk is thick and strong enough to drown it, there can be no mistake about the coming of a boy. All this seems more or less rational on these premises—whether the premises themselves are founded on fact, let the man of science up and speak for himself as a Brāhmi friend of mine is fond of saying whenever I look sceptical over any of his Brāhmi notions. But in some parts of Makrān they go about the test in a bewilderingly topsy-turvy manner. Instead of testing the anxious mother's milk they simply take a louse off her head and pop it into some milk drawn from another woman. This time they are anything but pleased if it dies, for it is only if it struggles back to life that they can be confident of a boy. In Zamrān they are not satisfied with the test of a single louse, but prefer to make matters trebly sure by picking three from her head.

Other forms of divination.

143. According to the Brāhmīs the Black Snake is blinded when its path is crossed by a woman great with a male child, though heaven only knows what mischief it might do were she not protected by the male life within her. I am sorry by the by to have to leave the identity of the Black Snake a mystery. In Turbat they use any snake killed in the house to solve the problem of the unborn's sex: they simply make the woman step over its dead body and then they fling it aloft in the hope that it will fall on its back, for it means a daughter for certain if it falls on its belly. But there are other forms of divination by throwing things in the air in this part of Makrān. In fact it seems to be as popular here as divination by throwing orange-peel is in our nurseries. The future mother for instance, puts some ashes from the hearth into a cake, and on its face she sets a mark which she fondly imagines resembles a skeleton and shutting her eyes she flings it in the air with the cry "Everybody feeds on the food you cook, so speak the truth." If it falls face upwards, she is a happy woman that day. Or she takes a flat stone, marks the face of it with a circle, and throws it aloft, conjuring it by the true Faith to speak the truth, with an inward prayer that it may fall with the circle upwards. Nowhere does the expectant mother appear to be so inquisitive as in Makrān: nowhere else at any rate do there seem to be so many devices at her command. Thus she marks one of the beads on a rosary and beginning with the marked bead she tells them over in pairs, muttering the names of all the prophets she can think of, and is highly disgusted if there is a bead left over at the end, for this is a sure sign of the coming of a girl. Or she shuts her eyes tight, and does all she can to make the tips of her middle fingers on either hand meet together across her breast.

Abortion has prevailed.

144. I cannot help thinking that the women must persist in their experiments, like their magpie-counting sisters in England, until the result comes out to their liking. At any rate, great though their disappointment must be when divination fails to tell in their favour I have never heard the slightest whisper of attempts at abortion except among the Chhutṭa Māngal of Samōṭri,—and among wild and hopelessly uncivilised Makrānīs of Faani and Kulanch. Among the former the practice is reported to be dead, and it is not impossible that my informant has confused abortion with female-infanticide, of which the Chhutṭa were once accused. Among the latter folk who have already a surfeit of daughters are supposed to attempt abortion by stuffing Akh leaf fibre or else *kiani kākhi* wrapped in wool up the vagina or by dosing the unfortunate woman with powdered *unafetida*. Whether either treatment is really successful, I cannot say. They certainly sound more efficacious, if less ingenious, than the reputed devices of the guilty Brāhmi woman, who is supposed to cover up the possible consequences of her amours by swallowing a roasted locust of

Analogies of divination.
Rituals of the Black Flag or *Asar* Cult.

the kind found in the Akh plant, or raw pigeon dung, or the roast anus of a wolf. But except in cases of illicit intercourse, which obviously stand on a different footing, the Brāhūis, like the people of Balūchistān generally, allow nature to run its course without let or hindrance at all stages of life. Abortion is universally looked upon as something sinful, unholy, abominable, it could hardly be otherwise among people whose earnest prayer is to have as many children, or at any rate as many sons, as possible.

145 And, unskilful though local midwifery methods may sound to a doctor's ears, the tribesmen according to their lights devote much care to the safety of mother and child during pregnancy and confinement, nor, as far as I have been able to ascertain, do they make any appreciable difference if divination has pronounced the unborn babe to be a girl. The kindness shown by Brāhūis, for instance, to the future mother is pleasant reading enough. After the first three months are out, she is relieved, as far as may be, of the heavy drudgery about the house. Not that she is suffered to sit idle the livelong day—this would only make it more difficult for her when her time comes, on the contrary, she is encouraged to keep on the move, especially towards the end. In matters of diet she almost runs the risk of being killed by kindness of every edible thing that is brought into the house she must be given a bite, for if she should catch sight of anything and her craving for it should be left unsatisfied, it would be almost certain to bring on a miscarriage, so if, as happens often enough, she gets a craze for clay or fullers' earth, they never dare to lift a finger to stop her, in spite of a shrewd suspicion that she is injuring not only herself but the babe in her womb. After the seventh month she lives apart from her husband. Against the spirits of darkness she is shielded at every turn, threads of blue cotton are tied round her big toes, she is not allowed to go into a dark room by herself, above all things she must not look upon a corpse. But among all our races elaborate precautions are taken to prevent miscarriage. Amulets and charms and the like are of course in great demand. In many parts of Makrān the pet talisman is a *band*—a knotted goat's hair thread to be got from any holy man—which must be hammered with a stone and thrown into running water as soon as the delivery is safely over. In Pasni and Kulānch any amulet that is used is washed after the delivery, and the water in which it is washed is poured on to the roots of some tree. But throughout Makrān they are so afraid of the spells of some spiteful enemy that, though amulets and charms are all very well in their way, the pregnancy is kept dark as long as possible, which leads one to wonder whether the shamefaced attempts at concealment of their honourable condition on the part of our own women have not deeper roots than false modesty or false vanity. With the same object the people of Makrān carefully gather up the combings of the woman's hair and the pairings of her nails and eventually bury them in a shroud. But do what one will, accidents will of course happen, and should miscarriage occur by some unhappy chance about the third month, a Brāhūi woman will often wrap the noisome thing in antimony and swallow it whole, in the certain faith that it will quicken once more in her womb and be born in due course.

146 The birth itself seems usually a simple affair, especially among nomads, and it is no uncommon experience for the goodman to leave his dwelling in the morning with never a suspicion of coming events, only to be greeted by an infant's cry on his return. It may, to be sure, be a very different matter, as Brāhūis and Balūch know to their cost, if the voice of a virgin or a woman with child is allowed to strike the ear of the poor wife. So it is no small comfort that there are a sheaf of devices to help her in her distress. If you have a leaning towards charms, this Persian couplet is recommended by Brāhūis as the very best of all —

*I have no place to dwell in and my ass hath none
Spouse of a farmer! give birth, give birth to a son!*

It should be written down (and the mulla is of course the proper man to do it for you) on two bits of paper, the one should be tied to the woman's thigh, and the other placed where she can gaze upon it. Another very favourite device, especially among the Dōmbkī Balūch and the Brāhūis, is to make her drink off some water in which any old gentleman has kindly dipped his beard. In parts of Las Bēla the husband (who by the by is very generally suspected of unkindness to his wife if her labour is troublesome) passes himself over her body,

or else he washes her hands and feet in water and makes her drink it off ; in the Kōlwah tract in Makrān he rubs her belly with his feet. If it is past her full time and there are still no signs of labour the Brāhūis fear she must be in for the long weary period of a mare. This would be indeed a serious business, were there not easy means of paying on the curve to the proper quarters. All that need be done is to give the woman any water that is left in the pail after a mare has swilled her fill, or to make her crawl under the belly of a mare that is in foal.

147 Even at birth the two sexes appear to affect the mother in different ways. At any rate the Pathāns will have it that females are so full of original sin that they are up to their mischievous pranks from the very beginning and give their poor mother far more pangs than their brothers, who of course comport themselves throughout life much more closely in accord with divine law. On all sides the birth of a son is hailed with delight. Among Brāhūis the young mother is left for a while in the saddening belief that she has been delivered of a daughter, lest her exceeding great joy should be too much for the poor thing in her prostration. Much ado is made over the breaking of the news to the father who generally retires to a neighbour's house during the crisis. Not only the father but the other kinsmen and close friends of the family are expected to tip those who manage to be first with the glad news. Almost everywhere shots are fired to celebrate the event. But among the Dōmbki Balōchi shots are only fired if the birth takes place by night. In the day time the glad tidings are announced by the weird cry " Mistress So-and-So has been delivered of an ass's colt ! There are one or two other quaint touches in Dōmbki birth-customs whether a son or a daughter is born to him, no Dōmbki would allow embers to be removed from his hearth for full seven days. If he is blessed with a son, a drain is dug through the wall by the side of the house-door and it is left to run for a week. But the Makrānis seem stranger folk still. Just as they endeavour to conceal pregnancy for as long as possible, so they make a show (and doubtless for the same reason) of keeping the birth dark for at least six days, and when at the last they announce it, they announce it (and again for the same reason) all wrong, giving out that it's a boy if it's a girl, and that it's a girl if it's a boy. Here, as elsewhere, the father is usually supposed to absent himself. In Panjgūr he betakes himself into the jungle, and though he returns briskly enough at the glad news of a boy he is not allowed to set foot in the house itself till the fourth day. In other parts of Makrān he has to keep himself in readiness to assist in troublesome labour and in Pasni and Kulāneh he may even be called upon to lend the midwife a helping hand at the delivery itself.

148 At the birth of a daughter no guns are fired. In truth this is no time for joyous sounds. A gloom falls over the household. Even the midwife has to be content with half fees there are no tips at all for the officious bearers of the bad tidings. Among the Brāhūis at large the unfortunate man whose first born is a daughter is thought to be a weaker vessel than his wife among the Zahri he is beaten seven times with a shoe, though he can compound for his beating (possibly a modern refinement) by standing a feast to his neighbours. But though no rejoicings herald the arrival of a daughter into the world, there is consolation for the family in the thought that it is at any rate better off than it was before. A son, no doubt, means honour and strength to the family and another worker to increase its wealth. But a daughter is wealth itself. For the time being to be sure, the capital is locked up, and there is one more mouth to feed. But a girl takes a hand in the household labour at an early age, and when after a few years she is turned into money in the shape of a bride-price they will be either woefully unbusinesslike or woefully unlucky if they can not show a goodly balance to their credit in the end.

Somebody traces of female-infanticide.

149 This by the by is the gist of the answers received on all sides, whenever we sounded the tribesmen on the existence of the practice of female-infanticide. It may possibly be thought that female-infanticide is hardly a subject on which we are likely to elicit any very trustworthy information, though there is perhaps something in these pages (which contain after all mere gleanings from our researches) to suggest that in Balūchistan we have at times a knack of getting fairly close to the intimate life of the people of the country. But our questionings

were neither direct nor clumsy regarding the seamy side of their own customs tribesmen may well be tongue-tied, their tongues wag freely when they are invited to dilate on the shortcomings of their neighbours, who are generally their rivals and as often as not their hereditary and exceeding bitter enemies. As it is, the only people I have any grounds for suspecting are the chiefly families in the Marī and Bugtī Balōch, and the Chhutta, a numerically insignificant branch of the Mēngal Brāhūis, apparently Jatt in origin. Yet even their enemies agree that female-infanticide is now dead among both Marī and Bugtī, where it owed its existence to the custom of strict endogamy of females within the chief's family. Even among the Chhutta (who, significantly enough, do not go in for bride-price) it is said to be dead, except possibly in the case of twin daughters, who still appear to be regarded as too much of a good thing altogether. With these exceptions—female-infanticide in the past but possibly not very distant past among the Marī and Bugtī chiefly families, female-infanticide dying if not already dead in the small Chhutta community,—and with the further possible exception of casual female-infanticide in isolated families already overburdened with female children, I have been unable to trace its existence in Balūchistān, and all whom I have consulted, tribesmen and experienced officials alike, agree with me in believing it to be practically non-existent in the country.

150 It is possible that in the unlucky children of to-day—children in whom some physical abnormality is eyed as the harbinger of grievous ill-luck to the household—there are preserved traces of by-gone infanticide in the dark ages of some far distant past, when the ill-luck seemed so imminent and so deadly that the only remedy was death. Of such ill-starred children Balūchistān has plenty and to spare. First—at any rate most common of the bunch—is the girl that grinds her teeth in her sleep, who is so universally regarded as a danger to the house that the list of the various local cures seems interminable: hanging a blue bead or a sheep's vein to her ear, tying a jav's feather or a broken harp-string round her neck, slapping her in her sleep, striking her on the teeth with a coin (but it must have the creed of the true Faith written on it), pouring powdered charcoal or sand or ashes into her mouth, branding her on her big toe—and many another crafty device. Others in the throng are the Brāhūi girl with the whorl of her hair at all forward on her head, and the Brāhūi child or the Makrāni child of Pasni and Kulānch born with two front teeth, and the Brāhūi child that cuts its upper teeth before the lower. A truly dread calamity is this last, one that fills the mother with an overwhelming terror that she cannot explain. And it is only putting the difficulty further back if we hazard the guess (and no one would be more horrified at the idea than a modern Brāhūi) that it is a faint echo of the agonising terror of the Brāhūi mother in the long-forgotten past, when her child was torn from her arms and done to death to save the family from the awful consequences of those upper teeth, which to this day are the signal for infanticide in many East African tribes. I have not come across any suggested explanation of this cruel but wide-spread superstition. Even the ingenious author of *The Golden Bough* dismisses the subject for once without further comment, only mentioning it in connection with certain customs which seem rooted too deep down in the blackness of the savage mind for the modern mind to probe.¹ But the answer to the riddle lies perhaps on the surface after all. Is it not simply but another instance of the portentous character of the abnormal? Though the authorities are at sixes and sevens regarding the details of dentition, one and all seem agreed that the lower teeth in the normal child come first throughout. And as most of the authorities hedge their limited statistics with the confession of ignorance that dentition seems to vary with race and climate and environment, it would not be surprising if more comprehensive enquiries revealed the fact that the premature cutting of the upper teeth is least common, in other words most abnormal, among those peoples and in those countries where it is regarded as most unlucky. But though the abnormal is nearly always portentous, it seems sometimes almost a toss-up whether it will be read to prophesy fair things or foul. Take twins, for instance. Nearly all our races regard them as lucky, no matter what their sex, though no amount of good luck that a couple of guls at a birth may bring can be expected to reconcile folks wholly to their disappointment at missing a boy. Most Pathāns look upon twins

Unlucky children
possibly survivals
of ancient
infanticide

¹ J. G. Frazer's *Totemism and Exogamy*, Vol. IV, p. 164

as emblems of God's good will and the Zarkūn playfully cast lots to decide which breast each should have for its very own. But among the Ohānās a couple of girls at a birth is regarded as so unlucky that they are still suspected of putting them out of the way (§140). And though in Paṣānī and Kulānch it is the best of good omens if one of the twins is born head foremost with a caul over its face and the other is born sucking its right thumb, for both to be born otherwise than head foremost is the worst of bad omens, even apparently though both are males and a caul cover the faces of both. Which of the two presentations is the normal and which the abnormal I must leave to the doctors to decide. One curious thing about such symptoms of ill luck is that the males sometimes know little or nothing about them. I remember once when they have dismissed the matter as a thing of the past or else as something of which they have dimly heard in some other tribe, only to return with scared faces a few days later to tell me of the terror they had spread among the female members of their household by mooted the idea casually regarding their own offspring. So true is it that the women have longer memories than the men, that they are not only the mothers of our children but the custodians of ancient custom from one generation to another.

Turning the womb.

151. Now though the people at large feel themselves helpless to regulate the sex of the first-born, they have several devices to avoid the birth of a second daughter. Thus among the Brāhmins the midwife looses no time in making the young mother of a new-born daughter gulp down a hot broth prepared from a fresh-killed chicken, heavily spiced with cinnamon, pepper and the like for this will turn the womb as the expression is, and prepare it for the conception of a son. To quote my Brāhmi informant "If nothing be done she will bear daughter after daughter and if there be no change at the third, seven daughters will be the lot of the unhappy father. This is what the midwives say and surely they should know but how far a man of science may believe them let the man of science up and say for himself. The corresponding remedy among Pāthāns is for the young mother to swallow something sour (pickles, for instance, or curdled milk) immediately after the delivery of a daughter. This should have the desired effect, though to be on the safe side she should really swallow the testicles of a cock. Not but what some folks think it enough to call their girl *Bala Nista* No More—of the Feminine Gender. The Makrāns of Paṣānī and Kulānch go one further and pride themselves on being able to regulate the sex absolutely after the first delivery by simply dieting the young mother forthwith with either a cock or a hen according as a son or a daughter is required, and stuffing a pellet of opium three days later as far up the vagina as possible.

The statistics.

152. Now and then to be sure, all devices are in vain and many a father pulls a rueful face over the superfluity of girls that has fallen to his lot. I have even heard of a plague of daughters in a whole community. A few years ago a famous band of Shīrānī outlaws made overtures to be allowed to leave their sanctuary in Afghānistān and return in a body to their old country. There was a piteous plight they said from the day they had left their native soil the birth rate among them had gone from bad to worse, and, more alarming still their womenfolk had lost all power of bearing them sons. Whether they had any theory to account for the calamity I never heard that they had the decency to read in it divine displeasure at their acts of outlawry. I very much doubt—the Shīrānī remains a Shīrānī still. But this, to be sure is a case that it would be hard to parallel. The indigenous peoples of Balūchistān as a body are quite content with what they doubtless regard as the direct results of their admirable efforts at the regulation of sex. And well they may be. For in the mass there are only 845 female emigrants to every 1,000 males among them. To those who are accustomed to the Western European standard of 1,038 females, even to those who have become hardened to the humbler Indian standard of 953 or thereabouts, the Balūchistān figure may seem an impossible one. And yet, so far from being an understatement of the female element in the indigenous population it undoubtedly errs on the other side, for the surplus of males among the emigrants from the country (§82) is incomparably greater than any leakage of females that could possibly have occurred in the enumeration.

Female to 1,000 males.

(Indigenous only)

Balūchistān.

Districts

Shīrānī

946

830

845

marshalling the several divisions of Baluchistan in the order of their sex proportions—the Bolan population is too pigmy to take into account—I was somewhat surprised at the extent of the range. The order itself is bewildering enough. Glancing first at the top, I was tempted to conclude that the more backward and deserted a locality the higher the proportion of females in it. Glancing at the bottom I was tempted to conclude the exact opposite. And in the end, as I glance at the list as a whole, I am almost tempted to conclude that all conclusions are vain. There are incongruities everywhere. The Kachhi, I suppose is less characteristic of Baluchistan than any other division in it yet its female proportion is nearest the average. It is a flat low lying plain yet in sex proportion it takes its stand by the side of the mountainous district of Quetta and comes almost midway between the two adjacent and mountainous districts of Zhob and Loralai. Physically and racially Zhob and Loralai—or better example still Chagai and Kharin—are about as much alike as any two parts of the province; yet they are widely severed in the order of sex proportion. The list has an embarrassing air of impartiality about it—it seems to baffle our every attempt to trace in it any certain correlation between altitude or rainfall or density or environment and a high or a low rate of females. There is hardly a single generalisation to which it proffers support, that it is not equally ready to assail. And the only safe but *without unsatisfying conclusion* appears to be this—that in Baluchistan whatever the reason, conditions are generally more unfavourable to female birth or female life in the north-east than in the south-west and that amid the multitudinous factors that enter into the mysterious struggle for the mastery between the two sexes, locality has its appointed part to play.

Racial variation

135 So on we pass to glean what enlightenment we can from the racial characteristics of the people. Again I give the main statistics in the margin; and again I marshal them in the order of the relative number of females. And again there is an amazing range of variation in the sex proportion. But this time there is no disputing the validity of the title to the first place, at any rate among the Musalmāns. For while the Sayyids condescend to take the daughters of other races to wife, they are much too high and mighty to give their own in exchange.

Nowhere else, I fancy do matrimonial customs upset the balance to such a degree but they are obviously weights in the scale that must be taken into account throughout. The high female proportion among the peoples lumped up as Miscellaneous is largely due to a plethora of females among the Ghulam, who form a fourth of their number. As the proportion among the Ghulamāns (who are simply Ghulam that have risen to the status of freedmen) is only 828, race has clearly precious little to do with the Ghulam proportion of 1,121. It is merely a reminder that a female Ghulam has much less opportunity and indeed much less temptation, to alter her status than her brother. The Last proportion is well above the average, yet it falls short of the proportion in the Last country by 10. The last four places on the list are occupied, significantly enough by the four races of tribesmen who interest us most. The Pathāns with 841 and the Baloch with 840 stand almost neck to neck. The Jatt with 837 follow hard on their heels, leaving the Brāhūis a long way behind with 802. But I must not forget the domiciled Hindus and Sikhs, whom I have put in a class by themselves. Among the Hindus the female proportion is 845. Identically the same as the general proportion among the indigenous Musalmāns. Among the Sikhs it stands at the extraordinarily high figure of 948, a figure that puts even the Sayyids to shame. But the domiciled Sikhs are less than 3,000 strong, and the abnormality of their female proportion is a danger-signal that should bring us to a dead-stop—we are no longer within the region of large numbers where we can safely trust ourselves to averages.

Internal variation among the Brāhūis.

136 And though I am alive to the perils of embarking on any conclusions once outside the deep waters of large numbers, I will venture a little closer to

the shoals in the case of our three most important races. And first let me turn to the race that has the smallest share of females. Despite much variation in the Brāhūi tribes, there is curiously little variation in the main divisions of the Brāhūi race. Somewhat to my surprise, the Brāhūi nucleus tops the list with 812, then come the Sarāwān tribesmen with 809, the Jhalawān tribesmen and the small miscellaneous group are bracketed last with 797. In the Jhalawān country itself the proportion among the Jhalawān tribesmen dwindles to 792—a figure low enough to arouse the worst suspicions in the mind of the sceptic. But his suspicions will be lulled, I fancy, on finding that there is not a whit of difference in the proportion among the 10,000 odd Jhalawāns enumerated in Sarāwān. Quantitatively enough, though the general Brāhūi proportion in Jhalawān is only 795, the proportion among the Sarāwān tribesmen in Jhalawān is 36 higher than in their own Sarāwān country, but there are so few Sarāwāns in Jhalawān that this is probably a mere freak begotten of inadequate numbers. And a notable gallery of freaks awaits anybody who has the curiosity to turn to the sex-proportions in the several tribes. These freaks have a morbid fascination of their own, but it is hardly less interesting and it is certainly much more edifying to revert to the Brāhūi race as a whole, and observe the significant way in which its proportion of females tends to go up in sympathy with the general female proportion in localities where Brāhūis are found in any numbers. In Quetta and Chāgai, it is true, the proportion among the Brāhūi inhabitants is actually a trifle lower than the Brāhūi average. It is very different in the three tracts where females are most abundant. In Makrān the Brāhūi proportion rises to 817, in Las Bēla to 840, in Khārān to 843, in none of the three, I need hardly say, does it touch the local average. This, then, is the general conclusion: the proportion of females among Brāhūis is extremely low, but tends to rise above the racial average in tracts outside the Brāhūi country proper where the local proportion is high.

157 The influence of locality seems to stare us in the face when we turn to the Balōch. For measured in terms of sex, there is a wide gulf fixed between the essentially territorial divisions of the race that we have adopted. The female proportion among the Eastern Balōch is 824, were we to

And among the Balōch.

Balōch
Eastern
Western

840
824
871

eliminate the Khetrān with their superabundance of women—as we apparently ought, for it is extremely doubtful whether they are Balōch at all (§264)—it would drop as low as 811. Among the Western Balōch it stands at the very respectable figure of 871. And as we mark the ups and downs of the Balōch proportion in the various parts of Balūchistān, we seem justified in enunciating this general rule: sex-proportion among the Balōch is a trifle lower than the average for Balūchistān, and tends to rise or fall above or below its own normal in sympathy with the proportion in the general population of the particular locality in which they live. The rule obviously holds good in seven out of the eleven tracts where the Balōch are to be found in reasonably large numbers—in Makrān, Las Bēla, Khārān, Sarāwān, Kachhī, and the Dōmbkī-Kahērī and Marī-Bugti countries. In all these tracts, whether the Balōch proportion is higher than the Balōch normal or not, it falls short of the proportion of the locality. And the only exceptions to the rule are Lōralai, which is no exception at all, for the so-called Balōch of Lōralai are the Khetrān; Chāgai, where the Balōch divide nearly the whole of the population with the Brāhūis, who of course bring the proportion down, and Sibi, where, for some obscure reason, the Balōch proportion overtops the local proportion by 7.

158 We are much less likely to be able to trace the influence of locality in the case of the Pathāns, for unlike the Brāhūis and Balōch who are dissipated abroad in many and various parts of the province, the Pathāns are massed in a more or less homogeneous block of country covered by the four

And among the Pathāns

	All Pathāns	Kātkar	Tarān	Pani
Balūchistān	841	819	803	881
Lōralai	860	836	904	880
Quetta Pishūn	841	823	859	
Zhōb	827	816		836
Sibi	851	789	859	950

districts of Zhōb, Lōralai, Quetta-Pishūn and Sibi, and to make matters worse, they bulk so large in the indigenous population of three of these districts as to exercise a dominant force on the local proportion of females. Yet the influence of locality

seems to pop out from the figures in the margin notably from the curiously constant superiority of Loralai over Quetta and of Quetta over Zhob the Sibi figures, I confess, seem hopelessly capricious. Of all the statistics, those for Loralai and Zhob interest me most. Where Loralai can boast a female proportion of 860 among Pathluns at large with 830 among the Kakay and 880 among the Paqi, Zhob comes limping behind with 827 810 and 830. Notwithstanding the strong family likeness that runs through the physical conditions of the two districts, it certainly seems as if these variations were in some degree the results of an influence subtle though potent exercised directly or indirectly by locality. And when we turn the table sideways and focus our eyes on the three main branches of the race the Kakay and the Paqi and the Tahir, and watch them maintaining their relative order in sex proportion amid the ups and downs of the figures for Loralai and Quetta and Zhob it is hard not to feel that we are at the same time in the presence of some sort of tribal or racial influence. The Sibi figures are frankly beyond me, unless an explanation for their vagaries is to be found in the alacrity with which the enterprising Paqi male wanders abroad, or in his readiness to indent on the Kakay for his wives—and anybody can get a Kakay girl for the asking (£ 100) — while disdaining to give the Kakay any daughters of his own in return.

Effect of nomadism.

150 But to say that there seems something in the locality something in the tribe or race that works for a rise or fall in the female population is a very different thing from saying that there is something in the air of a country something in the blood which runs through the tribe or race, that makes it easier for a man of Baluchistan to breed more sons if he lives in one part of the province, or happens to belong to this tribe or that. Even if we had any warrant to indulge in such wide conclusion we should have hardly reached the first stage on our journey. Sex proportion is a tangled yarn which cannot be undone by the breaking of a couple of strands in this simple fashion. Even granted that a man of such and such a tribe, living in such and such a locality actually begets more sons than falls to the lot of ordinary mortals in Baluchistan there may still be something in the life of his tribe or in the life of his locality that will soon readjust the balance and humble his pride. And infinitely complex though the problem is I can confidently point to one unmistakable factor of this character. In scanning our statistics of nomadism (§71) nothing

	Nomad.	Semi-nomad.	Settled.
Pathlun	829	841	873
Kakay	818	830	864
Paqi	799	815	831

struck me more forcibly than the way in which the proportion of females gradually rises as the people themselves rise from wholesale nomadism to a life that is wholly settled through a life that is half way between. And no one I think, who takes the trouble to glance aside at the margin, will feel disposed to dispute my statement. The upward movement is refreshingly constant in the three main races and in the light of what I have already written of the influence of race, it is not uninteresting to note how the Pathlun maintains his superiority in female numbers over the Baluch, and the Baluch his superiority over the Brahui, in all the changing walks of life. To the general rule that females are more abundant among those that are settled and more scarce among those that are nomad, than among those who are now the one and now the other exceptions are of course to be found in the several tribes, especially where the tribal strength is inconsiderable, or unevenly distributed under the three heads. But the tendency is at once too marked and too regular alike in the country at large and throughout its dominant races to be brushed aside as an idle curiosity in coincidences. And one reason for it lies, I suppose, in the somewhat paradoxical antagonism that exists between nomadism and emigration in the modern sense of the word. As far as sex proportion goes, the antagonism is complete. Whereas nomadism lures whole families from the province and leaves sex proportion where it was, emigration lures the males from the settled families and alters sex proportion very considerably. Not that this can be the sole explanation, or the female proportion would remain fairly constant among the Brahui, who, even when they reach the stage of settled life, are little affected by the emigration of individual males. There is, I fancy a still more potent factor at work. It is possible (if scarcely probable) that nomadism in Baluchistan showers its favours or curses on boys and girls with an impartial hand. But no one who has seen the woman of Baluchistan trudge heavily burdened

along the road with her lord and master stepping briskly ahead, or has watched her wearily pitch the tent while he looks on with a critical eye, can doubt that nomadism tells far more hardly on the women than it does on the men

160 Thus in the simple fact that nomadism, from which many a family in Balūchistān has still to emerge (§ 71), is careless of the female life, we have some sort of explanation ready to hand for our notable shortage of females. But whether one of the penalties of quitting life in the open for life under a roof is a growing incapacity to breed a proper quota of boys, is an interesting question on which discretion bids me keep my insubstantial opinion to myself. I unfortunately did not think of putting myself the question until it was too late. To the wider question whether the paucity of females in Balūchistān is in any way due to a paucity of females at birth, our birth statistics (§ 67) supply me with an answer as remarkable as it is decided. If I may generalise from the number of births we recorded (and 38,912 seems a fair round sum), and if I am right in believing the statistics to be untainted by inaccuracy (and even tribesmen have no excuse and little scope for romancing on such a theme with their neighbours for an audience) — then, if so much be granted, there are but 799 daughters born to the indigenous peoples of Balūchistān for every 1,000 sons. Pitted against the Western European birth-proportion of 948, this can hardly be called a paucity of females: it is a veritable famine. So remarkable is the figure that it might well be left to stand by itself in glorious isolation. But pointed questions as to the possible influence of race and locality on sex-proportion at birth press themselves so insistently upon me, that I have placed a few other statistics beside it in the

Sex proportion at birth.	
Baluchistan	799
Western Balōch	902
Brāhūī	815
Pathān	797
Eastern Balōch	787

margin, statistics primarily racial, yet in the subdivision of the Balōch into Eastern and Western automatically illustrative of the influence of locality at the same time. If the Western Balōch are left out of account, no very great deviation from the normal is displayed by the races, among whom the Brāhūīs, curiously enough, come out top. And the general conclusion, I take it, is that blood or race has comparatively little to do with the sex-proportion at birth among the peoples of Balūchistān—a conclusion the reverse of unwelcome to one who has some inkling of the heterogeneous character of our so-called races, and who knows how the Brāhūīs, for instance, have gone recruiting among the Pathāns and the Balōch and the Jatt and the Persians and into other less reputable quarters. A much more potent influence seems to be exercised by locality. Not only does it proclaim itself in the enormous difference in sex-proportion between the Eastern and the Western Balōch, we seem to trace it in the variations among the districts, notably in the wide range between the two Pathān districts of Zhōb and Lōralai, where Lōralai beats Zhōb by almost a hundred. As Makrān can boast the triple distinction of having the highest birth-rate generally, the highest female birth-rate (for we may ignore Bōlān), and the highest proportion of females in the living population, one is tempted to seek a causal correlation in Balūchistān between the blessing of large families, the curse of daughters, and a plague of females in the living population. But there are statistics in plenty to warn us off any hasty generalisations in the matter. Thus, though Pathāns are much more prolific than Brāhūīs, they seem much more lucky in begetting sons for all that, and though fecundity is above the average in the Mari-Bugti country, it is here that the female proportion in the living population almost reaches its lowest ebb.

161 The task before me has undergone a wondrous change indeed. I set out to justify our census results in the face of a paucity of females in the living population. I have now to justify the number of females enumerated at the census in the face of a famine of females at birth. Well might we wonder how a birth-proportion of 799 could convert itself into a proportion of 815 in the living population, had not Western European statistics already made us familiar with the marvellous rapidity with which females recover from the disadvantage in numbers which handicaps them at birth. Indeed, if we could argue blindly from Western European females with their proportions of 948 at birth and 1,038 in the living population, it would follow that the Balūchistān proportion of 799 at birth should eventually convert itself into a proportion of

875 in the living population. There is, however, too lively a difference in the factors that come to the assistance of the female sex in the two cases, for us to allow ourselves to be enjoined by the sweet simplicity of the Rule of Three. In both cases, I do not doubt, emigration is the factor that plays the most important part. But the very nomadism of our peoples is a sign that they have still to reach that stage in evolution where emigration in the European sense of the word becomes really active. Nomadism or the emigration of families, leaves sex proportion untouched: it is the more highly developed emigration of individuals that disturbs the balance. The volume of this emigration of individuals from Baluchistan has already been gauged, very roughly I admit, at 6,074 males (§92). Were we to restore these 6,074 transients to the bosom of their families, the sex proportion among the indigenous peoples would drop from 845 to 832. Our calculation no doubt wants a little rounding off, but it would apparently call for more mathematics than I have forgotten to avoid arguing in a circle, and I will let it stand at that—832 seems about as near as we are likely to get to the adjustment of sex proportion in the province. It is a pity that we cannot adjust the figures for the races and the districts in a similar manner: but in furnishing the numbers of the so-called emigrants from Baluchistan other provinces left us without a clue to their race and, far more often than not, without a clue to their district (§80). Only in the case of the Brāhūis are we at all on certain ground: and in the discovery that the Brāhūi sex proportion was 800 among those censused in Sind against 802 in Baluchistan, we stumble upon a pretty proof that a Brāhūi, wanderer though he is, is not overfond of emigrating by himself. But so much our local knowledge could tell us before. Elsewhere local knowledge is too uncertain to be of much help. The utmost we can safely say is this—that if we were in a position to make the necessary adjustments, it is chiefly among the Sayyids and the Pathāns and the Balūch of Makrān that we should have to make them, and that the result would be an appreciable lowering of their sex proportions.

ation by age—

10⁹ In the steady rise of the proportion of Western European females from birth upwards, emigration is clearly not the only factor—though in the prime of life it is certainly the most potent factor—that comes into play. Yet another is unmistakably the European female's superior tenacity on life, both at the outset and towards the decline. When we return to the birth statistics

of Baluchistan and compare sex proportion among the young generation whose fathers are still alive, the result is an extraordinary reversal of what European statistics would lead us to expect. So far from rapidly overhauling the males, the females, both in Baluchistan at large and among the Brāhūis and the Pathāns and the two

branches of the Balūch fall further back in the race. To those who are convinced that rules which hold good in Europe must necessarily hold good the wide world over the only explanation would lie in some violent and artificial disturbance of nature such as female infanticide or the deliberate neglect of female children. Of female infanticide I have been unable to find any real trace (§ 140). As for neglect of female children, the only sign of it seems to lie in the extra care and devotion which the doting mother lavishes on her sons, and that her favouritism is marked enough to exercise any great influence on the sex proportion, I very much doubt. A far more disturbing factor I fancy is to be found in nomadism which probably bears harder on the females even in childhood, and never more so than at the critical period of puberty which may well be doubly critical amid the discomforts of a gypsy life. The influence of this factor is very possibly accountable for the marked drop among the non-adult Brāhūis. But it is hardly profitable to waste much time over variation in sex proportion on this or that side of puberty not merely because the dividing line is uncertain and variable and is usually crossed by the girls at a much earlier age than by the boys (§ 185)

but because it is almost entirely among the adults that the drain of emigration comes into play. The exceptions to the general rule that individual emigrants are drawn from males who have already reached manhood, are so few that we

Birth statistics.

	At birth.	Among survivors.
Baluchistan	790	778
Western Balūch	903	830
Belūch	815	778
Pathāns	797	738
Eastern Balūch	787	771

Common statistics.

	Non-adult.	Adult.
Baluchistan	792	870
Western Balūch	804	918
Belūch	743	837
Pathāns	785	873
Eastern Balūch	780	783

may safely add the entire bulk of the surplus emigration to swell the figures of the male adults. This done, the female proportion in Balūchistān would run from 799 at birth, and 792 among the non-adults, to 856 among the adults. Even so, the females still gain perceptibly on the males in the latter half of life. And yet I am doubtful whether much of the apparent sprint towards the end is not largely an optical illusion arising from the fact that there are relatively more females to enter upon the second lap in the race, so unevenly does the dividing-line operate in the case of the two sexes. At any rate, it is certainly my impression and the impression of all whom I have consulted, that so far from the women of Balūchistān gaining lost ground as the years roll on, they usually age more rapidly and die off earlier in life than the males.

163 This impression, it is true, runs counter to the well-established experience of the female's superior tenacity on life in Western Europe. But as European experience is already stultified in Balūchistān both by the amazingly low proportion of females at birth, and also by the drop in the proportion of girls among the surviving children, it seems high time to disabuse ourselves of the idea that European rules of life necessarily hold good from pole to pole. What the causes are that bring about the extraordinary disparity between the sexes at birth, I hardly venture to suggest. Of the influence of race, it is impossible to speak with confidence in view of the motley elements that go to the making of our races, yet I am certainly not prepared to deny its existence. Much more clearly do our statistics seem to point to the presence of locality among the multitudinous influences that work — sometimes maybe directly sometimes indirectly, often at cross-purposes, and always in an infinitely complex manner — for the mysterious determination of sex. In any attempt to analyse the inner nature of those influences we seem to be mocked by our statistics: no sooner do they prompt us to set up one theory, than they supply us with the handiest weapon to overthrow it. They certainly bid us beware of pressing them too far, for though our birth statistics are all very well in the mass, they become dangerous playthings as soon as we split them up among the several races. Of the making of theories regarding the determination of sex, there is no end. Theorising is veritably in the air. Who indeed may escape the infection? Yet though I myself would fain unburden myself of a theory, I should have to thumb over many a weary tome before I could safely claim it as my own. Nothing in the voluminous literature that has been written round the subject of sex has impressed me more than the great disparity in sex-proportion between still-births and births that are safely brought to a happy issue. Thus, while the female proportion among living births in Belgium is as high as 955, the proportion among still-births is (or was when the statistics were collected) as low as 735. The explanation, of course, lies chiefly in the larger body or rather the larger head of the male that makes him much more chary of adventuring into the world than his smaller-headed sisters who have a far less perilous journey before them—a fact that helped to inspire Galton with his famous saying that the physical proportions of a race are largely dependent on the size of the female pelvis. Whether the female pelvis is unusually large or the infant's head unusually small in Balūchistān, I cannot say. But that parturition is much more easy and expeditious in Balūchistān than it is in Europe, there can hardly be any question. If this be true, it must needs follow that still-births are far more rare. And if this in turn be true, it is surely folly to expect the peoples of Balūchistān to rest content with the same relative number of males as are born to the peoples of Europe. It is upon the vaunted civilisation of the West that the full force of the primeval curse appears to have fallen, and to that curse is added, it would seem, this further curse, that a lower number of males are safely brought to the birth. In these simple facts, I suggest, lurks part, at any rate, of the explanation for the much-debated disparity in sex between Europe and the races of the East. And adapting Galton's dictum to my own purposes, I would sum up my theory in a nutshell: the sex-proportion of a race is largely dependent on the ease of parturition.

164 I do not claim that rarity of still-births is the only factor in the problem, but it seems a factor that in Balūchistān is much more certainly operative than any of the thousand and one theories that have been advanced on the determination of sex elsewhere—theories that seem to multiply in pairs

Sex proportion
possibly dependent
on ease of
parturition

Conclusion.

year by year for hardly is a theory started to fit one set of facts than its contrary is started to prove another. And one and all they seem to remain mere theories still. With all our sciences we have not pierced much deeper into the mystery of sex than the Pathān who calls the last of a succession of daughters *Bula Nista No Moro*—of the Feminine Gender or the Brāhūi midwife who stuffs the unfortunate mother of a new born daughter with hotly spiced chicken-broth, to ensure that when next she is brought to bed it shall be for a son; or the Brāhūi shepherds who never wash their heads during the lambing season for fear the ewes should suffer over much in their birth pangs and bring forth nothing but male young. Perhaps the true philosophy after all is that of the Balōchi lullaby in which the young mother for all her pride in her infant daughter cannot hide her exceeding great longings for a son. —

*Sons and colts are in God's hand—
God's to keep and God's to send
Where they goods on a market-stall
Princes would buy one and all
Beggars would get none at all
Lulla lulla lullaby
Lulla Moonface lullaby*

At any rate if this has less rhyme it has certainly more reason than Herrick's whimsey —

*Who to the North or South doth set
His bed male children shall beget*

SUBSIDIARY TABLES.

XVI—Sex Variation by Locality.

(Indigenous population only)

Locality	VITAL STATISTICS			CENSUS STATISTICS		
	Number of births recorded	FEMALES TO 1,000 MALES AMONG		FEMALES TO 1,000 MALES		
		Births.	Survivals	Non adult	Adult	All
BALŪCHISTĀN	38,912	799	778	792	879	845
Districts	24,948	796	798	799	861	836
Quetta Pishun	4,273	792	764	792	900	853
Lōṛalāi	6,927	830	824	847	875	864
Zhōb	4,543	740	764	774	858	824
Dōlān	654	1,083	1,115	1,065	570	690
Chāgnā	1,393	816	807	836	809	820
Sibī	4,900	796	844	784	847	823
Marī Bugī	2,258	711	711	789	813	803
States	13,964	805	746	785	894	852
Kalāt	12,819	816	756	773	894	848
<i>Sarāwān</i>	<i>1,561</i>	<i>839</i>	<i>810</i>	<i>776</i>	<i>847</i>	<i>821</i>
<i>Jhalawān</i>	<i>842</i>	<i>799</i>	<i>759</i>	<i>711</i>	<i>861</i>	<i>802</i>
<i>Kachhī</i>	<i>4,158</i>	<i>718</i>	<i>677</i>	<i>772</i>	<i>894</i>	<i>850</i>
<i>Dōmbkī Kohēri</i>	<i>1,606</i>	<i>817</i>	<i>791</i>	<i>842</i>	<i>878</i>	<i>865</i>
<i>Malrān</i>	<i>4,110</i>	<i>929</i>	<i>816</i>	<i>817</i>	<i>979</i>	<i>915</i>
<i>Khārān</i>	<i>547</i>	<i>765</i>	<i>709</i>	<i>812</i>	<i>912</i>	<i>869</i>
Las Bēla	1,145	696	656	858	893	880

XVII—Sex Variation by Race.

(Indigenous population only)

Race	VITAL STATISTICS				CENSUS STATISTICS		
	Number of births recorded	F L		1,000 vs	FEMALES 1,000 MALES.		
		Births	Survival		Non-adult	Adult	All
MUSALMAN	37 232	797	772		791	890	845
Baloch	18,538	827	790		780	874	849
Eastern	8,418	787	771		780	843	834
Western	8,721	902	890		804	816	871
Brāhūī	4,278	815	775		748	837	802
Original residents	308	787	681		732	850	813
Barwān	2,070	821	803		774	830	800
Jhalawān	1,661	880	773		723	890	797
Macerflamson	147	623	600		791	602	797
Pathān	12,549	787	785		796	873	841
Kāky	7,004	807	810		783	843	819
Papī	2,568	734	748		810	831	841
Tārā	1,209	808	687		818	808	803
Others	1,847	815	877		700	915	808
Lālī	486	687	694		813	838	878
Jaff	4,816	716	689		709	803	837
Sayyid	2,330	702	800		816	1021	935
Miscellaneous	1,815	819	810		850	883	863
HINDU	1 680	535	547		555	863	800
Hindu	1,680	838	847		847	844	845
Sikh					839	871	848

XVIII—Sex Variation by Nomadism.

(Tribal Census only)

Race and tribe	PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION THAT IS			FEMALES TO 1,000 MALES.		
	Nomad	Semi- nomad	Settled	Nomad	Semi- nomad	Settled
Baloch	82	5	57	818	838	844
Eastern	80	4	87	787	796	863
Western	81	8	85	836	897	877
Brāhūī	60	18	27	798	815	831
Original residents	67	8	28	807	847	840
Barwān	24	20	37	803	818	830
Jhalawān	75	8	20	794	818	823
Macerflamson	30	24	24	880	781	822
Pathān	24	33	43	822	802	878
Kāky	15	37	45	818	840	843
Papī	12	44	81	821	893	823
Tārā	54	7	27	824	895	873
Others	8	26	66	808	808	870

CHAPTER VII

MARRIAGE.

Statistical data

SUBJECT	TABLES	
	Imperial.	Subsidiary
Marriage in general	VII	
Marriage by religion	XIV	
Marriage in the indigenous population		XIX
Marriage among Brāhūis in Sind		XX

165 There is some irony in prefacing this chapter with an imposing list of statistical data, for if statistics were the only data for a discussion of marriage in Balūchistān, the chapter would never have been written at all. Not only are there no statistics for the tribal areas, the bulk of the statistics for the regular areas are concerned with aliens and can be of little interest to anybody. And the only statistics that an enquirer into the matrimonial life of Balūchistān has to guide him are statistics for 8,447 indigenous inhabitants who happened to be censused in the regular areas. Small though the number is, it might give us a not unlife-like picture of matrimony in miniature, if only these 8,447 persons were typical representatives of the province. Unfortunately, with more able-bodied men among them than women and children put together, they are so unrepresentative a crowd that the picture is grotesque in its distortion. There are of course one or two obvious but rough-and-ready devices for bringing it into some sort of focus. We can, for instance, easily raise the number of females to their proper proportion of 845 to 1,000 males (§152), nor is there anything—save a not unjustifiable scrupulosity in selecting the age of (say) fifteen as the universal dividing-line of puberty—to prevent us from similarly raising the number of children to their proper proportions of 391 among 1,000 males and 309 among 845 females (§135). And artificially touched up though it is, the picture in the margin gives, I do not doubt, a much less distorted reflection of actual facts than the crude statistics themselves. But in a picture where so much faking is needed there is little chance of catching an entirely faithful likeness. One feature of it, the enormous disparity of the married in the two sexes, strikes me as being ludicrously distorted. And this seems a defect at once unavoidable and ineradicable. To none has life in the regular areas such attractions to offer as to bachelors, and it is accordingly probable on the face of it that the picture should exaggerate the proportion of the unmarried and consequently exaggerate the polygamous tendencies of their married brethren. A pretty clear confirmation of this is to be found on extracting the Brāhūi statistics and comparing them with the statistics for their fellow tribesmen censused in Sind. On the female side there is a very close agreement in the two sets of statistics: thus to every 1,000 Brāhūi males, there are 300 Brāhūi spinsters in Balūchistān, and 317 in Sind. So far, so good: one could hardly have hoped for so gratifying a vindication of such rude adjustments of our flimsy statistics. But when we find that 1,000 Brāhūi males in Balūchistān are supposed to

contain no less than 680 bachelors among them or 114 more than their proper quota in Sind, it becomes fairly obvious that in this apparent plethora of bachelors our adjusted statistics give us a picture that is sadly out of drawing

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100. Juggle with the statistics as we may they are meagre and unsatisfying at the best. But when in default of marriage statistics we turn to marriage customs, it is a very different matter. The country bristles with them. Here the trouble is to pick and choose, and to pack into a small compass. Many customs of interest must needs be shorn of their interest and swept together into a dull heap of generalisation; and all that can be spared to enliven the prevailing dullness are a few customs a little more quaint or a little more characteristic than the rest. Now take a broad view of the country as a whole, and you will find that an ordinary marriage proceeds very much in this wise first and foremost—and very possibly while girl and boy are both immature—come negotiations (ostensibly set afoot by the boy's party) for the transfer of ownership in the girl from one family to another in consideration of a bride-price hard on the heels of successful negotiations follows a public ceremony of betrothal, in which the contract is announced in open assembly; and finally—after law and lad have both passed from childhood to youth—comes the wedding ceremony hallowed by what is nowadays regarded as the high religious ritual of the *wikāh*, when that contract is ratified and fulfilled. Polygyny up to the Islamic limit of four wives is open to all. But it is an expensive luxury that not one man in ten is likely to be able to afford. And though the very high and mighty have occasionally overstepped the limits of orthodoxy in the past without raising a scandal, those tolerant days are probably over. Divorce lies in the hands of every husband: he has only to throw three stones and bid his wife be gone and the deed is done but tribal opinion is a wholesome safeguard against a wanton abuse of the husband's unfettered powers. Widow remarriage (except maybe in the proudest families) is the very general rule, continued widowhood the very rare exception. It would be unthrifty indeed for tribesmen to suffer such easily convertible capital to lie idle. Nevertheless it is much more correct to keep a widow in the family than to dispose of her elsewhere. In most tribes she is the recognised perquisite of her deceased husband's brother: if he is unmarried or childless, the chances are that he'll avail himself of it brisily enough, especially as he usually gets her without paying a penny even though there are sons to inherit their father's estate. The freedom of choice that British rule has granted to widows has done little to shake his rights: indeed tribal opinion on the propriety of the match is sometimes so strong as to convert an apparent privilege into an irksome duty. And though no one has a prior claim to her hand in tribes (chiefly Baluch) where it is customary for a widow to revert to her parent's dominion (§190) it is hardly too much to say that second marriage with the brother's widow is at the bottom of most of the polygamy from one end of the country to the other.

Bride-price.

107 But a man's prescriptive right to the hand of his brother's widow is of course a thing apart. The workaday man has usually to purchase his wife with a price. And the principle of it seems reasonable enough. Bride-price is simply back payment for the girl's upbringing in her father's house. Most Brāhūi tribes carry out this idea with businesslike pedantry for the bridegroom has to pay not only *lab* or bride-price proper which goes to the father but also a *shir-paṭh* or milk-share, which goes to the mother: he has, in fine, to compensate the mother for the suckling and the father for the subsequent maintenance of his bride. This intimate relationship between bride-price and maintenance is brought out very clearly in the case of widows. As a general rule a widow continues to receive board and lodging during her widowhood from the husband's estate so it's only fair that her husband's heirs should appropriate the bride-price when she marries again. But where a widow returns to her parents' roof and dominion, as she does among most Baluch, it is equally fair that her bride-price should go to them and not to her husband's heirs. As for the bride-price itself, not only does it vary in different tribes, it has its ups and downs within the same tribe: looks, social position and youth—these have their market value even among tribesmen. Individual

variations in fact are too great for it to be easy to strike the average in any particular tribe. And even if we could be certain of the averages, it would be unsafe to assume a necessary correlation between a high bride-price and a low proportion of females, in the teeth of the multitudinous factors that enter into the determination of the bride-price in the several tribes. In one respect most tribes have the same tale to tell: the rates have gone up enormously all round in quite recent times. Yet I see in this no reason to suppose that the tribesmen themselves are becoming any more conscious of the shrewd pinch of the scarcity of women among them than they were before, in all probability it is simply the natural and direct outcome of the increase of wealth in the country. Facts that stare us in the face with census statistics before us do not necessarily make themselves felt in everyday life. The most intelligent Bugtī Balōch I know was dumbfounded when it was put to him that in his tribe there were not enough women to go round. Yet here, if anywhere, the pinch should be felt, for there are only 778 females to 1,000 males in the tribe. And here, if anywhere, we ought to find bride-price pitched inordinately high. But what are the facts? Among the Bugtī bride-price has never been otherwise than modest, and, with the avowed intention of encouraging cousin-marriage, they have recently decided to do away with it altogether.

168 But if bride-price holds the field to-day as the most characteristic basis of marriage, it is not the only system in Balūchistān and the probability is that its spread among many of the peoples is comparatively modern. Thus, though I have cited the Brāhūi custom of *shīr-parī* to illustrate the principle underlying it, it is beyond cavil that, whereas the Brāhūis have practised *shīr-parī* from time immemorial, they have copied the bride price itself almost within living memory from the Pathāns. A much older form of marriage in Balūchistān, I fancy, is marriage by exchange, which under many names—*sar'ī*, *vatāndia*, *lanōvatī*, *adal badal*, to mention but a few—flourishes in one form or another among all races to this day. Such a marriage system is in keeping with the whole spirit of a country where most affairs are conducted on a brotherly basis of mutual co-operation—where one tribesman, for instance, subscribes something as a matter of course in *biyyār* or *baspan* towards the marriage expenses of a fellow-tribesman, in the certainty that he will be repaid with a like subscription when his own turn comes round in the course of time. Even nowadays the family that has the least bother in finding brides for its sons is the family with an equal number of daughters to give in exchange. But the principle of bride-price is present in the germ even in marriage by exchange, which after all is little more than marriage by barter in disguise. Where the two parties have like to exchange with like, there is of course no scope for anything but exchange pure and simple. But if one of the two girls is of tender age or a widow, and the other a ripe maiden, it is (and was) the regular thing to give something in addition as a make-weight—some cash perhaps, or preferably the promise of a girl yet unborn, very possibly the issue of the projected union. But the exchange was never a promiscuous exchange: it was confined to a certain limited circle. Thus widen the circle as you will, a Pathān girl should properly marry a Pathān, a Balōch girl a Balōch, a Brāhūi girl a Brāhūi.

Marriage by exchange probably older

169 But according to strict old custom the circle should be drawn much closer. A Pathān girl is still supposed to marry within her parental tribe, and it has become a standing sneer against the Kākar among other Pathāns that anybody can get a Kākar girl for the asking—or rather for the paying. Far narrower was the circle among certain sections of the Balōch. To this day a daughter of the Bugtī chiefly family is never suffered to marry outside it, she is doomed either to become one among the several wives of some near kinsman or to pass her days in spinsterhood. But the lure of bride-price has opened up an avenue of escape to the daughters of some of the neighbouring chiefly families among the Balōch, which were once under the thrall of the same strict marriage law. And regarding this particular instance of hypergamy (or should we not rather call it hypergamous endogamy?) let me quote the son of Bugtī chief: "Just because we decline to give our daughters to the Khetrān chief, for instance, and yet freely take his daughters to wife ourselves, you must not rush

Bride price sometimes a change for the better.

to the conclusion that we think ourselves a cut above him, any more than you are to imagine that the Bugtī looks down on the Māzārī or the Māzārī on the Bugtī, because each chiefly family declines to offer matrimonial alliances to the other. The truth of the matter is simply this — we are bound hand and foot to an ancient but somewhat awkward custom — the custom itself implies no superiority one way or another. Now though all this need not shake our conviction that the custom is anciently founded on superiority of some sort, it may well make us chary of launching out into whole-sale generalisations from hyper-gamy to status, as I myself was tempted to do in the case of the Bugtī and Khoṭrān. Custom is a hardy plant that often preserves its characteristics even when it is transplanted to a different soil and a different environment. Thus this particular custom probably grew up generations ago out of the obvious superiority of the chief's family over the rest of the tribe — once the custom had struck firm root it could easily survive later contact with families of equal or even higher status in other tribes. It would of course be dangerous to prophesy on such a matter — but when the future chief of the great Bugtī tribe recognises, however imperfectly something of the awkwardness and anomaly of an existing custom — no one would be surprised if his family followed the suit of other Baluch chiefly families before long and consigned the custom to limbo.

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170 So far bride-price can fairly claim to have had some hand in the break up of cramping customs. But many hard things are said about bride-price, and it must be confessed that as a solvent of ancient customs its influence is sometimes too powerful altogether. The worst thing about it is that it counsels an obvious temptation to offer one's daughter to the highest bidder — though it is only fair to remember that this temptation is not wholly unknown in countries where the unveiled mention of bride-price would now be received with protestations of horror. Take for instance its influence among the Brāhūis. In the old days neither the tribal circle nor the immediate family circle appears to have been regarded as the true marriage-circle. Cousin-marriage no doubt, is to-day as common among Brāhūis as it is elsewhere in Balūchistān — perhaps even more so, for the Brāhūi putting great faith in his proverb that though it takes a good sire to breed a good colt it takes a good mother to breed a good son, favours cousin-marriage as the simplest means of keeping the stock pure. But in olden time cousin marriage seems to have been accidental rather than deliberate, the exception not the rule. Among Jhalawans in particular it used to be the correct thing for one group of families to interchange marriages generation after generation with another group which belonged very possibly to quite a different tribe altogether. Such a group called the other its *shāladr* or breeches — for breeches are as essential to a Brāhūi bride as a bridal veil to a bride in Europe. And the only decent excuse for not sticking to one's ancestral *shāladr* was the chance of worming oneself into a better. But the introduction of bride-price has altered all this. The *shāladr* once so fair so honoured, so cherished — (for I prefer to let a Brāhūi of the old school tell the tale of the degeneration of his race himself) — is now a sorry patchwork of rents and tatters of a truth it barely holds together at all. In these latter days the Jhalawan has grown ashamed of his threadbare *shāladr* and doffing his old rags he hunts and grasps for a fat bride-price with the best of em. The higher a man's rank and the greater his substance, the more he claims. As for the poorer folk, ill-content with what they may look to get from one of themselves, they bundle their women off to Sind — for all the world as if they were taking them to market. Gone past recall is the day when there was truth in the proud boast that a Jatt was about as good as a Brāhūi's shoe.

brother's age.

171 But be the past what it may bride-price is nowadays the great crux in the negotiations which are bandied to and fro between two households as a prelude to the normal betrothal. In the family counsels neither the future groom nor the future bride is expected to take part. In fact the girl is rarely old enough to lift up her voice at all. To put off her betrothal till she has reached puberty is certainly unusual. For it to be put off once puberty is passed would be looked upon in most tribes as a flouting of the deities on the part of her family only to be excused by some physical or mental defect in the

girl herself. It is much more common for her to be contracted away before ever she is born, either by a loving compact between expectant mothers, or as part-payment of a bride-price or bloodmoney. But though there can be no question of the antiquity of these customs, I am inclined to think that an ordinary betrothal is contracted nowadays at a much earlier age than it used to be. That this is true of Pathāns seems clear from the survival of certain antiquated customs which still crop up from time to time and cause not a little embarrassment among the people, who are not sure whether there is enough life in them to be respected or not. Such for instance is the *ai* custom, where a youth claims a girl by flinging a sheep's head into her father's house, or the custom of blazing away with his gun just inside the door, or of snatching off her head-dress with the shout that the girl is his, or the analogous custom of the rape of the lock. For these customs presuppose not only virility on the youth's part, but also sufficient age on hers to make her an object of his desire. Even more obvious is this in the recognised custom of *matizgar*, where the young couple take matters into their own hands and elope. In a country which is still enslaved to the bloodfeud and where women are chief among the causes that lead to it, it is only natural that the tribesmen should have learnt the wisdom of fixing up a betrothal before the girl is old enough to put a spoke in their wheel. The Pathāns go one further. At once more priest-ridden and less conservative of their ancient customs than Balōch or Brāhūi, they are endeavouring to merge betrothal and marriage into one, not merely in order to come into line with *shari'at* (in which the *nikāh* of course takes the place of both), but also in order to draw the betrothal-tie taut once and for all by hal-
lowing it with the *nikāh*.

172 But even Pathāns still recognise the existence of two stages, betrothal and marriage, on the ordinary road to wedlock. Though they insist on the finality and all-sufficiency of a betrothal whenever it suits their purpose, nobody ever takes part in a betrothal without looking forward to a marriage ceremony in due course as a natural and proper climax. Nor does it make much difference whether the *nikāh* has been read at the betrothal or no, the reading of the *nikāh* is usually regarded as an absolute essential at the marriage. And even though Pathāns frequently betroth away a girl while she is yet of tender age, and muddle up betrothal and marriage to such an extent that it is often puzzling to know whether she is veritable wife or trusted maid, there is no attempt to forestall puberty: not until she is actually ripe for wedlock does her family pass her on to the family of her husband. And the same is true of the tribesmen generally, as they themselves point out, a child-wife has absolutely no attraction for a man who wants his wife to be a sturdy helpmate about the house. Now, if we ignore exceptional cases on either side of the line—the very big folk who seem to be drifting into child-marriage as the correct thing for the gentility, and the very poor who may take years scraping together the wherewithal for the bride-price—the popular idea of the proper age to marry is a year or so after puberty for a girl, and half a dozen years later for a youth. And on the whole the popular idea seems to be borne out pretty closely in practice.

Marriage age

173 For the groom to be a few years elder than his bride is not only natural in itself and fairly common in most parts of the world, it is doubly natural and doubly common in countries where girls are in a minority and have to be bought with a price. Indeed, if I were asked to explain how polygyny and scarcity of women can exist side by side in Balūchistān, I should begin by saying that polygyny, though open in pleasant theory to all, is in cruel fact a privilege of which only the well-to-do can ordinarily hope to avail themselves. And I should go on to point out that, while there are no spinsters above a certain early age (except some lady with the fatal gift of high birth, or here and there some wretch hopelessly deformed or insane), a few full-bodied men, though doubtless very few, pass their lives in bachelorhood to the day of their death. Both facts are significant, as far as they go. But I should lay the stress elsewhere. The average girl passes into the married estate almost as soon as she passes over the threshold into womanhood, and in the married state she remains either with her first husband or — after a short spell of divorce or widowhood — with a second or a third, the average man is not married till

Polygyny not incompatible with scarcity of women.

Suppose (among other wild suppositions)
 (1) there are 1,000 men to 800 women,
 (2) 65 in the life of one and all,
 (3) more marry at 24, women at 16,
 (4) all marry re-marry immediately

Then
 1,000 800 = total male married years,
 800 80 = total female married years,
 Hence = 3,200 female married years,
 there's (1) wife for each man from his wedding day to
 death; and (2) 3,200 female married years over for the
 polygamists.

Now suppose
 (1) 15 per cent are polygamists, i.e., 150 in all,
 (2) 80 with one extra wife, 20 with two, 10 with three,
 (3) each lives in monogamy for the first four years, and
 then becomes polygamist up to his limit.

Then
 Total number of female married years required for 20
 years of polygamy

$$= \left\{ (80 \times 1) + (20 \times 2) + (10 \times 3) \right\} 20 = 3,200$$

But there are forthcoming Q.E.D.

Islam and polyandry is unknown, I fancy that if we stretched the two words so as to cover plurality of marriage of all sorts—the re-marriage of the widowed and divorced, to say nothing of what the Pathāns at any rate would call the re-marriage of the betrothed—we should find that polyandry in this wide and untechnical sense is far more common than polygyny

some years after the age of puberty is passed, and often fails to replace or supplement a first wife by a second, provided children or rather sons have been born to him. The enormous influence of disparity in marriage age between the two sexes in a country where widow re-marriage is the general rule, seems sometimes imperfectly realised. In casual conversation I once heard it so stoutly denied that I was provoked into working out the ludicrous calculation which (not without a blush) I here reproduce. The whole thing of course is farcical—gaudy, hypotheses and figures and all; yet it serves its purpose. Though polygyny is law in Baluch

Free-love among
 Sanjakbāshī
 Pathāns.

174 Now in throwing a modern religious glamour over the ancient custom of betrothal and thus pulling the betrothal knot as tight as it will go the Pathāns not only obviate future complications—and of all complications a refractory maiden is possibly the worst—their conscience is more or less salved in countenancing cohabitation by a betrothed couple before marriage as being sanctioned by the *shikāh*. The *shikāh* thus serves as a decent cloak to cover up a flagrant scandal which, if no longer so confirmed a custom as it used to be, is still common enough in many tribes, loth though they may be to admit it. Yet bastardy is nowhere tolerated pre-nuptial pregnancy simply hurries the marriage on and the only punishment that awaits the impatient youth is the inconvenience of having to pay up any arrears of bride-price on the nail. But in certain Pathān tribes a youth, even at the present day need not wait till betrothal for permission to traffic with the other sex. Among the Sanjakbāshī Kākā of Zhob and Lūqalāi there still survives—under the innocent name of *mafīs* or as Pashtō pronounces it *mafīs* meeting or assembly—a curious species of licensed free-love between the unmarried lads and lasses of the village. A lad who wants to join the lists of love has only to appoint a tryst with some maiden that has caught his fancy as she stood at the well or loitered along the road. Or if he cannot get a message through to her he creeps to her bedside at dead of night. Likely enough the coast is clear for unmarried maidens sleep apart from the rest of the household. A soft pressure of her hand or a gentle squeeze of her nose is the customary invitation to join the game. If the lad isn't to her liking, she tries to put him off with some excuse if he persists in his unwelcome wooing, she raises her voice until her father or mother calls out to the intruder to be gone and not make himself a nuisance. But if she shows herself ready for the sport, he tip-toes out of the house and she follows hard at his heels. At the first *mafīs* the couple should content themselves with breaking the ice, by merely talking of love till the peep of dawn. Any familiarity on the lad's part, even though she may have lured him on to it, should be instantly repulsed, and the meeting broken off, never to be renewed. For this is only the first stage in the game, and goes by the name of *ā khā lo mafīs mafīs* by word of mouth. But if the course of love runs smooth the meetings soon ripen into *wākh mafīs* the dry *mafīs*. Yet though they kiss and toy to their heart's content, actual intercourse is still against the rules of the game and if the youth does not play fair, the lass will tell on him among the other lasses of the village, and he will find himself barred from future revels. But once her wedding-day is in sight, the time is now ripe for *lūnd mafīs* the third and last stage of all. This, I am assured, is almost a thing of the past. But in olden days it was

apparently the regular thing for a girl to enter upon it freely, heedless of consequences which marriage would presently gloss over, though the precaution was usually taken to resort to some crude preventive, most commonly the one that is as old as the days of Onan. And on the very night of her wedding she would slip away for one last hour with her lover, for marriage put a final stop to the game. Prevalent though this curious custom still is in one form or another, at any rate among more unsophisticated tribesmen, there is doubtless a good deal of hyperbole in the statement made by one of my many informants that the odds are on every single lad certainly on every lad of mettle, having played the game at one time or another with every single lass in the village. Yet this is very possibly a true presentation of Sanzarkhél society a couple of generations ago.

175 Analogous is the custom, once common and still current in the same *Girl hospitality.* tribes, of providing an unmarried but marriageable girl for the better entertainment of any guest who stays in the house overnight. If the host has an unmarried daughter or sister in his household, well and good, otherwise he sends over to borrow one from his neighbour, not without a word of apology to his guest. Now whereas the explanation usually offered for *majlis* is the encouragement of manliness in the youth of the tribe—partly because the favours of the lasses are an incentive to feats of manliness, partly because *majlis* itself is believed to develop manliness—the explanation always¹ offered for this particular form of the custom is simply old-fashioned hospitality on the grand scale. And this of course is the explanation generally accepted for similar customs elsewhere. Yet girl-hospitality curiously enough, seems to be extended among the Sanzarkhél Kākar when ordinary hospitality is withheld. A short time back, at any rate, a stranger who came to a village known to no one, the guest of no one, had only to ask the first youth he met for the whereabouts of the likeliest lasses in the village, if he wanted to join in. But the custom has been abused by strangers who were not Pathans at all, and girl-hospitality like *majlis* is rapidly on the wane, even among the more uncivilised elements of society, though the Sanzarkhél are probably a little too precious when they affect to put a very innocent interpretation on both, or try to make out that they are only really current among the Dumar, whose claims to kinship with the Kākar are usually scouted (§257). Paradoxical though it may seem, these three customs of prenuptial licence—cohabitation between betrothed, *majlis*, and girl-hospitality—go hand in hand with the most stringent insistence on the sanctity of the marriage-tie. According to strict old custom the wages of adultery is death to wife and paramour alike. If they escape the clutches of the outraged husband and his kinsmen, there arises a bloodfeud that only a blood-settlement can wipe out.

176 Prenuptial licence of any kind is entirely foreign to the Brāhūi, *The tokens of virginity among Brāhūis.* who demands vivid proofs of the chastity of his bride, and is absolved by public opinion from all guilt if he slaughters her on the bridal bed when there are none forthcoming. But for a description of the scene at the Brāhūi nuptials I had better go to a Brāhūi himself. "Now when bride and groom are left alone at last, the two mothers sit without, attended by a few old ladies of the kindred, keeping watch and ward to the end that they may be as witnesses hereafter. They are all on the alert for the call that shall summon them within. And they wait and wait, and still maybe there is no call. And the bride's mother twits the groom's mother touching the sluggishness of her son. But the other is not at a loss for the reason: there must be magic abroad, it could not be else. And sure enough, the groom may presently call out in distress, bidding his mother hurry away for some holy water to undo the spell that has been cast upon him. Off bustles the old dame post-haste, and the priest, taking some water, breathes a potent charm over it, and she's back with it as fast as her old legs can carry her. And let's hope the charm will work this selfsame night, for the longer the delay, the greater the disgrace to the groom. And the moment it's all over, he calls the old ladies in. They don't stand on the order of their going, I'll be bound, but hasten in and eagerly

¹ I am wrong. Some local theorists, I now find, explain it as the crystallisation into a voluntary custom of what was once the enforced prerogative of the early Moghul tyrants.

scan the bridal apparel for the tokens of virginity. And if the stains are all she could wish great is the exaltation of the mother of the bride. Aloft she holds the cloth in triumph and displays it with pride to each lady in turn; and one and all they rejoice in her rejoicing. But the cloth is treasured up by the mother for it is her glory. And when the young men come to greet the groom on the morrow they greet him with the eager cry: "Are you a lion or a jackal?" Not a word does he answer in his pride, but carefully spreads out his skirt that they may see the tokens of virginity wherewith he took pains to stain it. The scene conjures up that well known passage in Deuteronomy from which indeed I have borrowed the translation for the central feature of the custom. If any man take a wife and go in unto her and hate her. And say — I took this woman, and when I came to her I found her not a maid. Then shall the father of the damsel and her mother take and bring forth the tokens of the damsel's virginity unto the elders of the city in the gate. And the damsel's father shall say unto the elders, I gave my daughter unto this man to wife, and he hath hated her — saying I found not thy daughter a maid; and yet these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity. And they shall spread the cloth before the elders of the city. And the elders of that city shall take that man and chastise him. But if this thing be true, and the tokens of virginity be not found for the damsel. Then shall they bring out the damsel to the door of her father's house, and the men of her city shall stone her that she die." (XXII, 13-21.)

Artificial deflower-
ment among the
Jat and others.

177 But in publicly exhibiting the stains on the bridal raiment the Brāhmins do not stand alone. The custom is found also among the Baloch and Jat of the Kachhi. But among the Jat and probably among some if not all the Baloch tribes, the stains are the outcome of artificial deflowering a few hours previous to consummation. The Jats make no secret about it, though they themselves are somewhat in the dark, as the operation is done by an old woman in private. The instrument she uses is a razor; the operation consists, one would presume, in the rupture of the hymen or the scarifying of the place where the hymen ought to be. Yet some of my accounts seem rather to imply the circumcision of the clitoris or *labia*. To staunch the bleeding they burn an old shoe and sprinkle a rag with the ashes and hold it to the wound for a few minutes. But the one and only permanent cure for the wound is consummation. And at consummation the wound breaks out anew thus ensuring the desired flow of blood on the bridal couch, which otherwise might not be forthcoming owing to the common disappearance of the hymen from natural causes when marriage is comparatively late. How far this custom is to be regarded as common to the Baloch, it is difficult to say. My own impression is that it is fairly wide-spread among the Baloch of the east. In the first place, it undoubtedly prevails among the Mari families who have taken up their residence with the Gharahin Sayyids of Mīshakhl. It is therefore probable enough that it prevails in the Mari *tasmas* at large and this seems amply confirmed from other indirect sources. And if, at I see no reason to doubt, it prevails among the Mari, it is at least not improbable that it prevails among their neighbours the Bugti with whose customs the Mari have much in common. Whether it prevails among other true Baloch of Baluchistan there is little or no direct evidence to show. Yet it can hardly be a mere coincidence that the only people other than Jat and Baloch among whom I have been able to trace the custom, should happen to be people who are known to have come under Baloch influence, though the prevalence of the custom among them may of course be evidence not so much of Baloch influence as of Jat influence on and through Baloch. The custom prevails, for instance, among the Jafar Pathān, who like most remnants of the Mīāna stock left in Baluchistan (p. 235) have been considerably infected by Baloch ideas. The Gharahin Sayyids, who, half Sayyid though they may be, are also off-shoots from the Mīāna, make no bones about the prevalence of the custom among themselves. At the same time, they state definitely that it is not a regular practice among the Buzdār Baloch who live with them as *kamedya* on the same terms as the Mari, but these Buzdār hail from the Panjab and do not belong to Baluchistan. That the custom does not appear to exist among

the Khetrān is much more remarkable, for of all offshoots from the Miāna stock this is the one that has been most affected by Balūch influence, and, curiously enough, the Khetrān, like the Gharshīn Sayyid, make no distinction of sex in the circumcision of their children (§ 99). On the other hand, among the Jat, that quaintly debased people who, though their claims to Balūch descent are probably unfounded, have been closely associated with the Balūch time out of mind (§ 285), the custom seems to be as prevalent as female circumcision in childhood.

178 These curious operations in girlhood and on the bridal night are usually lumped together in Balūchistān as mere varieties of one and the same practice, female circumcision. Like its counterpart among the males, female circumcision is vaguely regarded as a religious ordinance, an initiation into the Islāmic fold, a necessary preliminary all women must go through before their acts of charity can become acceptable to God. It is supposed to have a scriptural origin for Hagar was circumcised to appease Sarah's jealousy, according to a legend too familiar, I imagine, to bear repeating here. Apart from its religious aspect, the bridal operation at any rate is supposed to ensure the woman's fecundity, to deaden her passions, and at the same time to quicken the passions of her spouse. And, finally, unkind outsiders look upon it as an ingenious and deep-laid plot to prove that the bride is what all too often she is not—a spotless virgin. There may be a grain of truth in all these local suggestions though none of them may hit on the ultimate origin of the customs, each may have played its part in the later stages in helping them to survive. In Balūchistān it certainly seems awkward to apply the orthodox explanation that artificial defloration is grounded in some primitive dread of menstrual blood, for the blood in this country appears to be always carefully left on the bridal couch and on the groom's garment, and to be an object of solicitous interest to the community, as proving not only the virginity of the bride but the virility of the groom. We could no doubt account for the anomaly by assuming that the exhibition of the blood-stains is a much later development, possibly a mere aping (as local theorists suggest) of a totally different custom among a neighbouring people. But there is perhaps a little too much readiness to reduce similar customs the wide world over to one and the selfsame origin. On the whole I am inclined to trace both the girlhood and bridal operations of Balūchistān to a desire to facilitate the physical union of the male and female by the removal of all possible obstructions. At any rate, if this is not the mainspring of the customs—and crude and primitive though the motive seems, it may not be quite primitive enough to account for what are apparently ancient customs of widely different peoples—this idea has almost certainly played its part in their preservation. And the idea is undoubtedly still alive. Among the Marī, who apparently perform the bridal operation as a matter of course, and again among the Brāhūis, who otherwise have nothing to do with female circumcision in any shape or form, the snipping off of the tip of the clitoris is a not unusual device to overcome either complete barrenness or a stubborn perversity in bearing nothing but females, and the removal of a stoppage seems the only possible rationale of this strange piece of native surgery.

179 If local theorists are right in thinking that the bridal operation has anything to do with proofs of virginity, it is a little humorous to find it common among the Jat (§ 285). For whatever store a Jat may set by the chastity of his bride—and though he certainly takes pride in displaying the bridal stains, this may be less to show off her virginity than his own virility—he sets absolutely none on the chastity of his wife. It's a common saying that a tribesman who puts a camel out to graze with a Jat becomes thereby the *bhōtār* or master of the Jat's wife. He strolls up every now and then to have a look at his camel and more than a look at the lady of the house. As he comes in, the Jat goes out. The *bhōtār* leaves his shoes or his stick outside the tent as he enters. If the Jat on his return still finds shoes or stick outside, he shuffles with his feet or gives a discreet cough, if this is insufficient, he shouts out "Master! the horse has got loose!" or "Master! a dog has made off with your shoes!"—hints too broad to be ignored much longer. The presence of a

Its origin.

Post nuptial
licence
among the Jat.

visitor who comes along while the Jat is away will be advertised by his shoes outside the tent or some obliging old lady will keep a look-out for the husband and tip him the wink with the stock euphemism "There's a stallion after the mare." Though this is regarded as an ancient and honourable custom, and the husband we are assured, takes no small pride in his wife's conquests, it has of course a mercenary side to it. The *bāider* makes presents in one form or another if he is a big man in his tribe, there are a number of ways in which he can help the family

Wedding
buffoonery

180 It goes perhaps without saying that divorce is unknown among the Jat. It would be a little out of place considering the keen and kindly interest the husband takes in his wife's amours but it is hardly necessary to go as far as one of my informants, who finds the explanation for the absence of divorce in the charitable conclusion that the happiness of his wife is the first and last ambition of a Jat. But if there is no divorce among the Jat there is plenty of widow remarriage though the lady can please herself whether to live as widow or as wife. If she makes up her mind to remarry her late husband's brother has no claim to her hand, and the bride-price goes to her parents. Her second wedding seems to be regarded as a huge joke. The women make the unfortunate mulla the butt for the broadest of jests they stitch up his clothes and play him every trick they can think of and he's a lucky man if he escapes with his breeches on. To add to his misery he only gets half the usual wedding-fee. Not that a mulla is indispensable even at the marriage of a Jat maiden. Any old grovbeard can conduct the service just as well, though all he may be able to recite is some Jaṭki or Balochi song he happens to remember. Among some Zikri sectarians (§87) it is a more or less regular thing for a water-skin to be inflated with the mulla's holy breath and a marriage to be solemnised (possibly miles off) by deflating it into the bride's face. But though this sounds sheer buffoonery to us—we can almost fancy we have read of it in Gulliver's Travels—it is not buffoonery to the people themselves, but dire earnest. Even among the dominant race a wedding service is not the solemn ceremony one might expect. Young Brāhṃī bloods are always on the watch to catch the mulla tripping over the service and do their best to disconcert him with jocular interruptions. There is of course much more scope for buffoonery in the ceremonies that lead up to the *wikāḥ* thus the lads and lasses in the two assemblies would not consider the ceremonial anointing of the bridal couple with henna complete, if they did not manage to bedaub the groom's father and mother all over into the bargain. But for wedding buffoonery at its height we must turn elsewhere

Proskits among
Kashmiri Muslims.

181 Among the *Nakib* and other low classes on the Makrān coast a marriage is regularly made the excuse for a gross piece of horse-play which goes by the appropriately gross name of *prosk kaa*. It would have made Rabelais shake his sides, but decency forbids any attempt on my part to depict it in detail it is only in the chaste disguise of a dead language that I could venture to do so. There are several variants of the custom, but the central figures in the mummery are usually a man and a boy dressed up as bridegroom and bride, who are ushered into the assembly by a party of youths amid much clapping of hands and bawling of wedding songs. And when the pair are seated, up comes a man and calls upon the bride roundly to choose between the paltry groom and one whose manhood is famed from the coast of Makrān to the furthestmost corner of Baluchistan. The groom's best man tries to push him aside, but is flung head over heels for his pains. Then despite all the groom can say or do, the intruder seizes the bride round the head, and tondules her about, until—Hullo! what's this? he bellows in amazement—But hark the curtain must drop with a rush, and I can say no more than that the discomfiture of bridegroom and rival alike is the final tableau in the scuffle. Though this buffoonery which is almost gone through at a circumcision as well, is believed to serve as a wholesome reminder that matrimony isn't such a bed of roses as the happy couple may imagine, it looks very much like a fertilisation custom.

Kāfi Karkānāmeh
Pāthān

182. Of much the same character is a farce called *Haji Murda* or the Dead Pilgrim, which is acted before a Pāthān bridegroom and his male friends on the

wedding eve Most of the dialogue is in Persian, with a strong flavour of Pashtō to make it all the more ludicrous The scene opens with Hājī lying stark on the ground, covered by a sheet On one side stands a barber, saying again and again that Hājī's dead, on the other stands Hājī's father, yelling that he's alive To make sure the barber lifts up Hājī's limbs one by one, but they drop back lifeless, in one part only is there any sign of life "Humph! there's life enough here," says the barber, "but the rest of him's as dead as a door nail" And again the father yells back that Hājī's alive So the barber ties a shoe about his middle and with meaning but indescribable gestures tries to spur Hājī back to life When all proves in vain, he bursts out into song, punctuating each line with a yell that Hājī's dead, which the father drowns with a yell that Hājī's alive

*Hājī gorged on carrots, carrots full of dust,
Hājī's paunch is swollen, swollen full of must
Hājī, dearest husband, my slim cypress tree!
Hājī's grave is just the place to make a jakes for me!*

Then the father bids Hājī's eyes to open, and legs and arms to move, and the moment he touches his heart, Hājī leaps to life This is the cue for a shepherd to enter, driving imaginary flocks before him with his crook, and bawling as he comes along

*A shepherd's life's not a life at all!
I am sick of rising before the morn,
I'm sick of these goats with the crumpled horn,
I'm sick of these fat-tailed sheep unshorn
Oh why was I ever a shepherd at all?
I graze the flock in shady dells,
I drive the flock upon the hills,
The flock I water at the rills,
Plague take the goats and sheep and all!*

A lamb is promptly bought of him, and slain in honour of Hājī's wedding Then up speaks his father

*Limping craftsman, ply your craft!
Shear him trim both fore and aft!*

"Touch that nasty mangy poll?" says the barber, "not I!" And he sticks to his word, though two men step forward and solemnly pronounce the head to be free from mange So the father tries to wheedle him with promises —

*I'll give you a cloak and a turban so bonny,
I'll fill you your skirts to the brim full o' money,
Limping craftsman, ply your craft!
Shear him trim both fore and aft!*

("Not I!" says the barber "Then take that!" says the father, giving him a clout on the ear)

*I'll give you a cloak and a turban so bonny,
I'll fill you your skirts to the brim full o' money,
I'll give you a damsel to be your sweet honey
Limping craftsman, ply your—*

But at the word "damsel" the barber flourishes his tackle, and shears away right lustily Yet his only reward when his task is done is to have his face blackened and to be kicked out of the village

183 Though I cannot pretend to understand all the points in the farce, it looks like a fertilisation custom at bottom That this is the character of the Pantomime before
Fathān brides.

mummery that goes on among the women is clear enough. Here there are two leading ladies in the cast, the one young and the other old. The girl waddles on with a pillow strapped round her middle.

*Dearie dearie dearie me !
How many months may the little one be ?*

says the old crone in deeply sympathetic tones.

*Dear aunt of mine may I die for thee.
A month and a day must the little one be !*

replies the girl And again the old crone mumbles

*Dearie dearie dearie me !
How many months may the little one be ?*

and the answer comes pat—

*Dear aunt of mine may I die for thee
Two months and two days must the little one be !*

So it goes on till it gets to *Nine months and nine days must the little one be* And the words are hardly out of the girl's mouth before she begins to groan and moan and to writh about in such agony that it takes two or three women to hold her down. And between her moans she curses herself for a fool ever to have thought of marriage at all, and cries out to her friends

*Oh maidens all, be warned of me
How bitter the fruit on the wedlock-tree !*

And she points her warning to such purpose that the maidens run off and hide their faces. But when matters are at their worst, the pillow begins to descend, and with one last mighty strain she is delivered of her burden. Shrieks of laughter greet the climax. The only one in the room to keep her countenance is the real bride herself. At any rate if she cannot contain her feelings she can at least conceal them, for she sits with her face covered by a wrapper. But not a scream or a giggle may escape her for a Pathān bride must sit like a statue, and a whispered word to her bridesmaids is all that may pass her lips.

Self-effacement of
the bride.

184. Now I have gone out of my way to describe wedding buffoonery not merely because it is mildly interesting in itself nor because in one form or another it is regarded everywhere as only fit and proper at a wedding but chiefly because it is the one explanation local theorists have to offer for a curious shrinking from the wedding and the wedding ceremonies that is often displayed by the bride, her groom her brother and her father. It will probably be found hard to believe that this shrinking or self-effacement, which is essentially a customary thing, is not more deeply grounded in the case of the men. But maidenly modesty—real or assumed—is very possibly sufficient to account for most of the bride's coy bashfulness. There is after all nothing strange in a bride comporting herself during the ceremonies as though she were an unwilling participant in them and it is apt to become a bit of a nuisance to be pestered with ingenious traces of bride-capture at every turn, where a simple explanation lies ready to hand in the natural modesty with which many peoples, belonging to very different stages of development expect a bride to clothe herself. A Brāhūi maiden, for instance, is supposed to sit with eyes tight shut and a handkerchief to her face, from the moment she is decked out for the bridal until she is handed over to her groom. Nor should she utter a word, save of course for a frightened whisper when she is called upon by the witnesses to nominate her proxy father at the wedding. And not only ought a bride to hedge herself round with an air of maidenly reluctance, she is supported by kinswomen and a bodyguard of bridesmaids, whose chief object seems to be to protect her from her groom. Thus when the witnesses to a Brāhūi wedding come to the women's apartment to ascertain the name of the bride's proxy father they must be prepared for a deal of trouble before the door is unbarred to admit them. And much the same trouble awaits the groom himself after the wedding is over for the bride's mother and married sisters

slam the door in his face when he seeks to enter the bridal chamber. Among some sections of the Jatt one of the bridesmaids takes her stand at the door and bangs him over the head with a thorn-bush as he comes along. A Khetrān wedding-service is preceded by the unloosening of the bride's plait—one of many Hindu touches in Khetrān domestic customs, by the by—which is only carried out after a sham-fight in which the company range themselves in two parties, the one striving in vain to defend the bride against the onslaughts of the other. Those who would read bride-capture into this custom will be disappointed over the composition of the contending armies: it is the bachelors and the spinsters, and not the bride's kin, who champion her cause, the ranks of the enemy are filled by the married. Yet they may possibly find consolation in the thought that the fight must have lost its ancient character, for the issue is greeted with weeping and wailing by the mother and the other kinswomen of the bride. Now when the fight is over and the plait is unloosed the bride runs out in the open to swing with her playmates. And this at any rate seems an example of an outworn custom. For there can be little doubt that a much older form of the custom (though possibly not the oldest) is being enacted when she occasionally runs off with her playmates to the jungle, and there remains in high dudgeon until she is coaxed back by her father at night-fall. Not even when the bride is left alone with her groom is her air of reluctance always laid aside. A Brāhūi bride is often tutored to resist his advances, and a scuffle may ensue between them, only to be ended by his buying her over with presents.

185 Now if we are to see traces of bride-capture in much of the bride's reluctance, as some theorists would probably have us do, are we to see traces of bridegroom-capture in the reluctance that is sometimes displayed by the groom? There seem far fewer instances of it—I have found none at all among the Brāhūis—yet such as occur are very marked. Among the Sanzarkhēl Kākār Pathāns the one person who is conspicuous by his absence from the procession that wends its way from the groom's house to the house of the maiden to bear her off on the morrow for the wedding, is the groom himself. And in the customary delay of three days after the wedding during which he must refrain from coming near his bride, and the subsequent period during which he is often supposed to defer consummation, may perhaps be seen indications that at least as much bashfulness is expected from him as from his bride. However this may be—and I will return to the subject presently (§ 189)—much more significant for present purposes is the fact that among the Mūsakhēl Panī and some if not all Sanzarkhēl the groom hides himself on the return of the bridal procession from the maiden's house, and remains in hiding for full three days.

Self-effacement of the groom

186 As for the bride's brother, there is a wide-spread idea that he at any rate should efface himself from the wedding festivities. Thus as soon as the procession arrives to bear his sister away on the morrow for the wedding, a Sanzarkhēl youth leaves the house for the night—for very shame, they say, that anyone should dare to 'carry off his sister while he is there to prevent it. This custom seems to reach its height in Makrān, where the bridegroom has generally to buy off the bride's brother (or, in default of a brother, her first cousin) with what is known as *hamān-bahā* or bow-price. This bow-price used by rights to consist of a horse and a sword and a gun, but nowadays cash is often given instead. The gift of a horse and a sword and a gun seems clearly symbolical of the self-disarming of the bridegroom, just as the customary award of a sword and a gun as part of the bloodmoney throughout Balūchistān is symbolical of the disarming of the murderer and his kin, and is a survival of a custom, still current among Brāhūis, whereby the disarming of the aggressor in public assembly constitutes a substantial compensation to the aggrieved. And a similar idea seems to be at the back of the very name of the custom. For *hamān-bahā* can hardly mean anything else but the price that must be paid to the bride's brother, before he will consent to lay down his bow and arrows that otherwise would be lifted in her defence. Chary though I am of seeing traces of marriage by capture at every turn, it certainly looks as if we had something very much like it here.

Self-effacement of the bride's brother

And yet I am not sure whether the deep-rooted feeling that there is something humiliating in one's own flesh and blood being handed over in wedlock outside the family no matter how high the station of the groom might not account for it after all. It is a little strange that the bow price should go to the brother or first cousin and not to the father or head of the family. This may be simply another sign that betrothal and marriage used to be instituted much later in life in the days of old, when the father might often have one foot in the grave before the marriage was complete and would naturally look to the son to champion the honour of the family. Possibly the explanation lies deeper (§189).

Self-effacement of the father.

167 Among Brāhmins there is a very strong feeling that a daughter's wedding is no place for a father. In olden days it would have been a scandal for him to put in an appearance at all. He was expected to quit the house, leaving his wife's brother in possession to act as the head of the family. Folks, to be sure, are not quite so strait laced nowadays, but it is still considered the correct thing for the father to keep himself in the background during the festivities. In any case he should be spared the buffoonery with which the groom's father has to put up (§180). And not only should the bride's father make himself scarce at the wedding, his very name is never mentioned during the ritual, whenever the bride's name occurs in the *nikāh*. It is coupled with the name of her mother and her mother alone. Learned Brāhmins have a vague idea that their practice has Islāmic sanction. In the Day of Judgment one and all will be summoned by the names of their mothers: for God to Whom all secrets are opened, will put no one to shame by revealing his sinful parentage. Nor is a daughter's wedding the only occasion when a father's name is avoided in speaking of the dead, whether male or female. Old-fashioned folk would always refer to So-and-so, *shir milch* or milk-sucker of such and such a woman. Now in glossing over the father's name at the *nikāh* the Baluch of Kharin and Makran follow the Brāhmins. Yet the Baluch of the Kachhi and also the Jatt specify both parents. And so do the Pathāns. Nevertheless even among Pathāns the mention of the father's name looks at times like an innovation. For among the Sanzarkhail of Buri (and I dare say elsewhere) the father's name comes as an after thought at the end of the formula "Do you accept as your wife Minammāt So-and-so, the daughter of Mistress So-and-so, the grand-daughter of Mistress So-and-so (the mother's mother) and daughter of Mr So-and-so?"

Apparent survival of mother-kin.

188 It certainly seems as if glimpses of bygone mother kin—glimpses of days when the family centred round the mother and her brother and not her husband was its natural head—peep out from some of these customs, notably from the payment of bow price not to the bride's father but to her brother, from the omission or the slurring over of her father's name in the marriage service and from his self-effacement at the wedding, more especially as this used to be coupled with the prominence of her maternal uncle. And these and other instances of the kind are all the more significant because they are found in a country where the father is now a patriarch of the patriarchy. But space and time forbid a plunge into the eddies of the controversy which rages round this subject of mother kin. I can only pause on the brink and fling over a few other local customs to those engaged in the wordy struggle. It is quite clear for instance that a Brāhmin mother's rights in her child received formal and tangible recognition ages before the Brāhmin father had learnt to assert his. For nothing can be more certain than that she claimed a milk price on the marriage of her daughter (§167) ages before her husband dreamt of claiming a bride price for himself. Nor is marriage the only occasion when the milk price crops up, until a Brāhmin mother has expressly renounced all mother rights in her dead child, no one would dream of removing the body to the grave.

There is, however, hitch in the argument. The first cousin to whom the bow-price goes in default of brother (§156) is the son of the paternal and not, as of course should be the case if the argument is to hold good, of the maternal uncle. So we would apparently have to assume that the paternal cousin has arranged under modern conditions to serve for himself rights which under strict old custom either did not exist at all or else were enjoyed by the maternal cousin. Though there is little wavering in both assumptions, neither can be said to be impossible. If I had to choose between them, I should plump for the former.

189 But mother-kin is not merely the antithesis of father-kin, it is of course opposed also to the rights of the husband. And generations after the merging of mother-kin into father-kin was complete, this opposition might well continue to be felt in the clashing of the rights of the parents on the one hand and the rights of the husband on the other. Take, for instance, the simple question whether a girl is married in her father's house or in the house of her groom. With luck the answer ought to throw a glimmer of light on the subject, for a bridegroom can only hope to be allowed to remove his bride from her parental roof in a society where the father or rather the husband has firmly established himself as the head of the family. Now it is in the bride's house that a Brāhūi wedding is performed, and—much more significant—the young couple must abide in it for at least three days after the wedding, indeed in high Jhalawān families it is a point of honour for her parents to keep them much longer. So great store do Brāhūi parents set by this ancient custom that many a young husband wrings a goodly portion of the bride-price and the milk-price out of them by simply threatening to pack up at once and be gone with his bride. A Balōch wedding, on the other hand, is solemnised in the bridegroom's house, the *nikāh* being read the very evening of the bride's arrival, if she has not reached puberty, custom must nevertheless be fulfilled and the girl must be brought to the bridegroom's house, though consummation is of course deferred till she has left girlhood behind. There is some diversity of practice among the Pathāns, but as a very general rule the wedding is celebrated in the house of the groom. The *nikāh* is sometimes read the moment she arrives. Sometimes she has to wait, and wait she obviously must, if the bridegroom has hidden himself away. During this period of delay, which ordinarily lasts for three days, she is treated like a guest, and it is essential that some kinswoman should sleep by her side. Even after the marriage is solemnised, she often continues to share her bed with a kinswoman for three nights more, and when her husband eventually joins her, he is expected in some tribes to defer consummation for a considerable period. I suppose that those who are hot on the tracks of mother-kin will say that the Brāhūi custom is a very obvious survival of it, that mother-kin has given way entirely to father-kin in the Balōch custom, that the curious Pathān custom lies midway on the road to final evolution. That ancient mother-kin is the explanation of the Brāhūi custom seems not unlikely. Taken by itself the Balōch custom hardly proves anything one way or another. As for the Pathān custom, I confess I find the implied argument as far-fetched and unsatisfying as the local theory that the bridegroom's sole object in delay is to bring his bride's pre-nuptial peccadilloes to light. As the custom prevails more particularly in those tribes that still go in wholesale for pre-nuptial amours, it may sound ironical to suggest that this ostentatious but in many cases doubtless fictitious delay is simply an ostentatious but equally fictitious display of bashfulness on the part of the young couple—topsy-turvy analogous to the ostentatious and yet in reality bashful departure of the English bridal couple, who hasten away from home and the curious eyes of their kith and kin. But I forgot. Even the honeymoon has been glorified into a splendid survival of the flight of the groom after the capture of his bride.

190 But we must pass on to other and possibly more convincing evidence of ancient mother-kin. Once the bride-price has been paid over and the possession of the girl has been transferred from her parents to her husband, the authority of the husband over his wife appears at first sight to be so absolutely unrestricted in Balūchistān that one is apt to conclude that the parents' rights in her are dead. Nevertheless, whereas a Pathān or Brāhūi woman is transferred permanently out of her parental family on marriage and does not return to it on widowhood, the ordinary rule among the Balōch is for her to remain a member of her husband's family only so long as he is alive, on his death she reverts to her parents.¹ The custom is still unfixed

¹ The rule may be stated categorically of all the great *tuman* in the east with the special exception of the Khetrūn. Among western Balōch the rule is often the reverse, e.g., a good deal of the recent trouble in Khetrūn was due to the refusal of Sir Naurōz's son to hand over his father's widow to his uncle. But even among eastern Balōch the rule is only absolute in cases of ordinary marriage. Thus among the Dombkī and Umānī, a woman given in marriage as compensation for murder remains with her husband's family on widowhood, given as compensation for adultery she reverts to her parents. Among the Jamālī the rule seems the other way round. Among the Balūfī she remains with the deceased husband's family in either case.

among the Khetran, who for practical purposes are usually regarded as Baluch (§ 81) whether Khetran parents are to retain or renounce their hold over their daughter on her widowhood is a matter which is regularly defined in the marriage settlement. But the rights of husband and parents overlap in a still more interesting manner. Among all three races—Pathan, Brâhûi, Baluch—tribal law looks to the husband to avenge adultery with the blood of the guilty couple; and if the paramour manages to escape his clutches, he should slay his wife none the less. Now according to tribal theory the husband in so doing simply acts as executioner. It is the paramour who has signed her death warrant: her blood is on his head and it is with bloodmoney alone that he can wipe out the bloodfeud. Among Pathans the husband receives every penny of it. And this is exactly what one would expect on tribal premises. As Baluch parents merely make a temporary transfer of their daughter and recover their rights in her on her husband's death, it would seem only fair that they should receive some small compensation for their potential loss. In point of fact they receive not a penny. Yet among Brâhûis two-thirds of the bloodmoney go to the wife's parents. That Brâhûi parents should receive any of the bloodmoney at all—still more that they should receive the lion's share—seems altogether irrational, seeing that they relinquished their other rights in their daughter for good and all when they handed her over in marriage. I can only assume that their title to two-thirds of her bloodmoney is a relic of the days when the parents' rights over their married daughter were very considerable indeed. And I fancy that research would reveal the fact that the killing of an adulterous wife was once a right or a duty that fell primarily on the parents and not on the husband, and that (except when he caught her red-handed in adultery) he was only justified in acting as executioner if the parents were absent, or had delegated the execution to him. This idea, I fancy is still alive. Here, for instance, is a curious case that occurred the other day which also illustrates the stringency of the unwritten law in Baluchistan. An adulterous wife was killed by her Brâhûi husband on the spot: the paramour escaped and took sanctuary for a while: then thought better of it, and returned home: dug himself a grave, and sent word to the woman's kinsmen that he was awaiting their coming. He hadn't to wait long.

In the provinces
of the maternal
uncle.

191. And finally let us return to the maternal uncle who has already appeared on the scene (§ 187) and frequently plays a prominent part in the family life, which seems hardly intelligible except on the theory that he once played the most prominent part of all—as the brother and therefore the owner or natural defender of the mother. It is for him (to take a few striking instances) to put some rupees—eventually the barber's perquisite—under his nephew's feet at a *Mari* circumcision; at a Brâhûi circumcision it is he who leads the lad up to the wooden pot for the operation. It is he who furnishes him with his first breeches among the Khetran. Both these occasions, circumcision and breeching, are significant enough, for both are connected directly or indirectly with the boy's entrance to manhood. But the maternal uncle, unlike the paternal uncle, is always bobbing up in domestic customs. Indeed throughout Baluchistan he is regarded as a much nearer and a much dearer and more loving kin than the uncle on the father's side. The country is full of wise saws to prove it, just as it is full of saws (and Brâhûi saws in particular) to prove that the faults and virtues of a son are derived not so much from his father as from his mother—in short, that it is the mother and not the father who is the boy's nearest kin.

Inheritance
confined to male
agnates.

192. But if such ideas and such customs really hark back to the days of mother kin, those days are long since dead. To-day the position of husband and father is supreme, and in nearly all parts of Baluchistan inheritance is strictly confined not merely to males, but to those who can trace their descent through males. So far from females being reckoned among the heirs, they are not the least valuable assets in the estate. There is, it is true, a faint-hearted tendency springing up to give women the shares to which Islam entitles them. At present the tendency is little more than pious fiction. If it ever develops into reality the consequences will be far reaching indeed. At the stage when property still consists of flocks and herds and a few sticks of furniture, the

division of a dead man's estate among the various members of his family into the fractional shares laid down by religion is as easy in practice as it is certainly equitable in principle. But times change: pastoral life begins to give way before agriculture, and the possession of land comes to be vital to the tribe even though life is still largely nomadic. Yet so long as the land remains the joint property of the tribe, the partition of the property of a deceased tribesman into the requisite fractions gives rise to little tribal inconvenience. On the inevitable evolution from tribal ownership to severalty the difficulties begin in real earnest. With the death of each relative the whole family is plunged into a pretty mathematical problem, often difficult enough to work out on paper, a thousandfold more difficult to work out on the land itself. Complexity succeeds complexity, until confusion reigns supreme. But confusion would become chaos, if our tribesmen suddenly changed their own simple if selfish methods. And it is not merely on the score of complexity that *shari'at* or Muhammadan Law is ill-suited to our tribes in their present stage of development. It strikes at the very root of the tribal system itself. Once women are admitted to full rights of inheritance and put in actual possession of land, land will constantly be passing out of the family. Even if our tribes were strictly endogamous, this would have serious consequences impossible wholly to foretell. But as women are married freely outside the tribe, the land would pass not only from the family but from the tribe itself, and the tribal system would be threatened with its death-blow. This was perceived by the chief fathers of the families of the children of Gilead in the days of Moses, and the one remedy for the tribes of Balūchistān would be the remedy Moses propounded for the tribes of Israel, 'Only to the family of the tribe of their father shall they marry, so shall not the inheritance remove from tribe to tribe' (Numbers XXXVI 6, 7). In a word, unless and until our tribes go in for a radical readjustment of their marriage customs, the exclusion of women from the inheritance is dictated by the primary instinct of tribal self-preservation. It is no accidental coincidence that Makīān and Las Bela, where the women have in great measure made good their claims to inheritance, are just those parts of Balūchistān where the tribal system seems hopelessly in decay.

193 Thus in Balūchistān at large a woman might seem to be a mere chattel, an object of barter from birth to death, marriage simply a transfer of property by the parents to the husband's family in consideration of a bride-price. And heavy though his outlay may be, the husband should soon be able to make money out of his investment. There is at any rate a good deal of force in the retort made by a tribesman, taxed with improvidence in marrying while head over ears in debt: a wife does more work than a couple of bullocks, and with luck will breed enough in a few years to pay for her bride-price thrice over. Even if it prove a barren marriage, she need not represent so much money thrown away or remain so much capital locked up. The husband can divorce her, merely stipulating for the proceeds if—one may almost say when—she re-marries, and thus recover a fair proportion of what he had to pay for her. Out of her infidelity, sad to relate, he can make yet more. Even on widowhood she constitutes a valuable and, as a rule, an easily realisable asset of his estate, or else (as among some Balōch) she reverts to her parental family, only to be disposed of afresh. Death and death alone removes her finally off the market. It's a sorry existence that these gleanings of custom conjure up, sordid and drab from the cradle to the grave. Yet the truth of the picture seems borne out only too well by the casual glimpses we get of a tribeswoman in actual life—a drudge about the house, a beast of burden on the march, in the courts a chattel in dispute, and too often a thing of dishonour. In strange and pleasant contrast are the little maidens at play, as happy as the day is long. It is not simply that the tiny tots are 'regardless of their doom'; they are as well nourished and as well looked-after as their urchin brothers. And the sight of their happiness and the love that has evidently been lavished upon them at this one period of female existence when the curtain is lifted from the inner life, should give us pause. That life cannot always be one long sunless tragedy. Though customs and customary law reveal the narrow dreary limits within which it must be ordered, they tell us little or nothing of what the ordinary humdrum woman can make of her unpromising

Status of women.

environment. For life seen in the courts is life seen at its worst, here as elsewhere. Of the love of parents, of affection in the husband's house, we necessarily know little, and arguing rigidly and unimaginatively from customs to the inner life, we are at times inclined to regard their existence as an impossibility. It would be vain to attempt to prove too much. Yet amid much in the women-customs of the tribes that is repugnant to our more advanced ideas and a direct offence against their own religion, there is a good deal not unsuited to their stage of development. And though we are tempted to think that some of the customs are more than flesh and blood could bear I fancy that if we could peep behind the scenes and watch the customs being enacted in flesh and blood in an everyday household, we should find the average woman adapting herself to her environment with a matter-of-fact resignation not at all incompatible with happiness.

*Apologia for
bride-price.*

194. Thus, objectionable though we may think the payment of bride-price in the abstract, it has much to recommend it in practice. To its credit must be placed first and foremost the absence of female infanticide in the tribes. Indeed should any recrudescence of female-infanticide (§ 140) ever come to light, the most effective remedy would be not legislation, but the introduction of bride-price where bride-price does not exist, or the doubling of it where it does. It ensures the careful nurture of the child from infancy to maidenhood, and tends to invest the young wife on entry into her husband's home with a respect in some degree proportionate to its size. It acts as a very valuable check against wholesale and unbridled polygyny. The system of bride-price lends itself readily no doubt to abuses, some of which, by a curious tragic irony indirectly owe their birth or growth to the peace and security of our administration. But it is the abuses rather than the system itself that call for check. To abolish the system at this stage of tribal development would be to reap a rich crop of greater evils, the nature and offshoots of which it would be impossible to foresee.

*And for the con-
struction of unborn
babes.*

195. Or take a custom which outrages our ideas still more violently. Among Pathans one of the commonest ways of patching up a bloodfeud is to give a couple of girls born and a couple of girls unborn, as part of the settlement. That is to say the aggressor makes his peace with the aggrieved party by handing over a couple of girls in marriage and by covenanting to give two more, yet unborn, in the course of time. To us it might seem difficult to conceive anything more monstrous than thus to dispose of infants before they see the light of day. Yet look at the idea for a moment from another point of view. The contracting of unborn babes is not confined to settlement of bloodfeuds. Among Brāhmins in particular it is often a love-match arranged between two expectant mothers in token of the affection they bear one another much in the same way as among ourselves two friends are fond of interweaving schemes for carrying on their love to the next generation in a marriage between their prospective offspring. With us it is an ideal, a fond dream that usually goes the way of all dreams. With the Brāhmins it eventuates into fact. And if we are able to accept without many qualms the fundamental principle of the tribesmen that it is for the parent to make matrimonial alliances for their children, it seems hypercritical to cavil at their desire to take time by the forelock by arranging a love-match at the very beginning of things. That love is the deity that presides over the arrangement of marriages of girls and unborn babes in the settlement of a bloodfeud, it would be ridiculous to pretend. Yet the fact remains that no other means of preventing the further shedding of blood can rival this apparently iniquitous system. And the reason is obvious. Not only is peace secured for the time being by the more or less immediate operation of marriage-ties between the parties, it is strengthened progressively as the years go on by the prospect of fresh alliances, until it is cemented anew by marriages in the next generation when the girls are grown to maturity.

*The influence of
women.*

196. Now if women were mere chattels, as lasting a peace would be secured by the immediate payment of half their value in money or kind and a promise to pay the other half after a lapse of sixteen years or so. The truth is that women cannot be reduced to terms of money whatever tribesmen and professed misogynists like them may imagine or pretend to imagine. To treat them

as soulless abstractions is to ignore the fundamental laws of human nature which govern the relations of man and wife, or mother and child. It argues in fact a singular shortsightedness to look upon tribeswomen as chattels and nothing more. They are human beings with rights as well as duties, though the latter may bulk so large in our eyes as to crowd the former out of sight. So far from being mere chattels, the average wife and the average mother exercise a very real influence over their menfolk, none the less potent because it is exercised in the background. To say that the hand that rocks the cradle rules the tribe, would be hyperbole. Yet cases are on record of the paramount influence of women in the tribe. Witness the widowed lady who a couple of generations ago ruled the Zahri and hence all Jhalawān with a strong hand not only during the minority of her son but also after his death. Or witness the skill and statecraft with which Musammāt Gulsana managed the Jōgizai tribe when it was thrown into confusion on the murder of her father, the great Bangal Khān. Nor is it simply in the political world that tribeswomen have been known to play a significant part. In the spiritual world there is no personage of greater reverence and influence than Bibi Mariam, Chishtī Sayyid of Kalāt. And if the women can thus make their influence felt in the larger spheres of tribal life, it is certainly not inoperative in the home-life of individual families.

XIX.—Civil Condition among the Indigenous Population (Regular areas only)

SEX	0—14						15 AND OVER					
	MALES			FEMALES			MALES			FEMALES		
	Unmarried	Married	Widowed	Unmarried	Married	Widowed	Unmarried	Married	Widowed	Unmarried	Married	Widowed
All Indigenous	961	18	—	634	44	—	2,486	2,429	313	73	947	315
Polish	106	3	—	77	8	—	300	547	84	9	113	33
British	136	—	—	96	8	—	497	427	44	11	133	30
Poles	311	3	—	137	13	—	1,463	944	139	17	268	79
Others	416	11	—	324	13	—	327	823	106	33	347	113

XX.—Civil Condition among Britons censused in Sind

BIRTHPLACE	0—14						15 AND OVER					
	MALES			FEMALES			MALES			FEMALES		
	Unmarried	Married	Widowed	Unmarried	Married	Widowed	Unmarried	Married	Widowed	Unmarried	Married	Widowed
All	19,307	318	10	9,298	563	18	6,183	12,714	1,319	791	13,023	9,354
India	6,043	136	8	6,546	338	8	2,324	4,799	421	263	8,619	1,370
Pakistan	4,780	94	7	4,196	334	30	3,313	7,780	849	234	7,028	1,021
Other provinces	138	8	1	64	10	—	97	105	19	14	136	33

CHAPTER VIII

EDUCATION.

Statistical data

SUBJECT	TABLES		
	Imperial	Provincial	Subsidiary
Education by religion and age	VIII		XVII
Education by race	IX		XXI, XXII
Education among Musalmāns		II	XXI
Education by locality			

197 Without laying the slightest pretension to scrupulous accuracy, I fancy General. that our literacy statistics only need a little judicious weeding to yield a fairly true account of the general progress of education in the country. Education, to be sure, is a high-sounding title to give to what often falls short of the three R's, and the word progress has a somewhat strong flavour of irony about it. Our educational standard amounted to nothing more than the ability to decipher a letter and pen a reply, and, even so, I am not prepared to vouch that every one of our self-styled literates could really reach this humble standard. We had to take the statements, especially in the case of the women, more or less on trust. Among ourselves reading and writing are so correlated that it requires a mental effort for us to conceive of a man that can read and yet is unable to write. But in Balūchistān, where the goal of indigenous education is the reading of the Koran, scores who can read Arabic glibly cannot write a word. And as our enumerators could not be allowed to set themselves up as an examining board, the chances are that a fairish number who would be floored at having to write a letter, have found their way among the literates. On the other hand, there must have been a few genuine literates who escaped our notice, for reading and writing, though rare accomplishments among the tribesmen, hardly impress the tribal mind as being of any importance or even particularly reputable. And this is the upshot of the statistics. In every thousand persons we can produce no more than 33 who profess to be able to con a letter and scrawl a reply. Of the lot 31 are males. But if general literacy is at a low ebb, literacy in English is extraordinarily high by comparison. Of the 31 males who are literate, no less than 7 are prepared to back themselves as literate in English. Among female literates English, it would seem, has greater attractions still. Nearly every couple that can read and write at all contains one who claims to be able to read and write English.

	Literates per mille	
	Males.	Females.
Literate	31	2
English literate	7	1

198 There could be no happier proof of the futility of washing one's ingenuity over the literacy statistics of the province as a whole. The study of English has no lot or part in the tribesman's life, still less is it the concern of the tribeswoman. The bulk of these apparently advanced students of English are either English themselves or natives of India from down-country. Their presence in the statistics obscures the only thing of real interest that the statistics have to tell. To get at it, we must sweep the boards of all aliens, and

Literacy among the indigenous inhabitants.

look at the state of literacy in the country when the country is left to its true indigenous inhabitants. And it will clear matters still further if we weed out the domiciled Hindus at the same time. They are an unusually literate lot, these old Hindu families. Among them book learning is passed on from father to son to be used of course in the way of business. And in Hindu business it is a matter of workaday precaution to indulge in a script of one's own accordingly though every domiciled Hindu who returned himself as literate may actually be able to write to his father and read his reply I doubt whether it follows that a Hindu, let us say in Kharan could necessarily carry on a free correspondence with a Hindu, let us say in the Kachhi. Purgod of the aliens, the semi-indigenous and those domiciled Hindus, the statistics go down with a bang. Literacy must now be reckoned, not as so much in a thousand but as so much—or rather so little—in ten thousand.

Literacy by race.

100 In every 10 000 indigenous Musalmāns there are but 47 who were found to reach our modest requirements. Yet painfully low though this figure is, it gives an extravagant idea of the amount of literacy among those whom we have come to regard as the real tribesmen of the country. For if we muster the races in the order of their scholastic attainments, we find the Sayyid, the Lasi and the Jatt at the top of the list, and the Pathān, the Balōch and the Brāhūi at the bottom. To those who know something of the country there is little in the list to awaken surprise. It is after all only in the fitness of things that the Sayyid should head the list in virtue of his sacred

Literates per 10,000.

Sayyid	170
Lasi	94
Jatt	87
Pathān	80
Musalmān	47
Balōch	38
Brāhūi	23

calling. It is only in accord with his general attitude of contempt towards book learning that the Brāhūi should be relegated to the bottom. It will doubtless be the first instinct of the enthusiastic educationist flushed with the prospect of finding a rich harvest of literacy where his schoolmasters are abroad in the land, to trace the reason for the ups and downs of the several races in the varying educational facilities offered by the localities they inhabit. But his enthusiasm will receive a cold shock when he discovers that the districts, the very centre of his scholastic activities, can only reckon 43 literates in 10,000 of the population while the backward states, to which he has still to devote his attentions, can boast their 48. To these figures our educationist may perhaps demur for even he will confess that his schooling leaves the womenfolk unaffected. But if we narrow the statistics down to the males, his record becomes worse still in the states there are 80 literates in 10 000 males in the districts there are but 81. For my own part, though I would not deny the direct influence of our schools or question the likelihood of their giving an increasingly better account of themselves as time goes on, I confess to resting much greater faith in the indirect but vivifying influence of our administration, in the gradual pacification and settlement of the country and in the growing contact of our peoples, thanks to our roads and our railways, with other and more enlightened communities. After all, what hampers the march of education among the Balōch and the Pathāns and the Brāhūis, is not merely the bigotry or the suspicions or the prejudices of the tribesmen but also—and perhaps even more—the self-sufficiency of their tribal society which secludes them from the wider movements in the world outside them, and the nomad life that has so many of them in its grip.

Literacy by language.

200 But this is only one side of the picture. A settled life of husbandry and contact with a wider civilisation may explain why the Lasi and the Jatt should stand higher in the educational scale than the Brāhūis and Balōch, or why literacy should have struck root in Las Bela or Quetta, and withered away in Zhob. They are no reasons why the states as a whole should be more advanced than the districts. To understand this paradox we must turn to the languages in which literacy is claimed. As the language of present-day official education is Urdu, we might naturally expect to see Urdu drive all other languages out of the educational field. And if only we persevere long enough, this may possibly be the dismal issue. But the day is not yet. Persian, the ancient literary language of the province still maintains its supremacy. For every indigenous Musalmān that can read and write Urdu, there are more than two that can read and write Persian. Of the 3,121 literates who have been returned among the Balōch, Brāhūis and Pathāns, 1,544 have returned themselves as literate in

Persian, 555 only have returned themselves as literate in Urdū. And this to my thinking is the most striking moral that the statistics have to tell. It is surely a useful straw that shows which way the educational wind is blowing. In fact, I am sorely tempted to ascribe much more destruction than construction to our present educational efforts, and to seek the explanation for the backwardness of literacy in the districts in the greater scope that has here been offered for what I cannot but regard as our misdirected zeal.

201 This is a hard saying. Yet it has not been petulantly provoked by some illusion in the statistics. It has been forced upon me gradually by what little knowledge I have of the tribesmen themselves. But an end to this dreary prologue. The statistics have held the stage long enough. It is time to ring up the curtain on actual life. There is quite a pretty little scene among the tribesmen when a lad first enters the mosque for his schooling. His father presents the mulla with a plate of sweetmeats topped by a couple of rupees. And the mulla makes the lad repeat *Bismilla* after him, and puts him through the alphabet before the proud friends of the family who have assembled for the occasion. Learning proceeds very slowly: first comes the study of a simple Arabic primer, with a little general instruction in Persian, then a few simple verses of the Koran. The day when the lad has read the Koran from cover to cover is kept as a high day and holiday. Sweetmeats are distributed among the kith and kin, the lad is dressed up in gay clothes and tipped by his relatives, the mulla is given sweetmeats and cash and a new turban. The rejoicings of this day are never repeated, however much further the lad may prosecute his studies, and as for the mulla, he simply receives a fee called *‘īdī* on every *‘īd* festival. But further than this a lad is hardly likely to go, unless he is to become a *tālīb-i-‘ilm*, training for the priesthood. Then he will study various books on religious topics, though at the end it may be doubted whether he is really much wiser than he was before. If he wants to become really learned, he will go from mulla to mulla, for a mulla is rarely versed in more books than one, and in all probability cannot write at all. Reading is no doubt a religious accomplishment, and in pious theory at any rate a useful and desirable accomplishment, even for a tribesman. Writing is on a completely different footing: it is purely secular, worldly, and more or less dangerous. It must not be supposed that a lad is taught simply to rattle the Koran off by heart. What he reads he of course rarely understands, in the narrowest sense of the word the reading itself is genuine enough. The pity is that education usually stops at reading, the short and to us inevitable step onwards to writing, which might be calculated to put a little life into the mechanical reading, is taken by very few.

Indigenous
education.

202 As the mullas are the only people (with the obvious exception of the Hindu traders) who go in for education as a matter of course, and as they are the sole teachers outside the Government schools, the amount of literacy in the different parts of the country tends to vary directly with their position and influence. There is thus more book-learning among Pathāns than among Brāhūis or Balōch, more in the Quetta-Pishin district, where a strong mulla influence dates back to the old days of Kandahār rule, than in Zhōb and Lōralai. But education is at a low ebb even among Pathāns. In one sense the Pathāns have laid to heart the Prophet's injunction "Seek thou knowledge though it be in China," for they are world-wide travellers. But though a learned man commands respect among them, they are themselves no very ardent seekers after knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word. They regard book-learning as a matter that ill repays them for the time and labour that must be spent on it. Not but what the pious and the well-to-do will make shift to send their boys to the mosque between the ages of six and twelve to get a grounding in the Koran: the pious, because they would encourage their sons to become mullas, the well-to-do, because they seem to be beginning to look upon a smattering of religious learning as the right thing for people in their station.

Pathān attitude
towards education.

203 Among Brāhūis and Balōch there is usually a very different feeling on the subject. Book-learning may be all very well for the mulla, and a learned mulla is useful enough when it comes to the prescribing of charms and amulets. But for the rest—"who wants his son to become a mulla?" as one of the chiefs indignantly exclaimed, scandalised at the suggestion that he should give his son a decent education. For a bookworm and a mulla are regarded as one and the same thing by the countryside. To call a Brāhūi a mulla is to use a

Brāhūi and
Balōch attitude.

very ugly term of reproach. If you want to taunt him with cowardice, there will be an added sting if you call him a mulla—a cowardly mulla, who sits in the mosque where the leopard can't get at him, as the Brāhūī proverb puts it. In many chiefly families, no doubt, it is becoming fashionable for the sons to receive an education of sorts. And so long as this is confined to the education of the old school, all goes well. But the results of a more up-to-date education have been far from encouraging. A little modern book learning is a dangerous thing for a budding chief. It makes him discontented with the ancient ways of his fathers, and his discontent is usually advertised to the tribesmen and the outer world by a change in dress and manners. It is often said that the Balōch and Brāhūī are more naturally aristocratic in their political leanings than the Pathan. But Balōch and Brāhūī alike remain amenable to their chief only so long as their chief remains one of themselves. His manners, dress and customs may be a little more fine, a little more grandiose than theirs; they must be the same in kind. As soon as a chief turns up his nose at ancient customs and apes the manners and dress of aliens, it is a sure sign that he is already beginning to lose his hold over his tribesmen. Not until the mass of the tribesmen turn their thoughts to education, will it be altogether safe for any but the strongest minds among the chiefs to go in for it themselves. And that day lies far ahead. For education is instinctively regarded as a mysteriously insidious enemy of ancient custom and ancient custom is dearer to the tribesmen than anything else—it is more revered than religion itself.

Urdū education
uncongenial and
apparently
knowledgeable

201. Education has thus an uphill journey before it in Balūchistan. But need the road be quite so uphill as the one we are taking? There is, I think, a much easier if more winding road that leads to the same goal. We blame the reluctance of the tribesmen to avail themselves of the great boon of education we hold out to them. But I fancy we are putting the blame on the wrong shoulders, like the teacher in the Balōchī proverb who could not teach and whacked the boys instead. We profess to hold out to them a vernacular education, but the education we offer is not racy or vernacular at all; it is simply the vernacular education of Hindustan, with which the Central Asiatic civilisation of Balūchistan has no natural concern. And what the more intelligent tribesmen object to is not so much education itself, as a foreign system of education. It is not simply that Urdū is a foreign tongue, which must be laboriously mastered before education can begin at all, or that the teacher is usually as ignorant of the language of his pupils as they are of his. These are defects in the system burdensome enough to the boys; they are not the defects that worry the parents. To the tribesmen at large Urdū is the language of alien India, of its alien courts of justice and its alien modes of administration; it breathes strange ideas, ideas which menace their ancient manners and institutions. This is what is at the back of the minds of the shrewder tribesmen when they decline to send their lads to our schools. Call it sentiment, if you will; were it nothing more, it would be enough to give us pause. To one who is not bold enough to scoff at sentiment, and who feels, though none can measure, the great but subtle influence of alien language on thought and manners and customs, there is much in the prejudice against Urdū education to awaken his sympathy. The tribesmen after all are not condemning the system altogether unheard; they have given it some sort of trial, half-hearted though it has been. And they ought to know what they are talking about when they describe the local product of our Urdū education as an unnatural hybrid, a cross between a tribesman and a Panjābī that combines the poorer qualities of both, always fidgeting under the good old customs of his fathers, always aping new fangled ways which sit ill upon him. To use their own parable, he is like the crow of the Persian fable that never succeeded in learning to run like a partridge, but only managed to forget how to hop like a crow.

A plan for the
improvement necessary

202. The quack remedy is of course a more heroic dose of Urdū education still. But when the old prescription so palpably disagrees with the patient, is it not wiser to alter the prescription? The key note of administration in Balūchistan is home-rule—the self-government of the frontier as far as may be, by the tribesmen themselves along the ancient lines of tribal custom. And it would be only in harmony with the whole tenor of our administration if our educational system were directed to helping the tribesmen to educate themselves after their own methods. To be consistent with our general policy our object

should be to turn the young generation into better tribesmen, not into artificial individualists—to make them not different from their fathers, but better, more fully developed. And as in administration, so in education, we are only likely to achieve success by quickening the existing system. The success that has marked the employment of ancient machinery in administration, should at any rate make us hesitate before we scrap the ancient machinery in education. However difficult it may be to work through or with the mullas, the sole indigenous scholastic agency in the country, the experiment would deserve a patient trial even on grounds of mere policy, as long as their monopoly is threatened by our entrance into the educational field, so long will the dead-weight of their powerful influence be thrown into the scale against our educational efforts.

206 As regards the vehicle of education we may seem at a disadvantage. None of the three tribal vernaculars will serve our purpose. Brāhūi is never reduced to writing, Balōchī hardly ever, notwithstanding the rich and interesting collection of ballads it can boast, and though a few Pashtō works, chiefly of a religious character, figure among the books conned by the budding mulla, Pashtō in Balūchistān is not a written language like the Pashtō of the North West Frontier. And if we must turn to other languages, Arabic, on which existing education seems to be grounded, is as dead a language to the tribesmen as Latin is to the average schoolboy at home, and though it would be a mighty educational force if the grandeur of the Holy Book of Islām and not merely the grandeur of its sounds could reach the tribesmen, it must be confessed, that, as matters now stand, an Arabic education would be as artificial to the tribesmen as Urdū education itself. There remains Persian. Now, though Arabic may seem to be the basis of indigenous education, this is only because it leads on to the reading of the Koran. But it is in Persian that the Koran is usually expounded, and the teaching of Persian and the reading of Persian classics are almost invariably parts of the mulla's curriculum. Persian was and still is the official language of the Khān's Darbār, all correspondence between the Khān and the chiefs and between one chief and another is conducted in it, it is the common language of the polite world, it is understood by thousands, it is admired by all. In the form of Dēhwārī it is actually one of the vernaculars of Balūchistān, Balōchī is its first cousin, Pashtō is a near kin. Better still, the whole spirit of Persian is in a very real if indescribable manner attuned to the spirit of the country. Speaking, not of course as an educationist, but as a census officer who not only counts heads but tries to read what is inside them, I cannot but feel that the returns of literacy among the tribesmen, and among Brāhūis and Balōch more especially, would be much less dismal reading at the next census, if we ceased to kick against the pricks, and contented ourselves with fostering a sound but simple education through the indigenous agency on the foundation of this magnificent language and its magnificent literature. Such an educational system would not come up against a deadwall of passive resistance such as now confronts us, and on this foundation it ought not to be difficult—though one may doubt whether it would be worth the while—to build up an education in Urdū for the more robust spirits among the tribesmen who want to go further than their fellows.

207 Strong though the prejudice is against Urdū education, it is doubly strong against English. But of English education they hardly know except by hearsay. An English-knowing tribesman is very rare indeed. One of the Balōch chiefs, an admirable blending of the natural wit of the old school and the acquired wisdom of the new, tried the experiment of giving his eldest son a smattering of English. As the youth went to the dogs, all the blame was of course piled on to the English education, and English is accordingly a subject that is ruthlessly banned from the studies of his brother. Even among the more enterprising Pathāns the prejudice is strong. The common idea is that the man that learns English will be sure to mumble English on his death-bed instead of reciting the *Kalima*, and to die with English on the lips is to take a passport to Hell. Small wonder that the death-bed scene of the wretch that knows English is a favourite theme of the sensational story-teller and an awful warning to others.

208 And all that has been said about education generally applies with a sevenfold force to the education of women. A tribesman looks upon female

And for Persian education.

Strong feeling against English education

And against female education

education as something highly unbecoming. Among Pathāns, no doubt, it is considered in theory only right and in practice harmless enough for a girl to be put through her paces in the Koran and a few devotional books, and there is all the less harm in this as in ninety nine cases out of a hundred the modicum of learning is forgotten as soon as it is acquired. Further than this, the Pathān considers it would be mischievous to go and even this is more than Brāhūl or Bakīch would approve of. Education casts a blight on the sex, they think. Teach a woman to read, and she will read love-stories. And what conceivable use could she put writing to but the penning of love-letters?

SUBSIDIARY TABLES.

XVI.—Literacy among Musalmans by Locality.

District or state	LITERACY RATES										LITERATES IN 10,000 INDIGENOUS MUSALMANS OF EITHER SEX	
	TOTAL				ALIENS				SEMI-INDIGENOUS		INDIGENOUS	
	Persons		Males		Females		Males		Females		Males	
	Persons	Males	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
BALUCHISTAN												
Districts	7,306	7,093	213	3,507	177	110	1	3,116	35	86	1	1
Quetta Pishin	5,182	4,989	193	3,340	173	129	1	1,511	19	84	1	1
Loralai	2,843	2,712	131	1,961	126	49	1	702	1	149	0	0
Zhob	591	572	9	371	8	49		153	1	44	3	3
Bolan	563	561	2	414	1			147	1	44	3	3
Chagai	80	76	4	67	3			9	1	179	29	29
Sibi	200	189	11	76	10	2		111	1	135	1	1
Administered area	915	879	36	160	25	29		390	11	69	2	2
Mari Bagti country	891	855	36	159	25	29		368	11	97	3	3
	24	24		3				22		11		
States												
Kalat	2,124	2,104	20	158	4	11		1,935	16	89	8	8
Sarāwān	1,683	1,672	11	136	4	11		1,525	7	82	1	1
Mchalarān	498	437	1	29		5		403	1	118	3	3
Kachhi	131	131		3				128		27		
Dōmbki Kachhri country	515	510	5	17	1			493	1	108	1	1
Makrān	80	89		4				85		77		
Qhārān	412	407	5	83	3			325	2	87	5	5
Las Bela	98	98		1		6		91		76		
	441	432	9	22				410	9	130	3	3

VII.—Literacy among Indigenous Muslims by Race.

(NOTE.—Several Moslems returned themselves as Literate in more than one language; hence the apparent discrepancy in the language percentages)

RACE	Literate per 10,000	Female Literate in 1,000 male Literate	NUMBER PER CENT OF TOTAL LITERATE WHO ARE LITERATE IN						
			Persian	Urdu	Arabic	Rashdi	Urdu	English	Other languages
Indigenous Muslims	47	10	67	25	9	9	3	1	1
Baloch	33	19	77	23	4	9	1	1	1
() Eastern	31	23	57	40	3	13	1	2	3
Daghl	4			100					
Khatris	23		29	66	30		6	2	
Magad	30	129	81	11	3	9			
Mari	11		36	71	4				
Rind	26	12	73	27	9	23		1	
(U) Eastern	70	3	29	30	3	6	1		
Rajshahi	61		57	17		3		1	
Brakhi	32	7	32	16	7	1	1	1	2
() Original and/or	43	16	34	26	3			2	
(U) Bardak	31	7	54	16	7		1	1	
Rangabai	30		40	9	6	3			
Linga	67		30	13	1			1	
() Jhaland	17	6	17	14	9	4	1	1	5
Shuraj	13		33	7	7		7		
Mitmanval	21		31	3	6				2
Mangal	21		36	30	30	11			2
Kabri	10		31	25				3	
() Miscellaneous	181		74	29	3		3		6
Pajhi	59	3	35	35	17			2	
Kilar	41	1	63	31	30			3	
Shurajhi	31	3	57	36	31			3	3
Sharia	79		36	34	13			4	
Thoghra	46		36	6	14				
Paul	13		37	23	13			1	1
Muslihi	14		73	36	13			6	
Yaria	50	5	73	41	11			1	
Al-Hil Arshad	30		73	36	16			3	
Til-Tari	73		30	15	3				
Lhal	63	23	7	40	2	34	11		
Japt	57	9	66	13	14	14		1	
Sayyid	170	11	73	21	3	3		1	
Other Muslims	44	14	35	39	2	10	23		3
Durida	23		33	3	11				3
Shalik	3			66	30	30			
Lah	3			60		40			

CHAPTER IX

LANGUAGE.

Statistical data

SUBJECT	TABLES	
	Imperial.	Subsidiary
General		
Bilingual by locality		VIII
Bilingual by race		IX
Race and bilingual		X
Loss of racial language		XI

Statistical

209 Though we did our best to make up for other deficiencies in the tribal areas by conducting a highly elaborate linguistic census, my treatment of the statistics themselves will be very slight. And this for two reasons. The many languages spoken by the strangers within our gates, however interesting in themselves, have little or no interest to Balūchistān—they simply reflect the main features of immigration already reflected by the statistics of birthplace—only in a slightly different and perhaps less distorted manner. And elaborate though our statistics of the languages native to Balūchistān, then full statistical value must necessarily remain buried until we have others to compare with them. No gap in the last census was so regrettable—certainly none was so utterly unnecessary—as the omission to record the languages of the indigenous peoples. If language were perfectly stable—if we could assume, for instance, that every Brāhūi speaks Brāhūi, and every Balōch Balōchi—we might readily reconcile ourselves to the absence of linguistic statistics and get along quite comfortably with the statistics of race. But such assumptions, as we know, would be wide of the mark. Even at the present moment some language, unless I am mistaken, is elbowing out another here and being elbowed out by yet another there. One has only to look at the gradual disappearance of Brāhūi among the Brāhūis of Sind (§78) to realise how rapid the shifting of language may be, and to regret the more that statistics of the last census are not forthcoming to compare with the linguistic statistics of this.

No linguistic census in 1901

210 It was partly in the hope of being able to fathom the changes that are going on that I subjected the indigenous inhabitants to a bilingual census, and recorded not merely their mother-tongue but also any other language that is spoken freely and naturally outside the family circle by all members of the household. For at a humble stage of development nobody will burden himself with a second language if his mother-tongue will carry him everywhere in his ordinary walk of life, and where the mother-tongue is associated as a matter of course with another, there is evidently a struggle for existence in progress which can only end, be it soon or be it late, by the weaker going to the wall. Moreover, this bilingual census of ours is a useful reminder that there is a good deal of intercourse between the various layers of Balūchistān society, a fact which is patent to the man on the spot, but a fact which might easily be lost sight of by outside readers—if any there be—of Balūchistān census reports. Not

Bilingual census in 1911.

that our bilingual statistics give a full idea of this intercourse. It must be remembered that the statistics are essentially family statistics, not the statistics of individuals. Had they been collected individual by individual, the statistics of mother tongue would doubtless have been almost identically the same. But there would have been a goodly rise in the statistics of the secondary language. For we ignored the many precocious individuals who single themselves out from the rank of the family by mastering some language unknown to the rest—the only secondary language in which we were interested was the one spoken freely in addition to their own by the family as a whole. And though this distinction rendered it almost impossible to extend the bilingual census to the regular areas—and we made no attempt to do so—it served incidentally as a simple but not ineffective test that the secondary language was in reality a living thing and no chance accomplishment.

Chief local languages.

211. Balūchistan is the scene of a three-cornered duel between Iranian Indian and Dravidian. Not that there is any great harmony within the ranks of the competitors themselves. Bakochi and Pashto, the two great champions of Iranian, are old and inveterate rivals, among whom the honours rest for the time being with Balochi. The local champions of Indian are a ragged and ill-assorted regiment commonly known as Jaṭki or Jadgāli, the members of which though banded against their common enemies, are fighting among themselves for the supremacy of Sindhi or Western Panjābi (§ 225). Brāhūi alone, the sole champion of Dravidian shows a united front to the foe. And well it may. For unlike Iranian, whose forces are strengthened by a constant influx of allies more especially from Persia and Afghanistan, and unlike Indian which is steadily reinforced from India, Brāhūi has friends nowhere. So great is the preponderance of Iranian that ignoring the presence of the 7,500 speakers of Dohwari (§ 221) I will divide the Iranian army into its two main divisions, and follow the fortunes of the four chief languages of Balūchistan—Bakochi, Paṭiṭo, Brāhūi and Jaṭki. And as the forces of Pashto in particular are unduly swollen not merely by the semi-indigenous but also by aliens, I will clear the field of all outsiders and allow fair play for the indigenous Mucalmāns to fight out their battles among themselves. And the present state of their wordy warfare may be gathered from the margin. Balochi still holds the mastery. But Pashto proves it hard, and if it were allowed assistance from outside, it would press it harder still. Yet the battle is not always to the strong and the final issue will almost certainly not rest with Balochi. It may not even rest with Pashto, stubborn language though it is. In despised Jaṭki there is a yet more dangerous rival in the field. For though Jaṭki has a lot of ground to make up many of the conditions are in its favour and no one would be particularly surprised at its ultimate triumph. Brāhūi, I fear is no longer in the running.

Languages of indigenous Mucalmāns.	
Balochi	279,845
Pashto	265,775
Brāhūi	148,167
Jaṭki	141,464
Other languages	16,280

Racial distribution.

212. As a rule of course, language follows race. But we stand in no need of the assistance proffered in the margin to realise that not all our races are

Languages of indigenous Mucalmāns	Linguistic distribution per mille of each race.				
	Balochi	Pashto	Brāhūi	Jaṭki	Others
Balochi	313	278	196	162	22
Pashto	570	4	1	205	1
Brāhūi	1	974	2	21	2
Jaṭki	210	8	173	8	1
Others	45	2	8	678	69
Brāhūi	82	8	80	918	—
Jaṭki	62	76	82	181	47
Others	83	16	123	45	111

able to maintain proper discipline in their ranks. Between the almost unswerving loyalty of the Pathāns to their mother tongue and the infidelity of the Brāhūis to theirs, there is all the difference in the world. Among Pathāns the only outside language that seems to be able to make any serious headway is Jaṭki and the only tribes that show any real tendency to succumb to its wiles are the Jafar and the Paṭi—or rather the main branch of the Paṭi long settled in the Jaṭki atmosphere of Sibi. It is Jaṭki again that is by far the most successful in warring the Bakoch away from the language of their race. Even though its conquests would be notably diminished if we excluded the Khetraṇ.

from the Balōch ranks (§264), the fact remains that it has already effected a footing in the very citadel of the Balōch, for it has won over deserters from among the Bugtī and Magasī, and deserters, at once more numerous and more notable, from among the Rind. But Jatki is worming itself everywhere. Its hold over the Jatt and the Lāsī is of course only in the nature of things. Nor is there much significance in the number of its adherents among those I have classed as miscellaneous, for in many cases there is no rival in the field to challenge its claim to being their mother-tongue. But there is a good deal of significance, I think, in its signal success among the Sayyids, seeing that most of the Sayyids of Balūchistān live in a Pathān environment and that many of them are in all probability Pathān or half-Pathān by origin (§259). Only the Brāhūis seem to be able to resist its advances. And here one is almost tempted to mistrust the accuracy of our statistics in face of the remarkable statistics we received from Sind, where half the total number of Brāhūis enumerated were returned as speakers of what we should call Jatki (§78). But I am not disposed to explain away the apparent paradox by the easy assumption that the enumerators in either province were seriously at fault. There is, in the first place, an obvious difference in the nature of the two statistics. In Balūchistān the Brāhūis were given the opportunity of entering two languages in their returns, in Sind of course, they had to plump for one, and we shall see in the sequel that the Brāhūis of Balūchistān affect Jatki very considerably as their secondary language. And in the second place—and this perhaps is even more to the point—of the Brāhūis enumerated in Sind it is only among those who declared Sind (and not Balūchistān) as their birthplace that there is any serious abnormality in the Jatki returns. In short, I have no hesitation in finding in the analysis of the linguistic statistics of the two provinces yet another confirmation of my conviction that most of the Brāhūis who were censused in Sind and nominally born in Sind have taken up their abode in Sind for good and all, and belong to Balūchistān no longer.

213 Linguistic territories have no impassable frontiers to set casual trespassers at defiance or to resist insidious but wholesale encroachments. Yet with all its great but inevitable imperfections, the map on the opposite page, which purports to show the general dispositions of the contending forces, merits more than a fleeting glance. Pashtō is massed on the north-east. Balōchī is entrenched in a great block of country on the west and in a more confined but much more thickly populated block on the east, with a small outpost to the south. The Jatki forces are split up. But its disposition is not so unfavourable as one might think, for in reality it consists in strategical positions from which it can sally forth and wear down its enemies at leisure. It has already driven a wedge through Balōchī in the east and between Balōchī and Pashtō further north, and is beginning to drive a wedge between Balōchī and Brāhūi on the south. Brāhūi stands at bay in the centre of the country, surrounded by foes on all sides, with advanced guards of Dēhwārī and Balōchī planted in its very middle. On the map Brāhūi shows a brave enough front. But in looking at the map, one must of course bear in mind the varying density of the several parts of Balūchistān. Even Balōchī, strongest of the local vernaculars though it is, looms disproportionately large on the map, because its stronghold in the west is the most thinly populated tract in the country. The map loses nothing in interest on comparison with the equally rough map that serves as frontispiece, on which I have endeavoured to show the distribution of the various races. The first thing that strikes the eye is the ousting of Brāhūi by Balōchī among the Brāhūis of Makrān, yet the Balōchī inroads into the very heart of the Brāhūi country—into Sarāwān and the southern portions of Jhalawān—are perhaps more remarkable still. The Brāhūi tribes chiefly affected by these Balōchī encroachments are, first and foremost, the Mīrwārī, reputed to be Brāhūis of the oldest and purest Brāhūi stock of all, the Sājdi and the Bīzanjav and the Lāngav, and in lesser degree the Kambrārī (another branch of the ancient stock) and the Māmasanī and the Bangulzai. It is to these conquests among the Brāhūis and to its even more extensive conquests among the miscellaneous peoples that Balōchī owes its superiority in numbers over the Balōch race. And so far it has had to put up with comparatively few desertions from its ranks, though the full significance of the losses it has suffered at the hands of Jatki, notably in the Kachhī among the Rind and the Magasī, is not to be

measured by their actual numbers or the small show they make on the map. On the map, indeed Balochi seems to have sustained a much more serious loss in the apparent surrender of Barkhan to Ja'fki but a possibly truer way of interpreting the facts would be to regard the Khetran as only imperfectly won by the Baloch race from the Pathans (§ 961). Viewed in this light the Ja'fki assimilation of Barkhan would constitute a very signal loss sustained by Pashtu. But with this exception—if indeed it is any exception at all—Pashtu has yielded little ground, though it has had to admit defeats at the hands of Ja'fki in Misakbel among the Jafar and in Sibti among the Panj.

Lingual struggle.

314. We may now turn aside and watch a different and perhaps more interesting phase in the linguistic warfare—the stealthy encroachments of the enemy in the innocent guise of a subsidiary language.

Subsidiary languages per mille of each race.

	All	Balkh	M. Pashai	Brakhi	Ja'fki	Others.
Indigenous Musalmans	202	37	6	66	62	29
Baloch	242	13	7	69	191	31
Pathans	30	6	4	7	11	3
Brakhi	398	64	10	61	41	43
Ja'fki	132	23	1	31	14	64
Lidi	142	23		70	17	18
Poyyidi	197	37	23	37	8	13
Musalmans	273	43	4	175	23	28

no effort to impress their language on outsiders they are equally deaf to the overtures of others, whether what they offer is a principal or a subsidiary language. In fact only 3 per cent of the Pathans profess to be bilingual at all. A telling contrast to this policy of linguistic aloofness is afforded by the ingenuitousness of the Baloch and Brakhi in admitting subsidiary languages into their midst. Here the insidious enemy comes not single spies, but in battalions. One Baloch in every three, one Brakhi in every four boasts himself to be bilingual, little dreaming that his linguistic tolerance is placing the very preservation of his mother tongue in jeopardy. And it is these disarming but deadly tactics that render Ja'fki as it seems to me, so serious a menace to our other languages. Even the Pathans, who usually—and wisely—disdain the tempting help of a subsidiary language, resort to Ja'fki almost twice as often as they resort to either Balochi or Brakhi. The stealthy inroads that Ja'fki is making on the Baloch are indeed the most obviously salient feature in the statistics, though I am not sure that, if we could probe a little deeper into the inner meaning of the statistics, its conquests over the Brakhi would not prove more notable still. For the statistics clearly call for cautious handling. Thus, take the population in the mass, and it appears that Brakhi is employed as a subsidiary language more freely even than Ja'fki. Look to the races who so employ them, and you will stumble up against the extraordinary fact that while hardly a Ja'fki in a hundred is so false to his mother tongue as to degrade it to his subsidiary language, among Brakhi Brakhi has been relegated to the second place by at least eight in every hundred.

Forecast.

215. But the statistics are much too complex for an academic analysis to enable us to follow the fickle fortunes of the combatants in the linguistic warfare that is now being waged in Baluchistan. Even in the case of one and the same language, statistics, to all appearances identical, may in reality denote very different things: here perhaps they are the spoils of victory, there the admission of defeat. That a language figures prominently as a subsidiary language, may well be a proof of its powers of attack: it may equally well be the first symptom of rout. In itself, therefore it helps us little to combine the two aspects of a language—principal and subsidiary—into one whole, and measure the result

Principal and subsidiary combined.	
Baloch	257,281
Pathan	300,300
Brakhi	196,616
Ja'fki	180,723
Others	37,478

against the similar totals of its rivals. The full meaning of the bewilderingly multitudinous factors that go to the making of these deceptively simple totals can only be gauged by local knowledge at its highest power. But one or two of the main processes seem unmistakable. Thus, if an outside language is associated freely with the language of the race, the chances are that the day is not far distant when the racial language will have to struggle to hold its own; if the racial language is being constantly relegated to the second place, the chances are that decay has already set in. Accordingly though it is

obviously a sorry case of the blind leading the blind, the thought that it will be another ten years before statistics can be collected to contradict me, and many more years before statistics can be collected to prove me wrong, emboldens me to venture on a word of prophecy. The large reinforcements received by Brāhūi from its subsidiary figures seem to me but one among many lamentable signs that Brāhūi has entered on its decline, that it will be able to resist the inroads of Balōchī on the one side and of Jatki on the other for many generations more, I very much doubt. Yet in the nearly equal reinforcements that Jatki receives from its subsidiary figures I seem no less clearly to see a foreshadowing of the ultimate success of Jatki, now numerically the weakest of our vernaculars, all along the line. The full weight of our administration is after all at its back. Every advance that is made in our so-called vernacular Urdū education, every advance that is made in the opening up of the country, are in effect advances made by Jatki over the more racy vernaculars of Balūchistān. Balōchī for a time may be able to hold its own, it may even seem to advance, for what it loses to Jatki it may possibly more than make up by conquests among the Brāhūis and the miscellaneous peoples. But any success, I fancy, will be momentary, and only serve to hasten on the day of Jatki's ultimate triumph. Even Pashtō, which now seems to be marking time, will probably be driven, slowly but surely, further and further back. But the absorption of Pashtō will be many a long day in coming. For the present, Pashtō is secure, thanks not merely to its intrinsic strength and the loyalty it inspires in all Pathāns, but also to its resolute refusal to be drawn into the seemingly innocent game of give and take. Not alone to race or country does a policy of glorious isolation offer the best chance of staving off the evil day of absorption.

Descriptive.

216 The neglect that usually falls to the lot of Balōchī seems to be fostered by two curious fallacies. There is first the very common notion that it is of little practical value in Balūchistān. It is difficult to trace the origin of this extraordinary delusion. It certainly runs absolutely counter to our statistics. Balōchī is spread over more than half the area of the whole province, it is the principal language of nearly a third of the indigenous Musalmāns, it is spoken freely and naturally by one-twelfth of the remainder as their secondary language. I can only imagine that the delusion is part and parcel of that wider delusion that Balūchistān consists of the Pathān districts with the Balōch and Brāhūi country knocked in. And then there is the equally common notion that Balōchī is of no scientific value at all. The truth of the matter is that Balōchī has suffered from its very simplicity. I can think of no language a smattering of which is easier to acquire, especially for a man with a nodding acquaintance with Persian. The grammatical structure is refreshingly simple and straightforward, the pronunciation comes trippingly to the tongue, the vocabulary is by no means extensive. But it's a case of lightly come, lightly go. The facility with which a smattering is acquired is only equalled by the facility with which it is forgotten. And so arises the extraordinary delusion that Balōchī is not worth mastering at all—a delusion crystallised in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred in the verdict that Balōchī is a bastard Persian at best.

217 The verdict is curiously wide of the mark. In contrast let me quote the conclusion of Professor Geiger,¹ who has done so much to further the study of Iranian philology. "Of all the dialects"—he is speaking of Iranian dialects in general—"Balōchī is raised to a pre-eminence of its own by virtue of the marked antiquity of its phonetics. It has preserved the old tenues in all positions, even after vowels and liquids. In this respect accordingly it stands on a level with the older Pahlavi. In Persian the transition of the tenues after vowels and liquids to voiced spirants took place between the third and sixth century after Christ. In a word, Balōchī represents in the all-important matter of consonantal system a stage of language left behind by Persian some fifteen hundred years ago." So with equal justice we might almost invert the common verdict and speak of Persian as a bastard Balōchī. Thus at any rate would bring out the fact that Balōchī preserves a much more archaic form of

¹ *Grundriss der iranischen Philologie*, I, 2, p. 417

the parent language than Persian. But old beliefs die hard, and it will be many a long day before the idea that Balóchi is a mongrel patois of Persian is finally consigned to limbo. In the meantime the popular delusion must be rudely assailed, for it is without question chief among the stumbling-blocks in the way of a more genuine study of the language. And though this is hardly the place for a philological discussion, I am tempted to follow Professor Geiger's lead, and to go a little deeper into the question of the antiquity of Balóchi.

Eastern and Western Balóchi.

218. A wedge of Bráhmí splits Balóchi into two main divisions, Eastern and Western Balóchi. Though it must not be imagined that the two are mutually unintelligible, the differences between them are real enough, and a Balóch from the east finds it at first not a little difficult to make himself fully understood by a Balóch from the west. In point of fact the two divisions of the language hardly come into any very real contact. As might perhaps have been expected from its geographical isolation, it is in Western Balóchi, and more especially in that branch of it known as Makráni, that the purer form of the language has been preserved. Not only is its phonetic system older its vocabulary is less overloaded with loan-words its verbal and other terminations are on the whole less subject to curtailment. But within each of the two main divisions there are several dialects, clearly distinguishable by difference in phonetics alone, to say nothing of the degree in which the terminations are clipped and modified, and other characteristics of the kind. Certain of the Eastern Balóchi dialects are fairly generally if somewhat vaguely recognised for each of the main tribes—Marí, Bugtí, Rind, Mángai Dómbkí—is eager to claim its own particular dialect as the standard language. In Western Balóchi, where the boundaries are geographical rather than tribal, there is more diversity still the ramifications strike much deeper than the large and obvious territorial divisions of Makráni Kábrán and Ohágal.

Uneven phonetic development in the dialects.

219. Now when we come to study individual dialects, we find that the case is not quite so simple as Professor Geiger perhaps unconsciously would lead us to imagine. What he says regarding the antiquity of Balóchi phonetics is hardly correct in its entirety of any single dialect taken by itself. For the Balóchi consonantal system has developed itself among the many dialects in a curiously uneven manner. One dialect, for instance, has faithfully maintained the original sounds in one portion of its consonantal system, and has evolved variations of its own in another, in a second dialect we are faced with the exact converse. In other words, there is no one dialect which has preserved the whole consonantal system of the parent stock in its archaic purity and we are left to piece it together by a process of selection. To illustrate my meaning I will turn to Western in preference to Eastern Balóchi, not only because it is more archaic, but also because the existence of the many sharply defined dialects within it has hardly been recognised at all. Take for instance these typical variations in the two Makráni dialects spoken in Kéchi and Panjgúr —

	OLD PERSIAN.	MODERN PERSIAN.	MAKRÁNI	
			KÉCHI.	PANJGÚR.
<i>pidar</i> , father		<i>pidar</i>	<i>pít</i>	<i>pít</i> .
<i>mádar</i> mother		<i>mádar</i>	<i>mát</i>	<i>mát</i> .
<i>bádar</i> brother		<i>bádar</i>	<i>bít</i>	<i>bít</i> .
<i>ámádar</i> son-in-law		<i>ámádar</i>	<i>ámát</i>	<i>ámát</i> .
<i>mák</i> he, death		<i>márg</i>	<i>márg</i>	<i>márit</i>
<i>mákáhi</i> , dy		<i>márgi</i>	<i>márgit</i>	<i>márit</i>

This comparative statement almost tells its own tale. For the preservation of the original consonants *t*, *c*, *k*, we look to Persian in vain, and have to turn to Makráni Balóchi. But even Makráni preserves the archaic sound in both the dialects I have selected in the case of *c* only. And while Kéchi has retained the final *t*, it has, like Persian, forsaken final and medial *k* in favour of *g*. On the other hand Panjgúr has struck out a line of its own in the radical change of final *t* to *s*, yet at the same time has clung conservatively to the ancient hard guttural. How uneven the consonantal development has been in the various dialects, may further be seen in the fact that Kéchi, while preserv-

Mastung with a stock of anecdotes at the expense of their neighbours. If they want to give you an idea of the Pringābād jargon in a nut shell, they will mimic it in the story *say kaba kard gam dāba kard tāle-ue talangde shed pā-tāh rar-ddaklum, tāh-i-kārchā kardum* the dog barked, the bullock shied, my aunt took a tosa, so I hauled up her legs and put them in the saddle-bag the chief point of the jest lying in the use of the weird words *dāba talangde kārchā*. But their favourite jibe is at Pringābād hospitality. The story goes that a Brāhūl once put up in a Dāhwār's house in Pringābād. Get half a dozen *gašr* ready" cried the host, "and let's give him a feast!" Now as *gašr* means a lamb in Brāhūl, the Brāhūl remarked deprecatingly that *one* would be quite enough for him. But *gašr* means something very different in the Pringābād jargon, as he learnt to his disgust when he found that he was expected to make a feast off a single onion. And *Pringābādīnā gašr* has passed into a proverb.

Protest.

223. That Pashtō belongs to the Indo-European family of language, there is of course no possible doubt. But doubt seems to creep in, as soon as the circle is drawn closer. Its Indian affinities are so obvious that it has been classed as Indian its Iranian affinities so obvious that it has been classed—and this is the orthodoxy of to-day—as Iranian. And whereas Trumpp making a manful endeavour to combine both aspects of the language into a higher unity pronounced it an Iranian language transitional into Indian a learned Pathān has given me a suggestive essay to prove that it is an independent offshoot from the great mother stock. I am scared by my very slender knowledge off any attempt to follow the lead of my ingenious friend. Nevertheless I cannot help thinking that we have settled down to the Iranian theory pure and simple a little too complacently and that though Trumpp overstated his case and stated it wrong science would be advanced if some philologist took up Trumpp's position anew and attempted a saner restatement of his case.

224. With rashness born of ignorance I will point out what look to my

untrained eye a few gaps in the harness of the champion of Iranian origin. Is Professor Geiger absolutely unassailable, for instance, in asserting that the cerebrals *f* and *q* exist for Pashtō in Indian loan words only? What of *šapšā* the kite, *šāšā* coward, *šāš* stout, *šā'* the nape of the neck, *šā'* hidden? What of *šak* full, *šāqā*, side *šāqā*, edge, *šāqā*, belly? Are all these and many others which to a Pathān's ears ring as pure and as ancient and as racy as any word in his language—are they all loan words? If they are loan words indeed, some at any rate are loan words of such hoary antiquity as to make one wonder where on earth loan words end and Pashtō undefiled can be said to begin. And again, is Geiger absolutely unassailable in asserting that *r* and *š* and *šā* (and also presumably *šā* though he does not say so) are later developments sprung from sound-groups which originally had nothing cerebral about them? What remote period, one may ask, first witnessed the development of the *r* in *rāw*, blind, in *rāš* rased, in *šāš* sated, in *šāšā* snot, in *šāšā*, scorpion? of the *š* in *rāw* radiant in *kāš*, left, in *šāšā*, thread, in *kāšā*, stone, in *šāšā* apple, in *šāšā*, a kind of spider in *šāšā* the demouelle crane, and in *šāšā* lad? of the highly characteristic *šā* in *šā* *š* good, in *šā* *šā*, woman, in *šāšā* to bestow and in *kāšā* to *š*, to kiss? That his explanation of *š* as the coalescence of *r* + *š* and of *r* as the coalescence of *r* + a dental may possibly hold good in isolated words like *pāšā* Avasta *parvas* and *šāš* dead, Avasta *marēta* or even in groups of words of like formation, is surely not enough. Every language has its peculiar sounds which in season or out of season, it is always lugging in. And nothing would be more natural for such to be the common fate of the cerebrals *f* and *q* and *r* and *š* and the semi-cerebrals *šā* and *šā* (I hardly know what else to call them) for to a Pathān they seem as much at home as any other sounds in his armoury—to ordinary strangers they seem his very sword and buckler. And if Pashtō is really so unmistakably and so undilutedly

This essay by M. S. Mirza Muhammad Gul Khan, Gandapur, who has a pretty knowledge of his mother-tongue as my Pathān I have ever met, has furnished me in one form or another with most of the material used in my notes.

Though the distinction between these-sound and the -sound has become commonplace in Pashtō transcriptions, the analysis and equally varied though not equally common distinction between the -sound and the -sound has never I fancy been noticed before.

Iranian in its phonetics, where has the *f*-sound gone, and how is it that, like ancient Indian, it can get no nearer to *f* than *p*, so that even common loan-words like *faqīr*, beggar, and *fāda*, profit, have to become *paīr* and *pāda* before they can issue from the lips of a Pathān¹?

225 When we pass from the region of sounds and words to grammatical structure, almost all traces of Iranian character seem to vanish into thin air. Where is the sweet simplicity of Persian and other modern Iranian languages—that delightful absence of inflection in noun and pronoun and adjective, that harmonious conjugation of the verb, that easy and natural flow of the sentence? In Pashtō we look for them in vain. Here we are treading on very un-Iranian soil. In the past and throughout that maze of tenses allied to the past—the imperfect, the perfect, the pluperfect, the dubious past, the past conditional, the correlative conditional, and the past optative—a transitive verb agrees not only in number but in gender with its logical object, its logical subject is in the inflected instrumental. And piled on the complexity in the verb is the complexity in the pronoun. *z'h dē waham* or *tā z'h waham*, I beat you, *mā t'h wahalē* or *t'h mā wahalē*, I was beating you, *tā z'h wahal'm* or *z'h dē wahal'm*, you were beating me. And when, on top of all, we find similar bewildering constructions applied to nouns like *s'rar*, man, and adjectives like *st'rar*, tired, and interrogatives like *tsōk*, who? and relatives like *tsōk chi*, whoever, we feel that if Pashtō is really an Iranian language transitional into Indian, as Trumpp would have us believe, it has overleapt its goal with a vengeance: it has out-Heroded Herod. And Pashtō has several pretty little idioms all to itself. The infinitive noun, for instance, is plural *halta t'l grān dī* (not *dai*), going there is a difficult matter. And plural again are certain words like *sh'h*, good, *bad*, ill, *ts'h*, what? *h'is na*, nothing. *tā ts'h k'rī dī* (not *k'rar dai*) what have you done? I will notice one more idiom only, and then pass on. Certain verbs like *kl'nd'l*, to laugh, *z'kr'l*, to weep, *l'mb'l*, to bathe, *d'ng'l*, to jump, which one would naturally look upon as intransitive, are in the past used in the third person masculine plural only, regardless of the number or gender of the logical subject, which is of course in the instrumental. *mā ukl'nd'l*, I laughed, *sh'dzē ukl'nd'l*, the woman laughed.

Grammatical structure.

226 Whenever I try to conjure up the influences of race and environment on language, Pashtō at once springs to my mind. The overbearing virility of the turbulent Pathān and the austerity of his rocky, rugged mountains seem to have entered into the very soul of his language, with its ruthless docking of syllables (as in *vrōn* and *lūn*, the Persian *bu ādar* and *dukhtar*, and the English brother and daughter), with its crabbed concatenation of consonants (as in *skhw'ndar*, a steer, *ngw'shēd'l*, to limp, *ngl'r'd'l*, to swallow, *ngl'wat'l*, to hear), with its resolute raucous gutturals, and—I add it with an apology to Professor Geiger—with its stubborn stubby cerebrals. And yet, for all its harshness, it is a language of much rude grandeur, capable of expressing every shade of thought with wit and point and force—a worthy organ of speech for a shrewd and masterful race. I have often wondered whether the solution to the curious problem connected with its bifurcation into two great divisions does not perhaps lie as much in the different physical surroundings of the northern and eastern Pathāns as in their different social surroundings. The dialect spoken north and east is called by the Pukhtān^h who speak it Pukhtō², the dialect spoken south and west is called by the P'shtān^h who speak it P'shtō. The difference in the included vowel is worth noting, but the difference in the included consonant is more important still. For this is one of the main distinctive features in the two branches. P'shtō possesses four characteristic sounds *ts*, *dz*, *sh* and *zh*, whereas Pukhtō is content to get along with the much more ordinary *s*, *z*, *kh* and *g*, which P'shtō of course also possesses into the bargain. Thus while a P'shtun will say *tsōk*, who? *dzān*, body, *sh'h*, good, *zh'al'i*, hailstone, the Pukhtun will say *sōk*, *zān*, *kh'h*, *gal'i*. There are of course other variations. Pukhtō tends, for instance, to displace *z* or *zh* by *j*, as in *jaba*, P'shtō *z'ba* or *zh'ba*, tongue, *jāma*, P'shtō *zāma*, or *zhāma*, jaw, to displace *s* by *sh*, as in *shta*,

¹ Here we must take care not to judge the spoken sound by the written symbol. A Pathān will often, perhaps usually, write *پاکیر* and *پایدا*, but he will pronounce them *pakīr* and *pāda* none the less. This by the by is also a very common stumbling block in dealing with Balōchi manuscripts.

² Such at any rate is the pronunciation in Peshāwar, the headquarters of Pukhtō, but P'khtō and P'khtān^h are also heard.

two branches occasionally overlap even in the same village, and must often slide insensibly into one-another

229 The consequent chaos is much too great to be satisfactorily reduced to Dialects

Sindhī branch	89,115
Jatki unspecified	38,570
Jatki Sindhī	14,940
Lāsi	40,605
Western Panjābī branch	66,236
Jatki unspecified	18,786
Siraki	31,254
Jatki	1,519
Khetrāni	16,071
Jafarki	606

order, and the division of Jatki I have attempted in the margin is little more than guesswork. It is merely based on the one apparently certain fact that at least two-thirds of those that dub their language Jatki speak that form of the dialect which is closely allied to Sindhī. Regarding the more specific terms that have been recorded, one can generalise with a tolerable degree of confidence. That Lāsi belongs to the Sindhī branch, as the

contact of Las Bēla with Sind would lead one to suppose, there is no question, indeed the Lāsi boasts (I know not with what justice) that his speech is one of the purest forms of Lār Sindhī to be found anywhere. No less unmistakably does Siraki, 'the language of the upper country', range itself on the opposite side, it seems in fact to be not the least important representative of Western Panjābī. And it is on this side that Khetrāni, the language of the Khetrān Balōch (§264), after having been banded to and fro between Sindhī and Balōchi, must finally be allotted a place. But though Western Panjābī is writ large over its grammatical structure, it is impregnated with Sindhī influence even in such intimate parts of it as *ā*, *I*, *chhā*? what? *bā*, two, and Balōchi, if it has done nothing else, has undoubtedly furnished some useful contributions to its vocabulary. I have presumed, and probably correctly, that Hasanki, which has been returned by one or two Silāchi Khetrān living in Talli, is the same dialect under a different name, though the one slight specimen of it that I have seen contains a few peculiarities in the vocabulary. Jafarki, which has been returned by a few Jafar Pathāns, is manifestly near akin to Khetrāni, though fairly marked differences of vocabulary are only to be expected. Whether Jatki, the language of the Jatt (§280) has really any claims to a name of its own is doubtful, to say the least, personally I have never been able to discover in it any characteristic divergences from the Western Panjābī branch of Jatki, at the same time I would not be surprised to meet a Jatt who spoke the Sindhī form of Jatki and yet insisted that his speech was Jatki none the less. But this Indian branch of languages is clearly the most unsatisfying part of our linguistic census, chiefly because my own ignorance of it did not fully forewarn me of the difficulties that lay ahead. So here again is an inviting opening for local research, and at the same time a useful reminder that care will be needed at the next census to ensure that the various local terms are scrupulously recorded, and, in all cases of ambiguity, eked out with distinguishing symbols.

230 And surrounded on all sides by the Indian and Iranian languages Dravidian Family
Brāhūi. there is one language that bears no affinity to either. The time has now come for Brāhūi to take its place unchallenged as a member of the Dravidian language-group. Not without a struggle has its birthright been won. In the early days it was claimed on evidence so meagre and frail, that the claim inevitably aroused a healthy scepticism, which gathered strength—a very counterfeited strength after all—from the awkwardness of the ethnological conundrum which a recognition of the linguistic kinship seemed to involve. The evidence now available is clear, ample, decisive, and Brāhūi can be debarred from entering into its birthright no longer: its Dravidian descent has become a mere commonplace of philology. But here philology stops short. Who the Brāhūis themselves are, and how it has come about that a people living in the wilds of Balūchistān speaks a language akin to the languages of Southern India, are questions that must be left to ethnology. Though philology has presented ethnology with a very pretty riddle, it is not bound to present it with the answer. Yet I for one would not be surprised if a hint were gathered in the course of time from deeper researches into comparative phonology, grammar and vocabulary.

231 It is of course in its grammatical system that Brāhūi blabs out the secret of its parentage. There is no need to bother ourselves here with the dry Dravidian affinities
in grammatical
structure. details of the evidence, it has been my lot to deal with them elsewhere.¹ The

¹ The Brahui Language, Part I, Introduction and Grammar, by Denys Bray, Calcutta, 1909

main heads of the argument are all we want, and I have no scruples in plagiarising the following summary of them from my own writings. The language is agglutinative, and in this aspect it belongs, speaking in the broadest sense, to the same stage of development as the Dravidian language-group. This, in deed proves little or nothing but the argument of kinship rests on a surer foundation than a casual analogy of structure. The grammatical relations of the noun in Brāhūi are shown, as in Dravidian, by means of suffixes, and most if not all of the suffixes whether expressive of case-relations or of plural number are traceable to the same source as Dravidian. Even more direct is the evidence of the pronoun, that faithful repository of the secret of a language's origin. Of the personal pronouns, the pronoun of the second person in both numbers is in essentials the same as in Dravidian, and a Dravidian relationship is discernible in the pronoun of the first person, despite the ravages wrought by phonetic decay. The reflexive in Brāhūi and Dravidian has preserved one uniform type with singular consistency. The Brāhūi demonstratives are only explicable in the light of their Dravidian counterparts. The family likeness is but thinly disguised in the interrogatives, and several of the indefinite pronouns are stamped with the same birthmark. The Dravidian relationship of the first three numerals, often, though perhaps erroneously regarded as only less significant witnesses to the origin of a language than the personal pronouns, is hardly open to question, and it is interesting to find that Brāhūi and Dravidian, in the absence of an ordinal proper formed from the first cardinal, employ the same device and even, it would appear the same root to express it. The case of the verb is naturally more complex, but the evidence cannot be gainsaid. The most palpable analogies are to be found in the pronominal terminations of the plural, in the formation of the causal, and above all in the organic negative conjugation. These are, however far from exhausting all the relevant points in the evidence. Indeed, though the Brāhūi verb is not devoid of characteristic peculiarities of its own, it may safely be said—and the remark applies with equal force to the language as a whole—that a full understanding of it would be impossible without the help of the Dravidian languages. There can be but one verdict on this evidence. This verdict is not that of Caldwell, who summed up his final position in the words "The Brāhūi language, considered as a whole, seems to be derived from the same source as the Panjābi and Sindhi, but it evidently contains a Dravidian element," but the converse, first suggested by Lassen in the early days of the study of the language and resorted to by Trumpp more than a quarter of a century ago. The Brāhūi language is sprung from the same source as the Dravidian language-group: it has freely absorbed the alien vocabulary of Persian, Baluchi, Sindhi and other neighbouring languages but in spite of their inroads its grammatical system has preserved a sturdy existence.

Dravidian affinities
in vocabulary

232. So much for the outline of the argument from Dravidian affinities in grammatical structure, a somewhat sketchy development of which takes up the greater part of the Introduction to my work on the Brāhūi language. There seems, however a tendency on the part of some scholars to regard evidence from affinity of vocabulary as of equal if not of greater importance. The line of argument is a little difficult to follow. If by some freak Brāhūi diverted itself of those suffixes which it has inherited from the Dravidian mother-stock and adopted Iranian or Aryan devices for the declension of its nouns and pronouns and for the conjugation of its verbs, if it substituted for its organic negative conjugation, so characteristically Dravidian, the ordinary mechanical device of adding a negative adverb to the affirmative conjugation, and finally purged its grammatical structure of such last remnants of its Dravidian origin as its personal, reflexive, interrogative and demonstrative pronouns, it is hard to see how it could be said to remain a member of the Dravidian language-group any longer even though its vocabulary were as heavily interlarded with Dravidian words as it now is with words borrowed from Indian and Iranian languages. That it once belonged to the Dravidian language-group might possibly be demonstrated. To attempt to prove that it still belonged to it, would be like attempting to prove that the late President of the United States was a subject of the Queen of Holland. But once affinities in structure have been proved, we may confidently turn for corroboration and enlightenment to the secondary evidence afforded by affinities in the vocabulary

What proportion of the Brāhūi vocabulary is taken up by words inherited from the original Dravidian stock, it is, of course, very difficult to estimate. They are clearly in a great minority. But it is a minority of stalwarts. It is composed almost entirely of words to express the most fundamental and elementary concepts of life¹—substantives like mouth, ear, eye, brain, sleep, adjectives like big, small, new, old, sweet, bitter, the numerals one, two, three, pronouns like I, thou, he, we, you, they, self, who? what? how many? other, verbs like to be, become, do, stand, come, give, eat, speak, hear, see, understand, take, strike, fear, and adverbs like formerly, yet, to-day.

233. The positive evidence that can be gleaned from a comparative vocabulary is, I'm afraid, too flimsy to allow us to draw any very definite conclusions as to the state of society in the days when the Brāhūi language (not necessarily, it should be observed, the Brāhūi people) was still in contact with other Dravidian languages. But everything seems to point to the conclusion that the Brāhūi-speakers of those days were pastoralists, breeding (*hīn-*, to kid, to lamb, Tamil, Malayalam, Kanarese, Telugu *in-*) sheep and goats (*hēt*, she-goat, Tam, Mal, Kan, *ādu*, Tuḷu *ēdu*, Tel *ēta*, he-goat, goat) for the sake of their milk (*pāl*, Tam, Mal *pāl*, Kan, Tel, Kui *pālu*) and other produce. Without attempting to weave pretty theories out of the fact that the Brāhūi word for house (*urā*) is the equivalent of the Dravidian word for village (*ūr*), one may safely assume that like many a Brāhūi of the present day, these pastoralists did not herd together in villages, but moved freely from place to place in search of water (*dār*, Drav. *nīr*) and fresh pastures for their flocks. They were undoubtedly armed with the bow (*bi*, Tam, Mal, Tel *vil*, Kan *bi*, Tul *biu*). They were probably not men of the plains but men of the hills (*mash*, Drav. *mal-*). But further clues as to their locality seem to fail us. For though it evidently swarmed with stones (*khal*, Tam, Mal *kal*, Kan, Tul, Tel *kallu*) and worms (*pū*, Tam, Mal, Kan *pulu*, Tel *puruvu*, Tuḷ. *puru*, Kurukh *pu'ū*) and scorpions (*tēh*, Tam, Mal *tēl*, Kan, Tul *čēl*, Tel *tēlu*) and hares (*murā*, Tam, Mal *muyal*, Kan *mola*, Tuḷ *muyera*, Tel *nosalu*, Kui *mādu*) and rats or mice (*hal*, Tam, Mal Tul *eli*, Tel *eluka*, Kan. *ih*, Gōndi *allu*)—these are unfortunately incident to most, if not all, parts of India and many other countries into the bargain.

234. Much further than this we can hardly rely on a comparative vocabulary to guide us. It would even be rash to conclude that they were unable to count beyond three or were ignorant of the use of metals, simply because the Brāhūi language now draws on foreign languages for names for metals and numerals from four upwards. One might as well argue that they could not tell man from woman, because they now express the idea woman by *annat*, the Persian *aurat*, or by *zāifa*, a corruption of the Arabic word for 'weak'. Negative evidence of this description has the awkward habit of stultifying itself by proving too much. It is always dangerous, and never more so than in a case like this, where it seems plausible and attractive, just because positive evidence is tantalizingly defective. From comparative philology we may fairly look to receive more help, though we shall probably have to wait a longish time for it.

235. There is a certain appropriateness in winding up a survey of the languages of this province with Lōri-chini or Mōkkī, the cant of the Lōris, for it's a hotchpotch of the lot. A language in the ordinary sense of the word it is not. It is an artificial jargon, which the Lōris have mechanically invented on the basis of the language of the people among whom they live, and which they more especially employ when they want to keep their meaning to themselves. Thus if they go to officiate at a wedding, and only come in for unappetising scraps of food after the tribesmen have feasted on the dainties, they will vent their spleen to their heart's content in then Mōkkī gibberish. And yet so successfully and universally is the jargon used, that it seems doubtful whether its artificiality suffices to debar it from being classed as a language. However artificial its origin and character, it is at any rate acquired naturally and as a matter

¹ My selection is confined to words whose Dravidian cousins can hardly fail to be readily recognised: *ḍā*, *khaḥ*, *khan* *mīṣ*, *tuḡh* (cf. also *tuṅgān*, asleep); *ḍal*, *chun*, *pūr*, *mut*, *lan*, *khar*, *as*, *ir*, *mus*; *i*, *nī*, *ō* *nan*, *num*, *ōk*, *tēn*, *dō(r)*? *ant*? *aḥ*? *pēn*; *ar*, *ma(r)*, *la(r)*, *sal*, *ba(r)*, *ēt* and *tī(r)*, *kun*, *pā(r)*, *bin* *kha-* *chā*-(*ta*—, *tīā*) and *tīr*—, *hal*, *khal*, *khal*; *must*, *annā*, *ainō*.

of course by Lōpi children it is no longer it would seem, simply a secret patter it is becoming a language for the home-circle. Not that the Lōpis admit that its origin is artificial at all. On the contrary they plume themselves on the fact that it is one of Nature's secrets that has been vouchsafed to them and to them alone. The story goes that Mōkō as the Brāhūis call the spider revealed the spider-language to All, the Prophet's cousin, on the occasion when he took refuge in a cave. And All passed on the secret of the spider-language to Sarmaṣt the father of all Lōpis (§284)

Main characteristics.

§30. As one might expect, there are several varieties of the patter though a strong family resemblance runs through them all. I will confine myself to three, the Mōkki spoken by the Lōpis of Sarāwān Jhalawān and Makrān. The same key opens the main secret of all three. It is all very simple. Take any word from any language, and turn it inside out : /əp, belly Jaŋki pəŋ dokā, God, Bakčēt kədd čəkək dog Brāhūl kəkək random man, Persian mardam. But though this is their chief device for obscuring the meaning of everyday words, there are several others. Sometimes they add a suffix —ək, for instance, which is particularly common in Sarāwān Mōkki, e.g., kək-ək, hand —kəŋ is no less commonly used by the Lōpis of Jhalawān lək kəŋ for mək kəŋ land. Prefixes are affected still more, notably by the Lōpis of Sarāwān, who have a large stock to choose from e.g., nī-lab bride-price Brāhūl lab mātək, necklace, Persian ŋawq la pəŋ now-ring Brāhūl pəŋ. Sometimes they go to the other extreme and alip the word short and silver for čəkəndi ədə, now apparently for əməb Brāhūl bəməs Or they resort to sound-alonges, and this is the chief characteristic of the Mōkki of Makrān. Some of these seem natural, like wəpt soren, for kəpt wəski oight, for kəski wəsk six, for škəšk wəd hundred, for ənd. Others like kəkək army ləkək are clearly arbitrary. A few words, like mək, man, wəd woman, wife, pəm rupee, rəwəg, to bent, seem peculiar to Mōkki, but even these may be changelings, stolen from some language or other

Illustrations.

§37 So simple are the general rules for the making of this artificial language that it might seem lamentably deficient as a secret vehicle of communication. But the thin disguise of isolated words and the obscurity of connected sentences, blurred in the rapidity of speech, are two very different things, and both Brāhūl and Balōch admit freely that Mōkki is beyond them. As Mōkki has not before, I fancy attained to the dignity of print, it seems worth while to reproduce a sentence or two taken down from the mouth of a Lōpi of Jhalawān kək məkək kəd čəkək atənt rəkəndə čəkək wək lībər kəmərit : tōar məkək bōar rəkəkək rəkək kəməri kī məkək rəkək kəkək kəreki tōarə ləm kəkək kəməri rəkək jəkəkək bəŋtə əb rəkək nə gəwəŋ kī rəkəkək čəkək wək ləm čəm jəkəkək rəkək ləkək ləkək ə pək čəkək ləkək wək ləkək rəkək jəkəkək ; kək rəkəkək wək rəkək ləm rəkək jəkəkək, kək ləkək bīr rəkəkək rəkəkək pəwəkək ə kək random kəkək kək kək kəkək pəkək ləkək ə pək kək ləkək rəkək random rəkək rəkək. Even to a man initiated into some of the mysteries of the patter this is a little baffling unless he has happened to take an interest in the Linguistic Survey of India, and to have waded through multitudinous versions of the parable of the Prodigal Son.

General survey

§38 Here ends our review of the languages of Balūchistān. But the list is certainly not complete. If none of the more important languages of the country have been left out, there are dialects of which we are but awkwardly conscious, and without doubt others of whose very existence we are complacently ignorant. The country is a veritable Babel, an ideal hunting-ground for the philologist. Unfortunately philology is not likely to flourish very happily among officers whose work and anxieties leave scant time and less appetite for scientific research. Nor—from a narrowly official point of view—is it perhaps to be encouraged. On the frontier at any rate it is better with Sandeman to be able to speak one language and that to the point, though the language, like his, be of one's own devising than with Bekker to be silent in seven, though the silence cover a knowledge of their every phonetic and linguistic law

A word to the linguist.

§39 But a practical knowledge of at least one of the frontier languages is a very different matter. None but a Sandeman or a Nicholson can win success

without it. And with so many officers now on the frontier with an admirable grip of this dialect of Pashtō or that dialect of Balōchī, it seems a pity that it has gone out of fashion to impart such knowledge to the world. It is, I fancy, a feeling of diffidence that is largely to blame. Men are shy of putting their knowledge on paper for fear of placing on record at the same time their palpable lack of trained scholarship. Such diffidence is intelligible enough, but it is none the less mischievous. For as things now are on most parts of the frontier, it is impossible for the professional philologist to be abroad in the land, and advance in the scientific knowledge of the frontier vernaculars can only be won, first by the spade-work of the man on the spot, and then by the microscopic analysis of the scholar in the study. The material after all lies everywhere to hand, the ground is vast, it has only been scratched here and there, it hardly matters where the claim is pegged out. Hear accurately, describe what you hear accurately, and it is of comparatively little account if the results—grammar, vocabulary, folk-lore or the like—are strung together in a hopelessly unscholarly form. You will have given some scholar the food he has been craving for, and it will not be your fault if you fail to add a humble contribution to the advancement of knowledge between the two of you.

210 I have been lured into this digression by reading some pathetic appeals, written in Germany more than a quarter of a century back and reiterated with plaintive persistency at various intervals, for fresh material on Balōchī from Balūchistān. The pathos lies in the sad fact that the appeals never reached the ears to which they were addressed. If instead of being buried in the obscurity of a German philological Journal, they had been directed in a letter to the Local Government or the Government of India, they would long ago have been answered by a goodly sheaf of material. Strange though it may possibly seem, officers on the frontier, stationed maybe a hundred miles and more from nowhere and a thousand miles from a reference library of any pretensions, have rarely an opportunity and rarely, it must be confessed, a desire to turn over the pages of philological Journals. A word to the philologist

211 And having drifted into this digression, I may as well go one step further before this chapter on language is brought to a close. Though the Balōchī handbooks of Hitū Rām, Dames and Mockler, have done yeoman service in giving past generations something of a grip of Balōchī, they have outlived their day, and the time has come for a fuller and more accurate treatment of the language. The work on the Pashtō spoken in this province has still to be written. What is now wanted, over and above an analysis of our many subsidiary dialects, are practical handbooks and vocabularies of the two main languages. To overlay them with philology would be seriously to impair their practical utility. But even from a severely practical point of view their utility would be enhanced, not impaired, by a short preface giving a few sidelights on the scientific interest of the subject. One need not be a budding Bopp to derive stimulus from broad philological facts. The interest of even the most humdrum student who takes up a language from a material and unimaginative motive will be awakened on finding that the despised Balōchī, for instance, occupies the pride of place as the most archaic of living Iranian languages, or that the relationship of such common but unfamiliar-looking Pashtō words as *las* and *lūr* to *das*, *decem*, *zehn*, ten, and to *dukhtar*, *Tochter*, daughter, is only obscured by the normal change of the dental to *l* in Pashtō, or that the language of the Brāhūis of Balūchistān can claim the languages of the Tamils and others of Southern India as its next-of-kin. A word to the man who is a bit of both.

242 As I glance over this chapter, I am oppressed with the feeling that it is less a record of our knowledge than a confession of the measure of our ignorance. Yet a recognition of ignorance is after all the first step towards knowledge, and it is in the hope that this trite maxim will stand justified at the stock-taking ten years hence, that I have emphasised the gaps in our knowledge of the many languages of Balūchistān. But even this cursory review of our local vernaculars raises thoughts of a wider reach. How little, when all is said and done, do we know of language as a whole and the subtle influence on it of race or environment. For the last half hour I have sat at my open window some twenty yards from a Quetta thoroughfare, listening idly to the voices of the passers-by. Hardly a word, hardly an articulate sound has reached my Conclusion

ears, and yet there has been little doubt as to the identity of the various languages as they floated towards me on the air—Pashto, Brâhûi Balûchi, Jâfii, Persian, Panjabi Urdû, English—each has gone by with its indescribable but tell tale accent or timbre or intonation that living but intangible something which no transliteration can convey in dead print. I cannot but feel that we are standing on the threshold of a far-reaching revolution in our linguistic methods—a belated revolt against the fashionable tendency of philology to degenerate into an arid study of written symbols. And I for one look forward to the day when the second edition of the monumental *Linguistic Survey of India* will include, as a matter of course, not an appendix of comparative lists of written words, but a supplement of phonographic records, which will enable us to compare the living sounds themselves.

XXIII.—Local Distribution of the Four Chief Languages.

(Indigenous Musalmāns only)

JAFKI

Bhānōl

Pashrō

Bālōcnl

DISTRICT OR STATE

DISTRICT OR STATE	Bālōcnl		Pashrō			Bhānōl			JAFKI	
	Total	As principal language	As subsidiary language	Total	As principal language	As subsidiary language	Total	As principal language	As subsidiary language	As subsidiary language
BALUCHISTAN										
Districts										
Quetta Pishin	257,281	229,935	27,346	206,209	201,775	4,434	195,776	115,167	50,149	15,259
Loralai	77,278	69,624	7,654	203,805	100,858	1,007	27,802	21,118	6,771	21,358
Zhob	1,194	1,019	175	77,000	75,040	1,963	12,965	10,571	2,324	1
Bolan	3,203	1,935	1,268	10,894	15,612	1,282	99	97	47	709
Chagai	5	5	41	60,972	60,870	2	97	171	10,871	16,163
Sibi	630	649	2,417	29	23	6	737	5,790	3	1
Administered area	11,277	9,860	3,753	303	262	41	9,263	13,012	468	20,648
Mars Bugti country	60,900	57,156	2,178	18,658	17,945	713	1,830	1,457	419	20,533
States	26,579	24,401	1,575	18,658	17,945	713	1,830	1,457	19	115
Kalat	34,330	32,755	1,575	2,341	1,017	427	167,024	124,040	43,575	23,901
Saravān	180,003	160,311	19,692	2,341	1,017	427	167,024	124,040	43,575	23,901
Jhalawān	165,916	137,705	18,121	2,341	1,017	427	167,024	124,040	43,575	23,901
Kachhi	19,661	13,746	5,915	2,341	1,017	427	167,024	124,040	43,575	23,901
Dombki Kaheri country	17,451	14,615	2,836	75	75	39	15,189	8,663	62	8
Makran	83,687	29,720	3,917	83	44	16	267	205	17	8
Kāwān	5,049	4,460	589	19	12	3	1,906	989	86	8
Las Bela	70,984	69,889	1,095	13	3	3	7,483	7,066	417	3,228
	19,184	15,865	3,769	58	1	64	8,845	5,707	3,078	3,228
	14,087	12,510	1,571	58	1	64	8,845	5,707	3,078	3,228

XXIV.—Bilingual and Race

(Indigenous Musalmans only)

Language and race	Both as principal and subsidiary language	AS PRINCIPAL LANGUAGE								As subsidiary language
		Total	Without subsidiary language	With subsidiary language	PRINCIPAL					
					Dakhli	Pastak	Bishai	Jatki	Others	
Halobahi	257,281	229,938	184,484	75,471		750	32,638	35,861	8,581	27,340
Baluch	140,711	147,181	91,954	55,207		544	14,410	12,864	4,009	8,000
Pashtun	1,431	271	161	110			87	5	18	1,180
Baluchi	10,061	11,108	21,822	13,846		40	11,797	1,817	282	11,603
Others	14,738	47,915	69,807	8,465		120	8,942	1,678	706	7,413
Pashti	204,900	221,775	191,639	7,078	1,218		3,856	2,182	705	4,434
Pashtun	183,728	183,122	178,916	4,216	896		1,076	2,030	843	636
Baluch	1,999	37	68	31	48		3	—	—	1,222
Baluchi	3,101	1,405	33	1,374	570		1,100	5	5	1,094
Others	1,261	14,609	14,644	1,933	123	—	1,312	143	256	882
Bishai	193,519	145,167	110,803	34,364	17,583	2,169		6,760	7,828	50,319
Bishai	143,310	129,608	107,863	23,773	15,368	1,884		5,773	6,790	13,844
Baluch	17,013	2,951	1,872	1,489	804	14		267	110	14,063
Pashtun	1,698	220	302	77	37	33		—	15	1,337
Others	21,897	12,301	8,578	3,28	1,312	466	—	1,120	907	20,396
Jatki	186,723	141,484	120,487	21,037	7,481	1,418	5,951	—	6,189	65,259
Others	121,546	117,933	101,968	18,868	8,240	219	5,148	—	4,067	3,822
Baluch	80,993	18,212	18,391	—,821	1,972	618	226	—	94	21,731
Pashtun	6,025	2,967	1,073	801	378	878	36	—	—	2,068
Baluchi	6,180	1,343	693	680	91	—	800	—	5	6,709
Other Languages.	27,479	16,869	6,218	10,850	1,034	79	6,182	755	—	21,219
Baluch	8,942	229	129	100	43	5	3	50	—	8,713
Pashtun	761	364	150	304	9	13	189	22	—	378
Baluchi	7,229	184	22	172	43	—	127	—	—	7,086
Others	21,466	15,462	5,665	9,874	835	31	7,862	682	—	8,034

XXV.—Race and Bilinguality.

(Indigenous Musalmāns only)

Race and language	PRINCIPAL LANGUAGE			SUBSIDIARY LANGUAGE TO					
	Total	Without subsidiary language	With subsidiary language	All	Balochi	Pashtō	Brāhūi	Jaṭki	Others
Baloch	169,190	111,302	57,828	57,828	53,267	51	1,489	2,921	100
Balochi	147,151	93,891	53,267	3,060		48	998	1,972	42
Pashtō	737	689	51	1,222	594		14	619	5
Brāhūi	2,861	1,372	1,489	15,052	14,810	3		236	3
Jaṭki	18,212	15,291	2,921	32,761	32,364		387		50
Other languages	229	120	100	5,713	5,509		110	94	
Pathāns	188,093	182,494	5,599	5,599	110	4,316	77	892	204
Pashtō	163,132	178,816	4,316	626			35	678	13
Balochi	271	161	110	1,180		866	27	278	9
Brāhūi	339	262	77	1,357	87	1,075		36	159
Jaṭki	3,967	3,075	892	2,058	5	2,030			23
Other languages	384	180	204	378	18	345	15		
Brāhūis	167,787	122,863	44,924	44,924	13,646	1,374	29,073	659	172
Brāhūi	129,666	100,593	29,073	13,644	11,797	1,160		560	127
Balochi	35,168	21,522	13,646	15,693		201	15,356	91	45
Pashtō	1,407	33	1,374	1,604	40		1,654		
Jaṭki	1,352	693	659	6,798	1,517	8	5,273		
Other languages	194	22	172	7,095	292	5	6,790	8	
Other Musalmāns	209,540	169,293	40,247	40,247	8,448	1,935	3,725	16,565	9,574
Jaṭki	117,933	101,368	16,565	3,622	1,675	145	1,120		682
Balochi	47,345	38,897	8,448	7,413		123	1,212	5,140	938
Pashtō	16,499	14,564	1,935	892	126		486	219	61
Brāhūi	12,301	8,576	3,725	20,296	5,942	1,312		5,149	7,693
Other languages	15,462	5,888	9,574	8,024	705	355	907	6,057	

XXVI —Loss of the Racial Language

(Indigenous Musalmans only)

Race and Tribe	NON-RACIAL LANGUAGES			
	Balochi	Parsi	Dravid	Jat
Baloch		737	2,381	18,213
(i) Eastern		673	679	12,061
Daghi		60	4	613
Dumbki		13	43	371
Khetria		438	—	13,667
Masul		1	36	329
Mari		41	43	8
Rind		68	434	1,630
(ii) Western		64	2,323	261
Kapakhel		84	1,943	8
Rind		—	6	—
Rangar	—	—	—	14
Brahui	85,168	1,407	—	1,332
(i) Original western	4,333	36	—	78
Kumbhari	1,300	—	—	86
Mirvahi	2,133	—	—	29
(ii) Sindhi	11,494	1,346	—	308
Bangruhi	2,328	11	—	61
Lahri	33	18	—	30
Lingvi	8,156	84	—	80
Shahwahi	702	—	—	11
(iii) Jhalawadi	18,800	78	—	1,083
Marijor	7,601	—	—	60
Mirwadi	3,898	—	—	140
Masul	612	23	—	376
Sighi	3,982	—	—	—
Sahri	3,211	—	—	445
(iv) Miscellaneous	40	9	—	13
Pathan	371	—	338	2,967
Jafar	—	—	—	1,127
Kilay	—	29	—	79
Dumay	—	—	—	2
Kandukhal	11	—	—	30
Kandis	2	—	—	—
Turghay	—	—	—	1
Pasht	33	—	164	2,402
Musa Ahmad	36	—	364	2,196
Kandukhal	6	—	—	11
Kichad	—	—	6	61
Tark	—	—	34	36
Abdai Kandukhal	—	—	19	6
Sala Tark	—	—	19	1
Tir Tark	—	—	—	41
Lari	1,447	—	338	—
Darra	9	—	—	—
Jand	1,308	—	—	—
Kandukhal	—	—	40	—
Jat	2,785	144	282	—

CHAPTER X

INFIRMITIES.

Statistical data

SUBJECT	Totals	
	General	Sub-totals
Insane	XII (6)	
Deaf-mute from birth	XII (10)	
Blind of both eyes	XII (1)	
Leper		XXVII
Total		XXVIII

213 Until all enumerators are doctors who know every man, woman and child in the locality, it is vain to look for an accurate census of infirmities, though all that be attempted is the apparently simple enumeration of the insane, the deaf-mute from birth, the blind of both eyes, and the leper. Technical knowledge is the only safeguard against errors of diagnosis, local knowledge the only safeguard against wilful concealment. In some degree, no doubt, our local enumerators were able to secure us from the latter. Yet we can hardly hope in all cases to have got behind the decent veil with which folks endeavour to screen the infirmities of their women from curious outsiders, or to have been unaffected by the excusable optimism that leads parents to shut their eyes to the infirmities of their children long after they stare others in the face. And if our statistics suffer from a vein of optimism, they suffer still more from a less admirable but hardly less human vein of pessimism—a pessimism that dubs the village simpleton a lunatic, that glorifies the dim vision of the aged into total blindness, and the tongue-tied or stone-deaf into congenital deaf-mutes, that reads leprosy into any skin-disease if only it is loathly enough.

214 In fact the utmost we can expect to glean from a census of infirmities is a very rough idea of their general prevalence in the country. And the denser the population, the greater the chance of lighting somewhere near the truth, for statistical truth is hardly to be found except in the deep well of large numbers. In a population so scanty as ours the information we can pick up from the statistics is scarcely likely to be worth very much, and my remarks will be correspondingly brief. In Baluchistan as a whole every 10,000 persons have in their midst 38 who are reputedly suffering from one or other of the four infirmities with which we are concerned. If we divide the population almost half and half between the districts and states, the incidence of the infirmities in bulk and of every infirmity taken by itself is much higher in the states than in the districts. In the districts there are 27 afflicted persons in every 10,000, there are 48 in the states. The difference is much too marked and too uniformly distributed throughout the infirmities to be accidental. Nor can it be entirely due to the idiosyncrasies of the enumerators. Some of the difference clearly arises from the very much larger element of aliens in the districts, for the

allens are mostly full-bodied men, who usually take care to leave the lame ducks of their families behind in the home-country. And something at any rate may fairly be put to the credit of the medical department, which so far has had little scope for carrying its ministrations into the states: unfortunately infirmities were recorded in too confined an area at the last census for us to attempt to take stock of the progress towards health during the last ten years.

243 By far the most common of the infirmities is blindness, which easily overtops the rest put together. It works havoc in the Kachhi plain and the connected Dombki Kahari country and is distressingly prevalent in Makran and Chaghal. And this bears out the ordinary idea that blindness flourishes in excessive heat and glare which certainly seem—rightly or wrongly—to be predisposing factors of glaucoma and cataract. Of these two great causes of blindness

cataract is much the more common in Baluchistan though glaucoma is a regular scourge all over the Kachhi. And herein lies a gleam of hope for the gradual diminution of blindness in the country. The numbers who come in for operation are already on the increase and each successful operation may be relied upon to play its part in thinning the ranks of those who would otherwise be content to be couched—very likely into total blindness—by the local quacks. Another very fruitful local source of blindness is smallpox. Others are granular lids, especially in association with ingrowing eye-lashes, and ophthalmia, especially at or shortly after birth. The amount of blindness among young children which might have been avoided by a little antiseptic washing must be appalling. In comparison with blindness the other infirmities seem almost dwarfed into insignificance. Deaf mutism is the commonest yet for every victim it claims, blindness claims three. For some unknown reason it is relatively more prevalent in Las Bela than elsewhere, with Chagai a close second. There are rather more than half as many insane as there are deaf mutes and Las Bela has again the melancholy distinction of heading the list with the largest number in proportion to its population. Leprosy real or imaginary claims 83 victims in all, or 1 in every 10 000. Makran is accredited with a third of the lot, but I cannot pretend to be confident of the accuracy of the diagnosis anywhere. Indeed, medical opinion declines to regard leprosy as a local disease at all, though I am told that several genuine cases have been observed among immigrants from Afghanistan, especially among the Hazara.

240. Turning to race, I am not surprised to find that of all our peoples the Sayyids are the most immune from the four infirmities. It would be pleasant to think that this is but the natural privilege of a sainted race or the natural reward for a holy life. But I fear we must seek a more mundane explanation in the health of the localities where they live and the better surroundings in which their lot is ordinarily cast. And locality and decent surroundings have probably a good deal to say to the comparatively clean

health-bill of the Pathans who are usually next-door neighbours to the Sayyids and very nearly as immune. Among the Brahûis the standard of living is markedly lower and the proportion of infirmities, apparently in consequence, appreciably higher. Why the Balôch should be much less healthy than the Brahûi is a little less obvious but we have only to go down lower to the infirmities among the various tribes to find the explanation lurking in locality once more. That all three, Pathân and Brahûi and Balôch, should escape far more lightly than the Jatt and the Lasi who dwell in the hottest parts of the country is intelligible on the face of it. It is, of course, through blindness that locality is able to exercise a determining influence on the figures throughout: it is blindness, for instance, that makes the Balôch appear much more subject to infirmities than the Brahûi, and gives the Jatt, who live in the burning heat of the Kachhi plain, their unenviable position at the top of the sick list. Deaf mutism and insanity levy their heaviest toll among the Lasi of Las Bela. Leprosy appears to be most active among the miscellaneous peoples—which is only as it should be, for many of them stand low in the social scale: the Sayyids alone are reputed to be altogether free from the scourge.

Relative prevalence of infirmities.

Incidence of infirmities.	
Blindness	64
Deaf-mutism	21
Insanity	12
Leprosy	8
	100

Racial variation.

Infirm per 10,000.	
Jatt	63
Lasi	37
Balôch	47
Miscellaneous	45
Brahûi	31
Pathân	28
Sayyid	20

247 Classed according to the number of their victims among the women, the various infirmities range themselves in the same order as before. Infirmities among the females.

Afflicted females to 100 afflicted males.

All infirmities	66
Blindness	87
Deaf mutism	80
Insanity	38
Leprosy	26

stands unchallenged at the top, leprosy stands unchallenged at the bottom. The Balōch woman heads the list of the insane, the Brāhūi of the lepers, the Sayyid (curiously enough) of the deaf-mute, the women of the miscellaneous peoples head the list not only of the blind but of all the afflicted put together. On paper the women as a whole appear to escape far more lightly than the men, in reality they suffer a good deal more than the crude statistics would imply. The proportion of afflicted among them looks unduly small simply because their total number is much smaller than the total number of males glancing at the statistics we must throughout bear in mind this abnormal scarcity of females in Balūchistān. If we readjust the statistics and compare the proportion of the afflicted among equal numbers of either sex, we find that instead of there being 66 afflicted females to 100 afflicted males, there are as many as 83. As for blindness, it actually affects the females most, in an equal number of either sex there are 110 blind females to 100 blind males. And this of course is the one infirmity where we have come to expect the females to be at least as great sufferers as the males. In the other infirmities the males, here as elsewhere, reassert their unenviable but apparently well-established superiority of variability.

248 But it is hardly worth while to pursue the statistics further, the smallness of our numbers threatens to vitiate any conclusions we might attempt to draw from them. So much do I feel this difficulty that I for one take more interest in the local ideas about the infirmities than in the statistics themselves. The country folk are firmly convinced that smallpox is responsible for most of the blindness among them, but old age comes in of course for a good deal of the blame, and so does fever at all periods of life. Local theories, however, usually vary with local characteristics, and it is only natural that blindness should be attributed along the desolate Nushki trade-route to the whirling dust, on the Makrān coast to powdered shells driven with the sand, and in the Kachhī to the intolerable heat and glare of the summer months. Not only are the heat and the glare believed to be directly injurious to the sight, they make the salt perspiration drip into the eyes, or else set up a peculiar kind of headache known as *lōtī*, the natural issue of which is blindness or insanity or both. The unfortunate inhabitants of the Kachhī, perhaps the most scorching tract in all India, are very subject to *shab-lōtī* or night-blindness during the months of June, July and August, all treatment appears to be vain. There is nothing for it but to wait patiently for the break in the heat, when the nuisance passes off of itself. Insanity is variously regarded as the outcome of an excessive and heating diet, the result of a sudden shock, the punishment for perjury, or the malicious contrivance of the Jinns. But Kachhī folk put it down to the burning heat like most of their ills, and regard it as one of the ordinary endings of that racking headache they call *lōtī*. Deaf-mutism is ordinarily looked upon as an infliction sent by the Almighty over which man has no control. But the Brāhūis are convinced that it is the inevitable result of loquacity on the part of the parents at the very first beginning of things, in fact such strong believers are they in pre-natal or rather pre-conceptional influences that it is one of their first principles to turn out all animals from the vicinity of the conjugal chamber, lest the child of the union be born marred with the characteristic of some brute beast. Though I believe the country to be almost free from leprosy, there is a vague wide-spread dread of it. Most people attribute the scourge to the eating of fish, which may account for the reason why fish is regularly tabooed in several parts of the country. But the more learned in such matters tell me that there is scant danger in fish if you adopt the simple precaution of not taking milk or mutton or fowls or onions along with it. Then there are hundreds who think that leprosy comes from union with a woman in her impurity. More curious is the notion that it arises from ablutions with water that has been left standing in the sun in a copper vessel. But none of these theories appeal to the wise men among the Brāhūis, who tell me that it simply comes from eating the flesh of a peacock which has just devoured a snake. Local cures are interesting enough. But the subject would lead too far afield even for a report as rambling as this. And in any case I could hardly hope to

provide such entertaining reading as the following paragraph, which I first came across in the *Pakistan Observer* and which appears to be going the round of the provincial press, as I came across it a month later in the *Herts and Essex Observer*: In Baluchistan when a physician gives a dose, he is expected to partake of a similar one himself as a guarantee of his good faith. Should the patient die under his hands, the relatives, though they rarely exercise it have the right of putting him to death unless a special agreement has been made for freeing him from all responsibility as to consequences; while, if they should decide upon immolating him he is fully expected to yield to his fate like a man. One almost wishes—for the sake of local colour—that there were a grain of truth in it.

SUBSIDIARY TABLES

XXVII.—Incidence of Infirmitities.

NOTE.—The fact that one deaf mute male in Chāgai and one blind male in Sibi were also returned as insane accounts for the discrepancy in the total.

PARTICULARS	NUMBER AFFLICTED PER 100,000										
	ALL INFIRMITIES			INSANE.		DEAF MUTE		BLIND		LEPER.	
	Persons	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males.	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females.
	(i) By locality										
BALUCHISTĀN	380	409	343	57	28	103	50	235	260	14	5
Districts	274	309	227	44	14	93	43	165	167	7	3
Quetta Pishin	139	172	90	33	2	52	23	86	63	1	2
Lōpālāi	297	342	249	51	19	80	31	191	184	20	6
Zhōb	293	322	253	64	23	92	57	161	170	5	8
Bōlān	477	201	1,159	67		67		67	1,159		
Chāgai	503	571	553	88	55	220	83	274	401		14
Sibi	350	399	284	34	9	133	60	226	213	7	2
Administered area	404	431	367	89	9	141	54	248	301	6	8
Mārī Bugṡī country	221	321	97	26	18	114	71	171	18	10	
States	484	515	447	71	40	114	57	308	344	22	6
Kalāt	471	501	437	66	32	95	49	318	349	22	7
Sarāwān	450	544	384	117	31	114	52	296	247	17	4
Jhalawān	207	222	189	30	14	66	29	107	125	19	21
Kachhī	612	650	568	62	21	118	66	466	479	4	2
Dōmbkī Kahēri	748	768	724	79	28	87	9	602	687		
Makrān	556	554	557	55	61	98	58	337	435	69	3
Khārān	379	383	370	91	47	74	48	223	275		
Las Bēla	560	603	511	104	91	227	105	254	315	18	
	(ii) By race										
Indigenous Musalmāns	399	445	344	60	29	117	53	253	257	15	5
Balōch	468	519	497	55	35	126	60	322	308	16	4
Brabūi	322	341	297	62	35	85	64	174	189	20	9
Paṭhān	280	339	209	57	16	108	34	166	157	8	2
Lāsī	572	707	418	148	77	310	70	236	271	13	
Jaṭṭ	625	653	590	37	22	150	81	464	487	2	
Sayyid	258	345	165	54	10	73	48	218	107		
Miscellaneous	450	490	406	71	30	97	33	287	333	35	10

XXVIII—Incidence of Infirmitics among Females.

PARTICULARS	FEMALES PLACED PER 1,000 AFFLICTED MALES				
	All Infirmitics	Insane	Draughts	Blind	Lepor
(i) By locality					
BALUCHISTAN	661	381	350	674	255
Districts	539	329	311	741	353
Quetta-Pishin	618	40	870	481	1,000
Layari	659	874	306	787	223
Elak	581	300	430	781	800
Killa	1,331	—	—	7,000	—
Chagai	700	810	800	1,180	—
SW	830	717	337	708	800
Administrated area	631	197	361	680	333
Mari Raji country	313	470	800	61	—
States	733	481	425	819	231
Kabul	717	406	433	830	314
Kandahar	608	330	378	803	197
Jalalpur	673	317	313	840	899
Kabul	713	350	475	878	800
District-Kabul	816	800	31	897	—
M. P. S.	816	1,000	871	1,178	33
Kabul	630	473	838	1,074	—
Law Killa	741	783	673	1,084	—
(ii) By race					
Indigenous Mussulmans	654	407	386	880	307
Baluch	637	329	387	804	300
Balti	686	418	608	879	308
Pashtun	830	341	364	784	880
Lid	616	416	193	1,000	—
Jat	716	800	433	879	—
Soyyid	467	187	613	476	—
Khoshnawaz	774	400	317	1,063	397

CHAPTER XI

CASTE, TRIBE AND RACE.

STATISTICAL DATA —TABLE VIII

219 The heading of this chapter is none of our devising. Appropriate enough for India as a whole, it is curiously inappropriate for Balūchistān. Caste so absorbingly interesting elsewhere, is almost unknown, and though I shall have a little to say on the subject later, that little will be of a purely negative character. In Balūchistān the interest centres round our multitudinous tribal divisions and the parasitical elements grafted on them. We are chiefly concerned with three races: Balōch, Brāhūi and Pathān. In using the word race, I am unfortunately living myself open to the charge of begging a highly debatable question. In justification I can only plead the lack of a better workaday term. It is of course well-established that not one of the groups now designated as Balōch, Brāhūi and Pathān is entirely homogeneous in its composition. There is, for instance, no doubt of the presence of Jatt elements in all three, or of the Pathan origin of several of the Brāhūi tribes. But even if the Balōch and the Brāhūi and the Pathān are originally offshoots from one and the same stock, they have certainly differentiated with such persistence that they may well be treated nowadays as different species. In describing them as three distinct races, I am at any rate describing things as they now are or at least as they appear to be to the peoples concerned, who are content to accept the broad dividing-lines of looks, dress, language, manners, customs, without probing too deeply into questions of origin. And after all is said and done, is it so very certain that the nucleus of all three is derived from the same stock? Far from regarding a common origin as certain,—except of course a primeval all-embracing origin of the chief branches of mankind—I regard it, I confess, as altogether unproved and not a little improbable. But here again I have set foot on dangerous ground and am running in the teeth of the latest conclusions of anthropometry, which lump all three together, in company with the Jatt and the Dēhwār and the Lōri and the Mād and the Ghulām—strange bed-fellows with a vengeance—as constituents of the one Turko-Iranian race.

The chief races
of Balūchistān.

250 But though I incline to back unscientific but first-hand experience of the peoples themselves against this amazing result of scientific methods, I have no theories to offer regarding the origins of the races. It almost seems as if the whole question were insoluble at the present stage of ethnology. Whether we look upon the races as mere variations from one and the same stock or whether we look upon them as distinct species, we are equally groping in the dark, in either case the opinion we affect is little more than an opinion after all. Philology, anthropometry and the other keys that were to unlock the door and reveal the secrets of race—they all seem to have failed us dismally. But if the time has apparently come for a serious reconsideration of ethnological methods, the time is certainly not past for a careful description of the races as we find them. And this we may look to the Ethnographical Survey of Balūchistān to give us in due course. Here I can hope to do little more than pass the chief peoples of the country in review.

No theory as
to origins

The Pathāns.


251 And I will begin with the Pathān not merely because his is the most numerous race in Balūchistān but because he is so conveniently positive about his origin and his genealogies, and therefore comparatively easy to deal with. Of his supposed identity with the *Niderus* of Herodotus or the *Παρθύνοι* of Ptolemy he knows nothing. The lineage he traces is more ancient still, for he claims to be sprung from Malik Talūt, known to us as King Saul, the son of Kish. Seven and thirty generations separate King Saul from his descendant Qals Abdur Rashid. And Abdur Rashid, as befits the ancestor of such sturdy Mavalimans as the Pathāns, was among the earliest of the converts to Islām, though his home

was far away towards the Takht-i-Suleimān. Nay he was even counted among the honoured friends of the Prophet himself and his deeds of valour in the cause of the true faith were rewarded by this glorious prophecy from the Prophet's own lips: God will raise up a mighty seed from this man, and he will be firm in the faith, and the strength of his tribe will be as the strength of the keel of a ship. And in token thereof he hailed him Patan or Batiyan for the interpretation of the name (heaven knows in what language) is keel. And Abdur Rashid married Sarrah the daughter of Khalid the victorious, and by her he had three sons, Saraban, Ghurghushat and Baitan from one or other of whom all true Pathāns are sprung. So, at least, runs the tradition recorded by Niamat Ullah some three hundred years ago; and he has scores of genealogies to back his statements.

Genealogies.

252. It seems high time that these musty genealogies were subjected to the search light of modern criticism. Until this is done, there is nothing for it but to follow them as blindly though hardly with the same implicit faith, as the Pathān himself. Not that I propose to thread my way through their labyrinthine

mazes he who will can find them in any book on the Pathāns. A bare skeleton of the chief ramifications in the pedigree is all that we require—just enough to show the groupings of the representatives of the race still to be found in



Balūchistān. Now Saraban had two sons, Sharkhbūn and Gharahbūn. The descendants of the former are of much greater importance for us than the descendants of the latter whose only local representatives worthy the name of tribe are the Kāl. For from Sharkhbūn are sprung the Tarin, the Shirānī and the Bartch together with the Malam offshoots—the Lūpl, the Jafar and the Zamard, to say nothing of the Khetran now ranked as Baloch (§ 204) and the Gharahbūn, now ranked as Sayyid (§ 259). But important as is this Saraban branch of the Pathān race, it is overshadowed in Balūchistān by the Ghurghushat. Of the three sons of Ghurghushat, two, Bābi and Mandō, concern us little, though there are a few scattered Bābi in Quetta Pishin and Kalāt, and it is just possible that the Mandōkhal may be the descendants of Mandō (§ 258). But from Dān are descended not only the Kakhar the largest of all the Pathān tribes in the country but also the Papī with its numerous offshoots. With the third great branch of the Pathān race we need hardly bother ourselves at all for though in the Ghilzai we have enumerated a goodly number of the descendants of Baitan the Ghilzai are not truly indigenous to Balūchistān (§ 74).

Tarin.

253. With this skeleton pedigree as a guide, we may now follow up the main Pathān tribes in the country. Tarin, the son of Sharkhbūn, the son of Saraban, had three sons, Spin, Tōr and Bōr—White, Black and Brown according to somewhat apocryphal accounts, there was a fourth son Zhar Yellow descendants from whom are supposed to be traceable among the Zharikhel Dehwār and the Ransani Brahūl. The Spin Tarin, who are chiefly located in Shāhrig and Sanjawi, are the least numerous of the three their strongest clan the Vapēchī—indeed they set up as a tribe with a *sardār*

Spin	87,411
Tōr	6,19
Bōr	11,580
Abdulkhal	20,573
Others	115

of its own—are a quiet, peaceful community, whose unmixed Pathān origin (partly perhaps for that very reason) is not altogether above suspicion. The Tōr Tarīn, who are scattered over Sibi, Quetta-Pishin and Lōralai, are more than twice as numerous, and here again there seem to be many alien elements in the largest clan, the Makhiānī. But much the most important both in numbers and everything else are the Bōr Tarīn, better known as the Abdāl. Not only is this the stock from which the present ruling family of Afghānistān is sprung, it includes the Achakzai, one of the most prominent Pathān tribes in the province. The Achakzai have had a pretty bad reputation from time immemorial, which probably explains why Ahmad Shāh, Durrānī, himself a Sadōzai Abdāl and therefore a kinsman of theirs, took the precaution of removing them to a convenient distance from the parent-stock. They nowadays occupy the whole of the Khwāja Amrān range on the Chaman border, and swarm over southern Afghānistān as far as Herāt.

254 The precise classification of the Shīrānī, however obvious on paper, Shīrānī is in reality a very pretty little problem, which ultimately resolves itself, as may be gathered from Niamat Ullah, into a struggle of father-kin *versus* mother-kin. For Sharkhbūn, the son of Saraban, first married a Kākar wife and by her had one son, Shīrānī. Marrying again, he begat several other sons, and in course of time made up his mind to single out Tarīn, the eldest of them, to be *malik*

Shīrānī

8,552

or leader after him, an act of injustice which so incensed Shīrānī that he threw in his lot with his maternal grandfather Kākar, swearing that he had done with the Sarabanī, and that he and his sons' sons after him would remain Ghurghushtī for ever. But whether a tribe is Sarabanī or Ghurghushtī is in these days of course a purely academic question. The Shīrānī, or Marānī as they like to be called, are settled round the Takht-i-Sulemān. Those on the east of the range (who do not properly belong to this province) are known as Largha, those on the west are known as Bargha, but there is a good deal of chopping and changing between the two. One of the chief clans, the Haripāl, claims Sayyid descent from Harif, a Sayyid who married a Shīrānī wife and took up his quarters with the Shīrānī tribe, but Niamat Ullah knows nothing of this. On the contrary, he specifically states that Haripāl was the son of Chai, the son of Shīrānī. Of all the tribes within our borders the Shīrānī are possibly the most uncivilised, they are certainly the most turbulent at the moment. "A dog that knows you won't bite you," says the proverb, "but the better a Marānī knows you the greater his relish in devouring you."

255 We may pass over Barēch, another son of Sharkhbūn (for the number of his descendants in Balūchistan is too small to give them any special significance), and turn to his brother Miāna. It has been the curious fate of such descendants of Miāna as are left in Balūchistan to have come under Balōch

Lūnī
Jafar
Zmarai2,816
1,286
1,228

influence. Thus among the Lūnī, who reside in Dukī and who prefer to be called Durrānī (on no better grounds, as far as I know, than that their ancestor Miāna was a brother of Tarīn, the ancestor of the Durrānī Abdāl), the chief's title is not *sardār* but *tumandār*. More marked is the Balōch influence on the Jafar, who live in the neighbouring *tahsīl* of Mūsakhēl, and speak a Jatki language called Jafarki among themselves (§ 229) and Pashtō or Balōchī among their neighbours. The general impression that there is a good deal of Balōch blood in the tribe is perhaps confirmed by the practice of the artificial defloration of their brides (§ 177). The same custom exists again among the Gharshīn, who though related to the Miāna stock, have now been classed as Sayyid (§ 259). Curiously enough it does not exist—though female circumcision does (§ 99)—among the Khetrān, who though apparently descended from Miāna can be classed as Pathān no longer, for they have definitely taken on Balōch status (§ 264). In fact the only local descendants of Miāna who have kept clear of Balōch influence seem to be the Zmarai. But the name Zmarai (which by the by means lion) does not figure in the genealogies, and it is possible that this numerically insignificant tribe is not Miāna after all.

256 But while the descendants of Sharkhbūn have flourished, the Kharsh Kharsh būn branch of the Sarabanī is almost extinct in Baluchistan. With the

exception of a few isolated families of the Zamand its sole representatives are the Kāsi (or Kāsi as they are sometimes called) a tribe which has acquired an importance out of all proportion to its numbers owing to the richness of its lands in the neighbourhood of Quetta. But despite their wealth or perhaps on account of it, the tribesmen have a bad name among their neighbours for cowardice, untrustworthiness, and self-righteousness. If there is any mischief a foot, the Kāsi is supposed to be at the bottom of it. "Twas the will of God, but the deed of the Kāsi is a common proverb. A curious physical defect has earned them the nickname of *kar-gādeke* yellow tooth. And thereby hangs a tale that their neighbours love to tell at their expense. A harmless wayfarer once passed through their village with a greyhound on leash. Thinking to get a rise out of him they cried out. "Hallo there! D'you want to sell that mongrel of yours?" And the man replied that he was willing enough if they could give him his price. "All very well" said his baiters, "but let's have a look at its tooth, you can't palm off a toothless old mongrel on the likes of us." "Look at its teeth if you will," said the man, "but you may take my word for it that the hound is no yellow tooth like some I wot of." And with a grin he was quit of his tormentors.

Kākay 257 So much for the Sarbani. Of the sons of Ghurghuast, we may pass over Bābi because his descendants are few and scattered, and Mānda, because he either left no descendants in Baluchistan (and Niamat Ullah seems to imply that he left none at all) or they have forgotten their origin and trace back to the Pani (§ 238). But from Dāni, the son of Ghurghuast, is sprung first and foremost the Kākay which is not only the largest Pathān tribe in the province but accounts for one-eighth of the whole population. But to call the Kākay a tribe would

Kākay	186,872
Sarbani	56,022
Pani	22,848
Targhara	14,090
Sargara	2,515
Lamari	493
Dani	254

perhaps be a misnomer. For the connection between the great clans of which it is composed has become so slight, that each may fairly claim to be treated as a tribe by itself. Indeed the same may be said of some of the sections in the several clans which have increased and multiplied and come into separate political prominence. By far the largest of these clans, or tribes as I prefer to call them is the Sanzarkhel, which is chiefly located in Zhob and Logarai. The most influential group in the tribe is the Jūzai (a subsection of the Jalāzai) who provided the "King of Zhob" in the days of Ahmad Shah, and are still regarded with religious veneration by the tribesmen. One of the largest of the Sanzarkhel groups is the Dumay but there seems to be some doubt whether these are true Kākay at all. According to the Kākay they are descended from a *qissa* or minstrel in Sanzar's service. According to the Dumay themselves, they are descended from one of Sanzar's sons by a Shirani widow—a pedigree which obviously indicates uneasiness as to the purity of the breed. But according to Niamat Ullah's genealogies, Dum was the son of Dawi, the son of Dāni, and on this showing the Dumay and the Kākay and the Pani all belong to different branches of Ghurghuast. The Snaṭia, who are next in strength to the Sanzarkhel among the Kākay are mainly located in Quetta Pishin but there are also a good number in Sibi, and a few in Zhob. The Targhara are less widely dispersed than the Snaṭia, keeping almost entirely to Quetta Pishin. Though a well recognised tribe or clan of the Kākay it is generally believed that they are not true Kākay and it is certain that there is a large alien infusion among them. Of the Sargara, the smallest of the four main Kākay divisions, the majority now live in Quetta-Pishin, but their real home is supposed to be Zhob. How little tribal cohesion there is in this division may be seen from the fact that, when the Māndazai of Quetta Pishin recently endeavoured to renew their ties of kinship with the Sargara of Hindūbagh, their overtures were met with silence. As for the Dawi and the Lamari their numbers are too small for them to be of any political interest, though as remnants of once famous branches of the great Kākay tribe, they are interesting enough.

Pani. 258. Pani, like Kākay was a son of Dāni, the son of Ghurghuast. But the connection between the Kākay and the Pani tribes has long since faded away

indeed so little cohesion is there among the various clans of the Panī themselves that it is only by a stretch of the imagination that we can call some of them Panī any longer. They are a very scattered lot. Not only are they to be found in Sibi, Zhōb and Lōralai, and in lesser numbers in Quetta-Pishin, they are dispersed into Afghānistān, the North-West Frontier Province, and far

Panī	28,675
Sibi Panī	6,714
Mūsakhēl	12,202
Mandōkhēl	4,944
Isōt	2,812
Zarkūn	2,008

into southern India. In Balūchistān the only group that still clings to the actual name of Panī are the Sibi Panī, whose history dates back to Bāra Khān who lived about the middle of the fifteenth century and was the founder of the great Bārōzai section which supplied the rulers of Sibi and the surrounding country under Afghān rule. It is round these Bārōzai that the Sibi Panī range themselves, though the Ismailkhānzai have separated themselves off from the main stock, and have set up in opposition in Sāngān. The Panī of Zhōb and Lōralai have severed their connection altogether. Dropping the very name of Panī, they have taken on separate names, and constituted themselves into separate tribes, though still acknowledging a shadowy Panī lineage. The most powerful of these are the Mūsakhēl, who are chiefly to be found in the *tahsil* of that name in Lōralai, and are divided into two main divisions, the Bēlkhēl, the senior branch, and the Lahīzai, each under a chief of its own. Then there are the Mandōkhēl, who also claim Panī descent but repudiate anything more than a sentimental connection with the Panī of Sibi. As Mandō is the name of one of the three sons of Ghurghusht, it has sometimes been assumed that these Mandōkhēl must be his direct descendants. They themselves lay no pretensions to this pedigree, but trace back to Mandō, the son of Panī, the nephew of Mandō, the son of Ghurghusht. And whatever may be the real worth of these misty genealogies, it seems quite clear that, when a tribe deliberately forgoes a proud but plausible pedigree, the chances are that there is more truth in the more modest ancestry it claims. According to their own account (and Panī accounts back them up) they broke off from the main Panī tribe some twenty generations ago for good and all. They are now a fairly united tribe under one *sardār*, priding themselves on the purity of their many sections. Another offshoot from the Panī stock is the small nomad tribe of the Isōt. Yet another apparently is the Zarkūn, who chiefly live in Dukī and Kōhlū. But the origin of the Zarkūn is a little obscure, and if they are Panī in reality, the probabilities are that they are not a direct offshoot from the main tribe but an offshoot from its offshoot the Mūsakhēl. And finally there is one small Sāfi offshoot which has been classed as semi-indigenous, and another which has affiliated itself to the Sibi Panī.

259 The brief account of the Ghulzai given elsewhere (§74) will suffice Pathān Sayyids. for these sons of Baitan, for the Ghulzai are not true indigenous inhabitants of Balūchistān. There remain three groups, half Pathān, half Sayyid, to which I must refer. Bowing to public feelings of commendable piety, I have classified the Ustrāna and the Ghārshīn and the Mashwānī as Sayyid, and not as Pathān. And on this point it is interesting to note what Niamat Ullah has to say. "Several clans among the Afghān nations are Sayyids, such are the Ishtuwānī among the Shīrānī, the Mashwānī among the Kākhar, the Ghārshīn among the Miāna. Nevertheless they are now numbered among the Pathāns. For they never style themselves Sayyids, saying with one voice 'Ill-seeming were it and against reason, were we to style ourselves Sayyids, seeing that we have left their order, and have joined the nation of the Afghāns to have our kith and our kin and our commerce among them. Our fathers, moreover, have declared that whosoever of their sons shall take upon himself the title of Sayyid, the same is no son of theirs.' This thing was spoken of in the reigns of Sikandar and Shēr Shāh, and the high personages among them did not gainsay this saying." But the tide has turned, for there is plenty of gainsaying in these days, and it seems wisest to withhold the proud title of Sayyid from them no longer (§281).

260 These old genealogies of Niamat Ullah would decidedly repay study Tribal and racial composition Even at the lowest estimate they reflect the general ideas current about the Pathāns some three centuries ago. It is interesting enough to compare his antiquated statements with present facts, and not a little curious to find so

many of the names he mentions still surviving among the tribes as we know them now despite the ease with which new names spring up and old names die out in the mysterious ebb and flow of human generation. Take for instance, the insignificant Jafar tribe, one of our puny remnants of the Miāna stock. Among its tiny sections—and they are all tiny—are the Rawāni, the Sumat and the Surāni. Not only is Jafar himself reckoned by Niamat Ullah among the sons of Miāna, so are Sumat and Rawāni and Sur figures among Miāna's grandsons. Yet the Jafar might seem a singularly unpromising field for comparative research, for not only is it a very small tribe it is a tribe that has departed from pure Pathān standards. It has adopted a Jaṭki language; its customs, apparently have been tinged with Balōch influence. And this reference to Balōch influence suggests another point. It has been assumed time and again that there is no surer indication not merely of Balōch influence but of Balōch infusion than the tribal ending *-dāni* which figures for example in Rawāni Surāni. Yet when we find that the names of these two petty sections were living names among the Miāna three hundred years ago and that one of them bore the damningly tell tale termination even then without raising the slightest suspicion in the not uncritical mind of Niamat Ullah, this sort of argument seems clearly a trifle dangerous. Not that the racial or tribal purity of the Pathāns was perfect in Niamat Ullah's days or even in Niamat Ullah's opinion. He has constantly to cke out his genealogies with "adopted sons, and the concluding words of his treatise are a caveat against the vain pretensions of outsiders to Pathān descent. Still less is the Pathān's theory as to the purity of his tribe—the theory that it consists of a body of kinsmen, all descended on the male side from one common ancestor—borne out in fact to-day. Out of his own mouth can we condemn him. For there is hardly a Pathān tribe which does not make shift to explain the presence of this or that section in its midst as the descendants of some adopted son, or of some fugitive from another tribe, or—most pathetic of all his confessions of ignorance—of some foundling. And the absorption of strangers must have been easy enough in the old days when the land was the common property of the tribe, to be distributed and redistributed among the tribesmen from time to time. But though traces of periodical allottings of land still linger here and there, there is none of that thorough-going tribal commonalty of land such as still exists among the Mārī Balōch (§ 200). The days of wholesale affiliation are apparently over. Even the affiliation of individual refugees from other tribes is fast going out of fashion. Refugees are often a good deal more bother than they are worth. Taken in bulk as a race or individually as tribes, the Pathāns are much less of a medley than either Brāhūi or Balōch. The only real tendency towards fusion is within the tribe itself; clans, I fancy will still break off from the parent tribe to form other tribes of their own, as the Māndakhal and the Mānakhāl have done before them. And though the presence of the Khetran among the ranks of the Balōch (§ 204) and the existence of a clan composed largely of Shīrani elements among the Mārī (§ 208) and the plentiful admixture of Pathāns of various kinds among the Brāhūis generally (§ 272) are living witnesses of a fairly extensive race-change in the past, there is none—at any rate among the Pathāns within the country itself—at the present day.

Tribal constitution.

261. Those who have had dealings with the aggressively democratic Pathān of Triloh are sometimes inclined to imagine that the more aristocratic spirit that animates the Pathāns of Balūchistān must be due to the genius of Sandeman. But here, at any rate, the influence of Sandeman has clearly been overrated. Indeed there is evidence that our Pathāns are somewhat more democratic now than they were before his time. Nor will it suffice to put everything down to contact with the undemocratic Brāhūi and Balōch except in very narrowly confined areas the contact has never been effective enough to have produced such far reaching results. The true explanation, I fancy is that the democratic spirit, which is at once the glory of the Pathāns who live outside their ancient mother country and the despair of those who have to deal with them, is a comparatively modern development after all. To my mind, this is almost suggested in the genealogies themselves, in the tracing back of the tribe to an eponymous hero. In any case, one has no need to peer between the lines of Niamat Ullah's work in order to find evidences of an early subordination of the tribe to a chief

ship Take, for instance, the story that Shīrānī left the tribe of his father because his younger half-brother Tairin was to be made *malik* over his head (§ 254) Or take the lengthy story leading up to the Sayyid origin of the Ustrāna and Mashwānī, which tells how the wife of a certain Shīrānī appealed to "Hamīm, Shīrānī, the chief of that nation," when her husband proposed to set up their son as master of the family to the exclusion of the son she had had by her former Sayyid husband, and which concludes with an agreement made by "the heads of the three tribes, the Kerranians, the Kākar and the Shīrānī" Coming to historical times, we find that nearly all the great Pathān divisions had their chiefs or rulers or even so-called kings there were the chiefs of the Achakzai, the Bārōzai governors of Sibi, the chiefs of the Panī, the Jōgizai "Kings of Zhōb," the chiefs of the Sanzaikhēl. Wherever we know that a tribe has had a serious struggle for existence in historical times, we find a chief figuring prominently in its history And there are plenty of chiefs to-day there are chiefs of the Jōgizai, the Mūsakhēl, the Mandōkhēl, the Isōt, the Lūnī, the Jafar, the Zmarai, the Abdullazai, the Mēhtarzai, the two divisions of the Dumar, the Pānēzai and the Sārangzai of Sibi, and others besides Nevertheless, it would be a bold man who would prophesy that the Pathāns of Balūchistān will always remain true to their older tribal organisation Among Pathāns there is little of that blind faith in heredity, that has been so marked a characteristic of the Balōch and the Brāhūi, and probably there never has been The survival of the "tenth transmitter of a foolish face" at all costs is no part of the Pathān's political creed The present tendency is apparently two-fold on the one hand the power of the older chiefs seems to be decaying and their influence becoming more and more confined to the clansmen living in their immediate neighbourhood, on the other, new men are constantly rising into prominence and, having gathered a following around them, setting themselves up in authority as leaders of smaller sections None the less, these leanings towards democracy are leavened by a strong clannish feeling and a robust racial pride, and the Pathān seems much better fitted in character than either Balōch or Brāhūi to march with the changes in the times

262 A mass of curious legends and a noble cycle of epic ballads have gathered round the early history of the Balōch In one group of legends the scene opens in Arabia, and after an interlude in Aleppo shifts to Persia, where it wavers between Kirmān and Seistān In another group it is in Persia that the scene opens, it does not shift to Arabia till long after, in the days of the Prophet, on his death it shifts to Aleppo, and back again to Persia Yet even this latter group of legends seeks, incongruously enough, to associate the ancestry of the Balōch with the Prophet, by tracing the descent of Jalāl Khān—the father of Rand, Lāshār, Kōiāi, Hōt and their sister Jatō, who are generally accepted as the five progenitors of the race—either to the Prophet's uncle Mīr Hamza and a fairy wife, or else (less directly but still honourably) to a slave of his son-in-law 'Alī And over all hangs the magic of Arabia Much has been done to sift the grains of history from these interesting ballad and legend cycles, and no one has laboured more industriously in the field than Dames, whose enthusiasm alone should fire others to carry on the work, partly by collecting the many ballads that still remain on the lips of men, partly by analysing them in the light of the few scattered references to the race that are to be found in more historical records But at our present stage of knowledge the only facts that seem to emerge clearly from the tangled yarn of tradition are that the nucleus of the Balōch made its way into Balūchistān from Kirmān and Seistān through Makrān, and that internal dissensions soon dissipated large swarms of them further afield One can almost trace the last stages on their journeying to Balūchistān in many of the tribal names Bug, Lāshār, Magas, Dasht, Gashkau, Bulēda, Dōmbak, Kalamat And of their later dispersal eastwards there is eloquent witness in the fact that Balūchistān, notwithstanding its title as "the land of the Balōch," contains to-day but a fraction of the Balōch scattered broadcast over the Panjāb and Sind.

Balūchistan	172,473
Sind	601,008
Panjāb	532,499

263 In the oldest ballads the Balōch are grouped in four and forty *bōlah* or clans, four of which, however, were not true Balōch at all but composed of servile elements Nowhere, unfortunately, is a complete list of these

The Balōch

The Eastern
Balōch tumans

Balak given. Piecing the older references together we get a string of twenty six names, but it is of course hardly likely that all or even the majority of the twenty-six figured among the original forty-four. Many of these twenty-six names still survive, but survive for the most part merely as names of minor sections: the word *Balak* itself survives no longer for the Baloch save in the name of the Qhulām *Balak*, a section of the Rind. It is only a few of the great

Eastern Baloch	111,919
Rind	91,257
Margi	17,777
Mari	22,323
Bugti	19,377
Dumbki	8,113
Kharis	14,183
Others	1,406

tsaman—the characteristic tribal organisation of the Eastern Baluch of the present day—that bear the same name as one of the *balak* of old. Prominent among these is the Rind, now a *tsaman* in the Kachhi. But powerful though the Rind *tsaman* is and proud though its name, it must not be supposed that the pedigree of all its tribesmen or even of most of its tribesmen would bear close scrutiny. In its neighbour and hereditary rival, the Margi we have a typical example of the absorption of an ancient *balak* by a modern *tsaman*; for the Lashari *balak* whose feuds with the Rind are the theme of many a stirring ballad, has been swallowed up by the Margi with a host of less distinguished elements besides. Both these strong and well-organised *tsamans* were once doughty members of the old Brāhūi Confederacy and the Rind still ranks with Sarawan and Margi with Jhalawan. It is a little amusing by the by that the amateur philologist in delving into the old geographers for ancient analogies to modern names, never hit upon the brilliant derivation of Maga I by metathesis from the Margatēro of Herodotus and Strabo. But the name is probably of no great antiquity and is presumably derived from Magas in Persian Baluchistan. Here at any rate the Rind can boast an advantage over his ancient foe: his is the proudest of all Baluch names, the name not only of one of the ancient *balak* but of the eldest among Jalāl Khān's sons. But though the word Rind is often used as if it were synonymous with Baloch, and though there are Rind wherever the Baluch are to be found—in Makran, in Sind and in the Panjāb—this does not mean that even those who call themselves Rind or profess a Rind descent (and their name is legion) look upon the Rind *tsamandar* as their nominal leader or on the Rind *tsaman* of to-day as the purest representatives of their race. The idea would be contemptuously scouted, for instance, by the great Bugti tribe, who are full of protestations of their Rind descent. But they protest methinks, too much. In reality they are probably as heterogeneous as their ancient rivals the Mari whose mixed composition may be gathered from the facts that each of its three clans traces a different descent, and that one of the three the Loharāni Shīrāni, openly proclaims the Pathān origin of half of its members in the latter part of its name. Neither Bugti nor Mari figures among the ancient *balak* and the names are probably fairly modern. As there are several localities in Persia that go by the name of Bug it seems likely enough that Bugti is another geographical formation, though where the ending *-ti* can have come from seems a bit of a puzzle. Some there are who say that they are not Bugti but *bagg-a-fik* camel-slaves, just as there are others who say that the Mari are *mar-fa* or “slaves pure and simple. The Mari once on a time were content to retort that they were *mar-i* or “braves. (I am not clear what language came to their rescue) but they have recently got to hear of some place called Deah-i Mari in Persia and falling a victim to the prevailing fashion of geographical derivations, have given this out as their ancestral home before long they will doubtless weave a pretty legend around their exodus from Deah-i Mari under the leadership of some hero of old. The Dumbki, like the Rind, are a remnant of one of the ancient *balak*. In the ballads they are styled the greatest house among the Baloch. As they are the hereditary recorders or custodians of Baluch genealogies and legendary chronicles, this may perhaps savour of self-praise. But of their high rank there is no question. Not that blue blood runs through all sections in the *tsaman*. Some like the Sanghāni are Jat, others

The mysterious meaning (real or imaginary) that attaches to several Baluch tribal names is probably responsible for many of the honourable nicknames, like Kachhi, the Golden Bugti, Phoenix, the Feisty Mari, Baluch, the Royal Rind: the latter meaning of Rind itself seems to be secondary. The Margi are similarly Jang-Jōd or War-lion. Of different character are Mirān and Kharis, the second names of the Baloch and Chitral.

like the *Ghazīānī* are freed slaves, the *Gabōl* are the descendants of the ancient slave *bōlak* of that name. And even those who claim Balōch descent, claim it in different ways. *Lāshārī*, *Laghārī*, *Bulēdī*, *Khetrān* are among the multifarious elements in the *tuman*. But the nucleus is, or is supposed to be, purest *Rind*. Yet this is but one example taken at haphazard out of the bunch to show how miscellaneous is the composition of even the proudest Balōch *tumans* of to-day (§ 298).

264 But not only have many isolated sections acquired Balōch status by *Khetrān*, the once easy process of becoming assimilated into one or other of the great *tumans*, it is hardly too much to say that Balōch status has been acquired by a whole tribe. For take the curious case of the *Khetrān*. Here we have the quaint spectacle of a tribe with a *Jatkī* language (§ 229), with a weird Hindu vein running through its domestic customs (§ 184), and a *Pathān* vein running through its tribal law, with vague traditions of *Pathān* origin and still vaguer traditions of Hindu connection, none the less making good its claims to Balōch status, not on the grounds of Balōch blood (to which very few sections can lay pretensions) but on the grounds of Balōch dress, manners and tribal constitution. Nor is the acknowledgment which the great Balōch tribes extend to these claims academic only, it takes the eminently practical shape of matrimonial alliances. As for traditions—the *Mazārānī*, the chiefly section of the *tuman*, trace descent from *Mazār*, a *Tarīn*, who fled to *Bārkhān* from his home in *Vihōa* (in *Dēra Ghāzī Khān*) to escape the clutches of some Moghal emperor, whose wrath he had roused by harbouring a goldsmith who had embezzled money and jewels from the State treasury. But there are other and stronger traditions of descent not from *Tarīn* but from his brother *Miāna*, the son of *Sharkhbūn*, the son of *Saraban*, the son of *Qais Abdu Rashid*—a tradition which appears to have solid foundation in the presence of the *Silāch* and *Matt* sections for the latter are *Lat Pathān*, and *Lat* and *Silāj* were both sons of *Miāna*. And lastly there are persistent but muffled traditions of descent from *Khetīān*, the son of *Rām*, a *Khatī* chieftain who lived in the *Gomal* and set the Moghal at defiance, until he had to retire to *Vihōa*. There seems a germ of truth in all three traditions, though one can hardly hope to piece the real story together at this late date. It is quite possible that various *Miāna* and *Tarīn* sections broke off from the main stocks, and, ousted from their ancient home, migrated eastwards, and became so mixed up with *Jatt* elements and especially with *Jatt* women, and so infected by their Balōch environment, that on their return westwards they returned not only with their numbers reinforced by *Jatt* and Balōch recruits, but with a *Jatkī* language, a Hindu tincture in their domestic customs, and what is more important still, with a Balōch constitution, and Balōch dress and manners. That the name of the *tuman* has any direct connection with *Khetrān*, the son of *Rām* the *Khatī*, or with *khēt*, a field—both common suppositions even among scholars—I very much doubt. Nobody, I imagine, but the *Pathān* himself treats his ancient genealogies as gospel, but when they are ordinarily accepted for practical purposes in other cases, I fail to understand the conspiracy of silence regarding *Niamat Ullah's* explicit statement that *Khatran* (possibly connected with *khītar*, 'minor') was the second son of *Ashkun*, the son of *Miāna*, especially when the modern version of the eponymous hero's name is so easily explained as being the form imposed by folk-etymology during the stay of the tribe in a *Jatkī*-speaking country. Two of the clans, the *Īspānī* (to which the chiefly section, the *Mazārānī*, belongs) and the *Phallēt*, are known collectively as *Ganjūra*, possibly after some eponymous hero—at any rate no one seems to have a better suggestion to offer. The name is used of these two clans in contradistinction to the *Dhira*, whose name is supposed to be derived from *dhira*, a heap. As a matter of fact there seems little to choose between all three in the matter of homogeneity, and though the *Dhira* or "heap" certainly contains *Jatt* elements, it also seems to contain more true Balōch than the rest of the *tuman* put together.

265 This of course is an extreme case. But a somewhat similar process, *The rise of the tuman*, though on a much less wholesale scale, has possibly been at work in the formation of all the *tumans* as we now know them. For the Balōch tribal system of to-day is clearly a comparatively late development in Balōch history. To

under his leadership that his earlier successors won and held their chieftainship by personal prowess; and that the *tumandāri* became an hereditary office after a long process of time. To borrow a pregnant distinction from Tacitus, the *tumandār* was a *dax* ages before he blossomed into a *princeps*—he was first a war-lord and only later did he manage to transform himself into an hereditary chief. And we get a curious sidelight on these suggestions from the survival in the *tuman* of yet another officer in the Mari tribal hierarchy the *rdā-zan*. In those latter days the *rdā-zan* or "highway robber" is little more than a man with an honorary but honoured title, ranking in virtue of his high but leisureed office next to the *tumandār* himself. In the old days of tribal warfare he was (like the Teutonic *Hercloch*, the Welsh *Dialer* and the Scotch *Tviseck*) the war-chief who led the tribe forth to battle. Originally devised no doubt to counteract an almost inevitable failure of the hereditary principle in the *tumandāri* when tried in the fire of warfare, the office is itself succumbing in those days of peace to the hereditary principle. Though still to the gift of the *tumandār* to bestow on some warrior of proved valour it has become in practice more or less confined to one particular family and on the death of the last *rdā-zan* the title was conferred almost as a matter of course on his son. But this inglorious ending to the *rdā-zan's* warrior career is clearly a direct consequence of the enforced peace under British rule. Had tribe been left free to war with tribe, the *rdā-zan's* office could hardly have thus degenerated into an hereditary sinecure. It is much more likely that at some crisis of great stress in the *tuman* he would have brushed the *tumandār* aside. And history we may well imagine would repeat itself. The *dax* having overturned the *princeps* would seek to secure his new won position to his son and son's sons after him, and a new *princeps* would arise, only to fall in his turn before another *dax* who had to be appointed to lead the tribal hosts in the field. This after all is no mere empty conjecture. It is a fairly true picture of the rise of kingship in Europe. Nor is the Mari *rdā-zan* a solitary figure in Baluch politics. There is a *rdā-zan* among the Bagti but in this *tuman* the *tumandārs* seem to have been strong enough or themselves warriors enough to keep him from rising to any eminence.

The Western
Baluch.

288. I have dwelt at some length on the *tuman* and its organisation, not simply because the great *tumans* dwarf other Baluchi in political importance, but because the *tuman* is the most characteristic form of Baluch society to be found in Baluchistan. I must pass by the smaller communities among the eastern Baluch like the Umrāni of whom Baluchistan retains a mere remnant and the Kaheri, but lately a section of the Rind now beginning to blossom forth into Sayyids (§ 281) and scattered offshoots from great *tumans* domiciled in Baluchistan no longer like the Buzdār Leghari, Gurdāni Kasrāni. Far more interesting to us than these are the Baluch in the west. Here Baluch society runs on very different lines. The only community at all

Western Baluch

PLATE

akin to a *tuman* is the Rakhshāni, one of the ancient *bēlaks*, but now a somewhat disrupted and amorphous tribe of Brahūi rather than Baluchi pattern, with its chief head-quarters in the Chāgal district and with offshoots in Kharān and Makrān and Persia. To see the western Baluch in his most typical surroundings we must go to Makrān, where the Baluch won his first footing in Baluchistan. Says the old ballad: "Those that followed Chākar (into India) became Jatt; those that stayed behind remained Baluch." But a somewhat similar fate was reserved for those that never followed Chākar further into Baluchistan than Makrān. They did not indeed become Jatt like so many of the Baluch who wandered off into Sind and the Panjāb or like them forget their language. Baluch they remained, but Baluch in a land where the word Baluch came in time to be almost a term of reproach, like the word Baluch in the eastern Panjāb. Crushed under the heel of dominant classes, they are Baluch in humble distinction to their proud masters—whether these are the alien Gichki or the Brahūi Mirwāpi or the Naubah-wāni, who likely enough are Baluch themselves. And yet, if we are searching for the ancient *bēlaks* of the Baluch race, it is in Makrān that we seem to have most chance of finding them. Rind, Lāhari and Hot, proudest *bēlaks* of all; Gurgēj and Puzh, two *bēlaks* akin to the Rind and both of ancient renown. Bulēdi (known in Sind as Burdi) who preserve the name of an old world *bēlak* in their nickname Mirāli Rakhshāni, the *bēlak* which has transmitted its name

to the tribe in the north, Khōsa, from which have sprung two great *tumans* in the Panjāb and Sind; Dōdāi and Kalmati, ancient names now otherwise lost, Dashti and Gabōl, two out of the four servile *bōlak*. Yet with the one exception of the Rind, who are not only numerous but still hold their heads high, these are at best but feeble and scattered remnants for all their high ancestry, proud names and little more—living proofs, it almost seems, of the inability of the effete *bōlak* to struggle against the more youthful and vigorous *tuman*.

269 In the west of Balūchistān, more even than in the east, does the word *Balōch* convey status rather than race. For it is applied not only to this flotsam and jetsam from the old *bōlak* and also to others who can plausibly make out a case for Balōch descent, but to people like the Kishāni, who claim to be Shāhwāni Brāhūis, and the Barr, who are popularly supposed to be Bedouins, and the Kēnagizai, who are seemingly Jatt, and even to people of much lower origin. On the other hand, it is hard to find any other classification

Naushērwanī
Gichki

333
554

for the Naushērwanī and the Gichki, who in their own country are the *hākum* or dominant classes as opposed to the Balōch. And perhaps it is idle to hunt about for any other. For though the Naushērwanī claim descent from Kaanian Mahks, there is some significance in the historical fact that both Nādir Shāh and Ahmad Shāh styled the *Khān hākum* of their day as “Naushērwanī, Rakhsāni Balōch,” and it is not improbable that they may be Balōch after all. The Gichki, it is true, are in very different case. Whether or no they are Rājpūt who came from Karanga, now part of Barōda, as an old Kāthiawār chronicle relates, it is quite certain that they were originally Hindus from India, who made their way to Makrān somewhere about the sixteenth or seventeenth century and rapidly conquered the Balōch inhabitants. But the conquerors were themselves conquered by the conquered. Their religion became Musalmān, their language Balōchi. Indeed so powerful is the Balōch genius in assimilating aliens, that in the language spoken by the Gichki of to-day is preserved, it would seem, not merely the purest but the most archaic form of Balōchi to be found anywhere.

270 No people in Balūchistān has of late years provoked so much speculation outside it as the Brāhūis, chiefly owing to the fact that they speak a Dravidian language in about the last place in India where a Dravidian language would be expected. The Brāhūis themselves have taken a very languid interest in their past—possibly because there are among them so few who are true

Brāhūis
Brāhūi nucleus
Sarāwān
Jhalawān
Miscellaneous

167,787
15,047
55,370
94,708
2,652

Brāhūis at all. They know little about the history of their remarkable and not inglorious rise into something like a nation three or four centuries ago. Of their remote past, which, if less glorious, must have been more remarkable still, they have hardly an inkling. They are a people singularly incurious and unimaginative, devoid of all touch of that poetic instinct which prompts others to chronicle the history of their origin and the deeds of their fathers, or to invent both where both are forgotten. Though largely recruited from the Balōch and the Pathān, they have no ballads like the one and no genealogies like the other. A few traditions are all they can produce to illumine the mystery that broods over their origin. If only their traditions were conflicting enough and definite enough then illumination might serve. It is after all easier to piece together the truth from conflicting traditions than to extract it out of a tradition that has become crystallised into set genealogies or the conventional theme of an epic. But the bald Brāhūi traditions are hardly such stuff as history is made of. They are little more than far-away echoes of tradition among the Balōch.

271 Like the Balōch, the Brāhūis are sprung from the loins of Mīr Hamza, the Prophet's uncle, like them, they have wandered in from Aleppo. But while so much is treated as gospel, there are too many rival versions of the intermediate gaps for any one to be regarded as less apocryphal than the others. Not that there is any great difference between them. According to one fairly typical account, the Brāhūis trace their lineage from the seven sons of Gwahrām, the son of Brāho or Ibrāhīm, who was descended more or less

The Brāhūi
nucleus.

immediately from the Prophet's uncle. But the links are often left out in order to claim the descent of the seven brothers direct from Mir Hama. Thus the Prophet's uncle who according to Islamic tradition died without issue, is accredited with one batch of four sons and a daughter the forefathers of the Balūch (§ 20^o) and with another batch of seven sons, the forefathers of the Brāhūis. I hardly like to mention yet another son, Sarmast, the forefather of the Lōyl (§ 93) for both Brāhūi and Balūch are of course scandalised at the impertinence of the Lōyl in fabricating so preposterous and impious a fable. But though seven brothers usually figure in Brāhūi traditions, there is some disagreement as to the number and even more as to their identity. One tradition opens with the statement that Gwahram had three sons, Gurgin Sumal and Kalandar. But as the story develops, it appears that there were more than three sons after all; indeed Hama, the youngest of the lot, turns out to be the real hero of the story for as the future father of Ahmad (to say nothing of Itāx and Kambār) he is the ancestor of the Ahmadzai, the ruling family of Kalāt. It is not till we get to the fag-end of the story that we learn that there were yet two other brothers, Mirō and Rōden, who suddenly walk upon the scene as if we know all about them already. In the same story casual mention is made of a brother of Gwahram called Zagr and this is the first and the last occasion that he is mentioned in the narrative though he crops up in another tradition, but this time not as Gwahram's brother but as Brāhū's father. Zagr's place among the ancestors of the Brāhūis is, I am told, a matter known only to very old folk. It certainly forms no part of the ordinary body of tradition. Other accounts give the name of Gwahram's sons as Kambār Gurgin, Kalandar Sumal and Rōden—the last by a slave mother a common and significant touch in Balūchistan genealogies. And from Kambār sprang Mirō, from Mirō sprang Ahmad, and from Ahmad sprang Itāx. But there are several other ways of ringing the changes on these four. Mirō is sometimes regarded as the forbear of the other three—the ex-Khan used to say that Kambār was the father of Ahmad and Itāx and related in some shadowy way to Mirō. The one and only deduction that we can safely draw from all this is that Brāhūis of modern times regard

Brāhūi nucleus	18,007
Ahmadzai	25
Itāzai	144
Mirwāzi	2,824
Kambāzai	2,760
Gurgāzai	2,041
Sumāzai	2,700
Kalandāzai	2,013
Rōdeni	1,215

the following, and the following only among the many Brāhūi tribes as belonging to the true Brāhūi stock—first the ruling family the Ahmadzai, and its collateral, the Itāzai, then the Mirwāzi and the Kambāzai (both closely connected with the ruling house, though the Kambāzai, unlike the Mirwāzi, no longer look in reflected glory) together with the Gurgāzai, the Sumāzai, the Kalandāzai and—despite the servile strain in their blood—the Rōdeni. It would be hardly safe to add the Zagr Mēngal, for the isolated but reputedly ancient traditions regarding Zagr's ancestry receive little countenance from the public opinion of to-day which usually lumps up the Zagr Mēngal into the same category as the Mēngal.

Serāwān and
Jhalawān.

272. These then are the Brāhūis of the Brāhūis—the Brāhūi nucleus, to use an ugly term in default of a better. The rest of the Brāhūi tribes are supposed to be the descendants of strangers who in the early days threw in their lot with this Brāhūi nucleus, and in so doing took on Brāhūi status. The curious thing is that in course of time these strangers dwarfed the original stock in importance, and became, as it were, more Brāhūi than the Brāhūis themselves. For if we except the ruling family the true Brāhūi tribes have fallen into the background. The political importance has passed from them to the tribes of Serāwān and Jhalawān. And it is as somewhat indignant members of the latter group that the true Brāhūi tribes are nowadays reckoned, chiefly I suppose, because of territorial reasons but in the Dardar of the old Confederacy they seem to have sat in the centre, dividing the great lines of Serāwān and Jhalawān. Now there are at least five races which are popularly supposed to have been the recruiting-grounds of these Serāwān and Jhalawān tribes, and of the small miscellaneous group which, though generally included loosely among the latter seems properly to fall under neither Pathān, Balūch, Jaff, Persian and aboriginal. And this is how popular opinion usually attempts to class them—

Reputed origin	Sarawān	Jhalawān	Miscellaneous
Pathān	Bangulzai Raisānī Rustumzai (Raisānī) Shahwānī Sarparra Sātakzai (Kūrd)	Zarrakzai (Zahrī) <u>K</u> hidrānī (Zahrī) Jattak (Zahrī) Nichārī(?)	
Balōch	Lāngav Lahrī Kūrd	Bizanjav Pandrānī Mūsianī (Zahrī) Dānya (Zahrī) Bājōī (Zahrī) Sājdi	Relīzai
Persian		Māmasanī ¹ Hārūnī (Māmasanī) Sannārī (Zahrī)	
Jaṭṭ	Māmashahī (?) ¹	Mēngal Zagr Mēngal Sasōhī (Zahrī) Lōṭiānī (Zahrī) Natwānī	
Aboriginal	Māmashahī (?)	Nichārī (?)	Nighārī
War captives from India			Pirrikārī

273 But this racial classification of the several tribes is at best true only in the rough. It merely reflects public opinion, and public opinion goes largely by the origin, or reputed origin, of the chiefly family and its immediate clansmen, and, even so, public opinion is by no means unanimous. If it went by the reputed origin of the majority in a tribe, the classification would be very different. Take, for instance, the Bangulzai. The tribe has been classified as Pathān, simply because the Saidzai, the chiefly clan, are supposed to be Sārangzai Snatia Kākar, but most of the clans profess to be Rind Balōch, while the Badūzai claim to be Arab. And it is well to bear in mind that the true Brāhūī tribes are just as much of a mixture as the rest. Take, for instance, the Sumālārī. The Saadzai, the largest clan in the tribe, are said to be Pathān Sayyids, the Sheikh Hussainī are said to be Hārūnī Māmasanī, and therefore Persians, the Balōkhānzai, the Mūsāzai, Dādūzai, Rāzānzai, Nidāmzai, Adōzai, and Gvahrāmzai are supposed to be Kūrd, and therefore Balōch, the Lōkī Tappurī, to judge by the tradition that their ancestors were purchased for a *lōk* or camel and a *tappur* or felt, are apparently descended from slaves, as for the Būrakzai and the Sikhī, nobody seems to know who they are or where they came from. In a word, if we accept the popular accounts of the origin of the various elements in this true Brāhūī tribe, the true Brāhūī strain in it amounts to but one-eleventh of the whole. Indeed, whatever the mother-stock of a tribe, whether true Brāhūī or alien, it is the rule and not the exception for the nucleus—the chiefly family and those related to it, the *rāj-o-kabīla* as they are called—to be in a large minority to the *barōk* or new-comers, who have tacked themselves on to the tribe from time to time.

274 In the multifarious elements that have gone to the making of the tribes and the race one ought, I suppose, to find clues to the past history of the Brāhūī. But it is very difficult to get beyond insubstantial generalities. Traditional history is painfully meagre. We hear that Kalāt, which has been

¹This is the way the names are locally pronounced; but in finer language they are brought back to their presumably original forms, Muhammad Hasnī and Muhammad Shahī.

Heterogeneous
character of the
tribe

Brāhūī origin
untraceable

knit up with the destinies of the Brāhūls ever since they emerged from obscurity was at various times called Kalāt i Səwā, Kalāt i Nīchārī and Kalāt i Balūch—to the Afghāns of to-day by the by it is known as Kalāt i Nāsr, that the shadowy Səwā dynasty according to one account voluntarily abdicated in favour of the Mirwārī according to another was forcibly expelled that the Mirwārī in turn had to make way before the Moghāl; that the Brāhūls at the invitation of the Dēlhwār and with the active help of Rābānī Pathāns made good their occupation once again. And then there are vague but persistent accounts of fights with Balūch and fights with Jaff. Though these traditions are sometimes given piecemeal they are sometimes arranged consecutively as if one event followed closely on the heels of another; but the order is often reversed and in any case there must have been a good deal of telescoping. The vague impression left on my mind is that the Brāhūl nucleus, the Kambrāri and the Sumalāri and the rest first came to the front about the time of the Balūch migrations, and that their prowess under the leadership of the Mirwārī may have had something to do with the wave of Balūch emigration beyond the confines of Balūchistān. But who these Brāhūls were, and whether in those days also they spoke a Dravidian tongue, whether they came from the east or the west or the north or the south or whether they were housed in Balūchistan from time immemorial, I cannot pretend to guess. If we assume that they came from the east, they may perhaps have brought their Dravidian language with them—but even if those baseless assumptions were granted for the sake of argument, they would not entitle us to assume that they brought any Dravidian blood with them at the same time. If we assume that they came from the west, it is tempting to identify them with the Kēch, so often coupled with the Balūch in Persian and Arab chronicles—but these equally baseless assumptions would carry us little further than we were before. If they spoke another language when they arrived in the country they presumably picked up their present language from some people who were there before them, but if we assume—and this would simply be an assumption as baseless as the others—that they picked it up (let us say) from the Nīchārī, the only result would be to shift the linguistic problem one step further back.

*Rise of a Mirwārī
Confederacy*

275. But while it seems safest in our present state of ignorance to be shy of any rash assumption as to the origin of the Brāhūls, there is little harm in letting imagination attempt to follow the stages by which they rose from obscurity. According to my vague view the Brāhūl nucleus in the early days was a fairly compact body in which the Mirwārī an offshoot from the Kambrāri, gradually took the lead. Issuing successfully under Mirwārī leadership from the conflicts with the aborigines (whoever they may have been) and the Balūch and the Jaff and any others that stood in their way they must have found little difficulty in attracting recruits from all quarters, even from the ranks of their late enemies. Not the least striking proof of the fullness of their success is the very large Pathān element among them, for Pathāns are ever chary of sinking their own race except to join a vigorous and rising power. Once settled in Kalāt and the neighbourhood, the Brāhūls seem to have spread themselves over the country and in consequence to have undergone a certain amount of disintegration, the Brāhūl nucleus drifting apart into their clans, and their new found allies into communities of their own. And from these clans and communities were in course of time developed what we now call tribes. Though it is improbable enough that the tribes at their birth were either as numerous or as heterogeneous as the tribes of to-day it is hardly likely that they were truly homogeneous even then. In any case the original tribal stock must soon have become crossed by malcontents from other tribes and by fugitives or adventurous spirits from outside. But coincident with this partial disintegration there was a gradual organisation of the several tribes into a Confederacy under the leadership of the Ahmadzai, who though apparently a junior branch of the Mirwārī, soon forced their way to the front. The successful welding of the Confederacy seems to have been due in no small measure to the statescraft of the Ahmadzai leader—the Rāls as he was first called the Mir as he was called later the Khān as he is called to-day. Nevertheless it was of course self interest—or to use the local phrase, common weal and woe—that ultimately kept the Confederacy together. And it is not

difficult to guess in what that common weal and woe consisted. Though the rise of the Brāhūis appears to have been as successful as it was rapid, it can hardly be supposed that they had the field entirely to themselves. The Confederacy was in origin a combination for offence and defence, an organisation on a war-footing. It was split up first and foremost into the two great territorial divisions of Sarāwān and Jhalawān, with the true Brāhūi tribes either loosely associated with the Jhalawāns or treated loosely as a thing apart. At the head of the territorial divisions were leading tribes who carried the divisional banners, which after many a hard-fought struggle between the Mīngal and the Zarakzai and between the Shālwānī and the Raisānī now rest with the Zarakzai on behalf of Jhalawān and with the Raisānī on behalf of Sarāwān. And in the *dasta* or wings into which Sarāwān and Jhalawān still range themselves (nowadays chiefly in the prosecution of ancient feuds), we seem to see survivals of a further subdivision of Sarāwān and Jhalawān for the purposes of war. And mobilisation for war was always in the air. Not only had the tribes to find fighting-men to carry on the little wars of the Confederacy, they soon had to supply their *sān* or quota of men-at-arms to the army of the suzerain power, for the Brāhūis were not left long undisturbed in the independent position they had won for themselves. Yet even though they had to acknowledge the suzerainty of an outside power, the Confederacy in the glorious days of Nasir Khān the Great became not only a powerful military organisation but a political common-weal from which it is hard to withhold the title of nation.

276 But the forces that kept the Confederacy together—the need of showing a united front to a common enemy, the prospect of sharing in the common spoils, the wisdom and personality of their leader—gradually weakened one by one. The Brāhūis were left more and more undisturbed in the possession of their unalluring hills, the prospects of further territorial expansion faded away, the Khān's authority was undermined because he tried to pervert it from its proper function. Animated no longer either by a common fear or a common greed, and headed by a leader whose ambition was to establish a despotism, the Confederacy became racked in civil war. The anarchy that prevailed during the long rule of Mir Khudādād was really the death-knell of the Confederacy, it was only our appearance on the scene that patched up the breach between the Khān and the chiefs, and kept the shadow of a Confederacy alive. And the break-up of the Confederacy was the prelude to the disintegration of the tribe, and is likely, as it seems to me, to prove the prelude to the decay of the race. On a superficial view, it might be thought that, though the long rule of Mir Khudādād Khān, which was little more than one long struggle between the tribes and his mercenary army, shook the Confederacy from its foundations, it must also have encouraged the consolidation of the individual tribes. And such was perhaps the case for the time being. But the snapping of the ancient ties that kept the larger union together seems to have put too great a strain on the ties that bound the tribe. The snapping of ancient social ties became, as it were, the fashion, and the most characteristic feature of modern Brāhūi history is constant fissure. In Sarāwān the Rustumzai, once merely a clan of the Raisānī, has broken off from the mother-stock and set up as a tribe on its own, the Sātakzai has broken off still more recently from the Kūrd. In Jhalawān the Hārānī has broken off from the Mamāsānī, as for the Zalmī, it can hardly be called a tribe any longer. It is a mere reminder that the Zarakzai and the Mūsīānī and the Bājoi and the Khidrānī and the Jattak and the rest, were once clans of the most powerful tribe in all Jhalawān. Matters have got to such a pitch that it is often exceedingly hard to say what constitutes a tribe. To say what sections and subsections belong exclusively to the tribe, and what tribesmen to the subsections, is harder still. Before long it may become hard to say what constitutes a Brāhūi at all.

277 For disintegration has set in, all down the line. Not only have clans broken off from the mother-stock and constituted themselves into tribes, sections and groups and individual tribesmen are constantly breaking off from the tribe. Sometimes they affiliate themselves definitely to another tribe, sometimes they simply shift their quarters and change their old beats, quietly biding the day when they will have to throw in their lot with some tribe or another, not without the hope that that day may never come at all. In Makrān and elsewhere

Modern
disintegration

outside the Brāhū country proper it was quite a common experience at this census for members of some well known section of some well known Brāhū tribe to return themselves not as Brāhūs, but as Balūch. And I shrewdly suspect that so far from the sixty thousand odd Brāhūs enumerated in Sind (§ 78) being the only Brāhūs in Sind at the time of the census, there are many Brāhūs in Sind who prefer to masquerade as Balūch and the numbers who will take up this disguise will certainly increase as time goes on for the Balūch are a very strong community in Sind, and their name ranks high because of the Balūch descent of the former Talpūr rulers. In Balūchistan we took it upon ourselves to adjust these apparent anomalies to the accepted notions of Brāhū and Balūch. But I am not sure that we were right. Certainly if the present tendency gathers force in the next ten years, it will be a very pretty problem at the next census to decide who are to be recorded as Brāhū and the best course will possibly be to abide by the strict letter of what the tribesmen tell us. The precise extent to which these tendencies towards tribal disintegration and racial change have been operative since the last census, we are unfortunately not in a position to measure. The apparent decrease in the number of the Brāhūs is colossal; the apparent multiplication of the tribal sections and subsections is perhaps more striking still. But we must of course discount a very great deal of both. In the first place the last figures were mere estimates. In the second place they emanated from the chiefs, and the ideas of a chief as to what clans and sections and subsections and groups belong to his tribe are by no means the same as the ideas of the tribesmen themselves. But great as have been our difficulties in drawing up a reasonably correct classification of the Brāhū tribes, it seems safe to prophesy that the difficulties of our successors are likely to be still greater. If however my prognostications prove false, as I hope against hope that they may, it will be an extremely interesting study to trace the causes that have led to the unexpected arrest of what seems now to be a very unmistakable tendency towards dissolution.

The future of
the race.

278. To me the only chance for the Brāhū appears to lie in a resuscitation of some wider union on the lines of the old Confederacy but this at present seems Utopian enough, unless in the Jirga system wisely reformed and jealously administered a new lease of life is given to the tribal hierarchy and hence to tribal unity and the wider racial unity takes fresh roots in the consciousness of the possession of a common body of customary law (§ 90). It almost looks as if a loosely knit Confederacy were the one form of social community really suited to the Brāhū genius. The old Confederacy had at least this in its favour. It possessed a territorial unity and a geographical isolation, all the more effective because of the uninviting character of the country. But not only have the individual tribes no territorial cohesion worth the name, the lack of it is accentuated by the nomadic character of the tribesmen, which disperses them abroad among other tribes and into other countries. Every tribe, it is true, can boast its tribal head-quarters but this is often little more than the head quarters of the chief and his immediate clansmen; the majority of the tribesmen are scattered over the face of the country. And here I find it interesting to contrast the Brāhū with the Balūch. With a tribal constitution very similar to that of the Brāhū (on this score one has only to compare what has been said generally of the one in § 31 with what has been said equally generally of the other in § 97) and with the same baleful heritage of nomadism to contend with, the great Balūch *tribes* of the east can boast a solidarity with which no Brāhū tribes can vie. The Rind and the Magasī Balūch must once have been as nomad as any Balūch have ever been, or as any Brāhūs are to-day. They were once active members of the Brāhū Confederacy and like other members of the Confederacy received their share of the Kachhī war-lands but, unlike the Jhalawans who allowed themselves to be ousted out of large areas that fell to their share (§ 77) and unlike the Sarāwāns who left the Jatt tenants in possession and simply use the Kachhī as a farm of which they enjoy the produce and to which they resort for the winter the Magasī and the Rind quietly set themselves to colonise their lands, with the result that they are now compact, self-sufficient *tribes* occupying a tribal territory of their own. Confronted

I am of course taking the Magasī and Rind *tribes* as I now find them in Balūchistan; the offshoots from the west stock of both are of course far less.

with this example of what might have been, the Brāhūis would probably say that the comparison is unfair, for hillmen like themselves can never take to a life in the plains, in face of the growing expatriation of the Jhalawāns to Sind (§ 78), they can hardly solace themselves with this excuse much longer. But to drive my point home, let me turn to other Balōch who are still as nomad as the Brāhūis and almost as thorough-going hillmen. I cannot doubt that the Marī and Bugtī *tumans* owe a tremendous amount of their admirable tribal cohesion to the cunning way in which nature has provided each with its own territory, cut off not only from the outside world, but also from each other (§ 45). It is this lack of isolated, well-defined tribal territory that has helped on the dispersal of the Balōch in the west, where disintegration has reached a pitch that leaves Brāhūi disintegration far behind. And added to the absence of natural checks to Brāhūi disintegration there are a multitude of positive disintegrating forces, such as the growth of a selfish individualism among the tribesmen at large and most significant of all among the chiefs, the inevitably disintegrating influence of peace under a foreign administration, the increasing tendency to migrate beyond the limits of the country, and the consequent tendency to settle outside it. Taking one thing with another, I am forced to the regretful conclusion that unless the many disintegrating influences are arrested and some counter-influence, such as the purging and strengthening of the Jirga system, speedily arises to put new life into tribal and racial unity, the Brāhūi tribes have seen their best days, and that the Brāhūi race is doomed in the future, let us hope in the very distant future, to absorption into some more virile community.

279 Etymologically the word Lāsī means simply inhabitant of Las Bēla^{Lāsī}. In older writings the word Lumrī is often used in this sense, but Lūmrīya or Nūmrīya is properly confined to such Lāsī as live south of Bēla town. But though the term Lāsī is thus frankly of territorial and not racial connotation, it indicates status nevertheless, for not all inhabitants of Las Bēla come within the

Panj Rāj	27,779
Jāmōt	9,724
Angāria	3,146
Shēkh	4,432
Burrā	5,374
Rūnjhā	5,103

category. It applies primarily to the *panj-rāj* or five dominant communities, Jāmōt, Angāria, Shēkh, Burrā and Rūnjhā, and is extended by courtesy to the many various groups more or less loosely affiliated to them. In theory all five are equal, if the superior claims of the Jāmōt are often tacitly admitted, this is simply because it is to the Jāmōt that the ruling family, self-styled the Jamshēdī, belongs. In theory each is supposed to be endogamous, but breaches of the rule are common enough. In theory again no full member of the *panj-rāj* would give his daughter in marriage to a member of one of the affiliated groups, he does so in practice for all that. One and all, it need hardly be said, take wives from all and sundry. Even if the motley crew that have managed to get themselves tacked on to the *panj-rāj* are left out of count, the Lāsī seem to be a somewhat heterogeneous collection, though this is very different from saying that it is necessary to accept as gospel the pedigrees that the *panj-rāj* have concocted for themselves: that the nucleus of the Jāmōt is Qurēshī Arab, that Angāria was a hero who hailed from Arabia, and Burrā a hero of the great Samma tribe of Sind, that the Rūnjhā are Rājput, and the Shēkh, if not actually Sayyid, something mighty like it.

280 I fancy that these Arab and Rājput legends are largely Lāsī inventions, possibly unconscious enough, to cover up a Jatt origin. The truth is that the

Jatt	78,400
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term Jatt or Jadgāl has a contemptuous ring in Balūchistān, and all who can are at pains to rake up some other ancestry for themselves. I have often been tempted to regret that the famous though reckless derivation of Jatt from the classical Gethae has not filtered down from the studies of ingenious theorists and come home to the business and bosoms of the men of the country. We should then perhaps have heard less of the Arabs and more of the Jatt, and been in a far better position to judge of the real racial divisions of Balūchistān. As it is, I have every now and then had to pick my way warily, for fear of treading on some one's corns. Yet many of those who are Jatt self-professed, like the Abrā and others of the Kachhī, are fine up-standing men and excellent husbandmen. Though perforce occupying an inferior position to their tribal overlords, they hold

themselves proudly aloof. The Brāhūl for instance may mouth out his haughty saying that a Jatt is about as good as his shoe, yet many a Jatt home is presided over by a Brāhūl mother. The Jatt wives of Brāhūl husbands could almost be counted on one's fingers and it is only in the best Brāhūl families that they are found. Unfortunately for the Jatt he has little or no tribal cohesion and his one hope for a rise in the social world is the coming of that day when tribal bonds shall be broken and he can enter free and unhandicapped upon the race of life, an individual pitting himself against individuals. And in that race the proud tribesman of to-day will be hard put to it to hold his own.

281 How many of the twenty two thousand odd Sayyids enumerated in Balūchistān would find a place in the Sayyid peerage that used to be kept up by the Naqib-us-Sādāt under the Khalifa's orders, it would be interesting to know. Not a single one, was the unexpected verdict of a Musliman critic, whose lifelong experience of Balūchistān and Afghanistān and curious reading in the by paths of Islamic history made me think that his opinion on such a subject would be worth inviting. But I fancy his opinion was expressed in an unusually sceptical and splenetic mood. He certainly shuffled out of it when called upon to give chapter and verse for his dogmatic assertion. As a matter of fact I can conceive no more unprofitable and invidious task than to probe too shrewdly into this complex and delicate question. While I am conscious that a goodly number of those whose claims to the revered title of Sayyid have been acknowledged in our tables, are really trespassers and usurpers, I thought it best to exclude none from the hallowed circle whose title is generally recognised by the people at large. Room has thus been found, for instance, for the Mashwānī, the Ustrāns and the Gharehīn who for a long time were content to rank as Pathāns (§ 250) and for the Kahēri, who for a long time were content to rank as Balūch (§ 208).

282 The Dēhwār are a peaceful, law-abiding people, simple and unaffected in manners, homely thrifty husbandmen. The bulk of them are settled in Sarāwān, where they are divided between Kalāt and the Mastung valley into two main communities, each under an *arbab* or leader of its own. Of recent years a small colony has gone over into the Quetta district. How they first came to settle down in Sarāwān nobody knows. They have evidently been there for many generations. The vague but very persistent tradition that they had a large hand in the setting up of Brāhūl rule seems to be borne out both by the nature of the services they still render to the ruling house (the repairing of the Kalāt battlements, for instance) and the privileges they still enjoy. The honour of having played the chief part in the overthrow of the earlier tyrants is supposed to rest with the Dōdāki, one of the chief sections in the Kalāt group. And the story that attaches to their name is this. They had sworn an oath never to take up arms against the tyrant—whoever he may have been, for the story is told indifferently of a Moghal and of Sēwa, the Hindu. Crushed by his oppressions, they at last hit upon a method of putting him out of the way and at the same time of keeping to their oath. They baked a number of *dōd* or loaves, with a thin layer of dough round lappish stones, and with these they pelted him to death. The name Dēhwār itself seems clearly a descriptive appellation,—a mere variation of Dēhkan, common enough in Central Asia—people who live in *dēh* or villages, in distinction to nomad tribesmen. So it is not surprising to find that these Dēhwār are a very heterogeneous community. All the main peoples of Balūchistān seem to have been laid under tribute to swell their numbers. There are some, like the Zharikhēl (§ 253) and the Yūsufzai, who claim to be Pathāns; others, like the Hotāzai, who claim to be Balūch; and others, again like the Sankīl, who claim to be Brāhūl. And in addition there are many who claim to have come from Persia, Arabia or Afghanistān. But the nucleus is supposed to be Tājik, chiefly I fancy because of their name and their Persian language (§ 231). Unfortunately the word Tājik is often brought in when origin is uncertain, or when a humble origin has to be covered up. But the important thing for us is that however heterogeneous their origin, the Dēhwār are to-day a very homogeneous community homogeneous in every way—looks, manners, language occupation and all.

283 Over the pedigree of the Mēd, ingenuity has surely run riot. They *may* be the Mēd of the Arab chroniclers. If so, they must have changed a good deal since the days, described in the earliest chronicles of all, when they were a pastoral people living on the banks of the Indus and, unlike their neighbours, were unaccustomed to boats. They *may* be the Ichthyophagoi of Alexander's time—at any rate they occupy the same locality and follow the same calling. If so, they must have changed a good deal since the days when they had long claw-like nails and shaggy hair, and cut the growth of neither, when they lived in huts made of shells and the off-scourings of the sea, when their clothing was the skins of wild beasts, when they fed not only on sun-dried fish but on the flesh of sea-monsters cast ashore in stormy weather. And if they are the Ichthyophagoi of 325 B.C. and also the Mēd known to the Arabs centuries later, it is a pretty little piece of unexpected atavism that the fisherfolk of the Makrān coast should have reverted to their old haunts and their old calling after a spell of pastoral life inland. When, however, I am asked to go back much earlier still and to regard them as a colony of the ancient Medes, I can only repeat what Herodotus gravely remarked in like case of the Sigynnae on the Danube: "How they can be a colony of the Medes, I am at a loss to imagine. Not but what anything can happen—given plenty of time." But the Mēd is sufficiently interesting in himself, without our interest having to be tickled by guesses at his origin. He is an excellent fisherman and, though the Khōja has managed to get a good deal of the fish-trade into his own hands, a very fair man of business. And there is money enough to be made, what with the export of dried fish to India and Africa, of air-bladders to England for the making of isinglass, of shark fins to China, to become one of the ingredients, I suppose, of some Chinese dainty. He can manage his tiny crafts, his dug-outs and his luggers, with the best of them—and well he may, for though he rarely ventures far from the shore in the one, or further than Muscat and the Malabār coast in the other, storms rise in these parts with alarming rapidity. For all his humble fisher-life he can hardly be classed as a menial, in Las Bēla at any rate he is looked upon as *khāmōāda*, a man of respectable family enough. He is remarkably prolific—I have never seen so many chattering children in any Balūchistān village as along the coast of Las Bēla and Makrān. Like all true sons of the sea, he is intensely superstitious: if he toils all night and catches nothing, somebody must have bewitched the fish, so off he goes to the mulla for a charm, if he spends the night ashore, it's as much as his life is worth to poke his nose outside the door, and even indoors a night-light has to be kept burning to scare the Jinns off, if he is ill, the *gwāt* or Spirit of the Wind must have laid him low, and the Mother of the *gwāt*—some man or woman who poses as the invoker of the *gwāt*—must be called in to sing and dance him into a healing trance. And withal he is a cheery, breezy fellow, with the salt of the sea about him, though the unspeakable stench of the drying-yards in his villages is to most of us an effective barrier to a closer acquaintance.

281 Of more than local interest, I fancy, are the Lōrī, who ought to have little difficulty in worming themselves into any congregation of the catholic brotherhood of gypsies all the world over. They are dispersed throughout the whole country, and reach far away into Persia and beyond. Asked about their origin, they usually spin some yarn connecting them with the particular race among whom they live: they hail from Aleppo, they are descended from Sarmast, youngest of the sons of Mir Hamza, the Prophet's uncle, it was under Chākar the Rind that they came first to Makrān and on into Balūchistān, and much more in the same strain. Asked about the meaning of their name, they usually explain that old father Sarmast was luckless enough to get overlooked when Mir Hamza's patrimony was being divided up, and there was nothing left him but a *lōī* or share in the lot of his more fortunate brothers. As a matter of fact, they are not over-fond of the name of Lōrī, and many of them much prefer to be called Sarinastārī after their legendary ancestor, or Lōpī, for which they have no explanation to offer at all, or else to be dubbed *usta*, short for *ustād*, master-craftsman. By craft they are tinkers, first and last, after their own fashion they work well enough in gold and silver, they are not bad hands at carpentry, they are expert beggars, several of them are *dōmb* or professional minstrels, the wives of

the *gōmb* are the midwives of the country. After this long list of their attainments it is not surprising that the tribes to which they are attached—and nearly every section among the Balōch and Brālūts has its own little *Lōpi* group—are fully alive to the value of their services and keep a pretty tight hold over them taking them along on their wanderings and thereby recounting any overtures on the part of other tribes to lure them away. In the tribal head men the *Lōpi* have jealous guardians of their petty rights and privileges, and under their protection they lead a charmed if lowly life, for the excellent reason that their blood money is set at some fancy price, generally twice the blood money of an ordinary tribesman. Yet the wilder and uncaged life of *Makran* is probably much more to the *Lōpi*'s liking. Here he is not tied to tribal leading strings, but is free to live his life as he pleases with no one to say him nay. It is in *Makran* therefore, that we find the *Lōpi* in his element. And this is the way this merry careless, no-*er-do-weel* gypsy—this tinkler goldsmith, minstrel, ballad monger donkey-coper, juggler circumdancer quack, this jack of all trades, everything by starts and nothing long—sums up the story of his life: "Wanderers we were born, wanderers we live, and wanderers we shall die. When our bellies are full, we pray. When our bellies are empty we cheat—for we are not the rightful sharers in the food and the drink of you all! No birthplace nor home nor burying-ground is ours. Our birth is in the jungle and the desert. The desert and the jungle are our home and our grave."

Jat.

283 The Jat usually pose as Balōch, much to the disgust of the Balōch himself. They hark back in approved fashion to *Ohākar* the Blind, and attribute their drop in the social scale either to their refusal to support him in the struggle with the *Lāshārī*, or to their ancestral profession as camel-drivers, from which they

Jat

A. 1000

are supposed to derive their name. According to Balōch tradition so far from having dropped in the social scale, they must have gone up a step or two degraded though their condition is. For in the old days these *Harāhi* or *Rauchi* as they are called in the ballads, were little better than savages, living unwashed unshaven, unclothed partly on their camels and partly on their women—their two sources of livelihood to this day (§ 170). As for their absurd claims to kinship, the Balōch say that *Ohākar* himself had to warn them of the inevitable consequences of such impertinence, and Heaven proved him in the right by wiping out ten thousand of them in the next battle. But though it seems clear that their claims to blood relationship are really preposterous, it is equally clear that their connexion with the Balōch is of long standing. The bonds between their various sections are of the frailest, and in the individual section it is a case of *kipi kipi sardārā*, or one tent—one chieftain, as the proverb says. Lately they have begun to awake to the idea that union is not without strength, and some of them are beginning to follow though very gingerly the lead of their *sardār*. But if each man is a chieftain in his own tent they are a cringing lot to the outside world, submitting with whispering humbleness to any indignity put upon them. Sufferance is the badge of all their tribe even among themselves a flood of abuse or a cuff with the hand or a blow with a shoe is the utmost limit of their valour. Winter and summer they are on the move, in search of grazing for their camels, carrying with them a mat tent a hand mill, some pots and pans, and a few sticks of furniture. They are such notorious evil liveries and expert camel lifters, that they are not allowed to camp close to a village unless they have taken service with some big man.

Lak.

280 It is hard to find an equivalent for so antiquated a relic of pre-British days as the *Ghulām*, but the term "servile dependant" will perhaps do as well as any other. The *Ghulām* are a very motley crew the descendants of ancestors imported either by purchase or capture from Africa Persia, India and Afghanistan. There are *Kabāki* or negroes *Makrani* half-breeds Persians or Balōch, whose fathers were captured in border warfare *sardārā* who are popularly supposed to be descended from *Maharattas* led into captivity by *Ahmad Shah*. *Mazāra* women from *Afghanistan*. They are of course an anachronism. But their position in the tribal household is often much too comfortable for them to forfeit it lightly by claiming that full status which is theirs for the asking in any British court.

The relationship of *ghulam* to master is not so one-sided as it might seem. The *ghulam* have of course to work for their master about the house or farm, but the master has to support them like the rest of the family. When times are hard, the *ghulam* no doubt are the first to feel the pinch. But even though the master himself wants to be quit of them, he may find it no easy matter to shake them off. Not only are they loth to shift for themselves in this world, they have an uncomfortable idea that if their master seeks to earn merit by dismissing them, they will have to take his sins with them into the next. Sometimes the master tries to wash his hands of them as a punishment, only to be pestered by entreaties that he should forget and forgive and take them back into the bosom of the family.

257. The only Hindus I propose to discuss are the old families who have been domiciled in various parts of the country for so long that they have almost as much right to be regarded as indigenous as the tribesmen themselves. In fact, if their own accounts are to be trusted, they date further back than these, for the Hindus of Kalāt town—undoubtedly among the oldest in the community—claim to be offshoots of the mysterious Śiva dynasty that ruled in Kalāt centuries before the Brāhmi Confederacy took shape. But though the Bhūta of Las Bela punctiliously refer their advent to the year 708 A.D. and the Hindus of Lahri tell in all good faith of their journeyings from Aleppo with Chakar the Rind, the early history of these old Hindu families is hopelessly befogged. Everything, however, seems to point to the western Panjib and Sind as the countries from which most of them came, though isolated families in Nushki may have immigrated by way of Afghanistan, and a few others may have wandered in from the far corners of India. Originally they may have been as diverse as the villages from which they came and the dates of their coming. To day the old Hindu families form a more or less homogeneous community. In particular customs no doubt they vary considerably; but common environment has set its common mark on them all. And it is in the effect of an alien environment on Hindus and Hindu caste that the main interest in these old trading families of Balūchistān is centred.

258. In the olden days the Hindu shopkeepers were lumped up with the servile dependants of the tribe. They lived everywhere on sufferance, in the more important villages they enjoyed the direct patronage of the State in return for the payment of a poll-tax; elsewhere they sheltered under the protection of the tribe as a whole or of the chief or some influential headman, whom they had to conciliate with offerings on marriages and other set occasions. They were made to wear red head gear or red leg-gear as a distinctive dress, and the lowly ass was the best mount they dared to aspire to. They were treated as transferable property, and there were all the makings of a very pretty quarrel whenever a tribesman sought to coin money out of a transfer behind the back of his fellows, or one tribe endeavoured to slich some particularly useful Hindu from another. But this is only one side of the picture. If they ranked in theory a little lower than the lowest because of their idolatrous religion, they were in reality regarded as much more important than many of their betters because of their greater usefulness. And the protection accorded to them was in consequence complete. They were free from persecution and molestation, in any dispute with the tribesmen they could appeal to their protector or the headmen for a fair hearing and a fair settlement, the honour of their women was respected, their religion was tolerated, no one tampered with their customs. In spite of their apparent disabilities, theirs was no unhappy lot. If none were allowed to become very rich, none were poor. Friction between Hindu and Musalmān was unknown, because neither premed on the other, but each took his proper place in tribal society. Exercising a mutual forbearance—as they still do in outlying parts of the tribal country—both communities lived together in unruffleable harmony, such as is seldom seen where British justice gives every man fair play to ply for his own hand. And not only were the Hindus safe from persecution within the tribe, they were—like the Lōi, and for similar reasons—as inviolate in tribal warfare as women and unbreeched lads. This protection did not, of course, extend to those among them who took their place in the fighting ranks. And there were many such—though not to many fell the honour of being sung in ballad history like Marikan, the Hindu hero of a famous battle on the Pab hills.

between the *Khān* and the *Burrā* of *Las Bēla*. Nor was it individuals alone who became fired with the martial spirit of a tribesman. The pugnacity of the *Rāmzai* Hindus of *Bārkhān* and the so-called *Kākari* Hindus of *Mēkhtar* is a byword in the country to this day.

21. *Panchāyat*

250 In every Hindu settlement of any size is a *Panchāyat* or governing body of representative men called *panch* or *paryamans*. At the head of the *Panchāyat* stands the *mukhi* or president, with his deputy the *chaudhri*, sometimes the order is inverted. Both offices, which are occasionally vested in one and the same person, are ordinarily held by hereditary right, but hereditary claims have often to give way to the superior claims of an outsider; in a Native State the appointments require the ratification of the ruler. There is a third official, the *adhika* who is a paid servant of the *Panchāyat*. In larger communities, like *Kalāt* and *Bēla* and *Blāg* the *Panchāyat* is composed of a definite number of members especially appointed; in smaller communities everybody of any standing at all takes his place on the governing board as a matter of course. Each *Panchāyat* is ordinarily a self-contained whole working independently of similar bodies elsewhere, though there is sometimes a shadowy right of appeal to the *Panchāyat* of a larger community—from *Mēkhtar* for instance to *Duki*, and from the petty Hindu community in *Afghān Shūrāwāl* to the more flourishing settlement at *Nushki*. But this independence is not inconsistent with a certain amount of reciprocity: thus in cases of grave importance the *Lahri* *Panchāyat* will invite the *Panchāyats* of the neighbouring villages of *Phuleji* and *Chhatr* and *Shāhpur* to its councils and, if necessary enlist their co-operation in exacting the penalty from a delinquent. The functions of the *Panchāyat* are to keep the peace in the community to support its religious institutions, and to preserve its social system. It settles disputes among its members. It maintains the places of worship and feeds religious mendicants. It assists at domestic ceremonies and punishes sins against society. The sanction behind its orders is the force of public opinion and the extreme penalty it can inflict is *war khawā* the withholding of the hookah that outward emblem of excommunication. But the authority of the *Panchāyats* is on the wane, as a consequence partly of the institution of courts throughout the country partly of the fashionable spirit of individualism that has taught men to make light of the severing of old ties and to meet social ostracism by calmly shifting their quarters. But a timely recognition that these useful bodies are losing much of their usefulness will probably result in just that amount of wholesome yet unobtrusive official support that is needed to restore them to their former vigour.

22. *Caste*

200 An important characteristic of these *Panchāyats* must not be overlooked. Except in *Quetta*, where the Hindu community has become so overgrown that conditions are abnormal, neither caste nor sub-caste enters into their composition: there is nothing incongruous or unusual in a *Panchāyat* subscribing impartially to a *Sikh Dharma* and to the worship of a *Deri* or of *Daryā Pir* or in a *Panchāyat* (like that of *Chūharkot* in *Bārkhān*) which is composed almost wholly of *Arōras* having a *Brahman* as its president. In other words, a *Panchāyat* is a *Panchāyat* not of caste-members but of the whole body of Hindus in a village community. It is indeed almost always sheer waste of time to question a member of one of these old Hindu families regarding his caste. *Brahman* he knows and *Muslimān* he knows and it is enough for him that he is neither the one nor the other but a Hindu pure and simple. Most of the families are undoubtedly *Arōra* some few are very possibly *Khatri* the *Bhātās* of *Las Bēla* are probably *Rājpūt*. But these are distinctions too nice for a local Hindu. It is more than possible that he may never have heard the terms before. Nevertheless, though his mind may be a blank as to the name of his caste, he can sometimes give the name of his sub-caste—possibly a hoary name like *Abūja* possibly a newly coined name like *Rāmzai* or *Panjazai*, modelled on the name of a tribal section. But it is merely a matter of names after all. The *Rāmzai* and the *Panjazai* and the *Abūja* may have each some cherished peculiarities of their own. But such peculiarities strike no discord between them. The old Hindu families are a brotherhood of equals among themselves they know no distinctions valid enough to influence the intercourse of everyday life. And even outside their own select circles few distinctions are recognised. Let a man

but be a Hindu, and they will eat with him and drink with him, and though they will not marry their daughter to him, they will marry a daughter of his with alacrity

291 They are more broadminded still, for Musalmān influence and Musal- Food and drink.
mān environment have made themselves felt at every turn. Take for instance the water question. The Hindus employ the useful *halla*—goat-skin or sheep-skin—almost as freely as their Musalman neighbours. Outside Quetta it is even employed for water to be used in places of worship. It seems to defy defilement that Musalmāns have fetched it from the river or well, matters not a whit. It is somewhat otherwise with the *dilla* or earthen pot. In most parts of the country Musalmān touch renders it unclean, yet in Sibi a Hindu woman is glad enough if her Musalman sister lends her a helping hand with her *dilla* at the well, and throughout Las Bēla and in many parts of the Kachhī water brought by a Musalmān in a *dilla* is drunk without a qualm. In Nasirābād, by the by, it is such an everyday matter for a Hindu to prop up his *dilla* against his leather shod foot when he wants to pour himself out a drink of water, that I can only suppose that no one would be more astonished than he to hear of the horror of orthodoxy at the enormity of his act. As for water in a brass pot, the accepted rule is that water fetched by a Musalmān is clean enough for washing and bathing, but too unclean to drink. In Nushkī and some parts of the Kachhī such niceties are unknown: here they drink the water and wash with the water, and never think twice about it. There is much the same laxity over food. Musalmāns, both male and female, are freely employed as domestic servants, and it is part of their workaday duties to sweep out the kitchen, smear the floor with cowdung, and scour the cooking-pots and eating vessels. But even local Hindus draw the line somewhere, and they never allow a Musalmān to touch the cooked food, or to enter the kitchen while it is being cooked. Both these restrictions, however, are relaxed in the case of roast meat, of which they are very fond. Here their orthodox scruples are replaced by another of a very different kind: they are as particular as Musalmāns themselves that all flesh they eat should have been *halāl*-ed; if *ghalla* is known at all, it is certainly not practised. Away from home the local Hindu throws to the winds the few scruples he may pride himself on at his own hearth. He does not hesitate to borrow a Musalmān's griddle or a Musalmān's oven, nor—unless perhaps another Hindu is looking on—would he turn up his nose at the food some kindly tribesman may have offered to cook for him.

292 Except to a certain extent among the Aīoras of Nasirābād, where Marriage
the Utradhī consider themselves a cut above the Dakhana, there is a free interchange of marriage among all the old Hindu families. There is doubtless a tendency for marriages to be confined within the particular locality, but this is merely a matter of convenience, arising from the accident of distance which separates the various settlements. In Las Bēla again, the Bēlāro who constitute the old established residents are inclined to keep themselves apart from the Pardēsī, as the later comers are called, notwithstanding the fact that the same sub-castes—the Lohāna and Bhātia, for instance—overlap into both, but the artificial barrier between them is constantly broken down. Outside the charmed circle of old families a father would never dream of going for a match for his daughter, not even an alliance into a higher caste would tempt him. Where he himself is concerned, he is much less hide bound in his tastes. Fifteen or twenty years ago there was a regular epidemic of marriages with Marwārī women, who were imported (especially in the Balūch tribal country) under high-sounding but unknown caste-names. In marriages arranged after this fashion, occasional mishaps were only to be expected; but it was too much even for a local Hindu when his new-wed wife settled down to her work at the hand-mill with a pious *Bismilla*. The *misalliance* was hushed up, and the woman was married off to a Musalmān who lived at a convenient distance away. Not that marriages—I suppose one must call them marriages—with Musalmān women are altogether unknown. There have been three within recent times which have come to my knowledge: one in Nushkī, another in Jhalawān, and a third on the Makrān coast. In the last case the husband was an orthodox Hindu by religion and a Snāi Aīōra by caste. His wife was a Zikrī when he married her, but thanks to his suasions—this is a delightful touch

borrowed from my Musalman informant—she has laid her horsey aside, and is now a devout Sunni most punctual in her prayers. The union was happily blessed with numerous offspring of whom one daughter and three sons survive. The daughter has been married off for a respectable bride-price to a Gichki the *wikā* being duly read at the ceremony; the sons are shortly to be circumcised. Though the Musalman wives in all three cases were of low birth, little difficulty seems to have been experienced in arranging excellent matches for the daughters in Musalman circles. But such hybrid marriages are probably a thing of the more loose if more harmonious past. I doubt whether they would be tolerated nowadays by either the Musalman or the Hindu community.

Marriage age

203. In the old days child marriage appears to have been unknown. Girls were married off any time between the ages of twelve and eighteen; their husbands were generally three or four years older. But here again old customs are breaking up. There is a growing feeling that the sooner the children are married off the better. Two influences are at work. Orthodox Hinduism is gradually filtering into the country bringing with it the conviction that early marriage is a religious duty. And the greater freedom enjoyed by individuals of both sexes under British rule has brought home to the people the apparent advantage of settling their children safely in life, before they reach the dangerous age when they may be tempted to strike out a line for themselves. Needless to say this idea is doubly operative with regard to the girls; here independence may easily become an alarming scandal. Yet even so, matters are still a long way off infant marriage in the strict sense of the word, and the lowest age at which boy or girl is known to have been married is seven.

Widow remarriage age.

204. Almost more significant from the orthodox point of view is the local attitude towards widow remarriage. It is prevalent in varying degrees throughout the country. In Kalat, Mastung and Nuahki it is in somewhat bad odour and relatively infrequent. In the Kachhi the betting is at least three to one that a widow of anything like marriageable age will marry again. In the Mari and Bugi country a widow remarriage entails the payment of twice the usual marriage fee to the local Panchayat, which passes on a portion of it to the Brahman and a larger portion to the Lalji temple in Dera Ghazi Khan. In Las Bela the usual fee is cut down by half. In many parts of the country there is none to pay at all. There is considerable disagreement as to the position of the deceased husband's brother in the matter. In Quetta he is ruled out of court entirely. In Duki he appears to have an absolute right to the widow's hand, and if he prefers to forgo it, he can still claim her bride-price; elsewhere he has usually the prior claim or rather the first refusal, for the lady is supposed to have the last word in the business. And if there are more brothers than one, the lot falls not to the older or the younger but to the one who is still unprovided with a wife.

Divorce.

205. But a still greater scandal awaits orthodoxy in the existence of divorce. For if divorce is certainly not common, it no less certainly exists. Misconduct is the usual provocative, and divorce is generally accompanied by the payment of compensation. Even in Quetta, where the old families might be expected to have imbibed some of the rigorous ideas of the large orthodox community or at any rate to comport themselves with a due regard to outward appearances, there have been at least two cases of divorce within recent times. In the first the discarded wife eventually married a Panjabi. In the second, which took place only the other day she was married off to a local Hindu of Lalai. As a rule it is no doubt felt that it is more decent for the discarded wife to enter upon her new married life in another part of the country as in these two Quetta cases. But not everybody is so particular. There are two divorcees living with their second husbands in Dikdar, with their erstwhile husbands living round the corner.

Future tendencies.

206. It would be a bold man who would venture to dogmatise regarding the directions in which the customs of the old Hindu families will flow on the opening up of the country. There are too many cross-currents. But I cannot help thinking that before long castes will be reconstituted where they have not been wholly forgotten, and usurped where they have. Whether

the old sub-castes like Ahūja will be burnished up, or whether the Rāmzai and the Panjazai and the other fantastic modern creations will be able to hold their own, time alone can show. But it seems pretty clear that the sub-caste is destined to play a larger part in social and more especially in matrimonial life in the near future. Nor would it be surprising if groups like the old Bēlarō and the younger Pardēsī of Las Bela or the old Taldār and the younger Kachhiwāl of Quetta—artificial distinctions which have grown up around purely residential qualifications—became in course of time rigid endogamous sub-castes. Yet the present tendency, I admit, is in the opposite direction. As the years roll on, the marriage age will probably be pitched lower and lower, and infant marriage may possibly become general in Balūchistān just when enlightenment is banishing it from India. Divorce can hardly hope to survive the influx of orthodoxy for long, though the convenience of it is too apparent among their Musalmān neighbours for the old Hindus to relinquish it without a struggle. Nevertheless, the present tendency seems again in the opposite direction. Widow-remarriage will probably be eschewed by and by among families imbued with a desire to rise in the social scale, but it has taken such firm root in the country at large that it will certainly die hard. A spirit of reform will possibly grow up round the household hearth, but a wholesale reform in matters of food and drink will probably set in last of all, the Hindu population will always be too scattered for the nice observance of the strict rules of diet by a man who goes peddling about the country. It must not be overlooked that while the alien Hindus temporarily settled in Balūchistān are already influencing the old families in some slight degree, they themselves have not remained uninfluenced by the surrounding laxity, at any rate as regards diet. But as I count on having a few orthodox friends among my readers, I prefer to draw a modest veil over their venial and, I doubt not, temporary lapses from the strait path of orthodoxy.

297 These then are chief among the many peoples of Balūchistān. In a survey like this, it is not easy to bring their peculiarities, characteristics, and points of difference into clear relief. Yet even so it will possibly be a bit of a shock to learn that anthropometry reduces all the peoples so far measured in Balūchistān—and the net has been spread wide enough to catch Balōch, Pathān, Brāhūī, Dēhwār, Jatt, Lōrī, Mēd and Ghulām—to one and the same race, the so-called Turco-Iranian type. But this is not all. Through the medium of anthropometry the peoples of Balūchistān are now re-united to strange, long-lost kinsmen in the Hunza and the Nagar and the Kāfir and the Hazāra. Well, we will say nothing about the Hunza and Nagar and Kāfir. I doubt whether our Balūchistān peoples have ever clapped eyes on any of them except at the Delhi Darbār. But with the Hazāra they have a pretty intimate acquaintance. And like myself they would probably be hard put to it to imagine a much greater gulf between any two human types than that which exists—to the uninitiated eye—between the Hazāra and, let us say, the Mēd.

Anthropometry
versus empirical
conclusions.

298 When the tentative conclusions of science come into such rude conflict with the working pre-conceptions of everyday experience, it is only natural that the layman, even though he may feel obliged to accept unquestioned the premises on which the science is based, should look not a little closely at the actual methods which the science adopts. For here at any rate he may perhaps be a better judge than the scientific man himself. And as far as Balūchistān is concerned, criticisms are ready to hand. There is first and foremost the absurdly small numbers on which the conclusions are framed. And yet one cannot help feeling that even though the numbers had been multiplied a thousandfold, the Nagar and the Kāfir and the Ghulām and the Mēd and the Hazāra and the rest would still have been made to fit the same Procrustean bed. But when we find measurements of Balōch, for instance, among the data, we are entitled and more than entitled to ask who these Balōch were. Judged by their locality, they were Marī and Bugṭī. But what Marī? Shīrānī Marī? But these are commonly supposed to be Pathān by origin. Or Baddānī? But these are supposed to be Brāhūī. Or Mohandānī? But these are supposed to be Khetrān. Or Jhūng? But these are supposed to be slaves. The questioning in the case of Brāhūīs would be more pointed still. For years I have interested myself in the Brāhūīs, and am still uncertain where to look for a

Its methods
criticised.

pure type. The Brāhūis are so mixed as regards tribes and clans and sections that I should have thought even the most ardent anthropometrist would have realised it to be a thankless task to measure 198 Brāhūis in the Sarawāk country *en bloc*. In Baluchistan more perhaps than elsewhere, is it necessary for anthropometry to go to work on cautious and modest lines. The people must be measured tribe by tribe, clan by clan, section by section, and, if it be possible, the measurements should be restricted to families of known pedigree only.

Its premises
examined.

299 But the layman seems now in a position to form some opinion on the validity of the premises on which the whole superstructure of anthropometry has been founded. The persistence of the racial head type—to take the most fundamental premise of all—is an idea entirely at variance with the vivid, if unscientific, impressions of the traveller who cannot but be struck with the change, for instance, that comes over not only the stature and physique but also, as it seems to him, the head and physiognomy of the product of the European slums in the healthy environment of Australia. And now if I may put my trust in such of the results of Professor Boas' anthropometrical researches in New York as have come my way it would seem that anthropometry itself is justifying the conclusions of experience against the premises of anthropometry. These results seem to show clearly enough that even the head cannot escape from the influence of those multitudinous factors that we call environment. For where also can we find the explanation of the fact that the cephalic index of home-born Sicilians is 78 and the cephalic index of Sicilians born in New York is 80 or that the cephalic index of East European Jews is 84 and that of their descendants in New York 81?

Cephalic index
influenced by
environment.

300 But these and other experiments now being conducted by Professor Boas in New York suggest a wider generalisation. They seem to show that the heads of immigrants drawn to New York from all parts of the world are gradually approximating to one and the self-same type. Thus the brachycephalic Jews are losing their brachycephaly the dolichocephalic Sicilians are losing their dolichocephaly and both are approaching from opposite directions to a type which for the present we may call the New York type. If these results are confirmed, we have an explanation ready made for the similarity that runs through the head measurements so far taken in Baluchistan. We have also an explanation for the surprising coincidence that throughout India the classification of races according to head measurements falls together in a curiously convenient manner with geographical divisions. In other words, on this showing we must apparently look to anthropometry to give us evidence not so much of common race as of common environment.

Aid by sensory
experience.

301. Now the changes observed in the Jewish and Sicilian population of New York are confined, it appears, to people actually born in the new country and do not occur among those born, let us say on the sea voyage out from home. So far therefore, we have apparently been concerned with the influence of pre-natal environment only. The nature of this environment is of course not very easy to define environment after all is a term of the vaguest connotation, one of those Mesopotamian words which conveniently cover a multitude of things unknown. But there appeared a few months ago an article in a German medical journal which attacked the anthropometrical position on the other flank. While anthropometry has long realised the necessity of making allowances for artificial deformations, Walcher the writer of this short but most interesting article, has demonstrated the ease with which a change from brachycephaly to dolichocephaly or the reverse can be induced—and that in the most natural and unartificial of manners—by simply taking the trouble to lay the babe during the first months of its life either on its side or plumb on the back of its head, according to the particular kind of cephalic index that you desire to produce. Thus, given a ten-day old babe with an index of 79.6, Walcher arranged to have it kept on its side (chiefly by the device of giving it a hard pillow) and made it markedly dolichocephalic with an index of 72.5 in less than eleven months given a dolichocephalic babe three weeks old, with an index of 78.3 he kept it from lying on its side (chiefly by means of a soft pillow) and so converted dolichocephaly into brachycephaly (with an index

of 82.4) in little over ten months. Here are the details of three more of Walcher's experiments in the pre-determination of the head-type —

Child Erk	Child Friedrichsen	Child Butz
(b 14-2-10)	(b 5-11-09)	(b 2-6-05)
26-2-10 79.1	11-11-09 78.9	2-6-05 80.6
1-4-10 77.1	1-12-09 84.8	2-8-06 73
3-5-10 76.8	3-1-10 89.08	11-10-10 74.1
2-6-10 73.8	1-3-10 86.6	

The last experiment is the most interesting of the lot for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it is spread over a longer period than any of the others. The parents, like their child at birth, are themselves brachycephalic, the father's index being 84, the mother's 83.2, so is the three-year old sister with an index of 81.5. The child was under control for 14 months only, and it is expressly stated that it was given a soft pillow (in other words was encouraged to lie on the back of its head) after it left the observer's control, a fact which possibly accounts, in some measure at any rate, for the slight reversion to the original type. Now these experiments are of course tentative, not final. We must await the subsequent life-history of the patients, we want to know for instance, whether the slight rise in the case of the child Butz and the slight drop in the case of the child Friedrichsen (which occurred apparently while he was still under control) developed still further in later life. But one must needs be a very whole-hearted anthropometrist to anticipate that, great as are the changes arbitrarily or accidentally impressed on the skull in the first months or years of life, they will pass off in due course, and that the original racial types will reassert themselves in the end. This would surely be a miracle indeed—even in the eyes of the anthropometrist himself. So much seems clear. Anthropometry cannot brush aside these established influences of early nursing as mere accidental deviations on this or that side of the normal, which will right themselves when the population is measured up in the mass. True, the manner in which babes are laid to rest in our own nurseries is, for aught I know, a mere toss-up, it is just possible that, as the child of rich parents is more likely to sleep on a soft pillow than the child of the poor, whose pillow is often hard enough, we ought to anticipate a tendency to brachycephaly in the upper classes and a tendency to dolichocephaly in the lower. But the case is very different among more unsophisticated peoples. Here, if I may judge by our peoples of Baluchistan, custom will be found to reign as supreme in the nursery as in other walks of life, and the anthropometrist will have to recognise that nursery customs are as seriously disturbing factors to be reckoned with as the influence of environment.

302 Whether anthropometry will be able to take up the challenge and issue strengthened and triumphant from the difficulties that now beset it, time alone can show. The chances seem against it. Present-day anthropometry at any rate appears to be in somewhat parlous case. That it will not be able to maintain its premises, methods and conclusions in their present form, is tolerably clear. One is reluctant to believe with Walcher that so great a mass of painstaking drudgery can be altogether labour lost. One would rather hope that anthropometry may yet be able so to adapt itself to unforeseen difficulties as to throw some flicker of light on the infinitely complex problem it so lightheartedly set itself to solve. Yet glancing at the photograph of the twin sisters in Walcher's article, I cannot help wondering whether the future of anthropometry does not lie along practical rather than scientific lines. The cephalic indices of these twins at birth are unfortunately not given. At two and a half years the index of the one destined for dolichocephaly was 78.4, the index of the one destined for brachycephaly was 86.2. But not only have their skulls been deliberately moulded at the relentless will of the scientific observer, their faces have undergone changes, apparently *pari passu* with their skulls. And the result is striking indeed. The tragic melancholy of the long-faced dolichocephalic twin is in sad contrast to the jolly visage of her round-faced brachycephalic sister. Not at random surely has folk-anthropometry (if I may coin the barbarous term) ever associated jollity with roundness of face and melancholy with lantern-jaws and lean and hungry looks. And anthropometry would certainly have done the world

Possible practical future for anthropometry

good service though not the service it set itself to do, if it led on to the discovery of an easy natural but withal irresistible method of adding to the galaxy of nations.

Head-turning
among the
Brāhmins.

303. Though Walcher's article created no little flutter in anthropometrical dove-cots, its main thesis is as old as the hills, at any rate in Balūchistan: "Too many nurses," says the Brāhūī proverb (and the Pāṭhāns have a proverb modelled closely after it) make the babe's head oval or—as we should put it—too many nurses spoil the babe's head. The first concern in a Brāhūī nursery on the birth of a child is the moulding of its head and features. There is no time to lose. During the first three days the babe's body is believed to be so plastic that it can be shaped to will, especially if it is not exposed to the air. Whatever is to be done, must be done in the first fortnight, though as a matter of fact most people persevere for full forty days. According to the current idea—and this may be of interest to the anthropometrist—the babe is born with a tapering head. Nothing could be more opposed to Brāhūī standards of beauty and, I may add, to Brāhūī canons of luck. So they bestir themselves at once to set nature right. The methods they adopt are curiously like Walcher's. First and foremost the babe's head must be laid on a soft pillow millet being the usual stuffing. The object (as in Walcher's experiments) is of course to keep the babe plumb on the back of the head. The forehead again should be neither convex nor concave, but flat so they keep it wrapped round in a muslin bandage, drawn as smooth and as tight as they can get it. In these matters a girl gives her parents much more anxiety than a boy. A boy they say is one of nature's jewels and stands in scant need of embellishment after all is said and done. But failure in the case of a girl is little short of a disaster; so they bore three or four holes in her ears, with the result that if she chance to turn over to one side on her pillow the pain soon makes her turn back again to the proper position.

And among the
Jatt, Balūch and
Pāṭhāns.

304. The Jatt and the Balūch appear to have much the same standards of beauty as the Brāhūīs and much the same methods of conforming to them. So have the Pāṭhāns, but as the Brāhūīs have no very high opinion of the results they achieve, and are fond of poking fun at their long "mortar-shaped" heads, I will describe their methods at some length. The first thing the nurse does is to wipe down and dry the babe, body head and all. Then she carefully rounds the head with her hands. This done she takes a piece of old muslin and lays it four-folded over the infant's scalp. Then she swaths head and shoulders round with a long strip of cloth keeping it in place with a band, called *paṭī* which must be either silk or muslin. In Kandahar they make black silk kerchiefs, called *kalagāī* especially for this purpose. Thus trussed up, the babe is laid in its cradle on a soft pillow—usually stuffed with millet—with the object of inducing it to lie on the back of its head. Day by day the face is cleaned with a mixture of kneaded flour and ghee, which after use is kept in some safe place for forty days and then thrown into a stream. Every now and then the head is douched with the mother's milk. On the fortieth day the head and the whole body are bathed for the first time. The folded napkin is now discarded, its place being taken by a *raḥkākā*, a female headgear made of silk or some other soft material. But the *paṭī* is considered indispensable for two or three years, to shield the tender head from the air. Not until the child can pronounce *kāṣai* (stone) do they consider that the bones of the head have properly set. But the Pāṭhāns in their over zealous use of the *paṭī* seem frequently to defeat their object, with the result that the head at the end of the treatment is often found to be elongated—"the reverse of natural beauty as in the case of my own," adds my informant pathetically. Among the womenfolk, I am told, this tendency to elongated heads is exaggerated by the scraping back of the hair into one long plait behind. The Brāhūī Balūch and Jatt women, on the other hand, wear their hair in two plaits, which, scented and plastered with gum, stick out like ram's horns on either side. To a Brāhūī's eye it almost seems as if the Panjabī woman were proud of what he calls her "nut-shaped" head, for not only does she scrape back her hair into a

¹It is not even novelty or mere scientific strain. Many facts show how easily the skull is affected. Ethnologists believe that it is modified by the kind of cradle in which infants sleep. Darwin's *Descent of Man*, Ch. 2.

single plait, she sticks a rounded ornament called *chaunk* on the top of her head, which makes it look more nut-shaped than ever

305 But as anthropometry does not stop short at the measurements of the head, let us pass on to the deliberate moulding of the features. And here I will confine my remarks to the Brāhūis, though it must not be supposed that the other peoples of Balūchistān do not have parallel customs. One of the first things they do when a babe is born is to examine the size of its mouth, measuring it against a finger-joint. If it's too large, they compress it within a small ring, rubbing the lips slowly to make them thin. Not less is the care they lavish on the ears and on the nose, which is pinched constantly and pressed upwards. In fact what with pulling and compressing and massaging with kneaded flour and oil, they devote as much trouble to the features of a new-born babe, as a fashionable beauty-doctor in Europe to the wrinkles of his lady patients. They even do their best to train the hair in the way it should grow, for few things are more fraught with ill-luck for a Brāhūi maiden than to have her *baunrī* or the whorl of her hair at all forward on the head. So unchancy is such a *baunrī* that a girl had almost better be lame or blind or deaf, she would certainly have just as much prospect of getting a husband. Thus then is one of the first things a nurse must look to, and it rests with her to coax the *baunrī* with her deft fingers towards the back of the head. Not even the foot is overlooked, for the Brāhūis heartily endorse the Persian saying *sar-i-kalān kalān ast, pā-i-kalān ghulām ast*, a large head is the mark of a nobleman, a large foot is the mark of a slave. Not only should the foot be small, it should have a pronouncedly arched instep. To secure this shape, which they call *mōza-pād* or "boot-foot," the nurse massages the foot with oil, pressing the instep up with her thumbs. Bow-legs (a literal translation, by the by, of their own expression *kāmān-pād*) are regarded as a most unlucky formation, and they seek to avoid it by tying the legs together and stuffing wads of rags in between them to keep them straight. To be really effective, the whole course of beauty-treatment should be begun on the day of the birth and be sedulously adhered to for at least forty days. As may be imagined, the womenfolk are kept pretty busy in a Brāhūi nursery.

The moulding of the features,

306 So convinced are the Brāhūis that art should be the handmaid of nature, and so confident are they of the efficacy of their methods that, not even where their domestic animals are concerned, are they content to leave nature alone. The foreheads of their lambs and kids are smoothed and flattened by constant dabbing with the palm of the hand, for a smooth flat forehead is looked upon as a highly desirable feature in sheep and goats. How far the pointed, inward-tapering ears of the Balūchistān breeds of horses are natural, I do not know. The Brāhūi at any rate does not leave such important matters to chance. He takes a rag some eight inches square, cuts two holes in it, and thrusts the ears through, until the rag rests on the forehead. Not only is this treatment designed to pull the ears to the proper shape, it is intended to narrow the forehead. Another point in horseflesh which is much prized is a slender foreleg above the knee, and this they seek to secure by means of bandages, which are left on the legs until they get worn out or fall off of their own accord.

Similar treatment of domestic animals.

307 As the results of anthropometry, whatever be their value elsewhere, are stultified by nursery methods in Balūchistān, we must cast round for other means of analysing the racial characteristics of our peoples. Now Baelz¹ has put forward the theory that the appearance of temporary blotches of bluish pigmentation, which he was the first to observe among the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans and Malays, is an universal mark of Mongolian race. That they have been observed also among the Eskimo, he regards as a corroboration of his theory, he seems, by the by, to have overlooked the fact that similar patches have been observed among the Tagals of the Philippines.² Here then we are offered something tangible to go upon. And as the Hazāra are popularly supposed to be Mongolian, we have an opportunity of putting Baelz's theory to some sort of test in this country. Now none of the doctors I consulted had ever noticed any such pigmentation among the Hazāra or any

Blue markings on babies among Hazāra.

¹ Z f B. o d B G, 1901, Heft 11.

² Deniker, *The Races of Man*, p. 51.

other peoples of Baluchistan. So I had to fall back on less directly accessible but hardly less authoritative sources of information. But even among the indulgent midwives there was considerable haziness on the subject. Thus the first to whom I applied indirectly for assistance, said that out of the last eight Hazara babies that she had helped into the world, one had a bluish patch about the size of an eight anna piece on the arm and the second had a patch, somewhat smaller on the lower sacral region. Saint marks she called them. But a wider enquiry in midwifery circles led to the conclusion that such patches are to be found on all Hazara at birth generally on the lower sacral region the size varying from a four anna to an eight-anna piece. They tend to disappear early in life, and rarely last after the second year. But I was told of an Hazara who still has a blue patch on his arm though he has long left his teens behind him.

And among
Brāhūis.

309 Thus Bacl's theory seemed to find not a little corroboration. So far so good. But my enquiries at once revealed the presence of similar pigmentation on all Brāhūi babies. Every Brāhūi babe, so my information goes, is born with bluish patches, some two or three inches in diameter on the buttocks or at the back of the leg above the knee, which fade away in the first month or so after birth. Very occasionally there are also similar patches on the back of the waist and under the shoulder blades patches on the front of the body there are none. The colour varies somewhat: generally it is black, but occasionally it is purple, and occasionally reddish. Reddish colouration is the first to disappear purple the last. The current belief among the midwives is that the discolouration is caused by the impurities in the menstrual blood during the period the babe is stored up in the womb the nutritious portion furnishing it with its nourishment. Thus on Bacl's theory, one ought to be able to make out a good case for the Mongolian origin of the Brāhūis. An astounding conclusion this. The more so the pity that I cannot adopt it.

And among
Baluch, Pathān,
Jatt and Khosh.

300 I have been careful to reproduce the definite statement of my informants that this pigmentation is to be found on all Brāhūi babies, irrespective of tribe. The assertion is hardly susceptible of absolute proof, but it may be safely accepted as implying that fairly wide enquiries have not discovered the existence of exceptions to the general rule that Brāhūi babies are marked in this manner. Now as there is every reason to believe that a large number of Brāhūi tribes are not Brāhūi at all, but Pathān, Baluch, Persian or Jatt by origin, one would be led to suspect, if the statement were true, that similar patches would be found among other races of Baluchistan. And this my enquiries show to be the case. Among Pathāns the pigmentation seems to be very arbitrary in its occurrence, if my informants' powers of observation can be trusted among the Tarin of Pukin it is frequent in some villages, and appears never to have been heard of in others among the Achakzai of Chaman who are also Tarin, it seems to be common enough among the Kākar of Loralai it is said to be unknown. Yet it occurs in the neighbouring *tahsil* of Kila Saifalla, where it is said sometimes to degenerate into obnoxious and even dangerous sores among the Dumar of Shāhrig blue blotches appear on the buttocks of many infants a couple of days after birth, but though they usually vanish within three months, they are regarded as a disease which is occasionally fatal, and the precaution is often taken of wrapping the infant up in a goat skin. Among Baluch and Jatt in various parts of the country the pigmentation seems to be looked for as a matter of course. Even among domiciled Hindus it is, if not universal, at any rate far from uncommon. According to the midwives who practise among the Jatt, the patches are simply the marks left on the body by the placenta but then the midwives attribute all sorts of wonderful things to the placenta should a dog or a cat get at it the mother's milk runs dry so the wisest thing is to bury it safely indoors, and if it is covered with rice and molasses, so much the better as this will insure that the goodwife is shortly brought to bed again. But the learned men pooh pooh the idea that the placenta has anything to do with the patches according to them the patches are marks left by the Jinna, and there would be no patches at all, if there were no Jinns to pinch the luckless infant. Unfortunately I have not seen the patches myself nor presumably would I be competent to express an opinion whether they are essentially the same among the various peoples, and similar

to the pigmentation observed by Baelz and others elsewhere. But now that attention has been drawn to their appearance in Balūchistān, the subject will doubtless be looked into by medical men. My own impression is that similar pigmentation will be found to be common enough among many races of India¹

310 Where then shall we turn for guidance out of the labyrinthine race-problem of Balūchistān? We should at once issue into the blaze of daylight if only we could put our faith in language and let it lead us wheresoever it will. What could be more easy than to ticket off the Balōch as Iranian, the Jatt and the Lāsī as Indian, the Pathān as Iranian with a strong Indian strain, and the Brāhūī as Dravidian? Unfortunately we have long since learnt to discount the evidence that language has to offer, or rather, while fully recognising that it may contain a clue to the solution of the problem, to regard it as introducing yet another complexity, yet another element that will have to be explained. The history of a language and the history of the people that speak it must obviously dovetail in their later chapters, there is no earthly ground for assuming that their opening chapters and the development of their plots have anything in common at all. Language does not cling immutably and immemorably to race: there is nothing unchangeable about it like the spots of a leopard or the skin of an Ethiopian. And commonplace though all this is, it is just as well to point the moral with a few local illustrations. The Raisānī and the Zairakzai are fairly typical Brāhūīs of to-day, they have been the premier tribes of Sarāwān and Jhalawān far back into the history of the Brāhūī Confederacy. Yet both claim, and claim apparently with justice, to be Pathān by origin, and the fact that they speak Pashtō no longer, not even as their secondary language, does not strike them, nor need it strike us, as being in any way irreconcilable with the theory of their Pathān origin. Again the home language of the Raisānī chiefly family is not Brāhūī, the language of the tribe as a whole, nor Pashtō, the language of its origin, but Balōchī. Among the Mirwānī, who are Brāhūī if any Brāhūī is, there is hardly a man that can speak Brāhūī at all. The Hazāra speak a Persian of sorts, but whatever else they are, they are certainly not Iranian. This shifting of language is going on almost before our very eyes in Sind, where the Brāhūī is rapidly forgetting the speech of his fathers and taking on the alien language of the alien land of his adoption (§ 78). I will mention but one more case in point, perhaps the most curious of the lot. If we want to hear the purest form of Western Balōchī and at the same time the most archaic form of Balōchī in existence, I have the warrant of the Western Balōch on the one hand and the warrant of Professor Geiger on the other that we must go to the Gichkī. Yet the Gichkī but three or four centuries back were apparently Indian speaking Rājput—at any rate they were neither Balōch nor speakers of Balōchī. Not that language must be ruled out of court where race is in question. Far from it, the evidence it is trying to stammer out may be very much to the point indeed. We cannot, it is clear, class the Brāhūīs as Dravidian, we cannot even assume that they were ever in direct contact with Dravidian races, simply because they now speak a Dravidian language. Nevertheless, if comparative phonology is ever able to work out the road by which the Brāhūī language straggled into Balūchistān, or to prove beyond cavil its exact degree of relationship to the many branches of the Dravidian language-group, that itinerary and that pedigree ought with luck to throw some light on the past history of the Brāhūī-speaking people. But as matters stand, there are too many gaps in the evidence that language has to offer for us to take it at its face value. Of all circumstantial evidence, language is the most dangerous, and I for one do not propose to give a dog a bad name and hang him on the strength of it.

311 Still less do I propose to enter into a comparative study of names, ancient and modern, or seek evidences of origin in the similarity of their sounds—or should we not rather say of their looks?—that will-o'-the-wisp that has long flickered its treacherous light over the ethnological obscurity of Balūchistān. Never surely was a country so hapless a victim to loose etymology. Balūchistān itself has been supposed to enshrine the mighty name of Belus or Baal. Then we are asked to step from the sublime to the ridiculous and to read in Makrān

¹ I have, for instance, been told of patches on the babe of a high caste Brāhman from the Panjāb

a corruption of *maḥi-khārān* or "fish-eaters"—a naïve piece of folk-etymology suggested by the Ichthyophagoi whom Alexander found on the seacoast, on a par with the local idea that *Makrān* is the land of *maḥr* or deceit. The Balūch themselves are supposed to be *bad rōk*, men of "evil day" or *bar-rōk*, desert-naked or—and here comes a daring flight of imagination mis-called philology—the ancient Gadrūai themselves who harassed Alexander on his fateful march through *Makrān*. This school of etymology is delightfully accommodating. If you feel qualms about fathering the Balūch on to the Gadrūai (and well you may) you are offered the present-day Gadrū or Gadrūi as the alternative you may take your choice. Both are found in *Lav Bēla*, but the one is at the bottom of the social scale, the other at the top. Nor is there any lack of representatives for the Oritae, who are coupled in the Greek historians with the Gadrūai. In modern history they reappear either as the *Hūt*, an ancient Balūch tribe now fallen on somewhat evil days, or the *Hūrū*, an insignificant subsection among the *Alir-Ilājī* Mēngal. The *Paṭhān* or *Pakhtūn* must of course be the *Hakartae* of Herodotus unless they are the *Παρθύραι* of Ptolemy—though the reason is hardly obvious. The *Brāhūi* are the *ba-rūā* i, "people on the hill" or—as they themselves prefer to put it—*ba-rāh-i*, "people without roads" or—here again we must nerve ourselves to dizzy flights—men of *Biroea*, the ancient *Aleppo*. But imagination runs wilder yet over *Brāhūi* tribal names. The *Mēngal* are the *Mēn* people, and of course the *Alin* of the *Bohrīstān* inscription. The *Sajidi* with their subsection the *Sakzai* are the descendants of the great Scythian tribes, the *Sagatae* and *Saka*. The *Sarparra* are similarly the descendants of Strabo's *Sarmaratae*, a Thracian tribe whose name was supposed to be derived from their custom of decapitating strangers; and here ancient and modern folk-etymologies meet, for *Sarparra*—on the basis of the *Paṭhto* *ser prē-kar-i*—is popularly explained in precisely the same way. And not content with identifying the present-day *Mēd* and *Jaff* with the *Mēd* and the *Jat* of the Arab historians, they ask us to hark back to the *Medes* and the *Gedhae*. And so on, and so on wild guesses all. It is not for me to say that when the bow has been so often drawn at a venture, an arrow has not somewhere hit the mark. But it behoves us now to cry halt, and wait soberly for the slow advance of comparative philology; crimes enough have been committed in its name.

Arguments from
customs.

312 No one, I suppose, has grubbed among old and vanishing customs without hoping that he may by accident stumble across some one custom that will give him the clue to the racial origin of the people he is studying. Does any other people, one wonders, toy with stones in quite the same fashion, quite so childishly and yet so seriously as the *Brāhūi* (§§ 100-109)? But to be truly *racist* the custom must be very primitive and the more primitive it is, the more likely is it to turn out but another pleasant illustration of the same old grooves in which the human mind works all the world over. Then up crop analogies in occupations and crafts. I am told, for instance, that *Brāhūi* and *Balūch* would be fully qualified to drive sheep and goats and camels in Arabia, because they use the identical calls that the animals already know; that the silver design on *Nashli* sword hilts is characteristically Assyrian; that the stitch or pattern—I forgot which—on *Brāhūi* needle-work is characteristically—I forget what. Unfortunately I neither have the knowledge nor have I had the time to follow up these and similar clues. If the suggestions are really founded on fact, it is possible enough that there may be something behind them. But evidence of this nature is clearly circumstantial evidence at best; and instead of justifying us in rushing to conclusions, it is much more likely to embarrass us with yet another difficulty by demanding an explanation as to how on earth this Assyrian connection, or whatever it be, can possibly have arisen.

Conclusion.

313 And so we must leave the subject of the origin of our races in Balūchistan with a confession of ignorance. It almost looks as if the whole question of race were insoluble at the present stage of ethnology. First philology and then anthropometry have played us false, and there is nothing in the field to take their place as a ready method of solving the difficulties. A few philologists have kindly warned me that, though they are no readers of census reports, they intend to skim those pages for the solution to the *Brāhūi* problem. That their flattering curiosity will go unrewarded, no one regrets more than

myself. It is now some years since I closed a short essay on the Brāhūis and their language with these words: "We can no longer argue with the child-like faith of our forefathers from philology to ethnology, and assume without further ado that this race of Balūchistān, whose speech is akin to the languages of the Dravidian peoples of Southern India, is itself Dravidian, that it is in fact the rearguard or the vanguard—according to the particular theory we may affect—of a Dravidian migration from north to south or from south to north. Such short cuts in ethnology are no longer open to us. The questions with which this essay opened, return to us at its close, but they return with deeper import. Who are these Brāhūis, whose habitation is in Balūchistān, and whose language has to stretch beyond their utmost ken over so vast a tract of country and over so many alien languages before it can reach its own kin in the languages spoken by the strange peoples in the far-off south?" The question has haunted me ever since. The more I have studied the riddle, the more helpless I feel to unravel it. Now and then I thought the clue was in my hands, only to fling it aside as useless. And the only answer from which I can never get away is the mockery of that fine rhetoric of Sir Thomas Browne: "What song the Syrens sang, or what name Achilles assumed when he hid himself among women, though puzzling questions, are not beyond all conjecture." In sober truth, I feel as much competent to read those classical riddles as the riddle of these Dravidian-speaking Brāhūis.



CHAPTER XII.

OCCUPATION.

Statistical data

SUBJECT	TABLES	
	Imperial.	Subsidiary
Occupation in general	XV	XXIX
Variation 1901 11		XXX
Occupation by selected tribes	XVI	XXXI
Agricultural implements, livestock, etc		

314 It is a little humiliating to have to confess that the statistics of occu- General.
pation, which bulk about as large as the rest of the statistics put together, are in some ways the least satisfying of the lot. This is partly due to their very complexity, which invests them with a specious air of minute and scrupulous accuracy they do not really possess. And yet, paradoxical though it may seem, if we must have complexity at all, we should be better off with complexity carried to a higher pitch. All we attempted to record were the principal and subsidiary occupations of actual workers, and the source from which those supported by the labour of others derive their subsistence. This is enough and usually more than enough for a country in the swim of modern civilisation with its highly developed specialisation of labour. But in a primitive country like Balūchistān a man may put his hand to a score of things in the year's work. He himself perhaps may like to say that his chief employment is scratching his little patch of land, though one half of the village may tell you that most of his time is taken up with his flocks, and the other that he would find it hard to make two ends meet were it not for the cultivation of his neighbour's land. And withal it is quite possible that in reality he derived still more from the casual labour he picked up on the railway (which he now prefers to forget), or from the camel-loads of dwarf-palm leaves he bartered in Sind, or from his peddling trip to Makrān in the date-season, or from the asafoetida which he went far afield into Chāgai to collect and down-country to sell, or from any of the other odd jobs he condescended to do during the year. Yet in the end it may be nearer the mark to say that the chief means of livelihood of this apparently active worker is his share in the fruits of the labour of some other member in his family.

315 But these are difficulties that attach in varying degrees to a census of occupations throughout India. In Balūchistān we have to face a peculiar difficulty of our own to boot. As the tribal census was a census by families, we were obliged to deduce the occupations of the various members of the family from the occupation recorded for the householder himself, except in special cases where special means were employed to record specialised occupations. As regards the males, there need be little misgiving that in the mass the results are not just about as true to life as they would have been, had the particulars been collected individual by individual in the ordinary way. There remains the Record of occupa-
tion in the tribal
census.

thorny question of the womenfolk. In treating all children, whether girls or boys, as dependants on the main occupation of the head of the family we can hardly have gone far wrong. In treating all women in the same way we have at any rate faithfully reflected economic conditions, not indeed as they actually are but as they present themselves to the minds of the tribesmen at large. Speaking broadly—for in certain parts of the country where the tribal system is breaking up, conditions are a little different—a tribeswoman remains in a state of tutelage her whole life long as a child she is subject to her father as a married woman to her husband, as a widow to the heirs of one or the other. In theory she has no occupation at all: she is a mere dependant on the family into which she was born or into which she has married. In actual fact she is one of the hardest workers in the family though most of her work is household drudgery and other lowly labour that a tribesman considers beneath his dignity. It is, for instance, the man himself who ploughs the land, sows the seed and waters the crops; the woman helps in the reaping and threshing and grinds the dally corn. In a nomad family it is the man who goes to the breeding and shearing of his flocks; the woman pitches the tent, does the milking and the churning and the like, and often enough has to take the flocks out to graze. And everywhere she is the hower of wood and the drawer of water. But to treat her as a farmer in the one case or as a grazier in the other would be to do violence to the deep-rooted prejudices of the tribesmen regarding the position and functions of the sex. Ask any tribesman to enumerate the actual workers in his household, and he will run over the roll of full-bodied men in it; the women he will lump up with the children as dependants. Put it to him that his women do a vast deal more hard work than any of the men and he will promptly retort that the same applies to his ox and his ass. Boreft of the labour of his women folk, a tribesman's life would be hardly worth living to judge by the experience of a mulla who recently went on a revivalist mission among the Mari Baluch. Preaching the rigid observance of the fast the strict performance of the prayers, the punctilious giving of tithes, and the modest veiling of the women, he quickly gathered quite a respectable congregation round him. Even his insistence on the shearing of the luxuriant locks on which a Mari prides himself failed to check the wave of religious enthusiasm. But presently it began to dawn on his congregation that the apparently harmless roll turned their women into drones, and they gradually fell off one by one, until backsliders are now, alas, almost as plenty as converts.

310. As theory and practice are hopelessly at variance over the proper functions of womankind in Baluchistan it is obviously safest in reviewing the statistics to look not so much to the number of the actual workers as to the total number supported by the several occupations. To examine each detailed group would be weary work. Nor would it be particularly profitable. The one unimpeachable thing about an occupational census is that the larger the unit, the truer the account it can render of itself. Acting on this cautious principle, I have ranged the occupations under a few general headings which seem to hold

Distribution of Occupations.	
Agriculture	68
Pasture	11
Industry	4
Administration	4
Trade	4
Transport	2
Domestic service	2
Labourers (Industrious)	1
Professions	1
Others	2
	100

out most promise of reflecting the economic life in Baluchistan. And the most striking feature of the figures in the margin is the enormous number of the population that is dependent in some way or other on agricultural pursuits. To most of us Baluchistan probably conjures up a pastoral rather than an agricultural country. But the idea, I fancy is derived partly from a reminiscence of the state of affairs that existed before our coming, partly from the physical conditions of the country itself and partly from the fact that the people according to our standards are mighty fine graziers but even to-day prodigious poor farmers. In the old days of tribal warfare the tribesmen were chary of husbandry not merely or mainly because they were only just emerging from the pastoral stage, but because husbandry tied them down to one locality and so exposed them to the attacks of their enemy. As the ruined towers dotted over several parts of the country were to remind us, they only tilled as much land as their towers could command. But peace under British rule has altered all this and an observant traveller will come across few patches of really cultivable land that have not

been brought under the plough, and will readily admit that if large tracts are left idle here and there, lack of perennial water and a scanty and precarious rainfall are ample excuses. That our statistics do not seriously exaggerate the agricultural tendencies of the population (though taken literally they may exaggerate the position of agriculture as the chief means of livelihood) may be gathered, I think, from the somewhat remarkable census we took of the farm

Ploughs and Oxen.		
	Ploughs	Oxen
Balūchistān	75,924	139,304
Districts	33,327	60,425
States	42,597	78,879

implements and live-stock in the country. In a country where a plough and a couple of oxen go to almost every dozen inhabitants, there is nothing surprising in 68 per cent of the population returning themselves as dependent on agriculture. I am of course not prepared to vouch that all or even the majority are wholly and solely dependent on agriculture or that agriculture really beats pastoralism in the proportion of six to one. Where occupations are combined so freely as they are in Balūchistān, it is inevitable that the more respectable but possibly less lucrative occupation should be singled out, and the less respectable shoved into the background. There are comparatively few people lucky enough to be able to rely entirely on the produce of their land, and several owners of goodly flocks and miserable plots of land have probably returned agriculture as their main source of livelihood. Industry, administration, trade, follow a long way behind. At first I was a little mystified at finding industry the foremost of the three, but the explanation lies of course in the humble nature of our industrial pursuits. Except as basket-makers and well-sinkers, the tribesmen contribute little to the industrial figures, nor do they make any very serious demands on the industry of others. Given then carpenters and blacksmiths, they carry on very comfortably by themselves. The backbone of the industrial population is formed by the menial classes that serve the simple needs of the village community and the township: grain-parchers, butchers, bakers, wool-spinners, cotton-weavers, boot-makers, tailors, dyers, barbers, scavengers. True, the needs of the alien population have called one or two of the more highly developed industries into being, but those that follow them are a mere handful, and contain as yet but few of the real natives of the country among their number. In the very modest dimensions of the Industrial table (XV-E) there is eloquent proof how backward industry in the large sense of the word still is in Balūchistān. At first sight it may seem a trifle curious that four per cent of the population should derive their livelihood from administration in a country where the reins of administration are held so lightly as in Balūchistān. But a little sifting would show that the figures are recruited largely from the army, the levy corps, the police and the district levies, and would serve to remind us of two important facts—facts apparently paradoxical and yet in reality closely interrelated—to wit, that Balūchistān is called upon to play a very active and responsible part in the policing of India, and that the keynote of its internal administration under the Sandeman policy is home-rule, the gradual pacification of the frontier by the frontier tribesmen themselves. That there should be almost as many people dependent on transport as there are on trade may sound a little quaint to those who do not know this land of camels, for my own part, I am surprised that the number of those who returned themselves as primarily dependent on pack-animals is only 19,554. It may seem strange that two per cent of the population should be connected with domestic service in the primitive life of Balūchistān, but a large proportion of them are servile dependants, one of the typical features of the country. The only other occupations I have found room for in my list are labour, pure and simple, and the professions. There is little to choose between them in point of numbers, in the majority of cases there is precious little to choose between them in social status either. Indeed in Balūchistān the labourer often looks down upon our so-called professional men, whose ranks include (for statistical purposes only) minstrels.¹

¹ We even took a census of indigenous musical instruments—not that we seriously wanted the information, our enquiries were merely meant to disarm suspicion when we enquired about rifles. The statistics, too grotesque for the text itself, are sufficiently interesting for a footnote.—

	Dambūra (rebeck)	Sirūz (fiddle)	Rabab (lute)	Surnā (hornpipe)	Dhāl (drum)
Balūchistān	1,090	974	313	861	705
Districts	376	342	62	719	151
States	714	632	251	142	554

and midwives, the lowest of the low. There remains a miscellaneous group of miners, fishermen, beggars and others, who account in all for about two per cent of the population.

317 It would be interesting to compare these broad statistics with the similar statistics of a decade back. But comparison is really hopeless. It is not simply that our present scheme of occupations is different or that wholesale administrative changes have taken place, or that vast areas were left uncensused in 1901. More serious than any of these difficulties is the fact that the bulk of the population enumerated in 1901 were censused on a tribal basis, and their occupations recorded on the word of the headmen of the tribal sections. The resultant statistics give us inevitably a very distorted picture of the economic conditions that existed ten years ago, and the comparison I have instituted in the margin

Variation 1901-12 per cent.

	Baluchistan	Districts	Per cent
Agriculture	- 2	- 4	80
Pasture	5	64	678
Industry	125	22	63
Administration	9	2	184
Trade	82	- 20	83
Transport	- 02	86	124
Domestic service	110	—	70
Labour (industrial)	- 21	- 4	14
Professions	163	60	47
Others	- 9	- 42	

proceedings. Grouped together agriculture and pastoralism show an increase of 5 per cent in the province as a whole, an increase which corresponds closely enough with the nominal increase of 3 per cent in the population. Industry if we can believe the statistics has gone up by leaps and bounds. It certainly has not. The apparent increase and the similar increases in the professions and domestic service are chiefly due to the disdain of the tribal leaders to bother themselves overmuch about the parasites of tribal life at the last census. Transport is the only pursuit that appears to have gone down, at any rate in the states. And here hopelessly inaccurate though I believe the occupational census of 1901 to have been, it seems for once to have hit the mark.

318. But it would be idle to pursue the comparison further. Nor do I propose to go into niceties over the present occupational census. Perhaps the shortest cut to the broad facts concealed in the mass of statistics is to pick out the main occupations of the indigenous peoples leaving the detailed statistics to heaven the general impressions at which we arrive. And first and foremost comes agriculture. Now though the ordinary scheme of occupations is almost absurdly elaborate for the very simple life of Baluchistan we rashly went out of our way to add complexity to complexity by probing a little deeper into the various methods in which the agriculturists pursue their calling. But the results (the gist of which is given in the margin) would hardly tempt me to repeat the experiment. They certainly cannot be taken at their face value. To us a non-

Non-cultivating landlords	21,621
Cultivating landlords	80,667
Peasants	86,828
Free and sold labourers	4,514

cultivating landlord conjures up a picture of the owner of broad acres, living at his ease on the produce of his estate. One has only to cast one's eye down the list of occupations in which the non-cultivating landlord of Baluchistan is prepared to engage (table XV B), to appreciate how different our conception of the country squire may be from reality. For here in Baluchistan he is not only landlord but stock-breeder, camel-driver, labourer even beggar. The truth of the matter is that it would be a little difficult to come across a tribesman who cannot call some wretched plot of land his own just sufficient to enable him to fall in with the prevailing fashion and to glorify it into his main source of livelihood. The typical non-cultivating landlord is not the big chief or the man of wealth who disdains to sully his hands with the plough, but the poor man whose land is too unproductive for it to be worth his while to turn from his flocks or herds to look after it especially when he can get some one even poorer than himself to do so for him. It is much the same with the statistics of the cultivating landlords and the various classes of tenants. The mere fact that fully a fourth of their number have also returned themselves as dependent on animals, either as breeders or drivers, is enough to make us suspect that agricul-

ture is not always then most paying concern. It is only the farm and field labourers whose figures are innocent of all traces of exaggeration. Here indeed the figures err on the other side. They take no account, for instance, of the swarms of people, chiefly pastoralist, who so arrange their gipsy wanderings that they are able to roam from one harvesting to another, both in their own country and in Sind, picking up not only a respectable little livelihood for themselves, but also some excellent grazing for their flocks and herds.

319 Yet though the agricultural figures must be taken with a grain of salt, it is after all the spirit of the age that has infected them with their taint of exaggeration. Not only is agriculture rising in the public estimation, peace under our rule is enabling it to encroach on the old pastoral life more and more every day. Were the natural conditions of the country really favourable (and the fact that there are not 500 water mills in the country is a suggestive commentary on this point), the change would be rapid enough. But the supply of perennial water is limited, and a very large amount of the culturable land is dependent on flood or wholly on rain. Land no doubt, as the local proverb says, is a flock that never dies, but rain-crop cultivation, as another proverb puts it, is mighty like hunting the wild ass. If rain-crop land is all the land a family possesses, it is hopeless to rely entirely on so precarious a source of livelihood, and the petty landholder of the country is almost always an owner of flocks or herds. Time was, and not so very long ago either, when the sheep and the goat were the real staff of life in Balūchistān, even to-day they are all that stands between large numbers of the population and starvation or wholesale emigration. "The sheep," Nasir Khān the Great was fond of saying (and the only reason why he did not mention the goat was that the sheep is the shepherd's pet, while the goat comes in for all his curses), "the sheep is a goodly tree that bears four and twenty fruits—flesh, wool, milk, curds, whey, ghee—" and a multitude of other products, for many of which the English language might be ransacked in vain to supply equivalents. It may perhaps seem a little curious that the prime importance of flocks in Balūchistān should find so faint an echo in the number of shepherds and goatherds according to our statistics there are merely a couple of thousand actual herdsmen in the whole country. The simple explanation is that most flock-owners look after their flocks themselves, as for grazing, it is the regular thing to entrust it to the children or the poor old father who is getting past work. It is only the larger flock-owners or those who have valuable irrigated lands that engage outside shepherds. And there may be some little difficulty in securing them. For, according to the popular idea, a shepherd's life is not a happy one, and able-bodied youths are loth to take it up except in the last resort.

320 Although sheep and goats are vital to the existence of so many of its inhabitants, Balūchistān seems to have produced no breeds of any repute outside it. Yet, curiously enough, the local breeds of those luxuries of pastoral life, the ox and the horse, have won a fame far beyond its borders. But it is not the countless sheep and goats, nor the magnificent Bhāg-Nārī and Balā-Nārī

	Live-stock.		
	Camels	Donkeys	Horses
Balūchistān	55,087	51,614	14,044
Districts	23,542	24,902	7,360
States	31,545	26,712	6,684

breeds of cattle, nor even the famous Balūchī mares, that seem to catch the eye of the new-comer, but the apparently ubiquitous camels—especially when he sees them, as he may within half a dozen miles of Quetta, yoked to the plough. And indeed the camel ranks in local importance second to the sheep and the goat alone. With the exception of the patient ass, which is usually looked down upon as the characteristic drudge of the lowly Hindu and other poor creatures, it is the only natural means of transport in the country. In the old days, it is true, pack-animals were in no very great demand. The tribesmen were much more concerned to provide themselves with nags for their raids than with beasts of burden for transport, and merely kept enough camels and donkeys for their own small needs. It was not until the last Afghan war that their eyes were opened to the great profits to be gained from the camel. Rates went up a hundred-fold, everybody who could got hold of a string of camels and rapidly made his fortune. So developed a new and popular occupation, especially among the Sarāwān Brāhūis, from what was originally a mere matter of personal

convenience. But though Government brought the trade into existence and has given it an impetus from time to time, the tribesmen are beginning to have an uneasy feeling that the railway extensions are dealing it its death blow and that the game is about played out. With the decline of government needs, the camel transport trade is languishing and camel breeding seems somewhat on the wane. But this is probably a merely temporary reaction after an abnormal boom in the trade. The camel still holds the field as the one form of local transport in Baluchistan, and it is difficult to see how it can ever be supplanted off the line of rail.

Barter and trade

321 But comparatively modern though the regular camel-trade is, the camel itself has been essential to one characteristic means of livelihood in Baluchistan from time immemorial. To a man of Makran for instance, a couple of camels is a veritable godsend. He loads them up with dwarf palm leaves, makes his way down to the coast, barter his dwarf palm for dried fish, packs the fish on his camels and carries it off to the nearest date-grove where he barter it for dates, only to dispose of them elsewhere and so he goes the round. This is typical of a very ancient form of trade in the Brāhūi and Balōch countries, and the centre of the trade is Makran. At the time of the date-harvest, people flock in from far and near bringing camels laden with fish, dwarf palm, wheat, tobacco and all kinds of produce, and barter their loads for dates. And the process is repeated in miniature in the dwarf palm areas. This *girdōli* trade, as it is called, is almost the only form of trade that the Balōch and Brāhūi tribesmen do not think beneath them. The Pathān curiously enough, is much more of a trader outside his own country than he ever is within it. Perhaps he prefers to trade—if trade he must—outside Baluchistan, on the same principle that the Brāhūi prefers to labour—if labour he must—in an alien country where his dignity as a tribesman will suffer no eclipse: perhaps he thinks that his own countrymen are too poor to afford him a paying market, perhaps he has too high an opinion of their business wits. The consequence is that most of the local trade is in the hands of the Hindus, and the only serious challengers of their monopoly are the European and Parsi traders in the towns, the Indian and Persian merchants on the trade-route, the Ghilzai pedlars in the Pathān country and the fishmongering Khōjas on the sea-coast.

Tribal life

322 We may now take a bird's-eye view of the economic life in the country. Society falls roughly into three main groups. At the top of the economic scale is the town life, an artificial by-product of our administration, in which the tribesman at present plays but a fleeting part. Then there is the village community, to be seen at its height in the Kachhi, in which again the tribesman hardly plays an active part, only resorting to it every now and then to indulge in some new-found luxury. And lastly there is the tribal life, ranging from the purely nomadic life of the Bikanjari Brāhūi to the settled life of the Magahi Balōch. And this to us is by far the most important of the three. It is difficult to exaggerate its supreme simplicity. Take, for instance, the typical tribal life among Pathāns. A Pathān tribe with its few parasites is complete in itself. The tribesman is his own house-builder, grazer, husbandman. He may even be his own priest at any rate there are priests in plenty among his fellow tribesmen. He has no scavengers: his mode of life is such that one is hardly needed. He has no barbers: it is a case of shave me and I'll shave you—very possibly with a broken bit of glass. He has no midwives: any old crone about the place will perform the kindly office in his family. He has no potters: any vessel his womenfolk cannot make for him, he can get from the peddling Ghilzai, who also supplies him not only with copper pots and glass bangles but with new-fangled shoes, which have recently driven the home-made rope and hide sandals out of fashion. The Ghilzai indeed is the only outsider on whose services he relies and he finds the *khāre*-digging Ghilzai even more indispensable than the Ghilzai pedlar whose part after all could be easily taken by the tribal Hindu. In the Hindu, from whom he gets his sugar and his oil and his cloth (which his women fashion into garments in his own house) he has a general storekeeper, money-lender, grain-broker, ghee-broker, wool broker rolled into one. Almost equally invaluable is the blacksmith-cum-carpenter who for a regular dola at

each harvest, will turn him out sickles and ploughshares, razors and dooi-chains, knives and daggers. And third and last of the tribal parasites are the itinerant weavers, who make him carpets and tent-coverings from the wool he himself supplies. Among the Brāhūis and Balōch, though the women may be handier with distaff and needle, there is rather more division of labour in the tribal life, not so much because of their greater needs as because of their great laziness. Among them, for instance, the Lōri or blacksmith plays many parts, an indispensable jack of all trades (§ 284), the Lōri's wife is called upon to perform at least two important functions in domestic life, as go-between in marriage negotiations and as midwife. But life is becoming more complicated everywhere, widening perceptibly as a direct result of our administration. Facilities of communication have taught the tribesmen something of the tempting luxuries to be derived from the village community and the township, though so far neither the one nor the other is itself tempting enough to lure them to dwell in it. The standard of living among the tribesmen has risen out of all knowledge. New needs suggest new means of livelihood to supply them. Occupations which their fathers scorned are gradually being adopted one by one. A labour market has been opened at their doors: even distant markets are beginning to attract them, for labour has become mobile. Hence it is that most of the complex occupational groups that now figure in the census statistics have received recruits even from the tribesmen, though the recruiting is still very languid. But with each succeeding census we may expect that the tribal numbers, now lumped round agriculture and pastoralism, will become increasingly dissipated over the more specialised forms of occupation.

323 But primitive as is the economic life of our tribesmen, it was much more primitive before we came to the country. And no picture of present-day Balūchistān would appear in its true light unless it stood out in contrast with the Balūchistān of bygone days. Asked to state their principal occupation, the Marī Balōch mistook our meaning—we incautiously used the ambiguous word *asli*, which may mean either principal or original—and began to put themselves down wholesale as raiders, and the enumerator (himself a Marī and one of the most intelligent men in the tribe) protested indignantly when the accuracy of his record was called in question. But the forays of the Marī and Bugtī are things of the past, and in any case they are so well-known that I will turn from these ancient border raiders to those lesser known but notable highwaymen, burglars, cattle-lifters, rifle-thieves—the Achakzai Pathān (§253). Though the Achakzai are now on the reform, the old Adam is still alive among them, indeed it is popularly believed that, when an Achakzai is stricken in years and getting past work, he cannot woo sleep unless he first pilfers something out of his house and hides it away. Not that the Achakzai are all tarred with the same brush. There is of course many an Achakzai, and for the matter of that many an Achakzai section, whose conduct—for Pathāns—is irreproachable. Yet in recent times the Usmānzai section are commonly supposed to have been driven by the force of tribal opinion from unsportsmanlike honesty into joining the gentle craft of burglars, and many of them have accordingly shifted over into Afghānistān in search of a better opening for their new profession, now languishing under the unsympathetic regime of British Government. Some sections specialise in one branch of the profession, some in another. The Ghaibzai Bādinzai are expert cattle-lifters and confirmed kleptomaniacs on a petty scale, always very chary of risking their hides. The reckless daring of the Hamīdzai Gujanzai stops at nothing. But the real aristocrats of the profession are the Kākōzai Bādinzai. Their forefather Kākō, I am told, once made an ecstatic flight through the air with a gobbet of flesh between his teeth, and to a Kākōzai this pious legend is proof positive that burglary is a highly respectable calling for Kākō's descendants. But I dare say I have left out some step in the argument. Anyhow they are such past masters in the art that their pride in it is almost pardonable, and if genius is really an infinite capacity for taking pains, they have assuredly good claims to the title.

324 With a hearty contempt for the botching of amateur cracksmen, they always go over every inch of the ground beforehand, whether they work near home or far afield. It takes a gang of five to bring off a really artistic burglary. They fare forth severally and take service in houses worthy of their

Raiding and
thieving as
occupations

Burglary as
fine art.

attentions. Each stays with his unsuspecting master long enough to learn all the ins and outs of the house. Then, clock full of useful knowledge they throw up service and forgetful to compare notes. The honour of the day rest of course with the late servant of the richest house, and off they go to his old haunt to master the topography. On the great night they meet a few millos from the doomed house. If the ground is frozen enough to make tracking difficult they put on leather shoes called *ang'le*. But if there's any danger of being tracked, they wrap bits of rug round their feet. They strip themselves almost to the skin and see to it that what little clothing they keep on is dirty enough to be invisible in the dark. The rest they hand over to the least useful member of the gang and drop him behind about a mile from the house. Then with pouches crammed with stones, they move forward to within a hundred yards of their quarry where one is posted as *jadra* to keep on the look-out. The others make their way stealthily to the house and set to work on the wall which they breach with a *sik'aka* or jemmy. As soon as the breach is big enough the bravest of the gang squeezes through armed to the teeth. Cautiously he strikes a light and takes a hasty look round. If there's somebody asleep in the room, he calls one of his comrades to stand over the sleeper with a drawn sword, while he himself hands the treasure to the man outside. As soon as he has made a clean sweep, he joins his comrade and they decamp with the booty. The man on guard gives them a few minutes' grace, and then follows suit going through the hole backwards, in case the sleeper has been sleeping with one eye open all the time, and should raise the alarm or attack him in the back. Once clear of the house they spread out, each finding his own way to the *tryst*, where the spoils are to be divided. A lion's share goes to the hero who first entered the breach. Half a share is good enough for the man who looked after the clothes. Not that the fates are always on their side. Many a pretty piece of work has been spoilt by interruption. If there's any thing amiss, the man on the look-out attracts his comrades by flinging a pebble towards them. Once the alarm is raised, they take to their heels in different directions. Should one of them run into the crowd, he joins in the hue and cry bellowing "Stop thief!" with the loudest but soon lags behind and sneaks off. If the gang is rounded up they turn and offer a stout resist ance pelting their pursuers with stones from their pouches and, if needs must, slashing about them with their swords. If the worst comes to the worst, they abandon their hard-gotten booty and make off as best they may but whenever they can, they conceal it in the hopes of recovering it when the coast is clear. In the good old days (and those days are not quite dead) it was a recognised thing for the thieves, if eventually tracked and unable to clear themselves on oath to disgorge two-thirds of the loot and to retain the rest as *pa'ke'ff* or "foot-covering" a slight sop for all the wear and tear of foot-gear they had been put to. A lad is initiated into the mysteries of the profession as early as possible. He first tries his prentice-hand with the bundle of clothes. Then he acts as scout. Then he is taken along to learn the art of breaching a wall, but all he does at first is to hand the tools and make himself generally useful. If he gets through his probation creditably he has to enter the house himself and pass out the loot. His apprenticeship is now over he is fully fledged, a master of the craft, entitled to his full share of the spoil.

in the theft.

325. Of rifle-theft needless to say they make a speciality though in this branch of the business they have nowadays little scope within Baluchistan itself, for long and bitter experience has taught their prey most of the tricks of the trade. Here again their success is due not so much to their skill, admirable though it is, as to their close study of every factor in the problem. The whole surroundings, the petty habits of the sentry, his exact beat, the pros and cons between the moment of greatest drowsiness (when he is nearing the end of his watch) and of greatest stupor (when the relief first comes out from the light into the dark)—everything down to the smallest detail is gone over again and again before they venture upon action. And when such close study of details is combined with consummate skill in stalking behind a screen of leaves or in a goat's skin small blame to the sentry who to his cost takes the thief on a pitch-black night for a dog or a lamb if indeed his attention is attracted at all before it is too late.

326. As highwaymen, they are equally artistic in their methods. While Highway rob the gang lurks in hiding close by, the most raggamuffinly of the lot squats by the roadside, counting his beads with an unctuous piety that allays all suspicion, and keeping up a flow of devout ejaculations as wayfarers pass by. Along comes a caravan too strong to be overpowered. *Allāh y'ū, numūna ya dēi dī, chī pa k'm nām' bē-bōl'm?*—"God is One! but His names are many! By which name shall I call him?" bawls the holy man. And the caravan passes slowly and safely on, little dreaming that such innocent and devotional words have saved them from attack. Presently up comes another which ought to fall an easy prey. And at the words *lā ilāha illallāh, allāh y'ū dar, p'r rā g'rē'i*, "There is no God but Allah! Allah is One! So—down on 'em!" out rush the gang, pounce on the travellers, strip them of every stitch and their camels of every load, bind them hand and foot, kick them blindfolded into a ditch, and go on their way rejoicing.

XXIX —Occupational Variation 1901 1911

TOTAL POPULATION SUPPORTED.

Occupations.	1 1901.				1 1911.				Variations (+) Decreases (-)	
	Males.	Females.	Total.	Ratio.	Males.	Females.	Total.	Ratio.	Males.	Females.
Agriculture	277,827	203,425	481,252	310,134	274,078	204,231	478,309	311,157	12,665	-2,813
Industry	51,214	24,071	75,285	27,253	41,104	51,829	92,933	43,970	16,723	+14,246
Commerce	16,423	13,708	30,131	2,925	15,143	19,044	34,187	20,740	4,444	16,226
Transport	73,129	13,014	86,143	6,151	72,721	10,764	83,485	46,413	4,944	-51,967
Trade	22,087	16,278	38,365	8,311	23,413	15,411	38,824	7,278	-2,234	10,870
Arts and professions	7,703	24,146	31,849	8,770	21,083	8,410	29,493	8,410	467	2,134
Domestic service	4,253	9,023	13,276	291	6,400	4,048	10,448	6,916	2,277	4,610
Labour (Indefinite)	6,897	4,000	10,897	2,708	7,168	7,186	14,354	7,487	+5,119	4,368
Others	11,000	10,000	21,000	3,000	10,400	4,814	15,214	-2,571	-5,143	+1,253
	14,214	9,201	23,415	8,003	14,970	8,478	23,448	-1,451	-3,057	+2,146

XXX.—Occupational distribution per 1,000 actual workers among Selected Tribes.

NAME OF TRIBE	Agriculture	Pasture	Industry	Transport.	Trade	Administration	Art and professions	Domestic service.	Labour unspecified.	Others
Balōch	843	79	11	23	5	11	3	4	5	16
<i>Eastern</i>	905	58	8	5	2	6	8	3	4	6
Bugṭi	805	113	4		1	1			11	5
Khetrān	942	23	9		1	11	5	3	1	5
Mingasi	903	54	11	1	6	2	2	9	4	3
Mari	882	90	12	3		7			1	5
Rind	929	18	5	13	1	11	6	4	4	9
<i>Western</i>	660	148	20	75	15	24	4	4	8	47
Rakhsānī and Naushērwanī	618	214	8	88	5	45	5	2	9	6
Brāhūi	666	216	7	50	7	26	4	4	13	7
<i>Original nucleus</i>	640	258	7	30	7	36	2	8	11	11
<i>Sarāwān</i>	739	83	9	84	7	41	6	7	18	6
Bangulzai	770	86	8	70	2	48	6	4	7	4
Lāngav	813	25	17	79	11	13	3	12	25	2
<i>Jhalawān</i>	627	239	6	82	8	15	8	2	11	7
Bīzanjav	537	375	5	43	14	4	2	4	4	12
Māmasanī	478	391	5	52	4	22	7	6	20	15
Mengal	557	353	8	37	6	22	3	2	8	4
Zehri	747	191	4	20	10	11	1	1	12	3
Pathān	802	93	14	20	8	26	10	3	14	10
Kakar	757	128	10	22	8	29	11	4	19	12
<i>Sanzarkhēl</i>	743	161	11	15	6	26	9	8	14	12
<i>Snaṭia</i>	764	81	6	33	9	44	14	8	27	14
<i>Targhara</i>	827	31	12	36	19	16	13	4	30	12
Paṇi	832	89	25	4	5	30	5	1	1	8
<i>Mūsakhel</i>	945	16	10	2	1	16	8	1	1	5
Tarin	874	25	12	30	7	17	10	4	11	10
<i>Abdāl Achakzai</i>	894	4	8	33	8	20	9	6	12	6
<i>Tōr Tarin</i>	875	19	12	34	6	15	12	1	12	14
Lāsī	601	300	28	16	4	18	2	1	11	19
Jatt	816	45	87	11	4	5	14	4	3	11
Sayyid	749	66	16	16	24	24	90	3	9	3
Other Musalmāns	523	41	192	55	24	22	35	6	21	81
<i>Darzāda</i>	790	7	116	11	13	6	13	9	4	31
<i>Lōṛi</i>	123	8	600	1	5	4	127	6	6	120

XXXI—Agricultural Implements, Live-stock, etc.

District or State	Water mills.	Wind mills.	Ploughs	Plough bullocks	LIVE-STOCK			
					Horses.	Donkeys.	Cattle of settled inhabitant.	of nomads.
RAJASTHAN	492	83,330	75,054	139,304	14,014	51,614	30,541	15,240
DISTRICTS	409	32,312	33,337	66,425	7,360	21,962	15,818	7,784
Jaipur	197	2,743	2,851	6,359	840	2,361	2,903	131
Lodhna	84	8,702	9,645	12,211	2,231	4,612	879	2,112
Baran	67	4,257	2,202	9,015	651	4,123	4,201	9
Bikaner	—	91	54	64	12	8	3	3
Chittaur	6	1,212	1,212	630	78	1,244	4,272	272
Bhilai	24	12,272	11,272	22,402	2,424	10,127	2,110	1,274
Administrated area	81	9,232	9,090	12,222	2,222	4,222	1,210	844
Non-administrated area	4	2,712	2,272	7,472	1,242	2,222	200	1,110
STATES	83	51,021	42,597	72,872	6,661	26,712	22,722	7,222
Karnal	80	42,822	42,720	67,212	2,712	22,202	12,222	6,664
Baran	42	7,242	2,242	2,220	2,000	2,222	2,222	2,221
Jhalawar	12	12,222	2,222	22,222	212	2,222	2,222	1,222
Kanpur	12	12,222	12,222	22,222	2,222	2,222	2,222	222
Dismal-Kanpur country	1	2,220	2,224	7,224	222	222	222	222
Kanpur	1	2,222	2,222	7,222	222	2,222	2,222	1,222
Kanpur	—	122	122	222	2	20	222	—
Low Kan	3	2,122	2,222	12,222	222	2,222	2,222	1,222


Statistics were unfortunately collected in the Rajputana circle only

CENSUS OF INDIA, 1911

VOLUME IV

BALUCHISTAN

Part II—TABLES



PART II.—CONTENTS.

IMPERIAL TABLES.

	PAGE
I—AREA, HOUSES AND POPULATION	1
II—VARIATION IN POPULATION SINCE 1901	3
III.—TOWNS AND VILLAGES CLASSIFIED BY POPULATION	5
IV—TOWNS CLASSIFIED BY POPULATION WITH VARIATION SINCE 1891	7
V—TOWNS ARRANGED TERRITORIALY WITH POPULATION BY RELIGION	9
VI—RELIGION	11
VII—AGE, SEX AND CIVIL CONDITION	15
<i>Part A</i> —Baluchistan	16
<i>Part B</i> —By Districts and States	17
VIII—EDUCATION BY RELIGION AND AGE	19
IX—EDUCATION BY SELECTED TRIBES AND RACES	25
X.—LANGUAGE	31
XI—BIRTHPLACE	35
XII—INFIRMITIES	41
<i>Part A</i> —By Age	42
<i>Part B</i> —By Districts and States	43
XII A.—INFIRMITIES BY SELECTED TRIBES AND RACES	45
XIII.—CASTE, TRIBE, RACE OR NATIONALITY	49
XIV—CIVIL CONDITION BY AGE FOR SELECTED CASTES	59
XV—OCCUPATION OR MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD	61
<i>Part A</i> —Provincial Summary and Details by Districts and States	62
<i>Part B</i> —Subsidiary Occupations of Agriculturists	80
<i>Part C</i> —Mixed Occupations of Actual Workers	81
<i>Part D</i> —Distribution by Religion	82
<i>Part E</i> —Statistics of Industries	85
XVI—OCCUPATION BY SELECTED TRIBES AND RACES	87
XVII—TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION BY SECT AND RACE	91
XVIII.—EUROPEANS, ARMENIANS AND ANGLO-INDIANS BY AGE	93

PROVINCIAL TABLES.

I—AREA AND POPULATION BY POLITICAL AGENCIES, TAHSILS AND OTHER LOCAL AREAS	95
II—POPULATION OF POLITICAL AGENCIES, ETC, BY RELIGION AND EDUCATION	97

TABLE I

Area, Houses and Population.

The census of Balūchistān was made up of two parts (i) the regular census of towns, bazars and other alien settlements, which was conducted in the ordinary manner on the standard Indian schedule on the night of the 10th March 1911, and (ii) the non synchronous census of the tribesmen and other indigenous inhabitants on a schedule peculiar to Balūchistān, which was carried out during the previous summer, except in *Khārān*, where operations were for political reasons not feasible till the autumn of 1911. The results may be summarized thus —

	Persons	Males	Females
Regular Census	63,007	49,271	13,736
Tribal Census	771,696	417,148	354,548
Balūchistān	834,703	466,419	368,284

The term 'house' includes not only houses, but also blanket tents and other movable or temporary dwellings. The term 'village' includes not only villages in the ordinary sense of the word, but also localities which, though possibly containing no permanent dwellings, are regularly occupied at certain seasons of the year. 172,649 souls in all were enumerated in 912 localities of this description in various parts of the country —

	Periodically inhabited localities	Population		Periodically inhabited localities	Population
<i>Districts</i>	<i>253</i>	<i>60,956</i>	<i>States</i>	<i>659</i>	<i>102,693</i>
Quetta Pishin	80	13,893	Kalāt, &	523	81,979
Loralai	31	12,153	Sarāwan	106	21,651
Zhōb	15	5,146	Jhalawān	260	46,416
Chāgai	19	3,724	Kachhī	13	1,117
Sibi	108	35,040	Makrān	111	6,045
Administered area	21	4,093	Khārān	33	6,760
Mari Bugti country	87	30,947	Las Bela	136	20,714

The various areas have been supplied by the Survey Department and differ—in some cases materially—from those hitherto accepted.

I—AREA, HOUSES AND POPULATION.

POPULATION

POPULATION

OCCUPIED HOUSES

MALES

FEMALES

TOTAL

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TABLE II

Variation in Population since 1901

Census results in 1891, 1901 and 1911 may be summarised thus —

Year	Area in square miles dealt with	POPULATION		
		Total	Estimated	Enumerated
1891	20,568	171,752	142,473	29,279
1901	82,950	810,746	459,728	351,018
1911	134,638	834 703		834,703

The first census of 1891 was too rough and fragmentary to lend itself for comparison in the following Table

The figures for 1901 have been adjusted in view of subsequent changes in administrative charges, the chief of which was the splitting up of the Zhōb and Thal Chōtili districts into Lōralai, Zhōb and Sibi in 1903. No attempt has been made to adjust the rough estimates in the native states, the sanguine nature of which accounts for the apparent decrease in Kalāt at the present census

The following areas are included in the census for the first time —

New census areas	District or State	Method of census	Population
Western Sanjrānī	Chāga	Enumerated	1,620
Makrān	Kalāt	Enumerated	71 942
Khārān	Kalāt	Enumerated	22,663

II.—VARIATION IN POPULATION SINCE 1901

POPULATION VARIATION

District or State	1911			1901			Variations 1901-11		
	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females
1	3	8	4	8	6	7	8	9	10
Bahamas	834,703	468,419	366,284	810,746	443,330	365,396	23,037	25,089	+3,053
Dominica	416,418	230,181	175,237	388,166	219,323	168,843	22,296	+16,638	+18,018
Quetta-Peshawar	197,248	79,697	81,181	114,087	69,918	64,169	+13,661	+7,623	+6,009
Lahore	60,769	44,023	34,916	69,223	94,099	20,344	13,277	6,953	+8,005
Kash	70,306	40,346	30,000	69,718	66,627	80,061	648	+700	-61
Nizam	8,006	1,602	004	1,006	1,493	423	+100	9	181
Orissa	10,344	0,107	7,227	11,096	9,820	7,400	638	+948	-199
RM	117,189	66,816	80,343	113,344	63,111	40,323	4,813	3,716	+1,116
Administrated area	62,023	27,468	34,566	77,997	43,036	34,191	4,206	3,779	+716
West-Bengal country	24,796	13,866	15,078	34,227	19,973	18,003	+609	+13	+296
Station	438,861	227,523	183,043	428,646	221,867	206,612	-8,219	1,241	-9,590
Kash	369,006	194,806	164,466	373,131	196,379	174,223	-13,448	1,861	-11,764
Bombay	61,771	36,009	28,899	64,249	36,366	30,183	-7,783	-7,364	-419
Madras	64,866	37,116	27,116	64,073	118,087	204,996	-173,879	-63,797	-71,079
Coastal	83,719	30,371	43,866	62,867	34,851	28,178	+28,279	+18,940	+19,039
Penaliti-Kabul country	86,403	28,094	20,719	19,828	10,939	9,137	6,091	+8,209	+1,899
Madrin	71,840	37,890	34,944	—	—	—	+71,840	27,796	+24,944
Madras	86,843	28,229	20,640	—	—	—	+86,843	+28,229	+20,640
Los Nils	61,806	33,040	28,016	64,106	32,718	26,361	+8,076	+8,278	+2,176

TABLE III

Towns and Villages Classified by Population.

In this Table column 2 includes 912 periodically inhabited localities (*vide* Table I note).
Column 3 includes 2,497 persons counted on road, railway and steamer —

	Road	Railway	Steamer
<i>Districts</i>	499	1,394	
Quetta Pishin		307	
Loralai	56		
Zhob	443		
Bolan		415	
Chagai		38	
Sibi		634	
<i>States</i>			604
Makran			604

III.—TOWNS AND VILLAGES CLASSIFIED BY POPULATION

District or Pila	Dwars 200			500—1,000			1,000—2,000			2,000—5,000			5,000—10,000			20,000—50,000		
	Number	Population	Number	Population	Number	Population	Number	Population	Number	Population	Number	Population	Number	Population	Number	Population		
1	3	3	4	6	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15				
Paichik (1424)	3,093	834,703	3,398	410,917	352	189,058	90	191,268	26	66,937	2	11,604	1	33,972				
Dzhetysay	1,579	414,418	1,038	176,948	143	94,019	49	68,111	10	30,278	1	6,597	1	23,923				
Qorqas Pila	417	187,444	348	42,467	44	20,451	13	17,192	2	6,790								
Lapchal	447	80,790	414	44,864	22	16,793	9	12,291	2	5,994								
Shab	277	70,308	240	21,917	28	12,982	10	14,445	1	6,572								
Shab	12	2,800	11	844	3	1,127												
Osagol	62	16,344	25	7,216	6	4,582	4	4,408										
Shab	264	117,190	251	43,894	44	20,420	14	18,299	4	12,419	1	6,297						
Abshadard am	243	62,023	211	21,279	21	24,779	11	11,941	1	2,443	1	6,297						
Mar Dapf amaly	46	21,744	80	11,222	70	6,441	2	4,211	2	8,297								
Shab	9,123	490,251	1,933	253,933	129	93,400	41	85,597	10	20,559	1	6,907						
Shab	1,206	208,900	1,006	802,306	112	74,724	29	82,892	8	20,411	1	6,297						
Shab	224	62,731	284	26,678	77	36,437	8	11,543										
Shab	419	64,206	224	67,296	22	21,795	4	4,293										
Shab	640	62,746	441	60,217	76	11,779	11	14,319	1	4,543								
Shab	28	22,443	6	729	3	4,217	4	4,776	4	11,161								
Shab	231	71,942	242	22,795	27	22,416	70	12,990	8	4,237								
Shab	40	22,462	78	11,791	15	9,249	2	2,242										
Shab	297	61,308	290	26,447	27	16,906	2	2,223	2	6,716								

TABLE IV

Towns Classified by Population with Variation since 1891.

Pishin, Chaman, Fort Sandeman, Sibi, Kalāt, Mastung and Bēla were not treated as towns in 1891, the three last have now been treated as towns for the first time. Where past figures are available they are printed in italics, but not included in the totals.

TOWNS CLASSIFIED BY POPULATION WITH VARIATION SINCE 1891

IV

6

TOWN VARIATION

Town	Municipality or State or Territory, etc.	Population	Variation Increase + Decrease -	Males	Females	
			1911		1901	
			1911	1901	1911	1901
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
				8	9	10
					11	12
					13	14
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					571	572
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					575	576
					577	578
					579	580

TABLE V

Towns arranged Territorially with Population by Religion.

160 Chāhṛa and 18 Sāhṛa who returned their religion as such have been classified as Hindu and included in columns 8 and 9 —

Town	CHĀHṚA		SĀHṚA	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Quetta Cantonments	2	5	8	10
Quetta Municipality	60	32		
Lōṛāl	3	2		
Fort Sandeman	16	9		
Sibī	10			
Kalat	1			
Mastung	4	2		
Bēla	8	6		

Columns 20 and 21 are made up thus —

Town	JEW		BUDDHIST		JAIN		NO RELIGION	
	Males	Fe males	Males	Fe males	Males	Fe- males	Males	Fe males
Quetta Cantonments	5	5	2					
Quetta Municipality	22	15	4	6	8	1	1	
Fort Sandeman	1		1	1				
Sibī	2	2						
Bēla			1					

V-TOWNS ARRANGED TERRITORIALLY WITH POPULATION BY RELIGION

TOWN RELIGIONS

10

District or Sub- Type	POPULATION						SEX		LIST		RELIGION		COMMUNITIES		OVERALL				
	TOTAL		MALE		FEMALE		MALE		FEMALE		MALE		FEMALE		MALE				
	1901	1911	1901	1911	1901	1911	1901	1911	1901	1911	1901	1911	1901	1911	1901	1911			
Netherlands	59,559	43,028	10,531	9,514	9,518	13,510	4,929	2,973	748	335	197	10	10	3,750	1,108	90	73	47	30
Districts	48,000	37,840	11,840	17,777	5,358	12,783	4,455	2,898	712	318	197	19	19	3,718	1,100	90	73	46	30
Quinto-Palma	23,025	24,529	8,653	11,515	3,741	8,429	3,526	1,418	415	360	190	14	9	8,514	900	75	10	43	27
Quinto-Palma	19,807	21,913	9,797	8,647	973	4,653	1,273	470	64	78	4	2	2,181	637	5	6	7	8	
Medina-Polity (not included)	27,021	11,054	8,883	3,444	3,793	3,791	1,933	1,013	273	343	143	19	9	263	327	66	31	33	23
La Palma	744	817	227	313	144	146	75	45	13	4	8								
La Palma	1,009	1,808	401	684	194	841	175	323	16	7	4			20	25				
La Palma	1,026	1,423	808	1,073	177	708	236	602	85	13	5	3	43	13	1				
La Palma	1,397	1,911	480	1,344	182	859	171	161	63	17	6	2	5	44	18			2	1
La Palma	1,397	1,900	1,097	1,328	620	1,092	543	344	93	34	19	3	3	63	64	14	13	2	2
Station	9,859	5,383	4,553	4,737	4,169	548	381	75	36					7	8			1	
La Palma	1,397	1,024	803	828	734	183	143	25	31										
La Palma	1,007	1,371	1,323	1,397	2,006	187	125							2	3				
La Palma	1,006	1,448	1,447	1,331	134	101	101	140	15					4					1

TABLE VI.

Religion.

Of the Chūhra community 263 (males 174, females 89) returned themselves as Musalmān, 3,003 (males 1,940, females 1,063) as Hindu, and 33 (males 26, females 7) as Sikh, and have been classified accordingly

968 Chūhra (males 572, females 396) returned themselves as Chūhra simply, and have been classified as Hindu —

	Persons	Males	Females
Quetta Pishin	123	77	46
Loralai	35	26	9
Zhob	44	34	10
Bolan	15	13	2
Chagat	1	1	
Sibi	440	250	193
Kalat	285	155	130
Las Bela	10	10	6

18 Sahasi (males 8, females 10) returned as such in Quetta-Pishin have been similarly classified as Hindu

The last two columns headed 'Others' are made up as follows —

	ZOROASTRIAN		JEW		BUDDHIST		JAIN		NO RELIGION	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Quetta Pishin	77	60	27	20	0	0	8	1	1	
Loralai	1		1		1	1	1			
Zhob										
Bolan	1									
Sibi	14	13	4	5						
Makran	3	1			1					
Las Bela					1					

VI—RELIGION—contd

13

RELIGION

VI—RELIGION—contd																
District or State	HINDU				SIKH				NEO HINDU				CHRISTIAN		OTHERS	
	Males		Females		Kashmiri		Saradhar		Brahmo		Anya		Males	Females	Males	Females
	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28		
1																
Baluchistan	25,008	12,591	3,912	701	2,105	1,672	25	25	131	213	3,911	1,141	117	107		
Districts	18,470	7,204	3,843	674	550	223	25	25	431	243	3,892	1,138	142	106		
Quetta-Peshawar	9,600	3,644	1,731	412	203	84	14	0	301	178	3,549	1,016	119	87		
Loralai	2,038	920	788	82	50	16	2	2	33	13	58	17	1	1		
Zhob	1,150	198	553	24	96	12	2	5	25	11	154	11	1	1		
Bolan	416	107	67	21	15	4	3	2	1	8	14	12	1	1		
Chagai	264	112	18	3	11	2	1	1	7	1	6	3	18	18		
Sibi	5,002	2,313	686	132	175	75	5	7	61	32	111	81	18	18		
Administered areas	4,798	2,116	686	132	175	75	5	7	61	32	111	81	18	18		
Mari Bugt country	204	167														
States	6,538	5,300	69	27	1,555	1,449					49	6	5			
Kalat	5,550	4,552	16	9	1,548	1,440					45	6	4			
Sarawan	600	403	15	9	53	36					3	2				
Jhalawar	380	92			9	3					4	2				
Kachhi	3,748	3,428			16	572										
Dombki Kachhi country	664	598			869	838					38	2	4			
Makran	136	11	1		1											
Kharan	32	20														
Las Bela	988	748	53	18	7											

TABLE VII.

Age, Sex and Civil Condition.

As neither specific age nor civil condition was recorded in the areas censused on the special tribal schedule, this Table falls naturally into two parts. In part A the statistics for the regular areas are analyzed in full for the province as a whole, and a summary of the statistics for the tribal areas is added to give completeness. Part B contains the marital and sex statistics for the tribal areas by districts and states.

VII.—AGE, SEX AND CIVIL CONDITION


PART A—*Baldschun*

Age and sex condition	POPULATION			MARRIAGES			MORALS			DEATHS			CHARITY			OCCASION		
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
0-4	497	763	1,260	277	529	806	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
5-9	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
10-14	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
15-19	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
20-24	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
25-29	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
30-34	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
35-39	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
40-44	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
45-49	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
50-54	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
55-59	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
60-64	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
65-69	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
70-74	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
75-79	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
80-84	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
85-89	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
90-94	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
95-99	496	771	1,267	277	530	807	239	387	626	279	47	326	705	27	49	76	24	24
Total	4,960	7,710	12,670	2,770	5,300	8,070	2,390	3,870	6,260	279	470	749	270	490	760	240	240	240

VII—AGE AND SEX

PART B—By districts and states (for areas censused on the tribal schedule only)

District or State	Religion	PERSONS			MALES			FEMALES		
		Total	Under puberty	Over puberty	Total	Under puberty	Over puberty	Total	Under puberty	Over puberty
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Tribal areas	ALL RELIGIONS	771,696	293,974	477,722	417,148	164,249	252,899	354,548	129,725	224,823
	Muslimān	751,249	287,694	463,555	405,750	160,804	244,946	245,493	126,890	218,603
	Hindu	17,102	5,220	11,873	9,593	2,879	6,714	7,509	2,350	5,150
	Sikh	3,345	1,051	2,294	1,799	566	1,233	1,546	485	1,061
DISTRICTS										
QUETTA DISTRICT	ALL RELIGIONS	89,628	37,780	51,848	47,950	21,070	26,880	41,078	16,710	24,368
	Muslimān	89,340	37,715	51,625	47,732	21,031	26,701	41,608	16,684	24,924
	Hindu	235	53	182	179	34	145	56	10	37
	Sikh	53	12	41	39	5	34	14	7	7
LORALAI	ALL RELIGIONS	76,124	29,991	46,133	40,839	16,395	24,444	35,185	13,596	21,589
	Muslimān	74,603	29,493	45,110	40,086	16,146	23,940	34,537	13,347	21,190
	Hindu	1,516	406	1,020	869	247	622	647	240	394
	Sikh	5	2	3	4	2	2	1		1
ZHOB	ALL RELIGIONS	64,559	25,456	39,103	35,081	14,400	20,681	29,478	11,056	18,422
	Muslimān	64,525	25,454	39,072	35,053	14,399	20,654	29,473	11,055	18,418
	Hindu	24	2	22	19	1	18	6	1	4
	Sikh	0		0	0		0			
DOLLY	ALL RELIGIONS	647	232	415	336	111	225	311	121	190
	Muslimān	625	220	396	319	108	211	306	121	185
	Hindu	20	3	17	15	3	12	6		5
	Sikh	2		2	2		2			
CHAGAI	ALL RELIGIONS	15,459	6,037	9,422	8,427	3,290	5,137	7,032	2,747	4,285
	Muslimān	15,367	6,014	9,353	8,364	3,281	5,083	7,003	2,733	4,270
	Hindu	79	23	56	52	9	43	27	14	13
	Sikh	13		13	11		11	2		2
SIBT	ALL RELIGIONS	105,801	41,013	64,788	57,850	23,013	34,837	47,951	18,060	29,891
	Muslimān	102,157	39,985	62,162	55,740	22,422	33,318	46,411	17,543	28,868
	Hindu	3,479	988	2,491	1,992	655	1,437	1,487	433	1,054
	Sikh	165	60	105	112	36	76	53	24	29
Administered area	ALL RELIGIONS	71,035	26,948	44,087	39,562	15,162	24,400	32,473	11,786	20,687
	Muslimān	67,702	26,008	41,754	36,662	14,630	22,032	31,100	11,378	19,722
	Hindu	3,108	880	2,228	1,788	408	1,202	1,320	384	936
	Sikh	165	60	105	112	36	76	53	24	29
Mart-Bugfi country	ALL RELIGIONS	34,766	14,065	20,701	19,238	7,851	11,437	15,476	6,214	9,262
	Muslimān	34,395	13,957	20,438	19,084	7,792	11,292	15,311	6,165	9,146
	Hindu	371	108	263	204	59	146	167	49	118
	Sikh									
STATES										
HALAT	ALL RELIGIONS	358,278	130,970	227,308	193,930	73,861	120,069	164,348	57,109	107,239
	Muslimān	345,245	126,873	218,372	186,889	71,019	115,270	158,856	55,254	103,602
	Hindu	10,013	3,137	6,876	6,470	1,731	5,748	4,634	1,406	3,228
	Sikh	3,020	960	2,060	1,562	511	1,051	1,458	449	1,000
Sandwich	ALL RELIGIONS	63,641	22,986	40,655	34,981	12,950	22,031	28,660	10,036	18,624
	Muslimān	62,571	22,563	39,998	34,342	12,755	21,587	28,229	9,908	18,321
	Hindu	957	285	672	571	171	400	386	114	272
	Sikh	113	38	75	68	24	44	45	14	31
Jhalawān	ALL RELIGIONS	84,398	31,291	53,107	46,880	18,294	28,586	37,518	12,997	24,521
	Muslimān	83,914	31,190	52,724	46,401	18,219	28,272	37,423	12,971	24,452
	Hindu	472	99	373	380	73	307	92	26	66
	Sikh	12	2	10	9	2	7	3		3
Kachhi	ALL RELIGIONS	92,753	32,256	60,497	50,187	18,299	31,978	42,566	14,047	28,519
	Muslimān	84,389	29,613	54,776	45,823	16,788	29,035	38,566	12,825	25,741
	Hindu	7,176	2,276	4,900	3,748	1,221	2,527	3,428	1,055	2,373
	Sikh	1,188	367	821	616	290	416	572	167	405
Dombki Kaheri country	ALL RELIGIONS	23,543	8,437	15,106	12,624	4,585	8,039	10,919	3,852	7,067
	Muslimān	20,574	7,445	13,129	11,091	4,059	7,032	9,483	3,286	6,097
	Hindu	1,262	439	823	664	241	423	598	188	409
	Sikh	1,707	553	1,154	869	285	584	838	268	570
Makran	ALL RELIGIONS	71,280	26,682	44,598	37,135	14,679	22,456	34,145	12,003	22,142
	Muslimān	71,186	26,665	44,521	37,051	14,665	22,386	34,135	12,000	22,135
	Hindu	94	17	77	84	14	70	10	3	7
	Sikh									
Kharān	ALL RELIGIONS	22,663	9,318	13,345	12,123	5,144	6,979	10,540	4,174	6,366
	Muslimān	22,611	9,297	13,314	12,071	5,133	6,948	10,520	4,164	6,356
	Hindu	52	21	31	32	11	21	20	10	10
	Sikh									
LAS BELA	ALL RELIGIONS	61,200	22,495	38,705	32,635	12,109	20,526	28,565	10,386	18,179
	Muslimān	59,385	21,951	37,435	31,547	11,798	19,749	27,792	10,113	17,685
	Hindu	1,726	527	1,200	933	299	639	745	223	520
	Sikh	78	17	61	60	12	48	13	6	13



VIII—EDUCATION BY RELIGION AND AGE

Sex and Marital Status	Religion and Age	POPULATION									LITERATES IN ENGLISH		
		TOTAL			LITERATES			ILLITERATES			Percent	Male	Female
		Percent	Male	Female	Percent	Male	Female	Percent	Male	Female			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
	ALL RELIGIONS	854,773	466,479	388,294	37,423	36,883	1,540	866,350	429,617	436,733	8.221	8.541	7.90
	0-10	8,798	4,327	4,471	873	871	102	7,925	3,956	3,969	1.07	1.06	1.07
	10-15	8,110	3,998	4,112	749	741	88	7,361	3,257	4,104	1.07	1.03	1.11
	15-20	8,000	4,293	3,707	1,043	1,220	173	6,957	3,073	3,884	1.27	1.24	1.30
	20 and over	43,974	22,688	21,286	8,679	11,600	1,130	35,295	10,611	24,684	4.324	4.27	4.37
	Not reported	771,994	411,149	360,147	8,663	8,477	310	763,321	409,006	354,315			
	MEXICAN	702,642	358,326	344,316	7,366	7,073	612	695,276	351,551	343,725	9.63	9.36	9.90
	0-10	8,925	4,367	4,558	14	14	14	8,911	4,353	4,558	1.76	1.75	1.77
	10-15	8,117	3,998	4,119	14	14	14	8,103	4,014	4,089	1.76	1.75	1.77
	15-20	8,925	4,367	4,558	14	14	14	8,911	4,353	4,558	1.76	1.75	1.77
	20 and over	23,552	12,756	10,796	8,117	10,000	1,117	15,435	7,741	7,694	1.22	1.21	1.23
	Not reported	711,717	353,969	339,518	7,352	7,059	598	697,915	346,810	351,105			
	HINDU	27,663	14,000	13,663	11,877	11,800	777	15,786	12,200	13,586	9.63	9.78	9.47
	0-10	2,173	1,076	1,097	14	14	14	2,159	1,062	1,097	1.76	1.75	1.77
	10-15	2,173	1,076	1,097	14	14	14	2,159	1,062	1,097	1.76	1.75	1.77
	15-20	2,173	1,076	1,097	14	14	14	2,159	1,062	1,097	1.76	1.75	1.77
	20 and over	14,121	7,752	6,366	8,773	8,766	707	5,348	4,138	1,210	1.22	1.21	1.23
	Not reported	17,490	9,224	8,266	3,104	3,040	263	14,386	6,062	8,324			
	SIKH	8,399	4,317	4,082	8,000	8,707	100	4,399	4,318	4,081	93.6	93.6	93.6
	0-10	8	4	4	8	8	7	7	7	7	100	100	100
	10-15	8	4	4	8	8	7	7	7	7	100	100	100
	15-20	8	4	4	8	8	7	7	7	7	100	100	100
	20 and over	8,381	4,269	4,119	8,000	8,700	93	4,381	4,311	4,084	93.6	93.6	93.6
	Not reported	8,391	4,313	4,078	8,000	8,707	100	4,399	4,318	4,081			
	CHRISTIAN	8,863	4,541	4,322	4,501	4,578	723	4,362	4,066	4,306	4.180	4.278	4.077
	0-10	863	423	440	143	143	17	849	409	440	1.57	1.56	1.58
	10-15	1,206	571	635	143	143	17	1,063	522	541	1.57	1.56	1.58
	15-20	1,206	571	635	143	143	17	1,063	522	541	1.57	1.56	1.58
	20 and over	6,894	3,447	3,447	3,215	3,292	589	3,677	3,544	3,465	4.121	4.121	4.121
	Not reported	8,863	4,541	4,322	4,501	4,578	723	4,362	4,066	4,306			
	OTHERS	979	503	476	883	836	146	896	477	419	9.16	9.36	8.86
	0-10	815	426	389	83	83	19	812	423	389	1.07	1.06	1.07
	10-15	815	426	389	83	83	19	812	423	389	1.07	1.06	1.07
	15-20	815	426	389	83	83	19	812	423	389	1.07	1.06	1.07
	20 and over	808	408	399	4,500	4,400	144	43	43	43	9.16	9.36	8.86
	Not reported	979	503	476	883	836	146	896	477	419			
	ALL RELIGIONS	127,666	79,667	47,999	26,717	11,801	1,816	100,949	67,866	33,083	8.187	8.661	7.71
	0-10	8,798	4,327	4,471	873	871	102	7,925	3,956	3,969	1.07	1.06	1.07
	10-15	8,110	3,998	4,112	749	741	88	7,361	3,257	4,104	1.07	1.03	1.11
	15-20	8,000	4,293	3,707	1,043	1,220	173	6,957	3,073	3,884	1.27	1.24	1.30
	20 and over	39,821	20,688	19,139	8,679	11,600	1,130	31,142	10,611	20,531	4.324	4.27	4.37
	Not reported	97,845	47,349	41,528	4	7	544	93,800	47,106	41,694			
	MEXICAN	106,705	54,900	51,805	8,812	8,713	121	97,893	46,186	51,707	9.63	9.36	9.90
	0-10	8,913	4,367	4,546	14	14	14	8,900	4,353	4,547	1.76	1.75	1.77
	10-15	8,117	3,998	4,119	14	14	14	8,103	4,014	4,089	1.76	1.75	1.77
	15-20	8,925	4,367	4,558	14	14	14	8,911	4,353	4,558	1.76	1.75	1.77
	20 and over	23,552	12,756	10,796	8,117	10,000	1,117	15,435	7,741	7,694	1.22	1.21	1.23
	Not reported	86,153	40,544	37,259	8,800	8,700	107	77,353	37,445	40,000			
	HINDU	18,664	9,000	9,664	8,000	8,000	836	8,778	8,200	8,578	9.63	9.36	9.90
	0-10	1,800	900	900	1,800	1,800	17	1,630	1,630	1,630	1.76	1.75	1.77
	10-15	1,800	900	900	1,800	1,800	17	1,630	1,630	1,630	1.76	1.75	1.77
	15-20	1,800	900	900	1,800	1,800	17	1,630	1,630	1,630	1.76	1.75	1.77
	20 and over	14,064	7,200	6,864	8,000	8,000	126	6,078	5,570	5,508	1.22	1.21	1.23
	Not reported	18,664	9,000	9,664	8,000	8,000	836	8,778	8,200	8,578			
	SIKH	8,399	4,317	4,082	8,000	8,707	100	4,399	4,318	4,081	93.6	93.6	93.6
	0-10	8	4	4	8	8	7	7	7	7	100	100	100
	10-15	8	4	4	8	8	7	7	7	7	100	100	100
	15-20	8	4	4	8	8	7	7	7	7	100	100	100
	20 and over	8,381	4,269	4,119	8,000	8,700	93	4,381	4,311	4,084	93.6	93.6	93.6
	Not reported	8,399	4,317	4,082	8,000	8,707	100	4,399	4,318	4,081			
	CHINESE	4,861	2,500	2,361	2,500	2,500	686	2,361	2,000	2,361	4.718	4.975	4.45
	0-10	481	250	231	250	250	77	231	200	231	1.07	1.06	1.07
	10-15	481	250	231	250	250	77	231	200	231	1.07	1.06	1.07
	15-20	481	250	231	250	250	77	231	200	231	1.07	1.06	1.07
	20 and over	4,380	2,250	2,130	2,250	2,250	609	2,130	1,800	2,130	4.641	4.909	4.37
	Not reported	4,861	2,500	2,361	2,500	2,500	686	2,361	2,000	2,361			
	OTHERS	700	304	396	607	500	130	601	200	401	9.16	9.36	8.86
	0-10	700	304	396	607	500	130	601	200	401	1.07	1.06	1.07
	10-15	700	304	396	607	500	130	601	200	401	1.07	1.06	1.07
	15-20	700	304	396	607	500	130	601	200	401	1.07	1.06	1.07
	20 and over	696	300	396	603	500	127	599	196	403	9.16	9.36	8.86

VIII—EDUCATION BY RELIGION AND AGE—*contd*

1	2	3	POPULATION									LITERATE IN ENGLISH		
			TOTAL			LITERATE			ILLITERATE			12	13	14
			Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total			
4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	
TOTAL	ALL RELIGIONS	80,709	41,023	35,816	2,165	2,093	83	78,603	42,810	35,763	202	193	12	
	0-10	412	5	13	2	7	4	40	3	17	1	1	1	
	10-15	174	13	4	22	10	10	14	10	7	1	1	1	
	15-20	174	48	6	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	20 and over	2,003	1,112	1,112	1,750	1,751	57	2,191	1,862	1,111	6	6	6	
	Unspecified	2,174	4	2,174	2,000	6	2,174	40	1	1	6	6	6	
	MUSLIMS	76,753	41,003	31,803	281	272	9	76,174	41,283	31,791	54	54	1	
	0-10	14	4	7	1	1	1	13	1	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	15-20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	20 and over	1,172	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	Unspecified	1,174	4	1,174	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
HINDU	ALL RELIGIONS	2,003	2,071	923	175	168	27	2,003	1,170	823	53	52	1	
	0-10	174	13	7	1	1	1	174	103	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	174	48	6	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	15-20	174	13	4	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	20 and over	2,003	1,112	1,112	1,750	1,751	57	2,191	1,862	1,111	6	6	6	
	Unspecified	2,174	4	2,174	2,000	6	2,174	40	1	1	6	6	6	
	MUSLIMS	76,753	41,003	31,803	281	272	9	76,174	41,283	31,791	54	54	1	
	0-10	14	4	7	1	1	1	13	1	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	15-20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	20 and over	1,172	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	Unspecified	1,174	4	1,174	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
SIKH	ALL RELIGIONS	936	813	78	657	572	32	323	263	66	39	30	1	
	0-10	174	13	7	1	1	1	174	103	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	174	48	6	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	15-20	174	13	4	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	20 and over	2,003	1,112	1,112	1,750	1,751	57	2,191	1,862	1,111	6	6	6	
	Unspecified	2,174	4	2,174	2,000	6	2,174	40	1	1	6	6	6	
	MUSLIMS	76,753	41,003	31,803	281	272	9	76,174	41,283	31,791	54	54	1	
	0-10	14	4	7	1	1	1	13	1	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	15-20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	20 and over	1,172	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	Unspecified	1,174	4	1,174	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
CHRISTIAN	ALL RELIGIONS	71	24	12	27	40	11	14	12	2	51	40	11	
	0-10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	10-15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	15-20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	20 and over	1,172	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	Unspecified	1,174	4	1,174	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	MUSLIMS	76,753	41,003	31,803	281	272	9	76,174	41,283	31,791	54	54	1	
	0-10	14	4	7	1	1	1	13	1	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	15-20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	20 and over	1,172	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	Unspecified	1,174	4	1,174	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
OTHERS	ALL RELIGIONS	70,256	40,216	30,000	1,619	1,567	52	68,747	38,770	29,068	271	207	11	
	0-10	174	13	7	1	1	1	174	103	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	174	48	6	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	15-20	174	13	4	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	20 and over	2,003	1,112	1,112	1,750	1,751	57	2,191	1,862	1,111	6	6	6	
	Unspecified	2,174	4	2,174	2,000	6	2,174	40	1	1	6	6	6	
	MUSLIMS	76,753	41,003	31,803	281	272	9	76,174	41,283	31,791	54	54	1	
	0-10	14	4	7	1	1	1	13	1	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	15-20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	20 and over	1,172	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	Unspecified	1,174	4	1,174	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
MUSLIMS	ALL RELIGIONS	68,039	35,203	29,725	261	261	2	67,525	37,872	29,723	32	32	1	
	0-10	174	13	7	1	1	1	174	103	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	174	48	6	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	15-20	174	13	4	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	20 and over	2,003	1,112	1,112	1,750	1,751	57	2,191	1,862	1,111	6	6	6	
	Unspecified	2,174	4	2,174	2,000	6	2,174	40	1	1	6	6	6	
	MUSLIMS	76,753	41,003	31,803	281	272	9	76,174	41,283	31,791	54	54	1	
	0-10	14	4	7	1	1	1	13	1	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	15-20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	20 and over	1,172	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	Unspecified	1,174	4	1,174	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
HINDU	ALL RELIGIONS	1,218	1,150	198	470	400	20	869	691	178	66	65	1	
	0-10	174	13	7	1	1	1	174	103	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	174	48	6	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	15-20	174	13	4	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	20 and over	2,003	1,112	1,112	1,750	1,751	57	2,191	1,862	1,111	6	6	6	
	Unspecified	2,174	4	2,174	2,000	6	2,174	40	1	1	6	6	6	
	MUSLIMS	76,753	41,003	31,803	281	272	9	76,174	41,283	31,791	54	54	1	
	0-10	14	4	7	1	1	1	13	1	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	15-20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	20 and over	1,172	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	Unspecified	1,174	4	1,174	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
SIKH	ALL RELIGIONS	716	619	66	392	381	11	323	268	55	17	17	1	
	0-10	44	23	16	2	1	1	42	27	15	1	1	1	
	10-15	174	48	6	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	15-20	174	13	4	171	12	10	401	54	43	193	162	11	
	20 and over	2,003	1,112	1,112	1,750	1,751	57	2,191	1,862	1,111	6	6	6	
	Unspecified	2,174	4	2,174	2,000	6	2,174	40	1	1	6	6	6	
	MUSLIMS	76,753	41,003	31,803	281	272	9	76,174	41,283	31,791	54	54	1	
	0-10	14	4	7	1	1	1	13	1	7	1	1	1	
	10-15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	15-20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	20 and over	1,172	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
	Unspecified	1,174	4	1,174	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	1,112	
CHRISTIAN	ALL RELIGIONS	168	124	14	158	144	14	10	10	140				

VIII—EDUCATION BY RELIGION AND AGE—*contd.* 14

RELIGION TO AGE		POPULATION									LITERATE IN ENGLISH		
		TOTAL			LITERATE			ILLITERATE			LITERATE IN ENGLISH		
Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
ALL RELIGIOUS	8,896	4,066	4,830	888	374	514	1,736	1,215	521	66	22	18	
0-10	137	66	71	4	1	3	125	79	46	1	1	2	
10-15	179	87	92	23	14	9	17	25	12				
15 and over	8,580	3,973	4,607	861	349	512	1,594	1,111	483	64	21	16	
Unspecified	627	286	341				641	384	257				
MUSLIMAN	1,258	573	685	20	9	11	1,242	896	346	11	11		
0-10	79	33	46				69	34	35				
10-15	100	46	54				89	40	49				
15 and over	881	397	484	6	6	6	1,104	816	288	11	11		
Unspecified	258	119	139				279	211	68				
HINDU	863	436	427	123	123	0	886	564	322	23	23		
0-10	64	27	37				57	24	33				
10-15	73	30	43	15	15	0	67	33	34				
15 and over	77	29	48	19	19	0	262	167	95	22	22		
Unspecified	80	30	50				80	33	47				
SIKH	347	23	32	23	27	6	34	25	9	7	7		
0-10				1	1	0	15	1	4				
10-15							3	1	2				
15 and over	23	7	16	22	26	6	24	24	0	7	7		
Unspecified													
CHRISTIAN	18	14	4	26	23	3	6	8	2	23	18	26	
0-10										1	1		
10-15													
15 and over		11	7					2		1			
Unspecified	18	14	4										
OTHERS	13	9	4	13	7	6	8	1	7	8	8	1	
0-10									1				
10-15													
15 and over							2						
Unspecified													
ALL RELIGIOUS	18,841	9,187	9,654	200	876	23	11,846	8,331	3,515	23	21	1	
0-10		23	26	19	1	1	170	54	116				
10-15	73	30	43	23	23	12	67	33	34				
15 and over	11,433	5,267	6,166	158	126	10	11,570	8,244	3,326	23	21	1	
Unspecified													
MUSLIMAN	12,896	5,890	7,006	200	126	11	12,716	8,211	4,505	20	20		
0-10	66	34	32				61	31	30				
10-15	80	33	47	30	27	1	73						
15 and over	881	397	484	6	6	6	1,104	816	288	11	11		
Unspecified	258	119	139				279	211	68				
HINDU	863	436	427	123	123	0	886	564	322	23	23		
0-10	64	27	37				57	24	33				
10-15	73	30	43	15	15	0	67	33	34				
15 and over	77	29	48	19	19	0	262	167	95	22	22		
Unspecified	80	30	50				80	33	47				
SIKH	347	23	32	23	27	6	34	25	9	7	7		
0-10				1	1	0	15	1	4				
10-15							3	1	2				
15 and over	23	7	16	22	26	6	24	24	0	7	7		
Unspecified													
CHRISTIAN	18	14	4	26	23	3	6	8	2	23	18	26	
0-10										1	1		
10-15													
15 and over		11	7					2		1			
Unspecified	18	14	4										
OTHERS	13	9	4	13	7	6	8	1	7	8	8	1	
0-10													
10-15													
15 and over							2						
Unspecified													

VIII—EDUCATION BY RELIGION AND AGE—contd

District or State	RELIGION AND AGE	POPULATION									LITERATE IN ENGLISH		
		TOTAL			LITERATE			ILLITERATE			Persons	Males	Females
		Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
SINDH	ALL RELIGIONS	117,189	66,846	50,343	3,870	3,628	242	113,319	63,218	50,101	503	436	67
	0-10	1,320	682	647	42	26	16	1,287	656	631	12	8	4
	10-15	643	357	186	107	70	31	436	251	155	19	12	7
	15-20	902	681	221	202	160	30	700	515	185	28	21	7
	20 and over	8,614	7,270	1,338	2,240	2,083	155	6,374	5,191	1,183	444	395	49
	Unspecified	105,801	57,850	47,051	1,270	1,270	4	104,522	56,576	47,947			
	Administered area	71,035	38,562	32,473	1,181	1,180	4	69,851	37,382	32,469			
	Mart-Bugli country	34,766	19,288	15,478	9	95		34,671	19,293	15,478			
	MUSALMĀN	108,473	60,788	47,685	915	879	36	107,558	59,909	47,649	99	98	1
	0-10	675	358	317	11	6	5	664	352	312			
	10-15	294	209	85	18	15	3	276	194	82	3	2	1
	15-20	478	372	106	37	32	5	441	340	101	6	6	
	20 and over	4,969	4,103	766	505	484	21	4,364	3,619	745	90	90	
	Unspecified	102,157	55,746	40,411	344	342	2	101,813	55,404	40,409			
	Administered area	67,762	36,662	31,100	320	318	2	67,442	36,344	31,098			
	Mart-Bugli country	34,395	19,081	15,311	24	24		34,371	19,070	15,311			
SINDH	HINDU	7,315	5,002	2,313	2,088	2,013	75	5,227	2,989	2,238	165	164	1
	0-10	406	246	250	15	11	4	481	235	246	2	2	
	10-15	188	113	75	54	42	12	134	71	63	5	6	
	15-20	353	265	88	114	90	15	239	166	73	10	9	1
	20 and over	2,799	2,386	413	979	937	42	1,820	1,440	371	148	148	
	Unspecified	3,470	1,992	1,477	926	924	2	2,553	1,068	1,485			
	Administered area	3,108	1,783	1,320	855	833	2	2,253	935	1,318			
	Mart-Bugli country	371	204	157	71	71		300	133	167			
	SIKH	1,068	861	207	633	592	41	435	269	166	48	48	
	0-10	75	34	41	3	1	2	72	33	39			
	10-15	42	27	15	19	12	7	23	15	8			
	15-20	53	38	15	35	30	5	18	8	10	3	3	
	20 and over	733	650	83	567	540	27	166	110	56	45	45	
	Unspecified	165	112	53	9	9		166	103	63			
SINDH	CHRISTIAN	192	111	81	144	84	60	48	27	21	140	84	56
	0-10	47	24	23	0	5	4	38	19	19	9	5	4
	10-15	11	6	6	0	4	5	2	1	1	8	4	4
	15-20	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5
	20 and over	128	82	46	120	75	45	8	7	1	118	76	43
	OTHERS	141	84	57	90	60	30	51	24	27	51	42	9
	0-10	36	20	16	4	3	1	32	17	15	1	1	
	10-15	12	3	5	7	3	4	1	1	1	3	1	2
	15-20	8	6	6	10	6	5	2	1	1	4	3	1
	20 and over	85	55	30	69	40	20	16	6	10	48	37	6
SINDH	ALL RELIGIONS	359,096	194,598	164,488	5,745	5,720	25	353,341	186,878	164,463	85	82	3
	0-10	90	39	51	1	1	1	89	39	50			
	10-15	30	21	9	3	3	2	27	20	7			
	15-20	61	38	23	18	17	1	43	21	22	4	4	
	20 and over	927	570	57	130	122	8	497	448	40	46	43	3
	Unspecified	358,278	193,930	164,348	5,503	5,500	13	352,685	186,350	164,335	35	35	
	Sardar	63,641	34,981	28,660	971	970	1	62,670	34,011	28,659	10	10	
	Jhalawān	81,398	46,830	37,618	274	274		84,124	46,606	37,518	3	3	
	Kachhi	92,763	50,187	42,566	2,689	2,681	8	90,064	47,506	42,558	15	15	
	Dombki-Kaheri country	23,543	12,624	10,919	1,766	1,764	2	22,377	11,460	10,917	1	1	
	Makran	71,280	37,135	34,145	374	372		70,906	36,763	34,143			
	Kharan	22,663	12,123	10,640	119	119	2	22,544	12,004	10,540	6	6	
	MUSALMĀN	345,906	187,435	158,471	1,683	1,672	11	344,223	185,763	158,460	48	48	
	0-10	80	37	43	1	1		80	37	43			
	10-15	20	15	6	1	1		19	14	5			
	15-20	52	31	21	14	14		38	17	21	4	4	
	20 and over	509	403	46	67	64	3	442	399	43	17	17	
	Unspecified	345,245	186,889	158,356	1,601	1,593	8	343,644	185,206	158,348	27	27	
SINDH	Sardar	62,471	34,312	28,229	1,227	1,227		62,144	33,916	28,228	9	9	
	Jhalawān	83,914	46,492	37,423	131	131		85,783	46,360	37,423			
	Kachhi	84,389	46,823	38,566	1,515	1,510	5	83,874	45,313	38,561	14	14	
	Dombki-Kaheri country	20,574	11,091	9,483	89	89		20,485	11,002	9,483			
	Makran	71,186	37,031	34,135	341	339	2	70,845	36,712	34,133	4	4	
	Kharan	22,611	12,091	10,520	93	93		22,513	11,993	10,520			
	HINDU	10,102	5,550	4,552	3,005	2,998	7	7,097	2,552	4,545	11	11	
	0-10	7	2	5				7	2	5			
	10-15	10	6	4	2		2	8	6	2			
	15-20	4	3	1				4	3	1			
	20 and over	68	60	8	18	16	2	50	44	6	8	3	
	Unspecified	10,013	5,479	4,534	2,985	2,982	3	7,028	2,497	4,531	8	8	
	Sardar	957	671	386	328	328		929	649	380	1	1	
	Jhalawān	472	380	92	143	143		329	237	92	1	1	
	Kachhi	7,176	3,748	3,428	1,538	1,535	3	5,338	1,913	3,425	1	1	
	Dombki-Kaheri country	1,262	661	598	422	422		1,240	642	598			
SINDH	Makran	94	84	10	33	33		61	51	10	2	2	
	Kharan	52	32	20	21	21		31	11	20			

VIII - EDUCATION BY RELIGION AND AGE—*cont'd*

District or State	Religion	Age	POPULATION									LITERATE or ENGLISH		
			Total			LITERATE			LITERATE			LITERATE or ENGLISH		
			Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
N. E. 77	LEW		2,023	1,544	1,448	1,000	1,007	0	2,013	227	1,436			
	15-20		1	1										
	20 and over		2,022	1,543	1,448	1,000	1,007	0	2,013	227	1,436			
	Unreported													
	Persons of Indian and													
N. E. 78	CHRISTIAN		21	23	8	21	20	4	7	8	2	23	20	2
	0-10													
	15-20		45	42	1	41	39	1	2	3	0	23	20	
	20 and over													
	OTHERS		2	0	1	0	0	1	1	1		2	2	
N. E. 79	ALL RELIGIONS		21,825	21,643	20,143	1,079	1,079	0	20,786	21,379	20,120	13	13	
	15 and over													
	Unreported		21,800	21,618	20,143	1,079	1,079	0	20,771	21,360	20,100	4		
	MU ALMAN		20,200	21,007	27,790	661	630	0	20,043	21,123	27,790	0	0	
	HI DU		1,720	000	760	216	216		1,323	276	760	1	1	
N. E. 80	LEW		70	00	10	20	20		20	00	10			
	CHRISTIAN		4	4		4	4							
	20 and over													
	OTHERS		1	1					1	1				
	20 and over			1					1	1				

TABLE IX

Education by Selected Tribes and Races.

IX.—EDUCATION BY SELECTED

(Indigenous

Serial No.	Tribe or race	POPULATION			ILLIT. MRS			LITERATE		
		Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1	Indigenous Mamel means	774 610 308	401 336 400	731 129 391	735 376 373	3,431	3 446			33
2	Baloch	169,190	91,850	77,331	168,551	91,338	77,219	639	627	12
3	(i) Eastern	111,915	61,331	50,584	111,848	61,121	50,727	239	230	9
4	Bugti	19,378	10,491	8,887	19,362	10,485	8,877	8	8	8
5	Chitral	4,712	2,109	2,601	4,706	2,101	2,604	7	7	7
6	Jakhrat	200	111	89	200	111	89			
7	Khetra	14,122	7,272	6,850	14,118	7,267	6,851	23	23	23
8	Margh	17,771	9,772	8,000	17,753	9,755	8,000	22	22	4
9	Mert	21,222	12,479	8,743	21,210	12,471	8,739	21	21	1
10	Shal	31,227	16,079	15,148	31,163	16,017	15,146	22	22	4
11	Shal	999	529	470	993	516	477	4	4	4
12	Others	217	128	89	212	123	89	44	40	4
13	(ii) Western	27,251	10,464	26,623	27,251	10,464	26,623	670	627	3
14	Bart	791	417	374	787	414	373	7	7	7
15	Baloch	1,210	722	487	1,202	718	485	5	5	5
16	Dachit	0-3	2,3	4,3	0-3	2,3	4,3			
17	Dachit	44	44	20	44	44	20			
18	Dachit	44	44	20	44	44	20	1	1	1
19	Gandakot	143	80	63	143	80	63			
20	Gandakot	241	136	105	241	136	105	10	10	10
21	Gandakot	40	21	19	40	21	19	4	4	4
22	Hind	1,221	611	610	1,217	607	610	4	4	4
23	Kabul	412	221	191	410	219	191	8	8	8
24	Kabul	1	110	77	107	110	77			
25	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
26	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
27	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
28	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
29	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
30	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
31	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
32	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
33	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
34	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
35	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
36	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
37	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
38	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
39	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
40	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
41	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
42	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
43	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
44	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
45	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
46	Kandahar	1,122	607	515	1,114	599	515	8	8	8
47	Baloch	107 787	53,885	74,692	107,245	52,557	74,688	542	538	4
48	(i) Original natives	13,810	8,302	6,508	14,002	8,329	6,744	64	63	1
49	Akandahar	12	12	10	17	8	9	8	7	1
50	Dachit	126	63	71	126	63	71			
51	Gandakot	2,041	1,121	817	2,037	1,120	817	4	4	4
52	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
53	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
54	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
55	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
56	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
57	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
58	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
59	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
60	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
61	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
62	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
63	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
64	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
65	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
66	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
67	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
68	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
69	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
70	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
71	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
72	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
73	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
74	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
75	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
76	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
77	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
78	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
79	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
80	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
81	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
82	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
83	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
84	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
85	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
86	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
87	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
88	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
89	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
90	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
91	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
92	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
93	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
94	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
95	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
96	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
97	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
98	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
99	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4
100	Kandahar	2,012	1,121	817	2,010	1,120	817	4	4	4

TRIBES AND RACES

Musalman only)

LITERATE IN

PERSIAN		URDU		LARGE		SINDHI		ARABIC		ENGLISH		OTHER LANGUAGES		Serial No
Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
2,330	10	872	3	117		294	4	320	10	40		21	9	1
487	7	137	1	8		56		25		6		4	4	2
181	5	96		3		81		18		5		4	4	3
2		8				1				2				4
10		4		2		3		7		1				5
28	4	4						1						6
6		17				19		7		1				7
61	1	22				3								8
4		4		1		5		2		1		4		9
20		14						7		1				10
856	2	41	1	5		25								11
7														12
5														13
1														14
19		2							2					15
4														16
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														67
														68

IX.—EDUCATION BY SELECTED

(Indigenous)

Serial No.	Tribe or race	POPULATION			ILLITERATE			LITERATE		
		Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
66	(1) Jhalard	24,704	12,897	11,807	21,245	22,221	17,027	267	229	1
70	Blamhar	10,526	5,779	4,747	10,544	8,962	4,923	14	14	
71	Bilawal	1,81	874	937	1,248	871	84	8	8	
72	Mamam	12,149	7,171	4,978	12,448	7,411	4,018	25	27	
73	Mamam	27,405	13,190	11,009	26,729	18,123	11,806	56	56	
74	Thakur	2,211	1,099	1,112	2,203	2,211	1,211	2	2	
75	Thakur	2,707	1,250	1,457	2,703	2,717	1,211	2	2	
76	Thakur	2,011	1,112	1,179	2,004	2,217	1,211	2	2	
77	Thakur	22,610	10,000	12,610	21,617	17,809	14,619	23	23	
78	(1) Mirvassan	2,422	1,271	1,151	2,227	1,226	1,221	23	23	
79	Mirvassan	1,211	71	90	1,211	719	502			
80	Mirvassan	81	278	220	814	277	220	1	1	
81	Mirvassan	611	278	333	607	277	330	4	4	
82	Others	223	140	74	223	110	113	80	80	
83	Paikhar	122,903	102,148	83,915	127,133	101,101	83,012	940	938	2
84	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
85	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
86	Paikhar	1,211	600	611	1,211	604	607	5	5	
87	Paikhar	105,072	87,212	47,211	104,011	87,211	47,210	432	431	1
88	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
89	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
90	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
91	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
92	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
93	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
94	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
95	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
96	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
97	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
98	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
99	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
100	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
101	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
102	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
103	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
104	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
105	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
106	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
107	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
108	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
109	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
110	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
111	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
112	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
113	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
114	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
115	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
116	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
117	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
118	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
119	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
120	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
121	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
122	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	
123	Paikhar	223	172	126	219	149	149	5	5	

TABLE X.

Language.

Linguistic classification has only been attempted in the case of the Local Vernaculars and is accordingly not exhaustive, several alien Iranian, Indian and Dravidian languages given separately in the Table, being excluded from it

X.—LANGUAGE.

Language	Respondents					Districts													
	QUESTIONS					Lda.		Kata		Dula		Cakal		Kani				Kani	
	Persons	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Adult plantation area		Marl Bay			
														Males	Females	Males	Females		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18		
TOTAL	204,793	104,119	100,674	76,867	23,751	41,982	58,811	66,316	56,888	1,000	904	9,307	7,837	67,808	64,808	19,998	18,278		
A. Respondents of 1891	260,817	130,363	130,454	71,363	59,091	115,111	163,961	140,164	129,888	1,417	1,297	8,000	7,311	7,311	34,777	19,998	18,278		
I. Of British India	708,808	318,323	390,485	161,651	158,832	113,888	153,123	171,104	165,520	305	300	3,715	3,136	66,808	61,943	19,128	18,211		
London	443,119	211,129	231,990	111,119	120,871	171,111	211,111	271,111	271,111	300	311	3,349	4,179	74,119	70,119	19,119	18,119		
British	381,907	181,119	200,788	91,119	109,669	141,111	181,111	211,111	211,111	304	307	3,308	4,179	74,119	70,119	19,119	18,119		
Foreign	67,891	30,000	31,202	20,000	10,202	30,000	70,000	60,000	60,000	96	97	341	590	1,000	1,000	2,000	2,000		
India	115,331	53,119	62,212	22,111	40,101	111,111	111,111	111,111	111,111	111	111	111	111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Western Provinces	17,111	8,111	9,000	3,111	5,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	7,111	7,111	7,111	7,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	6,000	3,000	3,000	1,000	2,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Central	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
British	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
Foreign	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111		
W. Madras	11,111	5,111	6,000	2,111	3,889	11,111	11,111	11,111	11,111	11	11	11	11	11,111	11,111	11,111	1		

X—LANGUAGE

STATES

STATES																LANGUAGE
KALAT																
Total Kalat		Sarawan		Jhalawan		Kachhi		Dombki Kaheri country		Makran		Khuran		LAS BELA		35
Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	TOTAL
194,598	164,488	35,082	28,699	46,830	37,518	50,191	42,568	12,624	10,919	37,698	34,244	12,123	10,540	32,640	28,565	
194,462	164,425	35,049	28,650	46,873	37,508	50,189	42,568	12,624	10,919	37,604	34,234	12,123	10,540	32,687	28,555	A Vernaculars of India
183,474	159,647	34,564	28,337	46,527	37,413	46,266	39,105	11,653	10,078	37,344	34,177	12,120	10,538	31,314	27,650	I Of Baluchistan
84,329	74,134	12,528	10,608	8,120	6,824	16,325	13,567	3,427	2,040	36,629	33,817	8,300	7,269	6,600	5,949	Iranian
79,048	69,697	7,450	6,336	8,018	6,742	16,297	13,537	2,424	2,043	36,563	33,770	8,296	7,269	6,597	5,947	Balochi
4,073	3,438	4,021	3,390	49	43	2	30	1	5	66	47	4		3	2	Dehwari
1,208	999	1,067	882	53	39	20		2	1							Pashti
38,418	32,822	236	176	1,078	841	27,019	23,831	9,114	7,936	53	33	18	5	21,576	19,079	Indian
16,513	14,004	1				16,511	14,004	1								(i) Western Panjabi branch
10,513	14,004	1				16,511	14,004	1								Jafarki
6,799	5,874	5	3	50	19	6,744	5,852									Khetrani
0,799	5,874	5	3	50	10	6,744	5,852									Siraiki
15,106	12,944	230	173	1,028	839	4,664	3,975	9,113	7,936	53	33	18	5	19	24	(ii) Sindhi branch
14,390	12,368	215	163	1,028	822	4,388	3,742	8,697	7,603	53	33	18	5	19	24	Jatki-Sindhi
707	576	15	10			276	233	416	333							Lasi
65,603	52,660	21,790	17,545	37,324	29,745	2,003	1,695	112	93	602	527	3,802	3,264	3,138	2,629	(iii) Unspecified
34	22	10	8	5	3	19	12									Jatki and Jaggali
5,988	4,778	485	319	346	96	3,923	3,463	971	841	280	57	3	2	1,313	905	Jatki
1										1				1		Dravidian
48	9									48	9			11	11	Brahui
44	22	13	6	4		13	10	6	2	10	4			37	7	Unclassified
3																Lorichini
60		2														II Of other parts of India
4				4												Bengali
1,205	958	75	39	18	3	78	40	960	830	65	29	3	2	140	48	Bihari
5	3					5	3			75	15			8	6	Gujrati
4,018	3,780	390	274	320	93	3,827	3,404							1,114	832	Gurung
														1		Hindi, Western
																Kanarese
																Kashmiri
																Lahnda or Western Panjabi
																Telugu
																Malayalam
																Marathi
																Orya
																Pahari Central
																Pahari, Eastern
																Panjabi
																Rajasthani
																Sindhi
																Tamil
																Tibetan
117	59	32	41	7	10	1				77	8			9	10	B Vernaculars of Asiatic countries
50	4									50	4					Arabic
7										7						Bukhari
1										1						Chinese
																Hebrew
50	55	3	41	7	10	1				19	4			9	10	Japanese
																Persian
10	4	1	2			1				17	2			4		O European language
10	4	1	2			1				17	2			4		English
																German
																French

TABLE XI

Birthplace.

The birthplace of those enumerated on the Tribal Schedule was assumed to be the same as the district or the state in which they were enumerated, except in the case of Hindus and obvious aliens

The following are chief among the districts from which immigrants are drawn —

	Persons	Males	Females		Persons	Males	Females
<i>Sind</i>				<i>Panjab</i>			
Sukkur	1,275	857	418	Amritsar	2,408	1,870	508
Hyderabad	708	545	161	Rawalpindi	2,442	2,095	347
Upper Sind Frontier	628	453	175	Jhelum	1,894	1,596	298
Karachi	343	217	126	Sialkot	1,784	1,295	489
<i>North West Frontier Province</i>				Jullundur	1,666	1,320	346
Peshawar	1,553	1,211	342	Dera Ghazi Khan	1,632	963	669
Hazara	1,041	901	140	Hoshiarpur	1,450	1,216	234
				Gujrat	1,214	962	252
				Gujranwala	1,194	870	324
				Gurdaspur	1,045	773	272

DISTRICT OR STATE

District, State, Province or
Country—here born.

D. L. C. 1911

Sex

1	Persons			Males			Females			Persons			Males			Females		
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
TOTAL	814,780	446,419	368,361	237,843	76,897	51,371	86,798	41,882	86,546	78,308	66,946	26,438						
A. Born in India	814,521	433,889	361,513	118,819	68,863	49,653	86,256	41,817	86,741	60,776	37,428	28,340						
I. WITHIN BALUCHISTAN	776,703	420,807	345,806	93,477	51,371	41,096	75,633	40,719	31,928	61,847	32,806	17,861						
Districts	331,420	180,726	140,713	82,190	49,464	42,741	78,541	40,619	31,922	61,800	32,511	17,856						
Quetta Pukh	62,800	30,000	42,571	91,248	44,857	42,276	720	297	323	228	317	11						
Layal	74,286	29,229	31,154	70	47	23	74,808	30,730	34,296	128	119	6						
Kab	62,223	31,021	24,202	369	224	130	380	263	123	61,411	33,473	17,808						
Balla	732	344	348	12	8	4												
Chagai	14,032	7,916	8,414	92	84	24	2	2		2	2							
Shi	106,837	84,418	45,222	373	234	148	431	248	176	34	33	1						
STATES	424,784	229,871	194,793	3,378	1,823	1,348	114	100	14	67	62	5						
Kab	284,021	197,458	166,363	3,377	1,823	1,344	111	98	13	67	62	5						
Las Bha	60,763	32,313	24,430	1		1	2	2	1									
II. BEYOND BALUCHISTAN	42,309	33,302	9,707	23,112	17,574	6,898	4,703	3,896	806	3,801	3,022	379						
(a) ADJACENT TO BALUCHIS- TAN	33,234	23,920	7,308	17,544	13,234	4,310	4,040	3,336	784	3,070	2,708	384						
(i) British Territory	31,511	4,412	7,719	16,519	12,719	4,299	3,772	3,190	672	2,672	2,222	329						
Bombay	4,870	3,349	1,231	3,351	1,782	809	117	88	79	88	78	11						
M. W. P. Province	3,578	2,908	707	1,808	1,497	389	384	283	73	588	477	82						
Punjab	22,404	18,213	8,191	13,642	9,431	3,311	3,296	2,718	878	2,014	1,787	267						
(ii) Feudatory States	1,623	1,297	334	615	614	191	282	234	24	323	334	4						
Bombay States	324	311	77	227	178	49	10	9	1	9	9							
M. W. P. Agency, etc.	826	823	2	214	212	2	11	11		235	236							
Punjab States	770	663	107	174	134	80	341	216	23	64	80	4						
(b) NOT ADJACENT TO BALU- CHISTAN	9,785	7,152	1,636	8,372	4,167	1,305	680	849	161	628	610	25						
(i) British Territory	6,711	4,331	1,330	4,684	2,299	1,069	391	317	86	429	472	17						
Ajmere-Merwara	397	193	14	36	16	10	2	3		177	177							
Aom	30	6	4	3	2	1				1		1						
Bengal	196	80	48	111	70		4	3	1	3	3							
Bihar and Orissa	62	23	10	22	26	8	4	2	2	2	2							
Burma	38	19	29	36	18	18												
Central Provinces and Berar	124	66	58	83	25	22	23	23	26	2	2	1						
Madras	128	70	50	100	88	42	1	1		2	1	1						
United Provinces	6,008	4,888	1,122	4,803	3,188	264	328	274	82	301	267	14						
(ii) Feudatory States]	3,064	1,743	344	344	763	196	249	232	21	249	222	8						
Berda	7	8	2	2	1	1	1		1	2	3							
Central India	123	98	34	80	80	30	8	7	1	24	24							
Hyderabad	78	61	18	68	23	13				4	2	2						
Kashmir	880	704	166	480	308	78	80	84	6	88	86	2						
Mysore	87	30	27	80	28	24				3	1	2						
Rajputana	800	741	108	275	228	46	140	147	13	223	223							
Travancore	8	3	2							2		2						
U. P. States	27	18	12	25	13	12												
(c) FOREIGN AND FEUDATORY SETTLEMENTS	123	163	30	123	113	18	12	12	8	8								
(d) FERA CHITRAPOUR	127	81	46	94	88	26	1	1		1	1							

2

STATES

Kalāt

Las Bēla

Bōlān			Chāga			Sibi			Adā			Persons			Males			Females		
Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females			
14	15	10	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31			
2,096	1,492	604	16,344	9,107	7,237	117,189	68,846	50,343	359,086	194,598	104,488	61,205	32,640	28,565	32,640	28,565	28,565			
2,075	1,475	600	15,746	8,731	7,015	116,005	65,764	50,241	358,736	194,380	104,356	61,204	32,639	28,564	32,639	28,564	28,564			
961	570	391	15,349	8,427	6,922	108,031	59,465	48,566	358,010	193,850	104,160	60,853	32,369	28,484	32,369	28,484	28,484			
746	393	353	14,183	7,732	6,451	105,973	58,108	47,805	906	571	425	1	1	1	1	1	1			
48	30	18	152	125	27	512	343	169	84	59	25	1	1	1	1	1	1			
						76	50	26	6	3	3									
						51	42	9												
2	2		1	1					58	36	22									
662	340	322				81	67	14	345	208	137									
4	2	2	14,006	7,583	6,423	105,253	57,606	47,647	503	285	238									
30	19	11	24	23	1	2,058	1,357	701	357,014	193,270	103,735	60,862	32,368	28,484	32,368	28,484	28,484			
215	177	38	1,166	695	471	2,054	1,353	701	356,892	193,213	103,679	239	127	112	127	112	112			
215	177	38	1,166	695	471				122	66	56	60,613	32,241	28,372	32,241	28,372	28,372			
						4	4		726	530	196	351	270	81	270	81	81			
1,114	905	209	397	304	93	7,974	6,299	1,675	601	438	163	399	259	80	259	80	80			
881	711	170	320	241	79	6,449	5,004	1,445	581	425	156	274	201	73	201	73	73			
869	703	166	299	228	71	6,149	4,733	1,416	242	197	45	170	121	49	121	49	49			
65	51	14	38	25	13	1,458	997	461	18	15	3	2	1	1	1	1	1			
20	15	5	13	12	1	691	558	133	921	213	108	102	79	23	79	23	23			
784	637	147	248	191	57	4,000	3,178	822	20	13	7	65	58	7	58	58	58			
12	8	4	21	13	8	300	271	29	15	9	6	65	58	7	58	58	58			
			1	1		61	47	14												
						5	5		5	4	1									
12	8	4	20	12	8	234	219	15	98	66	32	10	10		10	10				
225	190	35	73	59	14	1,502	1,278	224	41	30	11	7	7		7	7				
203	171	32	56	44	12	1,116	947	169	1	1										
						6	2	4												
						6	4	2												
						3	1	2												
1	1		1			23	20	3	1	1										
						3	1	2												
						9	7	2												
6	4	2				20	13	7	1	1										
1	1		10	4	6	20	13	7	38	27	11	5	5		5	5				
195	165	30	45	40	5	1,046	899	147	57	36	21	3	3		3	3				
22	19	3	17	15	2	386	331	55												
						1	1													
						20	17	3												
						4	4													
						207	192	15												
20	17	3	12	11	1	3	2	1	1	1										
						148	112	36												
1	1		5	4	1															
1	1					2	2													
						1	1													
						6	5													
2	1		1	2	2															

DISTRICT OR STATE

Dis

District, State, Province or Country here born	BALUCHISTAN			Quetta-Peshawar			Lahore			Sindh		
	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
<i>B. Born elsewhere in India</i>	12,801	8,411	3,357	8,873	4,723	1,141	372	278	97	4,478	2,803	1,673
Afghanistan	16,023	7,091	2,801	4,203	2,323	870	371	274	97	4,478	2,803	1,673
Arabia	238	120	101									
Bhota	1		1	1		1						
Ceylon	1	1		1	1							
China	8	8	3	7	4	3						
Japan	7	1	6	7	1	8						
Nepal	1,677	1,429	238	1,041	1,324	227	1	1				
Perak	11	145	66	60	46	23	1	1				
Russia Turkistan	14	18	2	7	8	2						
Strait Settlement & Malaya	6	6										
Tibet	1	1										
Turkey in Asia	17	8	9	17	8	9						
<i>C. Born in Europe</i>	3,123	2,828	207	8,104	2,736	870	34	28	6	120	113	7
United Kingdom	3,287	2,808	279	8,074	2,719	354	34	28	6	120	113	7
England and Wales	3,175	2,819	256	2,785	2,329	296	23	19	4	85	88	6
Scotland	77	101	23	111	49	22	6	6		7	6	1
Ireland	131	173	68	235	287	68	6	4	2	17	17	
Channel Islands & I. of Man	4	2	1	2	2	1				1	1	
Austria Hungary	2	1	1									
Belgium	1	1		1	1							
France	6	3	3	6	3	3						
Germany	9	8	3	8	6	2						
Gibraltar	8	1	5	8	1	6						
Italy	2	2	1	2	2	1						
Malta	8	2	3	8	2	3						
Portugal	1	1		1	1							
Russia	1		1									
Sweden	1		1	1		1						
Switzerland	1	1		1	1							
<i>D. Born in Africa</i>	8	6	2	4	2	2	1	1		2	2	
Cape Colony	5	4	1	2	2	1	1	1		1	1	
East Africa (British)	1	1										
Mozambique	2	1	1	1		1				1	1	
<i>E. Born in America</i>	37	37	10	31	22	9	2	1	1			
Canada	10	18	4	18	14	4	1	1				
United States	9	6	2	4	2	2	1		1			
West Indies	2	2	1	2	2	1						
America unspecified	6	4	2	6	4	2						
<i>F. Born in Australasia</i>	12	15	4	14	10	4						
Australia	18	15	3	12	10	2						
Samoa	1		1	1		1						
<i>G. Born in Asia</i>	2	2	1				1		1	1	1	

TABLE XII.

Infirmities.

In Part I age is unspecified for 3,111 infirm belonging to the 771,696 souls enumerated on the Tribal schedule.

In both Parts there is a discrepancy in the total number of the infirm, as one deaf mute male in Chûgai and one blind male in Sibi were also returned as insane

XII.—INFIRMITIES.

PART A.—Distribution by Age.

XII
INFIRMITIES BY AGE

49

Age	Population Affected				Total Affected				Total			
	Persons		Females		Persons		Females		Persons		Females	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
0-1	3	4	0	1	0	0	0	10	11	13	13	16
1-2												
2-3												
3-4												
4-5												
6-10	4	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1		
10-15	7	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
15-20	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1			
20-25	5	1	1	3	3	2	1	1				
25-30	8	5	5	2								
30-35	5	4	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1		
35-40	8	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2		
40-45	5	3	3	2	2	2			3	1	2	
45-50	6	4	1	2	2	1	1		2	1	1	
50-55	8	8	1	1					4	4		
55-60	3	1	2						2	1		
60-65	3	2							3	2		
65-70	1	1							1	1		
70 and over	3	3	6						2	2	6	
Unspecified	2,111	1,265	1,216	221	219	102	636	473	182	1,979	914	17
Total	8,171	1,906	1,963	579	203	192	643	412	186	2,052	937	83

Total 0-5

XII—INFIRMITIES

PART B—Distribution by Districts and States

District or State	POPULATION AFFLICTED						INSANE				DEAF MUTE				BLIND				LAME			
	Persons		Males		Females		Persons		Males		Persons		Males		Persons		Males		Persons		Males	
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
1																						
Baluchistan																						
Districts																						
Quetta Pishin	3,171	1,909	1,262	370	268	102	668	182	186	2,052	1,095	957	83	66	17							
Loralai	1,136	738	308	130	106	21	209	223	70	686	391	202	23	17	0							
Zhob	178	132	46	26	25	1	52	10	12	98	66	12	2	1	1							
Bolan	240	154	86	30	23	7	17	46	11	152	86	66	11	9	2							
Chagai	206	130	76	33	26	7	51	37	17	116	65	51	3	2	1							
Sibi	10	3	7	1	1		1	1		8	1	7										
	92	52	10	12	8		26	20	6	54	25	29	1		1							
	410	267	143	28	23	5	119	89	70	238	131	107	6	5	1							
Administered area	333	205	128	21	18	3	86	67	19	223	118	105	1	3	1							
Mari Bugti country	77	62	15	7	5	2	33	22	11	35	33	2	2	2								
States																						
Kalat	2,035	1,171	864	240	162	78	369	259	110	1,366	701	665	60	49	11							
Sarawan	1,692	974	718	180	129	52	263	186	80	1,103	618	575	54	43	11							
Jhalawan	237	191	96	50	41	9	55	40	15	171	101	71	7	6	1							
Kachi	175	104	71	19	14	5	42	31	11	97	50	17	17	9	8							
Kachi	568	326	242	40	31	9	87	59	28	438	231	201	3	2	1							
Pomohi Kachi country	176	97	79	13	10	3	12	11	1	171	76	75	27	26	1							
Makran	400	269	191	42	21	21	55	35	20	276	127	119	29	6								
Kharan	86	47	39	16	11	5	11	9	5	56	27	29	90	6								
Las Bela	343	197	146	60	34	20	104	71	30	173	83	90	6									

TABLE XII A.

Infirmities by Selected Tribes and Races.

TABLE XIII.

Caste, Tribe, Race or Nationality.

RACE OR NATIONALITY

STATES																CASTE, TRIBE, RACE NATIONALITY
KALIT																
Total Kalit		Sarāwān		Jhalawān		Kachhī		Dōmbkī Kaberi country		Makrān		Khārān		Lār Bīla		
Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
10	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	
104,508	164,488	35,082	23,699	46,880	37,518	50,191	42,568	12,624	10,919	37,698	34,244	12,123	10,540	32,640	28,565	Total
102,584	163,272	34,713	23,496	46,714	37,481	49,738	42,263	12,264	10,609	37,129	33,970	12,026	10,453	32,309	28,434	Indigenous
603	518	81	53	8	5	139	119	71	56	211	201	92	81	3	2	Semi-Indigenous
1,412	608	288	150	158	32	314	186	289	234	358	73	5	3	328	129	Allens
15	4	1	2			1				13	-			1		European
4										4				1		Anglo-Indian
1,303	604	287	148	158	32	313	186	250	204	341	71	5	3	326	120	Oriental
215	105	41	26	9	9	60	47	10	13	104	13	1		10	4	Trans Indus
1,178	666	246	122	149	23	263	139	279	241	237	68	4	3	316	125	Qis Indus
44,989	38,443	1,484	1,213	789	644	15,774	13,098	2,276	1,871	19,026	16,763	5,630	4,854	2,868	2,496	Balōch
44,500	38,058	1,483	1,213	790	644	15,671	13,007	2,205	1,815	18,832	16,579	5,570	4,800	2,867	2,495	Indigenous
19,623	16,228	1,461	1,200	235	173	15,670	13,007	2,205	1,815	2		50	33	1,078	875	(i) Eastern
63	50					35	27	28	23					41	33	Bugti
2,190	1,800					97	72	2,093	1,728							Dōmbkī
																Jakhānī
																Khetrān
																Magasī
9,190	7,527	12	12	151	110	8,977	7,372									
226	195	184	156			14	14	28	25							
7,950	6,606	1,264	1,032	84	63	6,545	5,522	55	39	2				202	137	Mari
1								1						835	700	Rind
8																Umrānī
																Others
24,037	21,530	22	13	564	471	1				18,830	16,579	5,600	4,767	1,789	1,620	(ii) Western
447	347									447	347					Barr
672	574									669	573			51	43	Buledi
535	423									534	419	1	4			Dashti
44	36									44	36					Dōdai
37	42									37	42					Gabol
																Gamsbādzaī
																Gichli
268	283									262	275					Gōrgōj
24	22									24	22					Hōt
627	575									627	575			12	14	Kollagī
234	209									234	209					
																Kalmatī
51	36									30	24			50	41	Katōhar
93	83									93	83					Kaudāi
607	525									607	525					Kēngizai
242	218									242	218					Khōsī
607	563									607	563					
																Kolwāi
500	436									527	412			39	29	Kulānchi
19	19									19	19					Lashāri
226	226									226	226			4	3	Lattī
100	80									120	80					Lundī
63	53									63	53					
																Mullāzai
232	230									238	197					Nau-dēr-wān
120	108									71	68			50	2	Purki
352	337									352	337					Rais
2,187	1,960									2,187	1,960					Rakhshānī
6,094	5,995	15	10	442	378	1				1,026	909	5,480	4,695	77	60	
																Rind
4,702	4,257									4,696	4,251					Samī
627	499									627	499					Sanjur
1,620	1,429									1,620	1,429			1,429	1,323	Shahzādā
																Tauki
																Wādai
																Others
																Semi-Indigenous

Caste, Tribe, Race or Nationality	DISTRICTS																	
	BALUCHISTAN				QUETTA-PESH		LAKHAI		ZILA		DRAI		CHITRAI		RTHI			
	Persons	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
BRACHI	507,787	25,008	74,882	8,865	4,826	43	6	299		189	97	8,898	8,898	8,771	1,978	7	9	
(i) Orizoid sachia	11,917	4,397	6,711	189	961	7		2		8	1	279	111	299	18			
Akmalai	33	18	39	8	1													
Hindai	114	63	71															
Chargal	2,941	1,12	917	84	39					9	1	8	8					
Kalamkhal	2,913	1,128	87	89	41	1						13	10					
Kambkhal	8,882	1,079	1,14	91	164							89	66	17	17			
Mirwal	2,624	1,128	1,224															
Kadhal	1,823	744	901	43	84			1				9	13	83	23			
Bumkhal	2,729	1,087	1,981	662	991							91	77	86	23			
(ii) Barikala	61,279	39,8	8,712	2,177	2,61					111	43	1,899	1,812	1,299	9713	1		
Bangkhal	11,142	877	3,218	413	879	7		2		82	1	7	8	642	643	1		
Kord	2,476	1,318	1,549	324	81			2		43	19	23	7	14				
Lahat	8,829	1,82	8,823	472	962			19		1		7	4	803	176			
Langa	8,979	6,867	4,978	792	113							162	83	139	107			
Mimabaki	2,998	2,117	1,723	196	47			7		2	7		19	41	86			
Kadhal	1,977	1,893	964	119	136							8	51	86	66			
Bumabaki	626	941	813	81	87													
Barpura	2,812	1,213	999	366	99	3				1		78	86	28				
Balakhal	1,828	718	889	69	81					2				17	18			
Bhakhal	8,979	4,994	8,979	1,861	989			2		9		6	6	68	86			
Raghal	4,722	8,889	8,129	27	36					4	2	1,899	1,828	83	71			
(iii) Jhalabadi	8,794	23,227	23,211	1,89	796			87		42		1,842	1,229	1,212	967			
Bamajev	10,644	1,898	4,823									86	79					
Hindai	1,146	47	87		86							86	43	8	1			
Mimabadi	12,689	7,47	9,812		79							1,823	964	139	85			
Mimabadi	86,808	11,136	11,896	483	987			80		42				681	839	6		
Kadhal	7,641	9,890	1,981	86	89									44				
Pandhal	8,807	1,113	962											643	872			
Kajhal	4,981	9,889	1,718															
Kadhal	23,846	18,898	14,819	883	996							106	217	861	66			
Bajhal	8,821	263	1,899															
Dajhal	1,811	89	628	21	84													
Kadhal	8,863	1,863	899	89														
Jatish	1,899	2,863	2,811	124	118									79	82			
Lajhal	1,772	964	964		9									28				
Majhal	1,189	1,134	999									18	36					
Bajhal	8,812	2,879	8,939	19								86	79	6	8			
Gov. Bajhal	899	666	224															
Karabadi	664	826	962	63	12					1		83	86					
Others	1,814	4,899	6,123	126	89									12				
(iv) M. I. Mimabadi	8,892	1,821	1,14	19										86	8	87		
Kajhal	1,811	718	899															
Pandhal	877	129	129															
Rajhal	611	896	823															
Others	838	148	76	19				1						81	4	81		

STATES																CASTE, TRIBE, RACE NATIONALITY
Total Kalit		Sariwān		Jhalawān		KALIT		Dōmbki Kaberi country		Makrān		Kharān		LAS BILA		
						Males	Females							Males	Females	
Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
10	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	
70,734	61,847	26,399	21,417	38,748	30,805	2,255	1,893	108	89	5,045	4,122	4,179	3,521	4,358	3,659	Brāhūi
6,788	5,173	1,034	850	4,037	3,190	35	38	1		978	771	703	624	485	469	(i) Original nucle
7	0	7	8				1									Ahmadzai
85	71			72	40	13	22			99	79	42	37	143	136	Iltaizai
040	758	99	74	706	565	2	3	1		99	83	4	3	23	14	Gurgnari
1,040	809	212	166	725	557					118	107	227	209	193	186	Kalandrafi
1,219	1,018	221	173	636	519	17	11			480	415	1	2	98	102	Kambrafi
1,352	1,102			862	685					67	41	4	3	9	7	Mirwafi
035	534	205	208	260	221	3	1			106	46	425	371	19	15	Rodonai
1,510	1,172	209	161	770	594											Sumalafi
3,475	19,162	19,228	15,680	1,409	1,901	1,728	1,445	70	65	891	662	149	103	213	195	(ii) Sarawān
5,192	4,317	3,742	3,122	78	58	968	825	57	50	347	202			3	1	Bangulzai
1,407	1,003	1,287	1,024	104	98	23	20			44	38	39	24	107	102	Kūrd
2,528	1,900	2,139	1,920	157	111	208	153	1		23	13			89	83	Lahri
4,050	4,167	4,510	3,755	337	333	16	15			78	64					Lāngav
1,859	1,533	1,794	1,440	69	52	37	34			18	5	2	2			Mamashahi
862	713	411	340	78	57	319	265	8	15	40	36					Raisani
287	255	233	212			54	43			16						Rustumzai
1,000	878	952	850	5	5	27	23			5						Sarparra
650	517	649	515			2	2			257	242	100	65	14	9	Satakhzai
3,792	2,976	2,045	2,313	387	312	59	44	4		27	12	8	12			Shahwani
862	703	617	405	195	172	15	12									Zagr Menga
45,095	36,068	5,859	4,611	32,258	25,654	482	404	32	18	3,174	2,689	3,299	2,767	3,642	2,985	(iii) Jhalawān
4,206	3,608			2,932	2,420	2	1			1,317	1,134	45	44	1,673	1,314	Bizanjar
580	400	66	43	314	278					14	13	102	105	3	1	Harūni
5,862	4,748	549	442	2,594	2,035	13	11			578	485	2,123	1,775	141	109	Mamasani
13,089	10,033	3,323	2,560	9,457	7,220	75	70	32	18	109	146	3	4	854	656	Mēngal
1,915	1,534	445	307	1,404	1,165	5	2			1						Nichari
770	610	130	106	463	374	168	139									Pandranai
2,031	1,604			1,161	857					840	729	70	18	207	167	Sajdi
16,116	13,423	1,337	1,114	13,843	11,106	219	175			225	182	892	756	864	711	Zahri
1,344	1,142	67	49	1,374	1,092	3	1									Dājōi
754	608	14	15	764	588	6	5									Dānya
962	702	6	6	967	654	5	4					44	35	191	165	Kharān
2,938	2,269	410	345	2,377	1,803	148	115			9	6			1		Jattal
756	588			921	756	35	32									L'harāi
1,100	969	93	84	992	870	10	5							22	17	Mēnār
3,508	2,516	82	43	2,468	1,916	1	1			269	198	767	655	69	45	Garāi
419	335	442	335													Zarak
117	139	49	50	65	89											Opāi
4,565	3,632	199	159	4,072	3,393	17	17			16	8	61	62	579	442	
1,376	1,144	55	249	1,044	865	10	6	5		6	2		37	5	17	(iv) Mānār
715	597	5	4	715	589											

STATES																CAIT THIR PAGE OF NATIONALITY
KALIT																
Total Kalit		Sarawan		Jhalawin		Kachhi		Dombki Kaberi country		Makran		Kharin		LAS BELA		
Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	
10	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	
1,030	825	351	262	60	47	341	278	127	122	75	53	70	63	34	20	Pathan
771	646	230	186	54	39	304	249	124	120	22	19	37	33	31	18	Indigenous
87	74	34	34	27	18	21	22			1						Babi
07	51	24	12	4	5	2	2			4	5	33	27			Barfeh
																Jafar
																Kalaf
43	30	22	16	0	2	4	4			10	7	1	1			Dutai
2	1					1						1	1			Dumar
16	10	16	10													Lamar
																Sanzarkhel
8						3	4			5	1					Sargara
																Snafla
4	5	4	5													Targhara
1				1						5	6					Others
12	9	2	1	5	2											Kusi
20	13	20	13													Luni
0	5	4	1													Pani
370	333	80	74	13	14	163	125	123	120							Main branch
363	321	80	74	13	14	147	113	123	120							Isot
																Mandokhel
																Musakhel
10	12					16	12									Zarlun
																Shruni
63	51	21	26	2		40	25									Tarin
24	21	8	4	1		14	17	1								Abdol Akak
10	11	1		1		8	11									Spin Tarin
7	4	7	4													Tor Tarin
7	6					6	6	1								Others
																Zmarai
																Others
82	68	13	6	1		58	50			7	7	3	5	31	18	
195	143	81	53	8	5	36	28			38	27	32	20	2	1	Scimit in Ugenous
03																Ghltai
																Kharf
																Nisar
5	4						3	3		2	1					Sakantli
16	4	5					8	4								Tarai
17	13	4	1				13	12								Others
55	51	5	9	4	1	7	6			4	6	32	30	1		Pani Sufi
6	3	1				5	3									Darrani
95	63	60	43	4	4					32	21			1	1	Narai
47	33	33	23							12	10					Others
49	30	23	13	4	4					50	11			1	1	
64	56	40	23	4	3	1	1	3	2	13	7	1		1	1	Attens
60	46	39	23	4	3	1	1	3	2	14		1		1	1	Scimit in Ugenous
																Mir
																Others

STATISTICS																LAKH BILA		CASTE TRIBES RACE OR NATIONALITY	
Total Kalat		Sarawan		Jhalawan		Kacihli		Dombki Kaheri country		Makran		Kharan		Males Females					
Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females				
10	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34				
408	421			419	375					79	46			14,359	12,501	Lāsi (Panj Rāj)			
														1,656	1,400	Angara			
														2,033	2,441	Burra			
										79	46			4,705	4,109	Jamāt			
														2,688	2,415	Rūnjha			
														2,377	2,055	Shekh			
32,578	27,660	66	51	293	208	24,412	20,690	6,593	5,659	1,214	1,052			2,628	2,137	Jatt			
32,578	27,660	66	51	293	208	24,412	20,690	6,593	5,659	1,214	1,052			2,628	2,137	Indigenous			
																Aliens			
1,812	1,607	447	397	161	125	512	483	502	460	113	68	77	69	179	177	Sayyid			
1,811	1,607	447	397	161	125	512	483	502	460	113	68	77	69	179	177	Indigenous			
385	316	50	35	05	69	103	176	42	33	5	3			125	131	Bokhari			
232	225	134	118	27	28	57	61	12	18			2	2			Chishti			
6	4			6	4											Gharshun			
191	190	118	126	0	4	28	25	0	16	30	19			53	45	Gilani			
281	250	6	8			179	158	12	10	44	33	40	41			Husami			
424	370							424	370							Kaheri			
										11						Karbal			
37	22	20	17	14	10	6	5									Khōsti			
60	40	30	33													Mashwani			
																Maudūdi			
9	3					3	3									Pechi			
202	172	83	60	13	6	46	60	3	7	22	13	55	26	1	1	Taran			
1										1						Ustrana			
																Others			
1																Aliens			
																Trans Indus			
																Cis Indus			
29,794	27,668	5,664	4,909	6,005	5,219	2,529	2,119	1,485	1,282	11,976	12,126	2,135	2,013	7,161	6,809	Other Musalmāns			
29,458	27,508	5,609	4,879	5,989	5,207	2,445	2,055	1,477	1,271	11,803	12,083	2,135	2,013	7,093	6,779	Indigenous			
5,006	4,054			37	32					5,059	4,022			52	46	Darzāda			
3,671	3,071	3,553	2,984	93	65	2		1		11	6	11	11			Dēhwar			
7,537	6,312	501	620	1,778	1,852	496	493	145	170	3,128	3,771	1,426	1,400	3,716	3,455	Gadra			
3,620	2,978	947	528	1,439	1,142	434	327	258	203	701	654	149	124	055	1,005	Ghulam			
																Ghulamzād			
378	305							378	305							Gāi			
1,618	1,353	17	12			922	747	520	426	150	138			1	3	Jat			
														185	145	Klōja			
3	2			3	2									305	260	Kari			
3,522	2,959	826	726	1,560	1,209	290	236	100	107	571	526	175	155	718	634	Lōji			
253	242									253	242								
3,334	3,052			1,075	901	10	10			1,925	1,818	374	323	1,056	975	Mel			
370	310	5	9	4	4	291	237	65	55	5	5			24	23	Nahab			
336	160	55	50	16	12	84	64	8	11	173	43			161	151	Others			
156	72	1	3	5	6	49	46		11	74	6			68	50	Aliens			
1		1														Trans Indus			
135			3	5	6	49	46	7	11	74	6			9	5	Hazara			
209	85	51	11	6	35	15	1			59	51					Others			
																Cis Indus			
5,550	4,552	600	403	380	92	3,748	3,428	664	593	126	11	22	23	993	718	Hindu			
4,788	4,183	479	327	251	76	3,574	3,571	479	426	2	1	28	17	786	664	Indigenous			
767	769	161	76	129	14	164	95	155	172	101	10	4	3	207	605	Aliens			
1,564	1,453	68	45	9	3	616	572	869	828		2			69	15	Sikh			
1,791	1,711	10	76			577	517	776	761					8		Ind. non			
177	116		19	9	3	41	25	95	69		2			51	15	Aliens			
49	7	3	2			4	2			42	3					Miscellaneous			
																Aliens			

TABLE XIV.

Civil Condition by Age for Selected Castes.

The number of indigenous inhabitants censused in the regular areas, where alone statistics regarding age and civil condition were collected, is too small to justify a selection of races and tribes. The Table accordingly consists of a review of civil condition by age among the population censused on the regular schedule, divided into two main groups, indigenous and others, with subdivisions by the main religions.

XIV - CIVIL CONDITION BY AGE FOR SELECTED CASTES.

N	Sex	Age	Total			U.S. Nat.			N. Nat.			Whorens		
			Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females	Persons	Males	Females
1			2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Grand Total			62,997	49,371	12,736	29,782	21,411	8,227	29,660	27,000	7,217	2,411	2,219	1,042
100%			100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
A. Indigents			2,417	2,005	1,343	1,003	817	706	810	2,043	891	222	213	96
100%			3.84	4.06	10.55	3.37	3.81	8.58	2.73	7.57	12.35	9.21	9.60	9.16
MEXICAN			7,396	6,287	1,000	2,746	2,386	1,010	6,880	6,113	800	272	276	137
100%			11.74	12.71	7.85	9.22	11.14	12.16	23.19	22.64	11.03	11.36	11.36	13.15
INDIC			70	60	20	20	20	20	70	60	20	20	20	20
100%			0.11	0.12	0.16	0.07	0.09	0.24	0.24	0.22	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28
SIK			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
100%			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
B. Others			4,200	3,600	1,170	1,000	800	1,000	3,200	3,000	800	200	200	100
100%			6.68	7.29	9.18	3.36	3.73	12.16	10.79	11.11	11.11	8.30	8.30	9.60
MEXICAN			12,000	10,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	11,000	10,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
100%			19.05	20.25	15.74	3.36	4.67	12.16	37.42	37.04	13.87	41.45	45.00	96.00
INDIC			10,000	8,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	9,000	8,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
100%			15.88	16.19	15.74	3.36	4.67	12.16	30.70	29.63	13.87	41.45	45.00	96.00
SIK			1,000	1,000	0	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	0	0	0	0
100%			1.59	2.03	0.78	0.00	0.00	3.54	3.37	3.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
CHICAGO			10,000	8,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	9,000	8,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
100%			15.88	16.19	15.74	3.36	4.67	12.16	30.70	29.63	13.87	41.45	45.00	96.00
INDIC			1,000	1,000	0	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	0	0	0	0
100%			1.59	2.03	0.78	0.00	0.00	3.54	3.37	3.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
CHICAGO			10,000	8,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	9,000	8,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
100%			15.88	16.19	15.74	3.36	4.67	12.16	30.70	29.63	13.87	41.45	45.00	96.00
INDIC			1,000	1,000	0	0	0	0	1,000	1,000	0	0	0	0
100%			1.59	2.03	0.78	0.00	0.00	3.54	3.37	3.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

TABLE XV.

Occupation or Means of Livelihood.

This Table is divided into five Parts. Part A, which is complete in itself, deals with the occupations of the whole population, and consists (i) of a provincial summary and (ii) of a detailed statement for the various districts and states. Part B treats of the subsidiary occupations of agriculturists who returned themselves as actual workers. A review of certain other mixed occupations is given in Part C. In Part D all occupations are classified by religion. Part E contains the results of a supplementary Industrial census which was taken on the census night.

Group No.	OCCUPATION	MALAYSIAN				
		Total workers and dependents	TOTAL		Partially agricultural	Dependent
			Male	Female		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	III.—INDUSTRY—cont.					
21700000	28 Industries of dress and the toilet	7,871	8,920	788	871	4,378
21710000	Hat, cap, toilet makers	9	1	—	—	—
21720000	Shoe, milliner, etc.	1,007	700	—	—	—
21730000	Shoe, boot, model makers	1,070	1,175	—	—	—
21740000	Other industries pertaining to dress	—	—	—	—	—
21750000	Washing, cleaning, drying	2,071	643	—	—	—
21760000	Barbers, hairdressers, etc.	1,007	344	—	—	—
21770000	Manicurists, hair beauties, etc.	15	—	—	—	—
72	34 Furniture industries	100	6	1	1	28
73	Cabinet makers, carriage painters, etc.	90	—	—	—	—
74	Photographers, etc.	1	—	1	1	—
75	35 Building industries	8,191	1,481	19	11	1,291
76	Line makers, cement workers	—	19	—	—	—
77	Painters, plasterers	—	—	—	—	—
78	Stone workers, masons	1,2	—	—	—	—
79	Thatchers, building construction, plasterers, etc.	1,5	70	19	—	—
80	36 Construction of means of transport	41	32	—	2	1
81	Cart and carriage makers, wheelwrights	34	30	—	—	—
82	Boatmen, boat-repairers, etc.	—	—	—	—	—
83	38 Industries of luxury (furniture, arts, sciences)	2,630	818	8	26	279
84	Printers, lithographers, etc.	91	21	—	—	—
85	Envelope, soap, stationery, etc.	12	—	—	—	—
86	Bookbinders, etc.	—	—	—	—	—
87	Makers of musical instruments	—	—	—	—	—
88	Makers of watches, clocks, surgical instruments, etc.	—	—	—	—	—
89	Jewellers, etc.	1,000	70	—	—	—
90	Toy line makers, fishing tackle, etc.	—	—	—	—	—
91	Others (see performance in industry, non-agricultural service, knowledge, etc.)	—	—	—	—	—
92	39 Industries concerned with refuse (sanitary, sewerage, etc.)	4,623	1,200	227	21	1,617
	IV.—TRANSPORT	81,590	7,100	—	2,37	16,18
93	40 Transport by water	22	470	—	233	17
94	Ship's officers, engineers, mariners, etc.	27	21	—	—	—
95	Employed on piers, rivers, canals	—	—	—	—	—
96	Boat owners, boatmen, rowers	—	—	—	—	—
97	41 Transport by road	21,523	7,041	8	1,224	12,379
98	Trucks on roads and bridges	—	—	—	—	—
99	Cart drivers, coolies, stable boys, etc.	—	—	—	—	—
100	Palan, etc. drivers and carriers	—	—	—	—	—
101	Post-office carriers and drivers	16,224	4,778	—	97	11,921
102	Trucks, motorcars	—	—	—	—	—
103	42 Transport by rail	4,000	2,30	—	943	4,23
104	Railway employees	4,774	2,304	—	—	—
105	Laborers on railway construction	226	—	—	—	—
106	43 Post office Telegraph, Telephone services	798	428	—	100	623
	V.—TRADE	80,953	11,712	48	693	7,000
107	44 Bank managers, money lenders, money changers, etc.	19	254	—	80	45
108	45 Retailers, commercial travellers, ware-house owners and employees	979	27	—	—	103
109	46 Trade in textiles (phoe-poo's etc.)	2,67	1,970	—	270	2,000
110	47 Trade in skins, leather, furs	100	7	—	—	7
111	48 Trade in wood (timber work, bark, etc.)	787	923	—	4	879
112	49 Trade in metal (machinery, tools, etc.)	79	—	—	—	9
113	50 Trade in pottery	—	—	—	—	—
114	51 Trade in chemical products (drugs, petrolum, etc.)	830	321	—	96	848
115	52 Hotels, cafés, restaurants, etc.	324	209	—	3	45
116	owners of liquor, mixed drinks, etc.	213	121	—	—	—
117	Chefs, managers, employees of hotels, etc.	120	—	—	—	—
118	53 Other trade in food stuffs	12,637	2,200	43	262	7,214
119	Tobacco	22	—	—	—	—
120	Owners, sellers of vegetable oil, salt, etc.	1,000	4,000	—	—	—
121	Sellers of milk, butter, eggs, poultry, etc., etc.	400	—	—	—	—
122	Sellers of rice, sugar, etc.	—	—	—	—	—
123	Cannermen, brew, land, vegetables, fruit, meat and others	1,000	—	—	—	—
124	Grain and pulse dealers	—	—	—	—	—
125	Tanners, dressers, skins, etc., etc.	—	—	—	—	—
126	Dressers in skins and goods, etc.	—	—	—	—	—
127	Fishers in dry goods, leather	—	—	—	—	—

PART A—PROVINCIAL SUMMARY.

PART A—PROVINCIAL SUMMARY.											
DISTRICTS											STATES
Total workers and dependants	ACTUAL WORKERS				Total workers and dependants	ACTUAL WORKERS				Dependants	Group No
	TOTAL	Partially agriculturists	Dependants	TOTAL		Partially agriculturists	Dependants				
								Males	Females		
8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17		
3,895	2,081	109	125	1,762	3,726	1,249	66	246	2,411	67	
2	1			1		52	64		120	68	
1,231	708	44	33	479	236	633		75	1,261	69	
1,085	496	2	48	597	1,894					70	
10	9	1		498	1,040	365		111	673	71	
1,031	478	55	11	176	556	109		60	357	72	
621	345		54	11						73	
15	4										
86	36	1	1	49	14	5			9	74	
85	36		1	49	14	5			9	75	
1											
1,690	1,027	1	138	662	1,501	554	18	32	929	76	
40	16		1	24	9	8		1	6	77	
303	189		20	144	310	108		13	211	78	
619	345	1	24	174	695	245	18	17	400	79	
828	507		93	820	478	188		1	262	80	
41	25		2	16						81	
6	5			1							
35	20		2	15							
871	417	2	28	452	1,168	396		28	772	82	
88	48	1	6	39						83	
3		1		2						84	
13	9			4						85	
										86	
33	10			23	8	2				87	
670	312		17	359	1,164	389		28	765	88	
2	2		5	26	5	4			1	89	
62	36				1	1				90	
3,546	1,691	387	21	1,518	513	189		10	324	91	
17,972	8,566	6	1,507	9,400	10,784	3,600		864	7,184	92	
399	240	1	192	149	489	221		3	268	93	
										94	
399	240	1	122	149	57	1		1	260	95	
					431	165		2		96	
11,957	4,681	5	314	7,271	9,828	3,220		820	6,608	97	
803	423	2	48	433	31	10			11	98	
872	481	1	60	300	10	4			6	99	
6	6		2	3						100	
9,968	3,601		160	3,685	9,560	3,130		617	6,436	101	
228	165	2	44	63	231	78		3	155	102	
4,916	3,287		960	1,629	44	20		3	24	103	
4,755	3,151		903	1,604	29	13		2	16	104	
101	136		87	25	15	7		1	8	105	
700	349		111	351	423	139		38	284	106	
13,452	6,060	47	460	7,345	15,811	5,652	1	233	10,158	107	
288	109		30	179	481	145			286	108	
115	58		8	57	97	29			68	109	
2,540	1,026	1	120	1,513	2,530	944		50	1,586	110	
86	48		1	40	58	24		1	34	111	
7	5			2	745	218		4	527	112	
19	10			9						113	
9	6		3	3						114	
519	217	1	17	301	371	124		49	247	115	
271	179		13	92	83	50			53	116	
142	92		3	50	3	25			47	117	
129	57		10	42	10	4			6	118	
6,384	3,073	43	153	3,268	6,653	2,507		82	4,146	119	
8	3			5	275	91		1	161	120	
4,621	2,133		103	2,230	5,005	1,918			3,087	121	
423	194	20	13	179	10	61			233	122	
7	3			4						123	
544	291	10	30	243	571	150			423	124	
375	193		13	17	243	200			172	125	
105	5	1	3	47	13	12			20	126	
225	100		5	135	123	4			121	127	
152	84		16	68						128	

Group No.	OCCUPATION	BALCHISTAN			
		Total wages and depreciation	Actual numbers		Depend- ants
			Males	Females	
1	2	3	4	5	6
	V—TRADE—cont.				
121	81 Trade in clothing (readymade) and toilet articles	319	9	1	7
122	82 Trade in furniture	1,615	294		2
123	sale to landlords, etc.	1,044	201		2
124	hardware stores	57	27		1
125	86 and 1 Building Material	21	19		
126	87 Trade in means of transport (dealers and hirers of transport on wheels, carriages, saddlebags, etc.)	319	179		
127	88 Trade in fuel (firewood, charcoal and etc.)	490	167	1	1
128	89 Trade in clothes of luxury, leather, silk, etc.	648	211	2	7
129	Jewelry, etc., etc.	60	21		1
130	Jewelry, etc., etc.	60	21		1
131	Jewelry, etc., etc.	60	21		1
132	Jewelry, etc., etc.	60	21		1
133	Jewelry, etc., etc.	60	21		1
134	41 Trade of other sorts	3,370	533		63
135	Carpenters, etc., etc.	4,077	1,741		86
136	Carpenters, etc., etc.	4,077	1,741		86
137	Carpenters, etc., etc.	4,077	1,741		86
138	Carpenters, etc., etc.	4,077	1,741		86
	C—Public administration and liberal arts	62,194	26,341	213	10,896
	VI—PUBLIC FORCE	70,207	16,211	1	7,778
139	42 Army	13,219	13,207		7,617
140	Army (regular)	14,000	14,211		8,000
141	Army (irregular)	1,000	70		20
142	43 Police	1,227	227		121
143	Police	1,227	227		121
144	Police	1,227	227		121
	VII—PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	9,200	2,770	2	2,770
145	44 Public Administration	9,200	2,770	2	2,770
146	Services of the State	904	2,770		2,770
147	Services of the State	904	2,770		2,770
148	Services of the State	904	2,770		2,770
149	Services of the State	904	2,770		2,770
	VIII—PROFESSIONS AND LIBERAL ARTS	11,163	407	29	634
150	45 Religion	6,000	2,273	23	2,273
151	Priests, ministers, etc.	1,000	1,000		1,000
152	Priests, ministers, etc.	1,000	1,000		1,000
153	Priests, ministers, etc.	1,000	1,000		1,000
154	Priests, ministers, etc.	1,000	1,000		1,000
155	46 Law	223	77		27
156	Lawyers, etc., etc.	223	77		27
157	Lawyers, etc., etc.	223	77		27
158	Lawyers, etc., etc.	223	77		27
159	47 Medicine	227	213	78	27
160	Medical practitioners, dentists, etc., etc.	227	213	78	27
161	Medical practitioners, dentists, etc., etc.	227	213	78	27
162	Medical practitioners, dentists, etc., etc.	227	213	78	27
163	48 Instruction (professors, teachers, etc., etc.)	600	24	28	28
164	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
165	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
166	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
167	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
168	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
169	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
170	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
171	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
172	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
173	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
174	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
175	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
176	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
177	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
178	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
179	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
180	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
181	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
182	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
183	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
184	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
185	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
186	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
187	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
188	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
189	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
190	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
191	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
192	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
193	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
194	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
195	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
196	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
197	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
198	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
199	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
200	Teachers, etc., etc.	600	24	28	28
	IX—PERSONS LIVING ON THEIR INCOME	620	27	28	28
201	49 Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
202	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
203	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
204	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
205	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
206	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
207	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
208	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
209	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
210	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
211	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
212	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
213	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
214	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
215	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
216	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
217	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
218	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
219	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
220	Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, etc., etc.)	620	27	28	28
	D—Domestication	10,000	11,000	1,000	1,000
	X—DOMESTIC SERVICE	204	2,070	2,070	2,070
221	50 Domestic service	204	2,070	2,070	2,070
222	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
223	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
224	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
225	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
226	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
227	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
228	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
229	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
230	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
231	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
232	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
233	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
234	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
235	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
236	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
237	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
238	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
239	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
240	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
241	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
242	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
243	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
244	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
245	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
246	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
247	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
248	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
249	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
250	Cook, waiter, etc., etc.	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
	XI—INSUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED OCCUPATION	6,700	4,000	70	404
251	51 Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
252	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
253	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
254	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
255	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
256	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
257	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
258	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
259	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
260	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
261	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
262	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
263	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
264	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
265	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
266	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
267	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
268	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
269	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
270	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
271	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
272	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
273	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
274	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
275	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
276	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
277	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
278	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
279	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
280	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
281	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
282	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
283	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
284	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
285	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
286	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
287	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
288	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
289	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
290	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
291	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
292	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
293	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
294	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
295	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
296	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
297	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
298	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
299	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
300	Insufficiently described	6,700	4,000	70	404
	XII—UNPRODUCTIVE	2,210	2,210	210	2,210
301	52 Unproductive	2,210	2,210	210	2,210
302	Unproductive	2,210	2,210	210	2,210
303	Unproductive	2,210	2,210	210	2,210
304	Unproductive	2,210	2,210	210	2,210
305	Unproductive	2,210	2,210	210	2,210
306	Unproductive	2,210	2,210	210	2,210
307	Unproductive	2,210	2,210	210	2,210
308	Unproductive	2,210	2,210	210	2,210
309					

PART A—PROVINCIAL SUMMARY.

DISTRICTS					STATES						Group No
Total workers and dependants	ACTUAL WORKERS			Dependants	Total workers and dependants	ACTUAL WORKERS			Dependants		
	TOTAL		Partially agriculturists			TOTAL		Partially agriculturists			
	Males	Females				Males	Females				
8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17		
										125	
217	96	1	7	116	6	2	—	14	522		
317	146	—	10	171	766	244	—	14	516	126	
247	120	—	8	167	729	243	1	—	6	127	
30	26	—	2	4	7	1	—	—	21	128	
22	4	—	—	18	20	5	—	—	—	129	
258	97	—	6	161	84	32	—	2	52	130	
357	127	—	7	230	133	40	1	12	92		
512	210	1	7	262	150	62	—	—	88		
38	26	—	1	12	2	2	—	—	—	131	
451	212	1	6	238	145	60	—	—	68	132	
53	11	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	133	
1,533	610	—	46	923	3,675	1,243	—	10	2,432		
1,364	522	—	39	812	3,613	1,222	—	19	2,391	135	
151	78	—	5	5	33	13	—	—	20	136	
9	5	—	—	4	2	1	—	—	1	137	
9	7	—	2	2	21	7	—	—	14	138	
31,766	22,062	200	10,067	9,504	10,428	4,262	13	799	6,133		
18,638	15,067	1	7,660	2,970	1,759	917	—	118	842		
16,761	14,386	1	6,929	2,374	1,758	916	—	11	0	139	
16,761	14,386	1	6,929	2,374	1,758	916	—	107	833	140	
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
1,877	1,261	—	731	596	1	1	—	—	—	142	
1,673	1,250	—	730	103	1	1	—	—	—	143	
4	1	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—		
6,345	3,653	2	2,005	2,690	3,651	1,573	—	420	2,078		
6,345	3,653	2	2,005	2,690	3,651	1,573	—	420	2,078		
5,745	3,266	—	1,672	2,379	859	403	—	215	261	141	
19	12	—	1	7	2	84	—	202	1712	145	
413	242	2	75	199	—	—	—	3	8	146	
238	133	—	57	105	8	5	—	—	—	147	
6,220	2,629	171	379	3,420	4,949	1,778	11	255	3,100		
3,506	1,312	53	118	2,201	3,433	1,211	2	193	2,220		
2,210	—	2	63	1,417	1,625	618	—	99	1,207	148	
11,6	448	4	37	633	1,423	525	2	81	806	149	
48	24	6	7	18	—	—	—	13	117	150	
123	70	—	6	53	165	68	—	—	—	151	
146	43	—	13	103	87	20	—	14	58		
16	3	—	2	13	60	26	—	13	—	152	
150	40	—	11	90	7	3	—	1	4	153	
792	386	70	94	336	75	27	9	5	39		
340	163	4	41	183	43	16	—	1	27	154	
413	223	66	53	164	32	11	9	4	12	155	
514	303	48	44	183	72	45	—	2	27	156	
1,182	585	—	110	597	1,282	466	—	41	816		
28	10	—	4	0	—	—	—	2	—	157	
608	444	—	93	424	24	10	—	—	14	158	
69	47	—	6	42	28	11	—	—	17	159	
107	75	—	7	122	1,230	415	—	30	785	160	
563	113	26	23	424	69	14	2	6	53		
563	113	26	23	424	69	14	2	6	53	161	
16,352	8,016	1,163	1,010	7,173	14,244	3,382	4,976	385	5,886		
7,158	4,191	908	759	2,059	7,136	879	4,911	89	1,346		
7,158	4,191	908	759	2,059	7,136	879	4,911	89	1,346		
5,702	3,030	908	440	1,764	658	762	4,011	85	1,205	162	
1,450	1,161	—	318	295	618	07	—	4	81	163	
6,112	2,552	38	210	3,522	4,644	1,544	38	194	3,062		
6,112	2,552	38	210	3,522	4,644	1,544	38	194	3,062		
185	102	—	24	63	80	30	—	3	69	164	
81	47	—	3	33	31	13	—	—	19	165	
5,645	2,402	—	37	183	3,406	4,514	1,501	38	2,073	166	
3,082	1,273	217	41	1,503	2,464	959	27	102	1,478		
302	282	18	8	2	48	46	1	—	1	169	
2,780	991	109	33	1,590	2,416	913	26	102	1,477	169	

[illegible]

[illegible]

SIDÍ				KALÁT				LAS DÉLA					Group No
ACTUAL WORKERS			Depend ants	ACTUAL WORKERS			Depend ants	ACTUAL WORKERS		Partially agricul turist	Depend ants		
TOTAL		Partially agricul turist		TOTAL		Partially agricul turist		TOTAL					
Males	Females			Males	Females			Males	Females				
23	24	25	20	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34		
42,847	764	4,482	73,578	120,683	4,579	4 423	233 821	20,528	776	2 041	39,901		
32,508	10	1,234	64,759	101,480	1	2,009	199,539	10 586		1,473	32,370		
31,440	3	900	64,562	101,404	1	2,009	199,380	10,585		1,473	32,370		
31,438	3	890	64,562	100,831	1	1,959	198,057	15,579		1 478	29,732		
28 639		0	53,944	83,020	1	9	178 478	9 139			17,869		
2,209			5 913	10 903	1		25 334	1,415			3 154	1	
25,080			52,830	73 215			147,175	7,107			14 430	2	
12		0	8	50			105				278	3	
378			154	3 721			894	617			26	4	
69		11	33	457			1,063	17				6	
49		23	60	23			63	708		20	1,474		
24		13	12	4			11			20	1,474	7	
24		10	48	10			42	708				8	
2 691	3	850	5,525	12,331		1,916	23,463	5,676		1 418	10,870		
8			11	25			34	523		430	1 098	9	
2 125	2	843	4,518	11 041		1 721	20 067	4,700		971	8,610	10	
269			573	515		181	1 174	19		6	42	11	
283	1	5	423	750		11	1,293	337		3	451	12	
				573		50	1,293	1,046		35	2,638		
2				55		45	1,264	1,045		35	2 638	14	
2				18		5	20	1				15	
1,068	7	344	197	76			189	1					
1,068	7	344	197									16	
1,068	7	344	197									17	
				76			189	1					
				76			189	1				10	
								1				20	
5,233	43	787	5 662	13,209	275	1,603	25,301	2,272	90	197	4,496		
1,522	41	194	1,874	5,393	274	614	10,719	836	90	89	1,736		
10		6	34	454	2	28	846	110	24	11	216		
2			3	409	1	28	753	12	4			21	
10		6	17	20	1		54	73	1	7		23	
7			14	3			3					24	
				18				18	10	4		25	
				54			192					26	
				5			16					27	
				49			100					28	
												29	
202		40	472	943	65	147	2,056	154	15	19	373		
201		40	345	704		116	1,550	64	15	15	147	30	
61			127	140	0	31	407	00		4	220	37	
122		40	248	1,226		20	2,490	88		6	206		
												33	
1				1			8					40	
108		40	217	1 177		26	2 413	81		0	102	41	
3			7	27			50	5			8	43	
10			24	31			28	2			6	43	
56		15	99	154		13	282	24		10	46		
49		16	94	130		18	241	24		10	46	47	
7			4	24			41					43	
14			18	78		41	170	3			12		
				8			8	20				50	
0												51	
2			3									52	
0			16	70		33	160	5				53	
												55	
169	9	9	156	510	138	77	1,091	36	36	9	91		
												21	
10	0		17	17	135		131	1				54	
61	2		11	20	1		43	2				57	
29			54	202	2		404	2				58	
32	1		48	141		57	209	10		3	17	59	
				1			4					61	
88		1		118			210	21		0	33	63	
				2								65	

1	2	OCCUPATION	QUINTA PLAN			
			ACTUAL WORK IN		Partially utilized	Unemployed
			Total			
			Males	Females		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
III. INDUSTRY—cont.						
13		Industries of dress and the toilet	2,237	69	84	1,943
1301		Kil, dry, surface makers	1	—	—	—
1302		Tailors, milliners, etc.	140	36	36	104
1303		Hats, head, shoe makers	300	—	11	289
1304		Other industries pertaining to dress	—	1	—	—
1305		Shoe, clothing, drying	204	—	—	204
1306		Barbers, hairdressers, etc.	199	—	17	182
1307		Shampooers, bath houses, etc.	—	—	—	—
14		Furniture industries	23	—	3	20
1401		Cabinet makers, sewing painters, etc.	23	—	1	22
1402		Cyclusmen, etc.	—	—	—	—
15		Building industries	241	—	47	194
1501		Line barbers, repair workers	14	—	1	13
1502		Painters, decorators	17	—	3	14
1503		Roof workers, masons	107	—	10	97
1504		Plumbers, building contractors, plumbers, etc.	203	—	33	170
16		Construction of means of transport	3	—	—	3
1601		Cart and carriage makers, wheelwrights	—	—	—	—
1602		Saddlers, harness makers, etc.	—	—	—	—
17		Industries of luxury—jewelry, arts, sciences	236	2	12	224
1701		Printers, lithographers, etc.	—	—	—	—
1702		Engravers, managers, editors, etc.	6	1	—	5
1703		Book binders, etc.	—	—	—	—
1704		Makers of musical instruments	—	—	—	—
1705		Makers of watches, clocks, surgical instruments, etc.	—	—	—	—
1706		Jewelers, etc.	127	—	3	124
1707		Toys, etc., makers, etc.	1	—	—	1
1708		Others (non-performers) in jewelry, etc. (see notes, jewelry, etc.)	20	—	—	20
18		Industries concerned with refuse (sanitarians, scavengers, etc.)	1,113	222	16	1,075
IV.—TRANSPORT						
			2,274	2	400	1,874
19		Transport by water	164	1	60	103
1901		Sea port, seamen, etc.	—	—	—	—
1902		Employed on steam, etc.	164	1	60	103
1903		Boat owners, etc.	—	—	—	—
20		Transport by road	2,264	2	339	1,925
2001		Employed on roads and highways	200	1	30	169
2002		Cart owners, roadmen, etc.	164	—	—	164
2003		Trucks, etc. drivers and owners	—	—	—	—
2004		Trucks, etc. drivers and owners	120	—	—	120
21		Transport by rail	1,113	—	330	783
2101		Railway employees	1,113	—	330	783
2102		Laborers in railway construction	—	—	—	—
22		Post office, telegraph, telephone services	172	—	40	132
V.—TRADE						
			2,774	24	127	2,647
23		Bank managers, money lenders, money changers, etc.	23	—	—	23
24		Brokers, commercial travelers, warehouse owners and employees	40	—	3	37
25		Trade in cereals (grocers, etc.)	224	2	20	202
26		Trade in skins, leather furs	23	—	—	23
27		Trade in wood (timber, etc.)	2	—	—	2
28		Trade in metals (machinery, etc.)	2	—	—	2
29		Trade in pottery	2	—	—	2
30		Trade in chemical products (drugs, etc.)	2	—	—	2
31		Trade in food stuffs	1,113	20	34	1,079
3101		Meat, etc. restaurants, etc.	113	—	—	113
3102		Meat, etc. restaurants, etc.	113	—	—	113
3103		Meat, etc. restaurants, etc.	113	—	—	113
3104		Meat, etc. restaurants, etc.	113	—	—	113
3105		Meat, etc. restaurants, etc.	113	—	—	113
3106		Meat, etc. restaurants, etc.	113	—	—	113
3107		Meat, etc. restaurants, etc.	113	—	—	113
3108		Meat, etc. restaurants, etc.	113	—	—	113</

DETAILS BY DISTRICTS AND STATES

LÖRALAI				ZHÖB				BÖLÄN				Group No
ACTUAL WORKERS				ACTUAL WORKERS				ACTUAL WORKERS				
TOTAL		Partially agricul turists	Depend ants	TOTAL		Partially agricul turists	Depend ants	TOTAL		Partially agricul turists	Depend ants	
Males	Females			Males	Females			Males	Females			
7	8			11	12			15	16			
		9	10		13	14		17		18		
129	25	11	98	137	4	13	69	10	...	8	67	
29	15	5	14	48	2	6	24	5	...	1	68	
36	...	3	47	31	...	0	14	1	69	
37	10	1	35	31	2	1	31	2	...	5	70	
23	...	2	2	27	2	71	
...	72	
...	1	...	1	73	
...	1	...	1	74	
...	75	
...	
171	1	28	76	117	...	7	30	5	...	2	76	
54	57	27	10	77	
30	...	0	6	52	...	2	5	5	...	2	78	
87	1	19	13	39	...	5	0	0	79	
10	...	2	6	80	
10	...	2	0	81	
44	...	7	49	17	...	3	11	84	
...	85	
...	86	
...	87	
...	88	
...	89	
41	...	7	42	17	...	3	11	90	
...	91	
...	92	
154	30	2	112	107	0	1	29	35	4	24	93	
1,348	...	30	2,485	211	1	31	203	619	...	204	224	
9	1	...	1	
9	1	...	1	95	
...	96	
1,311	...	29	2,462	173	1	17	165	10	...	1	6	
50	...	5	31	78	...	2	82	6	...	1	...	
28	...	7	22	98	
1,227	...	8	2,416	84	1	13	81	3	100	
0	...	2	3	5	2	1	101	
...	604	...	201	206	
...	598	...	201	206	
...	0	103	
28	...	8	23	37	...	13	38	5	...	2	12	
870	...	116	1,112	417	7	85	407	65	1	5	43	
35	...	18	64	106	
4	4	1	3	1	...	107	
223	...	33	254	105	...	56	56	10	...	2	14	
14	17	108	
...	109	
...	110	
...	111	
...	112	
3	4	38	...	15	69	113	
28	...	8	9	7	...	9	9	3	
4	...	1	3	3	2	1	114	
24	...	7	6	4	2	115	
300	...	31	365	106	7	8	76	43	1	3	28	
257	...	28	305	...	51	...	8	41	...	1	...	
3	...	1	8	12	...	7	1	10	...	3	27	
1	3	...	18	8	1	
16	13	...	1	121	
6	18	...	3	122	
10	...	1	6	...	6	123	
3	10	...	16	124	

Group No.	OCCUPATION	CHIEF			
		ACTUAL WORKING		Partially employed persons	Dependent
		Total			
		Males	Females		
1	III.—INDUSTRY—cont.	10	10	25	25
12	Industries of dress and the toilet	29		9	25
12	Hat and fur makers				
12	Shirts, milliners, etc.	4			11
12	Shoe, boot, made makers	11		1	16
12	Other industries pertaining to dress				
12	Washing, cleaning, drying	1			
12	Barbers, hairdressers, etc.	1			
12	Shampooers, bath houses, etc.				
14	Furnace industries		1		
14	Paint and varnish makers, carriage painters, etc.				
14	Photographers, etc.		1		
15	Building and trades	64		27	47
15	Line workers, covered workers				
15	Construction, wall makers				
15	Stone workers, masons	20			
15	Turners, building contractors, plumbers, etc.	44		27	47
16	Construction of means of transport				
16	Cart and carriage makers, bicycle makers				
16	Builders, machine makers, etc.				
18	Industries of luxury, literature, arts, sciences	17			22
18	Printers, lithographers, etc.				
18	Bookbinders, engravers, etc.				
18	Small makers, etc.				
18	Makers of musical instruments				
18	Makers of watches, clocks, surgical instruments, etc.				
18	Jewellers, etc.	17			22
18	Toy makers, soap, fishing tackle, etc.				
18	Others (see performance in theatre, see some series, literature, etc.)				
19	Industries connected with refuse (scrapers, scavengers, etc.)	23		1	
20	IV.—TRADE	478		100	378
20	Transport by water	8			8
20	Ship's officers, engineers, sailors, etc.				
20	Landings on steamer, tug, canal	8			8
20	Boat owners, boatmen, etc.				
21	Transport by road	207		27	275
21	Engines on roads and bridges				
21	Cart drivers, coachmen, stage boys, etc.	20			71
21	Trucks, etc. drivers, and others				
21	Part-time drivers and delivery	10		27	101
21	Trucks, motorcars				
22	Transport by rail	20		20	23
22	Railway employees	21		20	23
22	Labourers on railway construction	19			19
23	Post office, Telegraph, Telephone services	62		24	112
24	V.—TRADE	202		6	120
24	Bank managers, money lenders, money changers, etc.	2		1	
24	Brokers, commercial travellers, warehouse owners and employees	2			
24	Trade in textiles (piece-goods, etc.)	20		6	79
24	Trade in skins, leather, furs				
24	Trade in wood (timber, cork, bark, etc.)				
24	Trade in metals (blacksmith, smith, etc.)				
24	Trade in pottery				
24	Trade in chemical products (drugs, petroleum, etc.)	1			9
24	Hotels, cafes, restaurants, etc.				
24	Yardens of liquor, mixed liquors, etc.				
24	Outlets, managers, conductors of meals, etc.				
24	Other trade in food stuffs	20		1	27
24	Food dealers				
24	Butchers, poultry of vegetable oil, etc.				
24	Butchers of milk, butter, cream, poultry, etc.	20		1	27
24	Butchers of cereals, etc.				
24	Butchers of fruit, etc.				
24	Butchers of meat, etc.				
24	Butchers of fish, etc.				
24	Butchers of eggs, etc.				
24	Butchers of honey, etc.				
24	Butchers of other food stuffs				

Query No.	OCCUPATION	QUETTA-PURIN			
		ACTUAL WORKERS		Partially employed	Dependents
		Males	Females		
1	2	3	4	5	6
	V.—TRADE—cont.				
126	21 Trade (including food-grains) and other articles	78	3	4	103
127	22 Trade in furniture	203	—	7	210
128	Trade in furniture, carpets, etc.	21	—	6	27
129	Business sellers	31	—	3	34
130	23 Trade in building materials	3	—	—	30
131	24 Trade in means of transport (drivers and drivers of transport animals, carriages, motorbicycles, etc.)	65	—	6	133
132	25 Trade in fuel (firewood charcoal, coal, etc.)	63	—	8	80
133	26 Trade in articles of luxury, tobacco, etc. accessories	181	1	6	190
134	Traders in jewelry, cloth, etc.	21	—	1	23
135	Dealers in horses, cows, goats, etc.	140	—	1	171
136	Fishermen, butchers, millers, etc.	—	—	—	11
137	41 Trade of other sorts	230	—	8	338
138	Physicians otherwise unspecified	204	—	23	227
139	Doctors, lawyers, etc.	20	—	—	21
140	Gun makers, saddlers, harness makers, etc.	3	—	—	3
141	Services of potters, etc.	3	—	1	4
	U—Public administration and liberal arts	12,377	187	3,367	1,877
	VI.—PUBLIC FORCE	2,269	1	2,217	2,419
142	42 Army	2,269	1	2,217	2,419
143	Arms (Imperial)	2,269	—	—	—
144	Army (Native Militia)	—	1	1,004	1,003
145	43 Police	240	—	237	243
146	Police	240	—	237	243
147	Village watchmen	—	—	—	—
	VII.—PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	243	—	249	1,079
148	44 Public administration	243	—	249	1,079
149	Services of the State	708	—	20	827
150	Services of Public Works	—	—	—	—
151	Municipal and other non-Village services	249	—	10	367
152	Village officials other than watchmen	27	—	10	30
	VIII.—PROFESSIONS AND LIBERAL ARTS	207	123	17	1,794
153	45 Professions	207	123	17	1,794
154	Professions, ministers, etc.	207	123	17	1,794
155	Professions, ministers, etc.	207	123	17	1,794
156	Professions, ministers, etc.	207	123	17	1,794
157	Professions, ministers, etc.	207	123	17	1,794
158	46 Law	23	—	3	6
159	Lawyers, judges, etc.	23	—	3	6
160	Profession writers, etc.	—	—	—	—
161	47 Medicine	223	20	22	245
162	Medical practitioners, dentists, oculists, veterinary surgeons	27	3	18	113
163	Midwives, nurses, etc.	196	17	4	132
164	48 Instruction (professors, teachers, clerics, etc.)	31	43	27	111
165	Teachers, etc.	31	43	27	111
166	49 Letters, arts, sciences	271	—	20	355
167	Public services, etc.	30	—	—	30
168	Architects, engineers, etc.	20	—	—	20
169	Artists, photographers, etc.	21	—	—	21
170	Music players, etc.	21	—	—	21
	IX.—PERSONS LIVING ON THEIR INCOME	23	21	20	217
171	51 Persons living principally on their income (proprietors, other than of agricultural land, pensioners, etc.)	23	21	20	217
	D. Miscellaneous	2,261	223	446	4,205
	X.—DOMESTIC SERVICE	2,790	187	200	1,209
172	52 Domestic service	2,790	187	200	1,209
173	Cook, waiter, domestic, etc.	2,790	187	200	1,209
174	Domestic servants, etc.	2,790	187	200	1,209
	XI.—UNSPECIALLY DESCRIBED OCCUPATIONS	1,200	—	279	1,229
175	53 Indefinite occupations	1,200	—	279	1,229
176	Unemployed, etc.	—	—	—	—
177	Unemployed, etc.	—	—	—	—
178	Unemployed, etc.	—	—	—	—
179	Unemployed, etc.	—	—	—	—
	XII.—UNPRODUCTIVE	203	217	21	271
180	54 Inmates of jails, etc.	203	217	21	271
181	55 Beggars, vagrants, etc.	270	217	21	270

Group No.	Occupation	CHINA				
		Actual workers			Dependents	
		Totals		Partially skilled laborers		
		Males	Females			
1	2	3	4	5	6	
	F—TRADE					
136	34 Trade in clothing (ready-made) and haberdasheries	2	—	—	2	
137	35 Trade in furniture	—	—	—	—	
138	Trade in hardware, carpets, etc.	—	—	—	—	
139	36 Trade in building material	2	—	—	2	
140	37 Trade in means of transport (bicycles and horses of transport on land)	2	—	—	—	
141	38 Trade in fuel (firewood, charcoal, coal, etc.)	2	—	—	—	
142	39 Trade in articles of luxury, jewelry, arts, sciences	2	—	—	—	
143	Jewelry, pearls, etc.	—	—	—	—	
144	Dealers in furs, hats, shoes, etc.	—	—	—	—	
145	Publishers, books, etc., stationery, etc.	—	—	—	—	
146	40 Trade of other sorts	2	—	—	2	
147	Shoppers of various commodities	2	—	—	2	
148	Dealers in furs, hats, shoes, etc.	—	—	—	—	
149	Commissioners, brokers, etc.	—	—	—	—	
150	Business of peddling, etc.	—	—	—	—	
	G—Public administration and liberal arts	477	2	212	277	
	VI—PUBLIC FORCE	23	—	21	79	
151	41 Army	23	—	2	62	
152	Army (Imperial)	23	—	—	62	
153	Army (Native Police)	—	—	—	—	
154	42 Police	27	—	23	21	
155	Police	27	—	23	21	
156	Village constables	—	—	—	—	
	VII—PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	27	—	220	263	
157	43 Public administration	27	—	220	263	
158	Secretaries of the State	27	—	220	263	
159	Secretaries of the State	27	—	220	263	
160	Magistrates and other non-village service	27	—	220	263	
161	Village officials other than constables	—	—	—	—	
	VIII—PROFESSION AND LIBERAL ARTS	21	2	21	125	
162	44 Religion	23	—	23	123	
163	Religion	23	—	23	123	
164	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
165	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
166	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
167	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
168	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
169	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
170	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
171	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
172	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
173	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
174	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
175	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
176	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
177	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
178	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
179	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
180	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
181	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
182	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
183	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
184	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
185	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
186	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
187	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
188	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
189	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
190	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
191	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
192	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
193	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
194	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
195	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
196	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
197	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
198	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
199	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
200	Religion, ministers, etc.	23	—	23	123	
	IX—PERSONS LIVING BY THEIR INCOME	2	2	—	—	
201	21 Persons living chiefly on their income (proprietors, others than of agricultural land, pensioners, etc.)	2	2	—	—	
202	D—Miscellaneous	225	22	12	7	
203	E—DOMESTIC SERVICE	7	22	20	207	
204	22 Domestic service	7	22	20	207	
205	Cooks, waiters, etc.	7	22	20	207	
206	Private grooms, milkmen, dog boys, etc.	7	22	20	207	
	XI—INSUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED OCCUPATIONS	219	2	212	212	
207	23 Insufficiently described occupations	219	2	212	212	
208	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
209	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
210	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
211	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
212	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
213	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
214	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
215	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
216	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
217	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
218	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
219	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
220	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
221	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
222	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
223	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
224	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
225	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
226	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
227	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
228	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
229	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
230	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
231	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
232	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
233	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
234	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
235	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
236	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
237	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
238	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
239	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
240	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
241	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
242	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
243	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
244	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
245	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
246	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
247	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
248	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
249	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
250	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
251	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
252	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
253	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
254	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
255	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
256	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
257	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
258	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
259	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
260	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
261	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
262	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
263	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
264	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
265	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
266	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
267	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
268	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
269	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
270	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
271	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
272	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
273	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
274	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
275	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
276	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
277	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
278	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
279	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
280	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
281	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
282	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
283	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
284	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
285	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
286	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
287	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
288	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
289	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
290	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
291	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
292	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
293	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
294	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
295	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
296	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
297	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
298	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
299	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
300	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
301	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
302	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
303	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
304	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
305	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
306	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
307	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
308	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
309	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
310	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
311	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
312	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
313	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
314	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
315	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
316	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
317	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
318	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
319	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
320	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
321	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
322	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
323	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
324	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
325	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
326	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
327	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
328	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
329	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
330	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
331	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
332	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
333	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
334	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
335	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
336	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
337	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
338	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
339	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
340	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
341	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
342	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
343	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
344	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
345	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
346	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
347	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
348	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
349	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
350	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
351	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
352	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
353	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
354	Manufacturers, etc.	219	2	212	212	
355	Manufacturers, etc.					

XV—OCCUPATION PART B—SUBSIDIARY OCCUPATIONS OF AGRICULTURISTS (ACTUAL WORKERS ONLY)

(X N.—The Table refers to males only none of the seven female agriculturists having returned on subsidiary occupations.)

Occupation	Subsidiary	Persons							By sex	
		Qualifying	Landed	Total	Horse	Cattle	All		Male	Female
							Subsidiary	Marked		
1		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
I.—All Horse Keepers (non-qualifying landholders)		21,221	2,247	1,266	2,771	21	274	2,201	21	12,242
Horse Keepers who returned Subsidiary occupations		9,420	224	123	1,212	7	224	1,166	66	4,691
Bull papers		27	12	77	20	—	24	120	—	23
Agricultural labour		160	—	—	17	—	—	14	—	118
Stock breeding		1,247	79	200	200	—	120	217	21	2,273
Horsemen		79	—	20	21	—	—	1	4	2
Agriculture		227	—	9	11	—	—	27	—	64
Tide		1,000	220	21	27	2	2	7	—	106
Parliamentary drivers		207	20	2	20	—	12	—	—	200
Government employed		140	21	11	12	1	9	20	1	23
Private		264	20	21	12	1	2	20	—	127
General labour		219	24	12	200	—	2	12	—	20
Horsemen		20	2	11	14	—	2	2	—	14
Others		124	20	25	12	—	14	20	—	27
II.—All Horse Owners (actual cultivators)		180,900	17,212	12,900	12,226	121	1,271	12,202	2,202	12,202
Horse Owners who returned Subsidiary occupations		27,272	2,202	2,120	2,127	12	227	2,202	2,222	1,222
Bull papers		201	24	21	20	—	2	7	—	206
Agricultural labour		212	—	—	24	—	2	11	—	200
Stock breeding		20,700	221	2,200	2,200	7	212	2,201	2,200	12,242
Horsemen		221	20	200	20	2	—	2	12	20
Horse		227	2	2	120	—	—	—	—	1
Agriculture		1,200	21	212	27	—	—	22	—	1,200
Tide		2,221	1,200	20	121	—	7	20	12	200
Parliamentary drivers		2,271	200	17	2	—	22	20	20	1,200
Government employed		200	207	20	14	2	2	17	—	14
Private		221	20	27	20	—	—	12	—	206
General labour		1,200	200	14	200	—	20	20	20	200
Horsemen		120	7	20	12	—	2	11	20	12
Others		204	20	20	20	—	14	20	—	20
III.—All Farm servants and field labourers		2,222	20	12	7	2	21	212	202	2,222
Farm servants, etc., who returned Subsidiary occupations		24	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	24
Bull papers		2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bull papers		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Stock breeding		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Parliamentary drivers		14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14
General labour		1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Horsemen		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others		2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2

XV—OCCUPATION PART D—DISTRIBUTION BY RELIGION

Group No	OCCUPATION	Total	Musalman	Hindu	Sikh	Neo-Hindu	Christian	Others
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
III—INDUSTRY—contd								
	13 Industries of dress and the toilet	7,621	6,450	1,011	118	16	26	..
67	Hat cap turban makers	2	2					
68	Tailors milliners, etc	1 467	1 290	60	88	3	17	..
69	Shoe, boot, sandal makers	2 079	2 728	223	19	..	9	..
70	Other industries pertaining to dress	10	1	1	..	9
71	Washing, cleaning, dyeing	2 071	1,463	600	2	4
72	Barbers hairdressers, etc	1,077	950	118	0
73	Shampooers, bath houses, etc	15	15	
	14 Furniture industries	100	99	8
74	Cabinet makers carriage painters etc	99	91	8
75	Upholsterers etc	1	1
	15 Building industries—	3,191	2,667	341	179	9	..	2
76	Lime burners cement workers	49	49
77	Excavators, well-sinkers	622	622
78	Stone workers masons	1 214	1 042	107	64	1
79	Thatchers building contractors, plumbers, etc	1,306	954	234	108	8	..	2
	16 Construction of means of transport	41	20	18	2	1
80	Cart and carriage makers wheelwrights	6	5	1
81	Saddlers harness makers etc	35	15	17	2	1
	18 Industries of luxury, literature, arts, sciences	2,039	1,416	444	186	4	0	10
84	Printers lithographers etc	88	48	14	16	..	4	6
85	Newspaper managers, etc.	3	3	..
86	Bookbinders etc	13	13
87	Makers of musical instruments	8	8
88	Makers of watches, clocks, surgical instruments, etc	33	20	6	4	3
89	Jewellers etc	1,224	1,280	407	134	3
91	Toy kite cage fishing tackle, etc	7	2	5
92	Others (non performers in theatres, race course service, huntmen etc.)	63	45	12	2	1	2	1
93	19 Industries concerned with refuse (sweepers, scavengers, etc.)	4,059	525	3,379	40	..	106	..
	IV.—TRANSPORT	28,756	25,602	2,130	482	194	313	35
	20 Transport by water	888	751	87	16	18	14	2
95	Ships officers engineers, mariners, etc.	57	42	13	2
96	Employes on streams rivers canals	400	312	63	16	18	1	..
97	Boat owners, boatmen towmen	431	397	34
	21 Transport by road	21,785	21,381	287	112	3	..	2
98	Employes on roads and bridges	844	847	25	12
99	Cart owners, coachmen stable boys etc	882	712	100	16	3	..	2
100	Palki, etc bearers and owners	6	6
101	Pack-animal owners and drivers	10,554	10,523	11	5
102	Porters, messengers	450	284	136	39
	22 Transport by rail	4,960	2,668	1,554	323	118	266	31
103	Railway employes	4,784	2,511	1 535	323	118	266	31
104	Labourers on railway construction	176	157	19
105	23 Post office, Telegraph, Telephone services	1,123	802	202	31	55	33	..
	V—TRADE	29,263	8,847	17,363	2,885	90	31	47
106	24 Bank managers, money lenders, money changers etc	710	33	601	79	5	1	..
107	25 Brokers commercial travellers, warehouse owners and employes	212	35	159	18
108	26 Trade in textiles (piece-goods, etc.)	5,070	1,799	2,849	394	23	1	4
109	27 Trade in silks, leather, furs	140	140
110	28 Trade in wood (timber, coal, bark, etc.)	752	744	8	6
111	29 Trade in metals (machinery, knife, tools, etc.)	19	13	6
112	30 Trade in pottery	0	0
113	31 Trade in chemical products (drugs, petroleum etc.)	890	136	686	55	7	6	..
114	32 Hotels, cafés, restaurants, etc	354	128	173	31	1	7	14
115	Vendors of liquors, aerated waters etc.	215	30	138	30	1	..	7
116	Owners, managers employes of sarais, etc	139	89	35	1	..	7	7
	33 Other trade in food stuffs	13,037	2,303	9,153	1,524	39	3	15
118	Fish dealers	233	258	15
117	Grocers sellers of vegetable oil, salt etc	0 630	218	7 694	1,237	26	3	2
118	Sellers of milk, butter ghee poultry, eggs etc	610	243	260	5	2
119	Sellers of sweetmeats sugar etc.	7	6	2
120	Cardamom, betel leaf vegetables, fruit, areca nut sellers	1 105	706	374	17	6
121	Grain and pulse dealers	918	258	452	175	1	..	2
122	Tobacco, opium, ganja etc. sellers	138	93	28	7
123	Dealers in sheep and goats etc	364	361	8
124	Dealers in hay grass fodder	162	121	15	33	10	..	3
125	34 Trade in clothing (ready-made) and toilet articles	210	195	16	4	..	3	1
	35 Trade in furniture	1,083	1,033	35	11	4
126	Trade in furniture carpets etc	1 046	1 031	10	1	4
127	Hardware sellers	37	2	25	10

XV—OCCUPATION PART D—DISTRIBUTION BY RELIGION

Group No.	Occ. year	Total	Hindus	Muslims	Sikhs	Non-Hindus	Christians	Others
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
F—TRAD—contd.								
126	36 Trade in building materials	81	81					
126	37 Trade in means of transport (dealers and hirers of transport animals, carriages, saddlery, etc.)	212	200	20	2	2		4
126	38 Trade in fuel (firewood charcoal coal etc.)	430	437	47	6	4		1
126	39 Trade in articles of luxury, letters, arts, sciences	667	321	297	24	5	10	
126	40 Trade in jewelry, cloths, etc.	40	30	30	17			
126	41 Trade in books, toys, flowers, etc.	300	300	300	17		1	
126	42 Trade in foodstuffs, medicines, etc.	42	1					
126	43 Trade of other sorts	5,506	1,114	2,320	729			
126	44 Trade in various imported	4,577	1,114	1,120	714	4		
126	45 Trade in various exported	300	1	300				
126	46 Trade in various other sorts	30	1	30	11			
126	47 Trade in various other sorts	30	1	30	11			
126	48 Trade in various other sorts	30	1	30	11			
126	49 Trade in various other sorts	30	1	30	11			
126	50 Trade in various other sorts	30	1	30	11			
G. Public Administration and Liberal Arts								
126	1. PUBLIC FORUM	42,194	37,000	1,000	6,180	210	6,210	300
126	2. Army	20,307	9,178	4,621	1,340	64	3,267	67
126	3. Police	12,870	7,797	4,670	1,700	23	2,745	67
126	4. Education	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	5. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	6. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	7. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	8. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	9. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	10. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	11. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	12. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	13. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	14. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	15. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	16. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	17. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	18. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	19. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	20. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	21. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	22. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	23. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	24. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	25. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	26. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	27. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	28. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	29. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	30. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	31. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	32. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	33. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	34. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	35. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	36. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	37. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	38. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	39. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	40. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	41. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	42. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	43. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	44. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	45. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	46. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	47. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	48. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	49. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	50. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	51. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	52. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	53. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	54. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	55. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	56. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	57. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	58. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	59. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	60. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	61. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	62. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	63. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	64. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	65. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	66. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	67. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	68. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	69. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	70. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	71. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	72. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	73. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	74. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	75. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	76. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	77. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	78. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	79. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	80. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	81. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	82. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	83. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	84. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	85. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	86. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	87. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	88. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	89. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	90. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	91. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	92. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	93. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	94. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	95. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	96. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	97. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	98. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	99. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	100. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	101. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	102. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	103. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	104. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	105. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	106. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	107. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	108. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	109. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	110. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	111. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	112. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	113. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	114. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	115. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	116. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	117. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	118. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	119. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	120. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	121. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	122. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	123. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	124. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	125. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	126. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	127. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	128. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	129. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	130. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	131. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	132. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	133. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	134. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	135. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	136. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	137. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	138. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	139. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	140. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	141. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	142. Other	1,207	1,207	173	347	16	9	
126	143. Other	1,207	1,207</					

TABLE XVII.

Territorial Distribution of the Christian Population by Sect and Race.

The term Anglo-Indian includes all persons of mixed blood formerly known as Eurasian, and is not confined to those of partly British origin

Under the head 'Minor Protestant Denominations' are grouped one male European belonging to the Church of India, two male Indians belonging to the American Church of God Mission, and two male and two female Indians belonging to the Church of God

One European male Theosophist and one Indian male Unitarian have been classed under 'Indefinite Beliefs.'

XVII - TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION BY SECT AND RACE

[illegible]

TABLE XVIII.

Europeans, Armenians and Anglo-Indians by Age.

No Armenians were returned in Balūchistān

The term Anglo Indian includes all persons of mixed blood formerly known as Eurasian, and is not confined to those of partly British origin

XVIII.—EUROPEANS, ARMENIANS AND ANGLO-INDIANS BY AGE.

Race and Age	BALUCHISTAN										DISTRICTS										STATES			
	Quetta					Lahore					Sialkot					Rawalpindi					Kashmir		Lahore	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females			
1	3	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22			
Total	4,333	3,416	897	3,153	779	41	13	133	12	12	10	1	1	53	69	19	4	2						
European and Allied Races	4,319	3,383	883	3,169	740	41	12	123	12	12	10	1	1	53	69	18	4	1						
British subjects	4,186	3,250	869	3,096	714	41	11	122	12	12	10	1	1	52	68	17	4	1						
0-15	10	10	10	10	20	10	10	20	10	10	10	10	10	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20			
15-20	10	10	10	10	20	10	10	20	10	10	10	10	10	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20			
20-30	10	10	10	10	20	10	10	20	10	10	10	10	10	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20			
30-40	10	10	10	10	20	10	10	20	10	10	10	10	10	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20			
40-50	10	10	10	10	20	10	10	20	10	10	10	10	10	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20			
50 and over	10	10	10	10	20	10	10	20	10	10	10	10	10	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20			
Others	14	34	14	14	28	14	14	28	14	14	14	14	14	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28			
0-15	14	34	14	14	28	14	14	28	14	14	14	14	14	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28			
15-20	14	34	14	14	28	14	14	28	14	14	14	14	14	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28			
20-30	14	34	14	14	28	14	14	28	14	14	14	14	14	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28			
30-40	14	34	14	14	28	14	14	28	14	14	14	14	14	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28			
40-50	14	34	14	14	28	14	14	28	14	14	14	14	14	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28			
50 and over	14	34	14	14	28	14	14	28	14	14	14	14	14	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28			
Anglo-Indians	133	64	59	44	39	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	15	16	4	1	1							
0-15	133	64	59	44	39	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	15	16	4	1	1							
15-20	133	64	59	44	39	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	15	16	4	1	1							
20-30	133	64	59	44	39	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	15	16	4	1	1							
30-40	133	64	59	44	39	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	15	16	4	1	1							
40-50	133	64	59	44	39	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	15	16	4	1	1							
50 and over	133	64	59	44	39	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	15	16	4	1	1							

PROVINCIAL TABLE I.

Area and Population by Political Agencies, Tahsils and other Local Areas.

In this and the following table certain main statistics are given for the administrative divisions of the various Political Agencies

Statistics of nomadism were collected in the tribal census only, all censused in the regular areas have accordingly been assumed to be 'settled'

I.—AREA AND POPULATION BY POLITICAL AGENCIES, TAHSILS AND OTHER LOCAL AREAS

POPULATION

1911

Political Area	Area (sq. miles)	Totals				Breeds				River valleys				Mountain				1901				No. of persons per sq. mile, 1901
		Males		Females		Males		Females		Males		Females		Males		Females		Males		Females		
		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20		
I. ALCOHOLIST																						
I. Quetta-Pishin Agency																						
Pishin	8,533	134,638	914,707	466,119	764,984	373,528	308,943	67,457	14,538	140,438	13,317	11,910	11,087	68,015	45,112	11,910	8,015	445,510	705,778	7	6	2
Quetta	1,071	18,719	11,311	59,853	37,083	20,717	20,717	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Chaman	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Quetta	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
II. Loralai Agency																						
Loralai	7,585	10,315	89,700	44,923	35,546	25,006	16,928	9,078	8,011	10,154	8,011	8,011	8,011	8,011	8,011	8,011	8,011	32,038	30,314	18,7	10	7
Quetta	1,071	18,719	11,311	59,853	37,083	20,717	20,717	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Chaman	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Quetta	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
III. Zamb Agency																						
Zamb	10,315	70,300	40,216	30,020	8,787	4,008	2,008	2,008	15,185	8,239	8,239	8,239	8,239	8,239	8,239	8,239	8,239	32,038	30,314	18,7	10	7
Quetta	1,071	18,719	11,311	59,853	37,083	20,717	20,717	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Chaman	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Quetta	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
IV. Chitral Agency																						
Chitral	10,315	10,344	8,107	7,237	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	2,123	16,839	7,439	4,7	2	2
Quetta	1,071	18,719	11,311	59,853	37,083	20,717	20,717	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Chaman	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Quetta	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
V. Sibi Agency																						
Sibi	11,183	117,180	60,816	50,212	37,740	26,822	2,278	1,794	1,794	20,718	20,718	20,718	20,718	20,718	20,718	20,718	20,718	60,718	49,822	4,7	10	7
Quetta	1,071	18,719	11,311	59,853	37,083	20,717	20,717	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Chaman	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Quetta	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
VI. Baluch Agency																						
Baluch	50,785	432,237	231,707	183,051	137,558	118,500	14,785	18,535	18,535	76,378	69,818	430,878	297,480	202,690	190,690	190,690	190,690	297,480	202,690	190,690	190,690	190,690
Quetta	1,071	18,719	11,311	59,853	37,083	20,717	20,717	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Chaman	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Quetta	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
VI. Baluch Agency																						
Baluch	50,785	432,237	231,707	183,051	137,558	118,500	14,785	18,535	18,535	76,378	69,818	430,878	297,480	202,690	190,690	190,690	190,690	297,480	202,690	190,690	190,690	190,690
Quetta	1,071	18,719	11,311	59,853	37,083	20,717	20,717	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Chaman	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207
Quetta	1,311	17,243	10,115	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207	1,207

The article prepared by the District Officer is under the control of the Local Political Agency.
 It is compulsory under the Political Agency, Chitral.

PROVINCIAL TABLE II.

**Population of Political Agencies, etc., by Religion
and Education.**

IDENTIFICATION BY REFLECTION

DISTRIBUTION BY RELIGION													NO. OF INTERVIEWERS	
Political Agency, Indian, etc.	M. S. S. S.		H. S. S. S.		S. S. S. S.		C. S. S. S.		O. S. S. S.		Male	Female	Total	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female				
I	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	
II. BALUCHISTAN	450,550	351,799	23,009	12,504	6,017	2,373	3,911	1,544	603	375	50,203	17,753	67,956	
1. Quetta Political Agency	69,850	41,753	8,000	3,615	1,354	408	3,519	1,015	431	374	11,481	1,303	12,784	
2. Quetta Political Agency	1,007	671	146	18	285	18	20	28	7	4	416	51	467	
3. Quetta Political Agency	1,071	871	6	7	285	18	20	28	7	4	416	51	467	
4. Quetta Political Agency	24,007	12,095	8,200	3,251	1,411	453	2,018	990	403	248	10,001	1,500	11,501	
5. Quetta Political Agency	41,815	31,800	2,033	938	833	86	58	13	35	15	2,083	83	2,166	
6. Quetta Political Agency	8,411	7,013	200	27	781	63	25	13	16	5	1,211	228	1,439	
7. Quetta Political Agency	8,721	4,171	1,178	27	115	4	1	13	3	3	286	40	326	
8. Quetta Political Agency	4,084	3,440	81	8	15	4	1	1	1	1	123	5	128	
9. Quetta Political Agency	6,163	5,055	446	223	6	1	1	1	1	1	123	5	128	
10. Quetta Political Agency	10,821	9,540	10	80	31	1	1	1	1	1	123	5	128	
III. KASHMIR	38,203	20,785	1,159	106	619	60	154	14	28	17	1,567	33	1,600	
1. Kashmir Political Agency	12,995	1,108	174	11	67	63	131	14	23	11	1,271	107	1,378	
2. Kashmir Political Agency	9,400	3,701	30	11	41	1	1	3	3	4	112	4	116	
3. Kashmir Political Agency	2,284	1,46	5	5	41	1	1	1	1	1	112	4	116	
IV. CHAGAL AGENCY	8,808	7,118	204	113	208	5	6	3	3	1	378	52	430	
1. Chagal Agency	4,573	3,641	81	100	19	4	3	3	3	1	63	15	78	
2. Chagal Agency	3,641	3,641	84	8	4	1	4	1	1	1	38	3	41	
3. Chagal Agency	910	898	9	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	
V. KASHMIR	69,703	47,635	5,003	2,513	861	207	111	31	36	57	3,623	310	3,933	
1. Kashmir Political Agency	11,703	7,703	1,400	14	12	12	27	23	27	23	1,400	100	1,500	
2. Kashmir Political Agency	3,871	3,871	400	14	12	12	27	23	27	23	1,400	100	1,500	
3. Kashmir Political Agency	37,254	14,373	1,297	78	148	28	27	18	3	13	312	17	329	
4. Kashmir Political Agency	1,083	3,008	7	7	3	1	1	1	1	1	15	1	16	
5. Kashmir Political Agency	1,729	5,538	83	63	1	1	1	1	1	1	15	1	16	
6. Kashmir Political Agency	11,114	8,098	110	104	1	1	1	1	1	1	15	1	16	
VI. KASHMIR	918,984	184,798	6,954	5,407	1,790	1,501	621	13	13	11	7,001	69	7,070	
1. Kashmir Political Agency	187,433	124,071	416	107	1,434	1,434	416	13	13	10	6,793	69	6,862	
2. Kashmir Political Agency	24,371	24,371	600	433	64	43	3	3	3	1	274	7	281	
3. Kashmir Political Agency	27,233	27,233	280	28	2	2	2	3	3	1	274	7	281	
4. Kashmir Political Agency	24,003	24,003	274	274	67	67	2	3	3	1	274	7	281	
5. Kashmir Political Agency	1,001	1,001	285	285	67	67	2	3	3	1	274	7	281	
6. Kashmir Political Agency	1,001	1,001	285	285	67	67	2	3	3	1	274	7	281	
7. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
8. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
9. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
10. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
11. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
12. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
13. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
14. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
15. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
16. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
17. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
18. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
19. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
20. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
21. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
22. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
23. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
24. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
25. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
26. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
27. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
28. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
29. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
30. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
31. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
32. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
33. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
34. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
35. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
36. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
37. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
38. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
39. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
40. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
41. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
42. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
43. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
44. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
45. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
46. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
47. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
48. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
49. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
50. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
51. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
52. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
53. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
54. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
55. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
56. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
57. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
58. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
59. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
60. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
61. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
62. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
63. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
64. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
65. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
66. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
67. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
68. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
69. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
70. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
71. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
72. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
73. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
74. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
75. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
76. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
77. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
78. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
79. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
80. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001	12,001	321	321	1	1	1	1	1	1	179	1	180	
81. Kashmir Political Agency	12,001													

INDEX.

(The references throughout are to paragraphs, not pages)

- Abdal or Ik-Tarin, Paṭhān, 253
 Abdalla, Mir, 28, 70
 Abdar Raḥīm Qa: the progenitor of the Paṭhān race, 102, 21, 264
 Abortion, 144
 Aḥṡa, Jaṭi 280
 Aḥṡal, Aḥṡal or Ik-Tarin, Paṭhān, 253; blue patches at birth, 300; predatory character 321—322
 Aḥṡal Lodī, 108
 Adultery, common source of blood feud, 17; compensation to whom payable, 191
 Age, 126—136 recorded in regular areas only 126; why not recorded elsewhere, 127—130; division into adult and non adult, 131 of puberty 134; of betrothal, 171; of marriage, 172—191
 Agency territories, 78
 Agrar, male, inheritance confined to, 102
 Agricul are, 310 317 318.
 Agricultural implements 310
 Ahmal, Mir, founder of the Ahmal-dynasty of Kalat, 26, 271
 Ahmal Shih Durrani 74 213 27
 Ahmal-dal Brahūī the ruling family of Kalat, 271
 Aḥṡar, Samāḥīp Brahūī 273
 Aḥṡa, 125
 Aḥṡa, 27, 264, 267, 311
 Alexander's march through Makran, 27 61 311
 Al-Balḥīn on Makran 22
 Al-Ṣaḥīb al-Jamāl, 235
 Alliance, see Feud, 102
 Amulets, against the Jinn, 123; to overcome barrenness, 140; to prevent marriage, 115
 Ancestor worship, among Paṭhāns 102
 Andar Marḡi, 91
 Anṡa, 126, 270
 Animals, domestic beauty treatment, 303; statistics 300
 Anthropometry, racial classification by, 219 207, methods criticised, 208; premises examined, 209, cephalic index influenced by environment, 300; and by nursery customs, 301, 301, 300; possible practical future, 302
 Ar, 171
 Arabi, 27
 Arab, 182
 Area, censused in 1891, 2; in 1901, 3
 Arora, Hindu, 200
 Army, standing, in Kalat, 33
 Ārya, 92
 Basal, 311
 Babi, Paṭhān, 252
 Bad-ṡaḥ, 311
 Badurzi, Bangulzi, Brāhūī, 273
 Baelz and blue patches, 307, 308
 Bagg a fish, 203
 Bahawalān, founder of chief family in the Marī Balḥ, 267
 Britain, one of the three progenitors of the Paṭhān race, 251—252
 Bājō, Brāhūī, 272, 270
 Balḥ, traditions, 202; early history, 205; Eastern, 203; Western, 208; *tuman* organisation 207; recruitment, 204, 200, 209; contrasted with Brāhūīs, 278; repudiate Jat claims to kinship, 285; nomadism, 71, 72, 75; religious attitude, 95—98;
 rapid female development, 185; solemnised marriages at bridegroom's house, 189; occasionally omit father's name at marriage ceremony, 187; artificial deformation, 177; transfer of woman by marriage only temporary, 190; sexual jealousy, 129, 129, 131; proportion of children, 67, 136, joint family, 69; sex proportion, 155, 157; attitude towards education, 199, 203; infirmities, 210, 247; blue patches at birth, 309; as traders, 321; tribal economic life, 322
 Balochi language, its strength, 311; geographical distribution, 217; conquests over Brahui, 213; losses to Jaṭi, 213, 214; its future prospects, 216; study undeservedly neglected 210; its linguistic importance, 217; eastern and western branches, 215, dialects 219; their importance, 220; handbook, 211
 Balochānza, Samāḥīp, Brahui, 273
 Baluchistan, area and boundaries, 21; physical aspects, 22, density and rainfall, 54; population, 23; ancient history, 27, British advent, 35
 Bam Marḡi, 91
 Bangulzi, Brāhūī, 272, 273
 Bara Khan, progenitor of Barozai Paṭi, 208
 Barichani, Mai, shrine, 100
 Bargha, Shizani, Paṭhān, 254
 Bar-luck, 311
 Baraki, 311
 Baral, 277
 Barozai Paṭi, Paṭhān, 208
 Barr, Balḥ, 269
 Barrenness, a source of gain to quacks, 110; circumcision of clitoris as a cure, 140, 176
 Bashfulness, of bride, 184; of groom, 185; of bride's brother, 183; of bride's father, 187
 Bayan, 100
 Beglar Begi 70
 Behistan inscription, 51, 311
 Belān, Hindu, 202, 203
 Belue, 311
 Belḥi, Muṡḥīl, Paṭhān, 258
 Beṡaḥ I, 311
 Betrothal, a public ceremony, 166; generally precedes puberty, 171; always distinct from marriage, 172
 Beauty treatment, of children, 303—305; of animals, 300
 Bhūṡa, Hindu, of Las Bēla, 267, 290, 202
 Bhotār, 170
 Bijar, first Marī *tumandar*, 267
 Bījjar, 168
 Bilingual census, 210; struggle, 214
 Birwa, 311
 Birth customs, 140—148; statistics, 67; proportion of sexes, 100
 Birthplace, and tribal responsibility, 8; why not recorded in tribal census, 69; no real criterion of migration, 68, 69, 80
 Bīzanjav, Brāhūī, 272
 Blue Patches Baelz's theory, 307; among Hazāra, 307; among Brāhūī, 308; among Baloch, Paṭhān, Jaṭ and Hindu, 309
 Blindness, extent and causes, 245, 248; among women, 217
 Blood feud, often started by adultery, 175; wiped out by blood money, 190; unborn girls in settlement, 171, 195

Blood-money wipes out blood-feud, 100; widows girls as part payment, 171; sword of sword and gun, 104.
 Bone, Professor on anthropology 206, 200.
 Batak 202, 242.
 Batak Pass and Khabul railway district physical aspects, population and density 42.
 Biv Turin, Pajala, 252.
 Bow-press 150.
 Brachada, 21.
 Brakili, an unimaginative people, 270; origin untenable, 271; nucleus, 271; Barikala and Jhalakia, 273; their heterogeneous character 273 rise of military Confederacy 26, 25, 275 No decline and fall, 23-24, 278; modern disintegrations, 277; their future 278; assimilation, "8-9"; religious attitude 28-29; female circumcision, 178; skirted, 103-106 culms, 100; bride-price 167; pre-nuptial license unknown, 170; wedding solemnized at bride's house, 182; marriage-fee-concealment 150; absence of father from marriage, 167 modesty of bride, 181; treatment of groom, 156 transfer of women on marriage permanent, 180; sexual jealousy 128, 129, 131; rapid female procreancy 133; proportion of children, 67 180; sex-proportion, 135-136; attitude towards education, 203; indirection, 245, 247 also patches at birth, 208 as traders, 221 tribal economic life 221.
 Brakili language, Dravidian affiliation, 220-222 also lights on ethnography 223-224 strength and distribution, 211-212; how to Brakili in Jajli, 215, 216; its future, 216.
 Brakili Confederacy rise 23, 278; constitution, 28-32; words of action, 25; decay 33-35, 278.
 Breaching, outward sign of puberty 182, 183.
 Bride, usually younger than the groom, 173, 293 must show tokens of virginity among Brakili, 178; artificial defecation among the Jajli and others, 177; pregnancy postponed among Pajala, 188; her self-enclosure, 184; stays three days under her father's roof among Brakili, 180.
 Bride-capture, 144, 146.
 Bride-price, back payment for previous maintenance, 107; houses claimed by widow's parents among Balokh, 107 and among Jajli, 180 and by husband's brother among Hlades, 204 universal but comparatively modern, 106 breaks up endogamy 103; checks polygamy 184; but leads to abuse 170; forbidden among Tlades, 89; payment hastened by pre-nuptial pregnancy 174; widows girls sometimes promised in part payment, 171.
 Bride's brother, absence from wedding, 180; demands low-price in Maklira, 180.
 Bride's father, absence from wedding, 107.
 Brakili Brakiliakia, 20.
 Brother, right to demand brother's widow 100, 180; among Hlades, 201.
 Brakiliakia, 24.
 Bugli Balokh, strength, 283; scattered distribution 78; distribution of land mostly parcelled, 280 (land cultivation, 278 probable prevalence of artificial defecation, 177 female infanticide, 140; sex proportion, 133; bride-price, 157 marriage circle, 106.
 Bule-cave, 181.
 Bulak (Bulak), Balokh, 204.
 Burial as an art among Achakul Pajala, 234.

Burial, Burakul, Brakili, 272.
 Burial 206.
 Cairns, in Brakili country 100.
 Caldwell, on Brakili, 231.
 Cattle, 230.
 Cattle practically non-existent among local Hlades, 290; but possible growing, 290.
 Census, general review of operations in 1891, 1901 and 1911, 1-30; synchronous operation why impracticable, 1; regular area, 4; tribal area, 5; special household schedule, 6-8; litigant, 210.
 Cynical index, influenced by environment, 200; and survey customs, 206.
 Chakli district, population and physical aspects, 42.
 Chakar Mir the Head Balokh here, 264, 264, 264, 267.
 Chaman, 20.
 Chandi-L, 259.
 Chandi-fall, or dancing place, 100.
 Chaman, against Jhara, 123; and barrowmen, 140; and intermarriage, 145; and difficult labour 146.
 Chania, for sharia, 100.
 Chastity club, for sharia 104.
 Chilly families and education, 202, 207.
 Child-marriages, exceptional, 172.
 Children, proportion, 131; valency 180.
 Chikra, 122.
 Christianity 22.
 Circumcision, 66, 181; side female circumcision, 181; snipping off of 92 180, 177 178.
 Cohabitation, pre-nuptial, among Pajala, 174.
 Communion deferred for three nights or more among Pajala, 156, 158.
 Common marriage, 107 170.
 Customs, no argument to origin of race, 212.
 Dabul, Brakili, Brakili, 278.
 Dabul, or Dabul, 27.
 Dances on Brakili, 211; on the Balokh, 202.
 Dancing place, 100.
 Dama, proprietor of the Kikay Pajala, 232, 237 238.
 Darya, Kaker, Brakili, 272.
 Darwin, quoted, 203, footnote.
 Death of Maklira, 208.
 Death, 278.
 Date-palma, fruitifying, 121.
 Daughter birth customs, 148.
 Dawa, Kikay Pajala, 237.
 Deaf-mutes, prevalence 215; racial incidence 240; female incidence, 247 local theories, 249.
 Defecation, artificial, 23, 177 178.
 Dehri, 274, 232.
 Dehri, Pajala dialect, 200; strength, 211; general features, 211 dialects, 222.
 Democratic spirit among Pajala, 201.
 Divi Merg, 21.
 Divi dancing, 124, 125.
 Dlab (dab, day dlab), 207.
 Dikay, Kakra, Balokh, 284.
 Dissolution of marriage, for hypogamy 140.
 Division, sex, 141-143.
 Divine right, of the ruler, 80, 82, 111.
 Divorce, 123, 104, 180; unknown among Jajli, 180; prevalence among local Hlades, 296, 200.
 Doda, Balokh, 206.
 Dofak, Dehri, 202.
 Dug-chakra, 107 106.
 Dombak, Balokh, 204, 200; Pajala, 20; various birth customs, 147.
 Dombak-Kakli country (Lakli), physical features, and population, 20.

Domestic animals, artificial moulding of limbs, 303; statistics, 316, 320.
 Double-counting, avoidable, 11; and unavoidable, 12
 Dravidian language-group Brahūī a member, 211, 230, 232, 270, 274, 310, 313.
 Duma, the progenitor of Dumar, Pathans, 257
 Dumar, Kabar, Pathān, 257; laxity of morals, 123, 175; blue patches at birth, 300
 Durga worship, 91
 Eastern Balōch, 269
 Education, 197, 205
 Emigration, effect on sex proportion, 125, 161
 Frisians, 162
 English education, 207
 Etymology, a dangerous guide to racial origin, 27, 311
 Evil spirits, and tallians, 123, appeased by sacrifice, 125
 Exchange marriages, 169
 Family, the tribal unit, 27, its size, 59
 Father, self-sacrifice at his daughter's wedding, 147
 Features, and facial moulding, 303, 305
 Female circumcision, 99, 177, 178
 Female energy, worshipped, 91
 Female infant, date practically unknown, 119, 191
 Females, as part of inheritance, 192; infirmities, 217; education, 205; precocity, 135; proportion, 159, 159, 167
 Fertile careers, 121, 140, 151—153
 Fertility, among Brahūīs, 270, 277
 Fertility, among Barzakhī and Khar Pathān, 171
 Gabāl, Balōch, 269, 269
 Gadā, 27, 311
 Galto, on sex proportion, 163
 Gao's rel. Treaty of 35, 39
 Gajjara, Khutran, Balōch, 161
 Geger, Professor, on Balōch, 217, 219; on Pathān, 221; on Western Balōch, 11, 310
 Ghazāl, classified as Sayāl, 270, 251; artificial defloration and female circumcision, 19, 177, 27
 Chaman, Bagti, Balōch, 263
 Ghilzai, Pathān, 74, 272, 259, 321, 322
 Ghilzai, 256
 Ghulam Balal, Hind, Balōch, 263
 Ghurghust, one of the three progenitors of the Pathān race, 251, 252, 257
 Ghilzi, Balōch originally Hindus from India, 269; Professor Geiger on their language, 310
 Gidān, 59
 Girl hospitality, among Pathāns, 175
 Girls unborn, contracting of, 171, 197
 Goanese, 93
 Gondranī shrine, 109
 Gōrgi, Balōch, 265
 Gorchānī, Balōch, 263
 Gurgin, one of the progenitors of the Brahūī race, 271
 Gurgūnī, Prāhūī, 271
 Grāchi trade, 321
 Gwahram, one of the progenitors of the Brahūī race, 271
 Gwahrāmzal, Samalāpī, Brahūī, 273
 Grāt, spirit of wind, 289
 Hāji murda, 182
 Hālāl, 291
 Hair, ideas about beauty, 304—305
 Hamsāya, 25, 260
 Hamza, Mir, the Prophet's uncle, 262, 271, 284
 Haripāl, Shīrānī, Pathān, 254
 Hārūnī, Brāhūī, 272, 276
 Hasankī, 229

Hasan, Mir, the first head of Brāhūī Confederacy, 28, 271
 Hazara, Shīahs, 80; blue patches at birth, 307; language, 310
 Head measurements, 300, 301
 Head moulding, artificial, 303, 304
 Head tapping, sign of bad luck, 303
 Highway robber, an old Balōch title, 267
 Hinduism, 90
 Hindus, domiciled, 257; beliefs, 90; immunity in tribal war, 133; position in tribal days, 259, *pauchayats*, 259; no caste distinctions, 290; heterodoxy, 291; marriage, Muhammadan wives, 292; as traders, 321, 322; blue patches, 309
 Hita Ram, I. B., 211
 Home rule policy of Sandeman, 316
 Hospitality and unmarried girls, 175
 Hot, Balōch, 269
 Hōtāl, Duhwar, 292
 Hypergamy, no safe criterion of status, 169
 Ichthyophages, 51, 253, 311
 Idi, 201
 Itar, one of the progenitors of the Brahūī race, 271
 Itarī, Brahūī, 271
 Implements, agricultural, 310
 Impotency, a ground for dissolution of marriage, 119
 Indian language-group, 211
 Indigeneous people, 61, sex proportion, 133; education, 195
 Indo-European languages, 223
 Industrialism, 316
 Infanticide, female, 149, 191
 Infant marriage, 293, 296
 Infirmities, 213—218
 Inheritance, confined to male agnates, 192
 Initiation ceremony among Ham Mangī, 91
 Insanity, prevalence, 215, racial incidence, 216; female incidence, 217; local theories, 218
 Iranian languages, 211
 Islam, 85, 86, 95, *see*
 Ismail Khānzai, Papi, Pathān, 263
 Isat, Pathān, 256
 Isani, Khutran, Balōch, 261
 Jādgal, *vide* Jagt
 Jafar, Pathān, strength, 255; language, 260; artificial defloration, 177
 Jafarkī, a Jaghī dialect, 229; spoken by the Jafar, 255
 Jafri, 80
 Jainism, 91
 Jalāl Khān, the progenitor of the Balōch, 262, 263
 Jām, divine powers, 111
 Jamōt, Isat, strength, 270
 Jamshedi, 270
 Jat, origin and strength, 285; female circumcision, 99, 177; artificial defloration, 177; post nuptial license, 179; widow re marriage, 180; no prior right to deceased brother's widow, 180
 Jaghī (Jadgali, or Jagdālī), strength, 211; racial distribution, 212; geographical distribution, 213; as subsidiary language, 214, future prospects, 215; main divisions, 223; dialects, 229
 Jagt, 262
 Jagt (Jadgal), strength, 280; character, 77, 280; rapid female development, 135; curious bridal custom, 184; artificial defloration, 99, 177; marriage with Brahūī women, 280; proportion of children, 136; sex proportion, 155; joint family, 59; infirmities, 240; blue patches at birth, 309
 Jattak, Brāhūī, 272, 276

- Kashira (country), physical aspect and population, 48; decrease only 75; vol. 63, 61; birth-rate 67; handicrafts, 67; rural scene, 279
- Jaka has, one of the two chief divisions of the British, 24-272, 275; strength, 270; female carriers, 170; share in the Kachhi lands, 77; migration to India, 0, 78, 79-276.
- Jakha, 701
- Janggi, 55
- Jina, as merchant-makers 123, 115; how joined and appeared, 134, 125
- Jirga system, 86; present scope 87 and tribal unity 87B.
- Johel family, the staff of society 7; am) of Crows, 11
- Jogani, Jafiri, Samakhil, Khar, Pakhan, 257
- Juhama, 84
- Kachhi, physical aspects 1 population, 40 acquisition by British, 76 distribution among Fard in and Jhalawa, 50, 77 Hindia, 291
- Kachhelvi Hindu, 290
- Kahri Payji, 259-261
- Kalbi, 257
- Kalitra, 261
- Kakar, Pakhan, 257
- Kakar, dialect of Pakhi, 257 Hindu, 28
- Kaldaji, 256
- Kalendar one of the progenitors of the British race 271
- Kalavand, British, 271
- Kalit, headquarters of the British, 274 ancient history 20, 21—22; extent in palmry days, 20-41 political relations with Defindal Kachhi 24 decline and its causes, 23—24, 76 British occupation and policy 32—37 population, 43 Hindia, 297
- Kasabkaid, in Malwa, apparent survival of bride-price, 190
- Kasab-pid, 202
- Kasabka, 21
- Kashar one of the progenitors of the British race, 271
- Kashmiri, British, 271
- Kashmiri, 180
- Kash, (Kad), 250
- Kasht, Pakhi, 208
- Kick, dialect of Mahral Pakhi, 219
- Kramphed, Pakhi, 260
- Kr-mas, distribution of land by males, 266
- Kufa, the Higher Hgt, 30 power limited Internal Government, 31 exposure in external policy 23 divine right and powers, 20-22, 111
- Kukra, physical features and population, 32
- Kuruti, Ghilzal Poonchik, Pakhi, 74
- Kurubika, progenitor of the Kad, Pakhi, 232, 230
- Kutai, Hindu, 290
- Khetria, supposed progenitor of the Khetria, Pakhi, 281
- Khetria, Pakhi, traditional origin, 261 female stream-alien, 98-177-233 sham-right at wedding, 184 return of widows to parents' house, 180
- Khetris, divisions of Western Panjial Jagi, 259
- Khetri, British, 272, 270
- Kjaha, Pakhi, 252
- Korabekal Khas, Mr his standing army 22 as ruler-male, III, and British Confederacy 270
- Kawerda, loose earth taken from stones, 104
- Kawya Anora, 242
- Khabat, Pakhi, 260
- Kudat, religious service among Khria, 20
- Kudhat, 86
- Koch, 274
- Kok-i-malik, 260, 21
- Kok-i-malik, 47
- Ksh Mar, 24
- Kshal, 252
- Kshali, kind, Balich, distribution of land, 205
- Kshd, British, 272
- Lah, 167
- Lahori device to shorten, 168; husband's assistance, 167
- Lah-lahing, 116
- Laghi, Balich, 252, 209
- Lahit, British, 272
- Lahit, Vahat, physical features and population, 50
- Lahuri, Mahajil, Pad, Pakhi, 254
- Lamoy Kiky Pakhi, 257
- Land tenure, 206
- Langer, Balich, 272
- Language, 200—212; no criterion of race 210
- Largha, Mahari, Pakhi, 254
- Las Riva, 2 physical features and population, 53; inhabitants, 270, 277-279-282, 284
- Lahit, one of the progenitors of the British race 212
- Lahit, Pakhi, 262, 263, 254
- Lah, 279 Inductive, 245
- Lah language, 229
- Lamra, on British, 251
- Lat, Pakhi, 261
- Leproy local rarity 245; racial incidence, 245; female incidence 217; local theories, 245
- Lery system, 26, 27
- Lernae pre-natal, among Pakhi, 174; post-natal among Jal, 179
- Lizgan apparent survival, 106
- Livory 197—209
- Live-stock, statistics, 216
- Locality effect on sex-proportion, 100
- Local-drawing, 119
- Lgh, 257
- Lah, 267
- Lahit-Kishiri, Mari, Pakhi, 252
- Lah Tappert, Sumkhil, British, 272
- Lah (Lah), 257
- Loyal district, physical aspects and population, 40
- Loyt, strength, 241 military 123; language 275—277
- Loyt-khai (Mahari), 232—237
- Lajthal, British, 272
- Lajti, Pakhi, 255
- Lajti dialect, 257
- Magnet, Pakhi, strength, 263; settled character, 78; hand-tower, 205; once members of the British Confederacy 273
- Magle 122, 176
- Mago cuckoo, 200
- Mahdi, 87
- Mahala, sometimes undressed, 86
- Maintenance of widow, 187
- Mahila, 81
- Mahila, 176
- Mahilal, The Tark, Pakhi, 252
- Mahira, physical features and population, 51 Alexander's march, 87-81, 211 British inhabitants 205 date-trade, 78, 221 wedding customs, 181; birth customs, 157
- Mahiri, branch of Western Mahari, 215; dialects 216
- Mahy Buryal, 119
- Male agnates, inheritance confined to, 122
- Mamasat, British, 272
- Mamasat, British, 272, 273
- Mamad, one of Qarachak, 252, 257, 254

Mandikh, Pathān, 261, 268

Mango trees fructifying, 121

Marānī, Pathān, 261

Marefa, 246

Mardān, gladi, 122

Mari, 201; tribal character, 76; land tenure, 266; once members of the Brāhūī Confederacy, 278; sexual jealousy, 128; chiefly families, how affected by bride price, 169; artificial deformation, 178; female infanticide, 149; sex proportion, 172

Mari Begli country, physical aspect and population, 45; report on, 162, 167, 169

Marran Bibi of Kalāt, 186

Marlan, a Hindu hero, 289

Marriage (among tribesmen) 165—169; statistics defective 165; a transfer of ownership temporary or permanent, 166, 169, in consideration of bride price, 167, 170; or by exchange, 168; circle, how affected by bride price 169, 170, and 172; pre-nuptial licence, among Pathāns 174; solemnised at bride's house among Brāhūīs and at groom's among Baloch and Pathāns, 189; sanctity among Tālib's, 180; buffaloes, 180—181; self-effacement of bride 184; of groom 185; of bride's brother 186; and of her father, 187; post-nuptial licence among Jat, 179; for divorce 177; dissolution for impotency, 40

Marriage (as a dissolved Hindu) 292; age, 293; of widows, 291; dissolution by divorce, 295; future tendency 296

Marriage of trees 121

Mashwāt, Sayyid 219, 281

Maternal uncle, his legal power 187, 191

Mawaz, 171

May, Khelān Baloch, 264

May, 244

Mayānī, Ipan, Khelān, Baloch 244

May, 243

Memorabilia 102

Mepal Brāhūī 172

Mina Pathān, 255, 261

Mindfulness, 284, 322

Migrant in 68—84; birth place an unwise criterion, 68, 69, 50; different character of the people 70—72; Pathān 73—74; Baloch, 75; Brāhūī 76—79; to India 69—82; out of India, 81; immigration 81

Milk ripens in deal chut 154

Milk share (milk price) an immemorial Brāhūī custom, 184; payable to mother-in-law; remission how secured 189

Mirali Baloch, 268

Mir Hamza, unapproved ancestor of Baloch, Brāhūī and Jat, 262, 271, 284

Mir Hassan, first head of Brāhūī Confederacy, 28, 271

Mirā, 271

Mirwāpī, original tribe of the ruling family of Kalāt, 26; true Brāhūī, 271; as leaders of Brāhūī nucleus, 276

Miscarriage prevention 115

Mockler, on Balochi 241

Mokki (Isphichini), 235; main characteristics 236; specimen passage, 237

Mother-in-law, survivals, 188—191

Mosque, 101

Mōldar, 267, 285

Mōza-pād 305

Mubārak Khan, the Mari tumandar, 267

Muhammad Fāzil, Hājī, 89

Muhammad, Sayyid, Jaunpūrī, 87

Mukaddam, 267

Mulātī, 289

Mulla, position among Pathān and Brāhūī, 100; requisitioned to eject Timar, 121; a butt at Jat weddings, 180; influence in education, 201, 202.

Murād, Mulla, 87

Mūzakhlī, Paṭlī, Pathān, 258

Mūzari Samālārī Brāhūī 271

Mūlani, Brāhūī, 272, 276

Musical instruments, indigenous, 316

Musalman, strength, 87

Nakīb, of Makran, 181

Names, similarity of, no evidence of origin, 27, 311

Nasar, Ghilzi Powindah, Pathān, 74

Nasir Khan the Great of Kalat, 20, 29, 31, 33, 34, 275; acquisition of, Quetta, 39; and of Kachhi, 76; his well known saying, 319

Nasir Khan II of Kalat, 34, 111

Natural population, 69; sex proportion, 137

Nature, attitude towards, 110, 111, 122

Natwānī Brāhūī, 272

Nauthernani 219

Nekran, Bibi, 106

Neo-Hindu, 85, 92

Niswat, crown land in Kalat, 16

Nisamat Ullah on Pathāns 261, 254, 257, 260, 261; on Khelān 261

Nisari Brāhūī, 272

Nidamzi Samālārī Brāhūī, 271

Nighāpī Brāhūī, 272

Nikāh, ratification of marriage contract, 172, 189, occasional omission of father's name, 187; at betrothal a check for pre-nuptial licence among Pathāns 191

Nomadism 61, 70—76; effect on sex proportion, 150

Not synchronous census, in tribal areas, 1, 6—7; how conducted, 5; its advantages, 11

Nur to stand up for, 131, 132

Nūmpira, of Las Bela, 279

Nur Muhammad, Khatūra of Sind, 76

Nursery customs and cephalic index, 301

Os helix auris 101

Occupations 311—320

Orital, 27, 311

Pack-animals, 320

Pinehaya, constitution and functions, 280, composition, 297

Pardani, Brāhūī, 272

Paṭlī, Pathān, 252, 268

Panjabi, Western, 228

Panjgūri dialect of Makrani Balochi, 219

Panjra, 67, 279

Pāra, 267

Pardesi, Hindus 202, 203

Pringarātūn gāfar, 222

Parvee, 85

Partition, according to Shariat, fatal to tribal system; 192

Partition, effect on sex—proportion, 163

Pashū, a member of Indo-European family, 213; Iranian origin discussed, 221—225; strength, 211; racial and geographical distribution, 212—213; loss to Jatki, 214; character, 226; dialects, 227; future prospects, 215

Pastoralism, 316, 319

Paṭalī, 304

Patches, blue, on Hazāra, Brāhūī, Baloch, Pathān, Jat, and Hindu (domesticated) children, 307—309

Pathāns, 261—261, origin and genealogies, 261—262; tribal and racial composition, 260; tribal constitution, 260; nomadism, 73—74; religious attitude,

93-99, 100-102, 106; attitude towards nature, 116, 117 122; rapid female development, 125; betrothal and pre-nuptial norms 172, 174; solemn marriages at groom's house 190; wedding traditions, 182, 183; self-effacement of groom, 186; and of bride's brother 186; artificial & forced 177 transfer of women on marriage pronounced, 180; sexual jealousy 129 181; proportion of children, 186; joint family 80; sex-proportion, 132, 133; attitude towards education, 198 205; handicrafts, 215 blue pot live at birth, 208; as traders, 221 tribal economic life 222; Archakmi as exiles, 223-226.

Parson, as the best local vehicle of education 209.

Plains, Khetra, Baluch 254.

Plains, 257

Plains, 108.

Plains, 112.

Plains, Baluch, 272.

Plains, density and rainfall, 80

Plains, 236.

Polygamy non-existent, 172.

Polygamy as expensive luxury 184, 173 not incompatible with scarcity of women, 173; bride-price 184.

Population, according to 1901 Census, 2; according to 1907 Census, 3; according to 1911 Census, 22; three main divisions, 61 variation in districts since 1901 62 and in Baluch, 63, 64 Baluchistan, 66; summary of Bal. statistics, 67 'natural' 68, shifting character 90 seq.

Population, 74.

Prayers, to start, 121, 122.

Pregnancy its concealment, 143; before marriage, 174; post-natal among Baluch, 182.

Pre-nuptial, influence, 248.

Prostitution, by devil dancers, 125 as to sex, 141-142.

Proverbs, local, quoted, on British vicinity 81, 82, 79 on daughters, 140 on the difference between breeding men and animals, 170 on British and Jaffi areas, 170 250 on Jaffi luxury 179 on visiting instead of working, 204 on Peshawar hospitality 220 on British treasury 224 on Khaf machine making, 226 on nursery customs, 203; on land and rain-crop cultivation 219.

Poor father at wedding, 184.

Purity 121-122.

Purity, 181.

Pure, Baluch, 254.

Quotas (towns), 20-24.

Quotas-Pakistan district, physical aspects and population, 19

Race, 249-252.

Rajput, 287

Rajput, Quetta-Pakistan district, 20; Lahore district, 41

Rajput district, 41 Bal. district, 44 Mary-Jaffi country 45.

Rain-making, among British, 111-114, 118; among Baluch, 116

Rain-stopping, 114, 117

Rajput, British, 248, 272, 274 struggle with Shikhar, 273 language, 270

Rajput-Kashmir, 272

Rajput, Hindu, 280.

Rajput, 284.

Rajput, Baluch, 286

Rajput Hindu, 286

Rajput or Rajput (Jat) 286.

Rajput, 280.

Rajput, British, British, 272.

Rajput, British, 272, 276

Religion, 21-22; general review 26; Islam, 25-29; its superficial character 25-27; male and female circumcisions, 29-30; walls and phara of worship, 100-101; atoms of reproach 100; attitude towards nature 118; miscellaneous superstitions, 119-125; Hinduism, 20-21, 221-226; Sikhism and Neo-Hinduism, 22; Christianity 22; miscellaneous, 24.

Rite-stating as an art, 225.

Rite, one of Jaffi Khat, 262.

Rite, Baluch, 262; settled character 74; land-taxes among Kachhi, 296; of Baluch, 298; once members of the British Confederacy 278

Rite, as an art, 226

Rite, one of the prophecies of the British race, 271.

Rite, British, 271.

Rite, 264, 278.

Rite, red, how reserved from best crop 120.

Rite, British, 271, 276.

Rite, to appear Jaffi, 128.

Rite, Peshawar, 226.

Rite, British, British, 272.

Rite, British, 272.

Rite, British, 272.

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